PART II. FOREIGN COUNTRIES

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I. BRITISH EMPIRE

1. Great Britain

During the period under review, probably more than at any previous period, Jews sought consolation and encouragement in the reaction of the democratic countries towards events affecting them. For a time it appeared as if the dictates of humanity would give way to considerations of political expediency. But, although certain circles in England tried to counsel "moderation" in judging events in the totalitarian states, such advice failed to stifle the free expression of indignation on the part of both statesmen and the people. The protest of the British people against the continued persecution of Jews in Germany, found eloquent expression on the Intercession Day on July 17, 1938 which was observed in all the churches and synagogues throughout England.

The November excesses in Germany aroused the greatest indignation. This was reflected in the press, which was unanimous in condemning as wholly inexcusable the pretext of the assassination of vom Rath by Herschel Grynszpan as justification for the unconscionable outrages that swept through Germany. The protest was also echoed in Parliament, November 14, where Prime Minister Chamberlain expressed "deep concern over the Nazi anti-Jewish deprivations and decrees in Germany, following the senseless crime in Paris." On November 21, the House of Commons adopted a resolution endorsed by the Government protesting against the persecutions of racial and political minorities, and calling for immediate international action to deal with the refugee problem. Prayers for the victims of Nazism were also offered in the churches on Armistice Day, while British notables and groups manifested their continued protests at public meetings, in declarations, and in
a variety of other ways. "Practical proof" of the sympathy of the British people with the victims of Nazi persecution was provided by the response to the Lord Baldwin Fund, which was launched on December 8. Even the most ardent advocates of Anglo-German friendship had finally become convinced that the persecution of Jews was more than an internal German problem and much more than a sentimental obstacle in the way of cooperation with the Nazi State. Thus, on November 18, Lord Mount Temple resigned as chairman of the Anglo-German Fellowship in protest against the November occurrences. Several days later, the Council of the organization declared in a resolution that the Nazi anti-Jewish campaign was a setback to the understanding between nations. That this sentiment was shared by the overwhelming majority of the people was revealed in a survey whose results were made public on November 28, by the British Institute of Public Opinion. These results showed that 77% of the people believed that the Nazi persecution of the Jews constituted an obstacle to Anglo-German understanding. On December 13, Lord Londonderry, who was known as one of Germany's staunchest friends in England, came out, for the first time, with the strongest condemnation of Germany's "medieval ferocity" and warned that the British Government will not sacrifice an inch of territory to satisfy Hitler's colonial demands. The following month, J. L. Garvin, editor of the London Observer and for years an advocate of English rapprochement with the totalitarian states, reviewing Anglo-German relations, declared that even those who had striven hardest and longest for Anglo-German appeasement have joined in expressing horror and indignation of the anti-Jewish excesses in Germany. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, which led to revolutionary changes in British foreign policy, only fused all the active and latent anti-Nazi forces into a common front against Nazism and against all threats of Nazism, both from without as well as from within.

Indeed, the anti-Semitic activities of the Fascist groups within England, claimed no less attention than the persecution of Jews abroad. As in the years before, the Jewish community was harassed by the provocations of the Mosley
Fascist group. Thus for example, on the evening of July 25, 1938, swastikas and anti-Semitic slogans appeared in various parts of London. A three-foot high sign reading "Kill the Jews" was painted in North London, while the Finchley Synagogue was tarred and smeared with Nazi symbols. During the September crisis, culminating in the Munich pact, anti-Jewish agitation reached a new high pitch. On September 16, Jewish passersby were attacked and windows in Jewish houses were smashed in the suburbs of London. Renewed disorders in the city’s East End, caused the Home Office to reinforce the police guard and to take drastic steps to put down disturbances. As a precautionary measure, too, the police prohibited a scheduled Fascist march through the East End on September 26.

The premiere showing of the film “Stolen Life” on January 19, for the benefit of the Lord Baldwin Fund, was marred by a Fascist demonstration. On January 14, 1939, Fascist protests against collections, in cinemas, of funds for refugees led to serious riots in London’s theatre section. During the recent crisis over Danzig, new efforts were made to stir up anti-Jewish agitation by repeating the charges of Jewish war-mongering. Early in April, the desecration of several synagogues in North London made necessary special police guards during the Passover week.

These and other sporadic incidents, which occurred throughout the greater part of the year, aroused consternation and resentment on the part of all sections of the population. Addressing a rally of the British Legion in Durham on July 25, 1938, the Bishop of Durham denounced all talk of a Jewish “invasion” of England and of Jewish “control” of English life as sheer nonsense and warned that unless the members of the British Legion and other citizens are on guard against anti-Semitism, “it may grow up and lead the country to the most shocking excesses of injustice.” On December 8, the Archbishop of Canterbury; Cardinal Hinsley, Roman Catholic primate; and Rev. J. Scott Ledgett, President of the United Methodist Church, issued a joint statement deploring the prevalence of anti-Jewish agitation in the East End of London. But the most solemn denunciation of anti-Jewish activity in England was contained in a letter addressed on December 18 to Mr. Neville
Laski, President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, in which the Primate and other leading members of the Church of England, of the clergy and of the laity, formally repudiated anti-Semitism and any other form of racial discrimination, "in the name of the vast majority of Christian English people," and assured him of their determination to combat all anti-Jewish manifestations with all the power at their command.

Because of her insular position, Great Britain was spared that painful refugee problem which confronted many of the continental countries. Her geographical position made it possible for her to regulate strictly the admission of refugees. The chief requirements for their admission were guarantees of their maintenance during their stay in England and the assurance of their eventual transmigration. This policy was frequently criticized, as demands were heard for the admission of larger numbers of refugees. By the end of 1938, Britain was harboring 14,000 refugees. Most of these were self-supporting, and a considerable number were in positions to provide work for thousands of British subjects by establishing new industries. On February 6, 1939, Sir Samuel Hoare, Home Secretary, declared that 11,000 refugees provided employment for 15,000 Britons. Furthermore, the Jewish community had guaranteed that no Jewish refugee would become a public charge. Under these circumstances, Alfred Duff-Cooper, former First Lord of the Admiralty, for example, wrote in the Evening Standard of April 18, that Britain's policy of turning away "useful, able-bodied, hard-working, honest immigrants," can be described only as "criminal lunacy."

A month earlier, Sir John Hope Simpson, director of the Refugee Survey of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, urged the Government to support and house 50,000 refugees, not only on humanitarian and charitable grounds, but on political grounds as well.

As the center of the world's largest empire, Great Britain was also called upon to cooperate with other nations in a permanent solution of the refugee problem, both in its migration and financial aspects. This subject was a topic of extended discussion at cabinet meetings, in Parliament, in the press and at public and private meetings of various
groups. Because of its international character, this question as well as many others bearing upon the subject, will be discussed in the chapter dealing with the refugee problem. Events in Great Britain relating to Palestine are dealt with in the chapter on that country.

2. Canada

The Fascist movement and Nazi activities in Canada continued to occupy a prominent place in public discussion. Fascism, which has become an important political factor in the Province of Quebec, gradually spread to the English-speaking Provinces as well. At the national convention of the National Social Christian Party in Kingston, early in July 1938, efforts were even made to unite all anti-Semitic groups in Canada under the leadership of Adrian Arcand. Although it does not appear that the Fascist movement has made more progress during the past year than in previous years, there was no noticeable lessening in anti-Jewish agitation. Speaking in the Quebec Legislature at the end of April, Mr. Fitch, Jewish representative, charged that a systematic campaign against Jews was being carried on by the National Social Christian Party and its Nazi allies and, of late, also by Italian Fascist groups. Premier Duplessis promised, in reply to the representative's appeal for the suppression of anti-Semitic activities, that he would not tolerate Fascism; and the leader of the Opposition pointed out that if the Government found it necessary to adopt a padlock law against Communists, he saw no reason why it should not be invoked against Fascists as well.

Indeed, partial responsibility for the continuing Fascist-anti-Semitic activities in Canada was attributed to the general tendency of the authorities and the public to disregard the danger inherent in these movements. It may be recalled that, early in 1938, when R. B. Bennet, former leader of the Conservative Party, warned against the danger of anti-Jewish manifestations in the Dominion, Ernest Lapointe, Dominion Minister of Justice, ridiculed these fears by declaring that the anti-Jewish agitation in Canada was merely the desire of a number of irresponsible leaders without influence seeking publicity. This tendency to
regard lightly the anti-democratic movements, caused, for example, the *New Statesman* and *Nation* of London to warn, in an article on August 26, 1938, against underestimating either Adrian Arcand or his Party.

While relatively little heed was paid to the native Fascist movement, the activities of the Nazis aroused greater resentment. On December 18, the Dominion Vice-President of the Canadian Legion charged that Nazi agents were organizing clubs throughout the country to promote Nazism. On April 26, 1938, one Arthur Burnell, a former member of a Nazi organization, openly accused the German Consul at Toronto of spreading Nazi propaganda. Canadian customs officials often confiscated Nazi literature clandestinely brought into the country. These and other disclosures led to increasing demands for an official investigation into Nazi activities in Canada. The failure of Prime Minister Mackenzie King to reveal the results of an investigation of the work of Nazi agents, started sometime in 1938, aroused great indignation, and editorials in the press demanded publication of findings. As these demands did not subside, Mr. Lapointe, Minister of Justice, announced in the Dominion Parliament, on March 22, 1939, that the Government was considering either a Royal Commission or a Parliamentary Committee to investigate all subversive activities as well as anti-Semitism and other anti-democratic movements. In this connection, it may be added that the most persistent demands for the suppression of Nazi activities came from German groups, especially the German-Canadian League. For, notwithstanding all attempts to nazify the 500,000 Canadians of German origin, only a small minority had turned Nazi.

Whatever active or latent anti-Jewish prejudice there existed in Canada, came into play in connection with the debate in the Dominion Parliament, in January, on the question of admission of refugees. The refugee question was not a party issue but cut across party lines. While it was expected that representatives of French Canada would bitterly oppose any proposal for a liberal interpretation of the immigration laws, yet it was hoped that their opposition would be tempered by humanitarian considerations. This hope proved illusory for these representatives stubbornly
demanded that Canada be hermetically sealed to the entrance of Jews. On September 25, 1938, several months before the question came up in Parliament, the Quebec City Council unanimously adopted a resolution calling upon the Dominion Government to take immediate steps to prevent the immigration of Jews into Canada. The resolution was supported by *L'Action Catholique* of Quebec.

During the Parliamentary debate, the St. Jean Baptiste Society, the largest organization of French Canadians, submitted a petition, bearing 127,000 signatures, urging Parliament not to admit into Canada any refugees, especially Jews. On April 13, 1939, the same society met in Montreal and adopted a resolution expressing its "undying opposition to any further immigration into Canada."

The discussions in Parliament revealed that the Government was trying to satisfy both the anti-immigrationists as well as that section of public opinion which was in favor of admitting refugees. The Government was particularly averse to antagonizing the Quebec Province. This consideration prevailed in the end. On January 30, 1939, Prime Minister Mackenzie King intimated in Parliament that Canada would not open its doors to refugees from Europe. As the review period closed, there were no indications of the likelihood of any change in this policy.

On January 21, the Canadian Jewish Congress opened its fourth biennial assembly in Toronto. In his report to the assembly, the secretary of the Congress declared that although anti-Jewish propaganda was widespread in Canada, yet the Jews had made great progress in awakening Canadian public opinion to the dangers of Fascism and Nazism; friendly relations had been established between Jews and Catholic and Protestant groups; and the English and progressive French press had cooperated in the fight against anti-Semitism. Regarding economic problems, the secretary reported that the anti-Jewish boycott movement, "Achetez chez nous," instigated by the St. Jean Baptiste Society was being supported by a group of newspapers and by nationalist and Fascist groups in the French provinces. This movement, as well as the delicate question of discrimination against Jewish workers, was increasingly occupying the attention of the Congress.
In respect of the anti-Nazi boycott, it was disclosed that, following the November outrages in Germany, many non-Jewish citizens who previously had opposed the boycott, joined it. Another report discussed the refugee immigration question, and the need for the organization of a national committee to deal with the refugees already in the country. Interesting reports were read on the economic and cultural trends in the Jewish community and recommendations were made regarding the development of Jewish educational institutions and the vocational guidance for Jewish youth. The assembly, which lasted four days, closed with the adoption of a series of resolutions condemning the persecution of Jews in many lands, calling upon the British people to honor the Balfour Declaration, and envisaging an ambitious program for the development of Jewish communal life in Canada.

3. Union of South Africa

It may be recalled that during the parliamentary elections in May 1938, the “Jewish question” became, for the first time in the history of the Union, a national issue and played a major role in the election campaign. The defeat of the anti-Semitic Nationalist Party may have momentarily allayed the fears of the Jewish community, but it did not lessen apprehension concerning the future. The results of the elections had shown that the anti-Semitic movement in South Africa was organized into a strong and well-disciplined party, having a large following and contending for power. For, although the Nationalists won only 29 out of a total of 150 seats in the House of Assembly, they gained more than one-fourth of the popular vote, and emerged as the chief opposition party. They also scored a number of victories in the municipal elections towards the end of 1938.

The emergence of anti-Semitism as a political program was but one of the many results of the increasing influence of Nazi thought. It struck deep roots in South Africa because the Nazi doctrine of race superiority provided a plausible justification for the traditional attitude of many South Africans towards the native races. Insofar as Nazism
is a negation of the English tradition, it recruited many followers among the anti-British elements. Indeed, much of the emotional strength of the Nationalist movement is the antipathy to England and all things English, and the major point in its program is the fullest political and economic independence of South Africa. Thus, anti-Semitism became an integral part of the triangular program of a party which ministers to traditional prejudices and appeals to deep-seated political and economic interests.

An equally disquieting symptom in South African political life, was the infiltration of Nazi thought to some extent also into the ranks of the ruling United Party. This Party, it may be recalled, was created in 1934 as a result of the merger between the South African Party and the old Nationalist Party. The growth of the Malanite Nationalist movement, therefore, had its repercussions also in the Government Party. Thus, on several occasions during the past year, J. H. Hofmeyr, Minister of Mines, Labor and Education, found it necessary to warn the United Party not to allow itself to be stampeded and to uphold the principles of Christian trusteeship of the native races, which for many years has been a national issue. An example of the extent of the penetration of Nazi thought was provided, early in 1939, by the defection of ten members of the Labor Party who joined the Malanite Nationalists.

If the racism of the Nationalists refers primarily to the native races, their anti-Jewish program closely follows that of Germany. At the Nationalist Party Congress, held in the middle of November, 1938, at Bloemfontein, Dr. Malan, who styles himself the "Moses of the Africans," declared: "We are not race haters but anti-Semites. We shall follow the same policy as Germany, Austria and Italy and we shall deal with the Jews in South Africa as the above-mentioned countries." The Congress gave the signal for an anti-Jewish legislative campaign in Parliament, which found expression in the bill introduced by the Nationalist deputy Eric Loeuw. The bill provided for the exclusion from admission to the country of Jews, including British subjects, as well as of persons who had been deprived of their citizenship in, or were barred from return to, their homelands. It also excluded Yiddish from the category of
European languages recognized as Western tongues in the immigration laws. Further, the bill provided that immigrants who entered the country after January 1, 1930, were to revert to the status of foreigners and to be required to obtain special residence permits. Finally, the bill sought to restrict the occupations of foreigners and excluded from employment those who immigrated after January 1, 1933, except by special permission.

While many of its provisions applied to all immigrants without distinction — a precaution taken to increase the chances of its passage — no secret was made of the fact that the bill was directed against Jews. Although it applied to immigrants and would-be immigrants only, the bill was to be the first step in a general anti-Jewish legislative program. This was made clear when, on February 24, 1939, the bill came up for its second reading in the House of Assembly, Deputy Loeuw, its sponsor, warned not only against the “menace” of Jewish immigration but lashed out against the Jews in general. In a speech which would have stood comparison with classic Jew-baiting addresses in Berlin's Sportpalast, he accused the Jews of having a stranglehold on the economic, professional and cultural life of South Africa, and of stirring up communism and international wars. Warning the Jews to abandon the anti-Nazi boycott, as “playing with fire,” he urged their elimination from the press and news agencies in order to “improve the prospects of international peace.”

The speech of Deputy Loeuw in the House of Assembly, climax ed months of intensified anti-Jewish and anti-British agitation, which was whipped up in preparation for the centenary celebration, on December 16, 1938, of the Voortrekkers in Pretoria. The march of the symbolic oxen-drawn trek wagons, through the towns and hamlets of South Africa, was turned into an anti-British and anti-Jewish demonstration. This campaign was responsible for the outbreak of serious street excesses against Jews in Johannesburg on November 24, and the attempt to blow up the synagogue at Benoni, Transvaal, two days later.

Because of its serious implications, which touched upon the vital interests of the Union, the nazification of the
Nationalist Party caused great concern to the responsible leaders of the State. On February 1, General Jan Christian Smuts, Deputy Prime Minister, uttered a strong warning against the nazification of the Nationalist Party at the Cape Province United Party Congress, declaring that, if the present tendency continued, the Nationalist Party would become more and more Nazi, and freedom, self-governance, and the representative system would become controversial points. During the reading of the anti-Jewish bill in the House of Assembly, Minister Hofmeyr pointed out that Deputy Loeuw was only out to stir up antagonism and hatred among the different sections of the population. Robert Stuttaford, Minister of the Interior, described the bill as a reactionary attempt to return to the Middle Ages and declared that its only purpose was the persecution of Jews. These warnings brought about the defeat of the bill on April 14, 1939, by a vote of 81 to 17.

In an endeavor to prevent the recurrence of the anti-Jewish riots in Johannesburg, which were widely condemned throughout the country, General Smuts, on November 29, 1938, invoked the Riotous Assembly Act of 1914, to ban Fascist and anti-Fascist meetings throughout Cape and Transvaal. On May 19, 1939, the Government announced the preparation of a bill to be introduced in Parliament “to prevent abuses of freedom of the press,” in an attempt, among other things, to protect various groups and parties against defamatory agitation. Such a measure had long since been urged by various organizations, including the Free State Congress of the United Party.

As the period under review came to a close, it became evident that Nazi propaganda in the country was having less and less effect. The November outrages in Germany, the destruction of Czechoslovakia, the belligerency of Germany, and especially her persistent colonial demands, combined to dampen the pro-German sentiments in South Africa and facilitated the work of all those engaged in resisting the penetration of Nazism.
II. OTHER WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

1. Belgium

During the period under review, the anxiety caused by the agitation of the Rexist and Flemish Nationalist movements, with their Nazi-inspired anti-Jewish programs, calmed down. Twice during the year, the extremist parties were defeated in elections. In the communal elections on October 16, 1938, the Rexists, Flemish Nationalists and the Communists lost heavily to the Catholic, Liberal and Socialist parties. Similarly in Eupen, stronghold of the Nazi movement, the Heimattren failed to sweep the district. In the National elections on April 2, 1939, the Rexists were almost swept out of existence, losing 17 out of the former 21 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 7 out of 12 seats in the Senate. The Nazis in the former German districts failed to win a seat in either House. Only the Flemish Nationalists succeeded in holding their own. The chief gainers were the Liberal and Catholic parties.

While the extremists suffered one defeat after another, their anti-Jewish agitation, particularly their campaign against foreign Jews, who constitute 70% of the total Jewish population in Belgium, was not without effect upon sections of the Belgian middle and professional classes. The entire issue was, of course, confused by the presence of thousands of Jewish refugees. Under the general cry that foreign Jews had invaded Belgium, causing the destruction of commerce and industry through allegedly dishonest competition, spokesmen for some sections of the population pressed for legislation to curtail the economic activities of such foreigners. These demands had the support of practically all political parties, especially the Liberal and Catholic parties which have always been in favor of protection of national commerce. As a result, early in July, 1938, the Chamber of Deputies had before it a bill limiting the commercial activities of aliens. The bill, if enacted, would have gone far towards undermining the economic position of aliens, as it granted the authorities
the right to shut down any business carried on by a foreigner, if it was found to be competing with enterprises of Belgian citizens.

No action appears to have been taken on this bill, but reports indicated a tendency towards making more stringent the execution of existing legislation against aliens.

Anti-alien agitation continued to grow. Thus, on April 20, 1939, the Brussels Municipal Council moved to request the Government, while adhering to the laws of hospitality, to examine with special care all applications from foreign merchants to do business in Belgium. A demand that foreigners be prohibited from settling in Brussels and Antwerp was made in the Chamber of Deputies on June 16, by Professor Henri Rolin, Socialist representative. In this, he followed the reasoning of the Trade Unions in Brussels who argued that restrictions upon the economic activities of aliens would take the wind out of the Fascist sails. On June 23, several Catholic, Liberal and Flemish Nationalist deputies charged that alien merchants and artisans were engaged in illegal competition with native businessmen and demanded legislative restrictions. This charge was made the occasion for violent anti-Jewish attacks by the Rexist and Flemish Nationalist deputies. While M. Camille Huysmans, President of the Chamber attacked anti-Semitism as moral cowardice, and the anti-Semitic deputies were denounced by their colleagues, yet without touching upon the question of aliens, M. G. Sap, the Minister of Economics, recommended the consideration of the proposals against them.

A similar situation obtained in the liberal professions, where the practice of law and medicine by aliens has long since been restricted. On May 8, 1939, the Belgian Medical Association moved to ban all foreigners from the practice of medicine. In a public statement, the Association cited the danger of an alien invasion of the profession and demanded that the right to practice medicine be reserved exclusively to Belgians and naturalized citizens having Belgian diplomas.

Exploiting the anti-alien campaign, Germany tried to take advantage of the situation to strike at the Jewish
diamond trade in Belgium, over which she was seeking control. The German campaign was said once to have induced several Jewish firms to liquidate their businesses and remove them overseas. The Belgian Government, which has always encouraged Jews to develop this industry, soon intervened. On November 5, 1938, at a conference of Jewish diamond merchants in Antwerp, Premier Paul Spaak expressed the admiration of the Government for the achievements of Jews in this field and pledged Belgium's eternal adherence to its traditions of tolerance and democracy. When the German agitation was intensified early in 1939, especially after Jews had strengthened their boycott against the German diamond trade as a result of the November excesses, Premier Spaak, several days before his resignation late in February, again visited Antwerp and bestowed service medals on a number of Jewish merchants.

Nazi Germany also sought to impose her "Aryan" policy upon Belgian firms dealing with the Reich. On June 13, 1939, the Chamber of Deputies heard charges to the effect that the German Ambassador had instigated acts, such as demands that Belgian firms dealing with Germany dismiss Jews from their employ. Admitting that German propaganda was carried on in Belgium, Premier Pierlot declared that his Government would stamp out such activities if they threatened the country's existence.

To combat the campaign against foreign Jews, which threatens tens of thousands, the Council of Jewish Organizations initiated a series of expert studies on the role of Jews in Belgian economic life. In April, 1939, the first study, dealing with the leather goods industry, was published. The role of Jews in this field had been vehemently attacked by Belgian leather goods manufacturers. The study revealed that the development of this industry was due mainly to the activities of the Eastern European Jewish immigrants. It cited among others the testimony of the "1934 Bulletin d'Information et de Documentation," published by the Belgian National Bank, which stated: "Refugees from Eastern European countries introduced after the Armistice the fine leather and fur industries."
Brussels has thus become an important center of the fine leather industry."

As was the case in other west European countries, the situation was further complicated and confused by the refugee problem. Notwithstanding all threats that no more refugees would be admitted and that all those found to have entered illegally would be deported, more than 7,000 Jewish refugees made their way into Belgium between November, 1938 and February, 1939, bringing the total up to about 15,000. Indeed, on November 22, Joseph Pholinn, Minister of Justice, told the Chamber of Deputies that Belgium was prepared temporarily to admit additional refugees, provided Britain and the United States undertake to find permanent homes for them abroad. On that day, which was wholly devoted to the German-Jewish question, Parliament heard not only the strongest condemnation of Nazi anti-Jewish policy, but also demands that the Belgian Government liberalize the admission of refugees and that it take the initiative of calling an international conference for the regulation of the Jewish question. Replying to the interpellation of Deputy Mme. Blum, (non-Jewish), the Minister of Justice, whose department was in charge of the refugees, declared that Belgium’s liberal refugee policy deserved honorable mention in the world of humanity, but that small Belgium alone could not solve the problem, although it was prepared to lend all its moral and material help in the attempt.

In line with this attitude, the Minister of Justice, M. Paul Janson, early in June, requested Parliament to vote additional funds to help defray the cost of maintaining several thousand refugees, the brunt of which was being borne by the Jewish Refugee Committees. On June 16, the Senate voted by an overwhelming majority in favor of the Minister’s bill which increased the refugee fund from 360,000 francs, voted during the preceding fiscal year, to six million in the current year. The voting of the funds was accompanied by denunciations of anti-Semitism, and many Senators stressed the contribution of the refugees to the country’s economic life.
2. France

More than was the case in England, influential circles in France had considerable success in urging careful comment upon events abroad, in order not to increase the tension in the international atmosphere. The assassination of Ernst vom Rath in Paris, it was feared, would vindicate those who had counseled against giving offense to Germany by utterance of unfavorable comment on the anti-Jewish course there. But, no sooner had the French Government formally expressed its regrets to Germany over the assassination, when French public opinion lashed out against the events which followed it. Indignation was reflected in the press as well as in Parliament and in the action of private organizations. Thus, on November 17, 1938, the Socialist members in the Chamber of Deputies not only condemned, in a body, the physical and legal terror against the Jews in Germany but protested against the Government for not voicing its indignation. Several days later, the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee adopted a resolution expressing solidarity with Great Britain and other countries against the persecution of "certain religious and racial minorities." On December 19, Fernand Laurant, a Rightist deputy, introduced a resolution in the Chamber condemning the persecution of minorities and urging a concerted effort among nations to adopt a common policy. In the meantime, Cardinal Verdier, Archbishop of Paris, and the Council of the Protestant Federation added their expression of sorrow and indignation over the happenings in Nazi Germany. On February 5, 1939, the President of the Republic denounced the racist policies of "dynamic nations" who are "replacing the rule of law by the rule of force."

In the measure as the reaction of French public opinion towards events in Germany was an expression of sympathy with the victims of persecution abroad, it was also a warning against the activities of anti-Semitic groups in France. The critical days of September especially, were exploited by these elements to intensify the anti-Jewish campaign in Paris and in other parts of France, particularly Alsace. On September 24, 1938, anti-Jewish riots broke out in
Strasbourg as Jews were charged with inciting France to war. The incessant anti-Jewish provocations and attacks in Alsace prompted the Alsatian Federation of Labor to issue a manifesto on September 30, denouncing anti-Semitism as playing into the hands of the enemy and urging the workers to defend Jews from attack. On December 13, political, religious, educational and other prominent leaders in Alsatian public life, headed by the President of the Legislative Assembly, issued an appeal to the population to "block the road to the dangerous racist propaganda."

While the anti-Jewish campaign in Alsace was attributed mainly to work of Nazi agents, the French anti-Semitic groups were active mostly in Paris. Thus, for instance, late in October, 1938, thousands of copies of an inciting anti-Semitic appeal were being mailed in the official envelopes of the Paris Municipal Council, the work of an alderman notorious as a Jew-baiter. This and similar incidents were violently attacked in the Paris press, which demanded strong action to put an end to them. On October 29, Premier Edouard Daladier, speaking before the Radical-Socialist Party Congress, warned that the French Republic would go the way of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Spain and China, unless it firmly defended democratic liberties as well as "the right to be born Jew or Christian."

The fear that racial and religious agitation might become a serious menace to the peace of the country, especially as it was known that it was in a large part stimulated from abroad, caused the Government to embark upon legislative action. On October 4, 1938, the Government declared in Parliament that "everything inciting hatred, everything arousing Frenchmen against other Frenchmen can be considered only as treason." In March, 1939, the Government announced that it was preparing a decree which would outlaw propaganda against racial and religious minorities. As was to be expected, the reactionary press angrily opposed the measure and, although the projected decree was approved by the Press Association of France, yet it was opposed by several liberal newspapers. The former argued that the proposed decree was menacing the freedom of the press; the latter contended that the Government could check propaganda through existing legislation. The general
opinion, however, was that while anti-Semitic propaganda could, in former days, be ignored as silly, it could, in the critical present, become dangerous, as it was aimed at stirring up internal strife.

On April 25, the Government issued a decree extending the power of the authorities to prosecute for defamatory or slanderous publications promoting hatred “against any group of persons belonging to any particular race or religion.” In submitting the decree for the signature of the President of the Republic, the Government pointed out that the vigorous effort for national defense, necessitated by circumstances, required internal discipline and solidarity among the citizens and that anything capable of creating or fostering disunion among the people was bound to jeopardize this endeavor. Referring to the abuses of public liberties, especially the freedom of the press which the existing legislation could not effectively curb, and which were often of suspicious origin, the Government declared that the decree in no way altered the fundamental idea of freedom, but aimed only to align this idea with those ideas which are inseparable from it in the very motto of the Republic. “On these grounds,” the Government concluded, “no racial or religious cause should destroy the equality of citizens; no distinction resulting from hereditary circumstances should touch upon the sentiments of fraternity, which unites all the members of the French family.” Simultaneously, the Government dissolved three anti-Semitic organizations in Alsace for promoting disunity. At the same time, the Government decreed a rigorous control over the activities of foreign groups, and tightened the restrictions upon foreign organizations. Both decrees were enthusiastically hailed by newspapers of all shades of political opinion, including Colonel de la Rocque’s Fascist Petit Journal; the sole exception was the anti-Semitic Action Française.

During the period under review, the refugee problem in France became exceedingly grave as the enforcement of the decree-law of May 2, 1938 began to show its deplorable effects. This decree-law severely restricts the right of sojourn in France and imposes automatic and unconditional prison terms of one month to three years upon foreigners
who fail to leave the country upon the expiration of their residence permits. This decree affected both refugees who escaped from Germany and Austria subsequent to its enactment, as well as refugees long resident in the country who had been denied an extension of their permits de séjour. Its full severity, however, was invoked against the stateless Polish and Roumanian Jews.

The situation was further complicated by the action of the Polish, the Roumanian, and the Hungarian Governments, depriving Jews resident abroad of their respective citizenship, thus rendering them stateless.

On December 26, 1938, the Federation of Polish Jews in France disclosed that several hundred Jews, whose passports had been cancelled by the Polish Government, had been thrown into prison. The Government, indicated that these drastic measures resulted solely from the practice of the Polish Government of turning its Jewish citizens abroad into stateless persons, thus adding to France's heavy burden of stateless refugees. A total of 163,000 foreign Jews, most of them Polish, Roumanian, and Hungarian citizens, were residing in France at the time the decree of May 2, 1938, was enacted.

The announcement, on April 2, 1939, by the Ministry of the Interior, of projected legislation to draft the country's millions of aliens in case of general mobilization, brought hope to thousands of Polish, Roumanian, German, Austrian and Czech refugees and the stateless, who have long since declared their readiness for service in the French armed forces. As a matter of fact, during the September crisis, many of them volunteered for service in the army. An appeal for such action was issued by the Federation of Jewish Societies on September 27, and was enthusiastically taken up by many other organizations of foreign born Jews. Indeed, preliminary registration was begun by the Jewish War Veterans Association, while in synagogues in Paris, immigrant Jews collectively swore allegiance to France. The decree of April 16, placing refugees and aliens under military duty during general mobilization, was, therefore, hailed with the greatest enthusiasm by the foreign groups in France, as presaging the end of their precarious existence. The press hastened to report that the Government
was planning to make it possible for many refugees not only to remain in France, but to obtain labor and commercial permits, which hitherto had been denied to them.

3. The Netherlands

In The Netherlands, as in so many other lands, the Jews felt the impact of Nazism both from without as well as from within. Notwithstanding the apathy of the population, the strong denunciation of the press and the resistance of the Government, various local Nazi and Fascist groups continued their attempts to stir up anti-Jewish agitation. Their activities moved the different political parties to unite in demanding that the Government take strong measures to suppress them. On November 11, Premier Colijn gave assurances to this effect.

Subsequently, the shots that were fired on January 6, 1939, at a German consul's private home in Amsterdam, provoked a fresh agitation against the Jews, before the responsibility for the firing could be established. The anti-Jewish campaign was coupled with warnings to the Government that unless it restrict the activities of Jews it would have to bear the consequences of a deterioration in German-Holland relations. As the agitation continued, the Minister of Justice announced, on March 12, that the Government would take strong legal measures to put a stop to all anti-Jewish activities. The defeat of the Nazi groups in the elections to the provincial councils on April 19, in which they lost more than one third of their votes as recorded in 1937, hastened the Government's action. On May 5, the Minister of Justice introduced in the Lower House an anti-defamation bill which would protect Jews and other sections of the population from incitement and agitation, and tighten the existing legislation. This step, however, did not stop the Nazis from injuring twelve Jews in a raid, on May 30, in a refreshment shop in a suburb of Amsterdam frequented by German Jewish refugees. Nor did the Government prevent the Nazis from winning, for the first time, three out of 45 seats in the Amsterdam Municipal Council in elections held in the middle of June.
More serious than the internal anti-Jewish agitation, which was neutralized by the existence of an overwhelming public opinion opposed to it, was the pressure of Nazism from without, primarily in the economic field. Because of the special economic relations between Holland and Germany, Germany's "Aryanization" policy outside her frontiers proved more successful in Holland than in all the other neighboring countries combined. For a number of years, The Netherlands has been greatly dependent economically upon Germany, whose participation in the technical, electrical, pharmaceutical and a variety of other industries of Holland, has been very extensive. Besides, Germany's industrial products have had a traditional market in The Netherlands.

Naturally, many of the larger German firms have their own depots as well as representative agencies there. Up to the middle of 1938, many of these agencies were in the hands of Jews. For business reasons, they were left relatively free. In the middle of 1938, however, German business began to force their dismissal, and many Jews lost positions they had held for many years. At first, this practice aroused great resentment in Holland commercial and industrial circles, and led to protests by the Chamber of Commerce. But these protests proved of no avail and the dismissal of Jews came to be accepted as inevitable. In addition, Germany brought to bear great and successful pressure upon Holland firms dealing with the Reich, to dismiss their Jewish agents and employees.

The refugee question continued to present many difficult problems. The flood of refugees which followed in the wake of the November outbreaks in Germany, caused the Government to tighten still further existing restrictions, and to make more rigorous the control over those who had already entered. At that time, Premier Colijn justified the Government's policy on the ground that inasmuch as the germ of anti-Semitism also existed in Holland, the indiscriminate admission of refugees "would tend to confuse the present atmosphere of charity and willingness."

This official policy was mitigated, however, by the sympathetic attitude evinced throughout, both by the Government and the population, which manifested itself in
the generosity of their contributions to refugee funds. Thus, for example, on December 3, 1938, a nationwide collection endorsed by the Premier, received a generous response. On April 24, 1939, the Government asked Parliament for an appropriation of one million guilders for the construction of camps for refugees who had entered the country legally as well as illegally. The brunt of the burden, however, continued to be borne by the Jewish Refugee Committee.

Much of the sympathetic attitude towards the refugees was due, aside from humanitarian reasons, also to the contribution they made to the economic life of the country. In a report, prepared on July 11, 1938, for the Board of Overseas Trade by the British legation at The Hague on the economic and commercial conditions in The Netherlands, acknowledgement was made of the beneficial effects of the clothing factories established by German Jewish refugees on Holland's textile industries and its balance of trade. On January 11, 1939, the Catholic Jersey Manufacturers requested the Government to admit Austrian Jewish knitters to help them meet the demands of the British and American markets for Austrian style garments. The situation however, was different in the professions and those commercial fields where fear of competition led the Government to issue, on September 5, 1938, an Order in Council prohibiting the admission of foreigners to the legal professions, and on February 24, to decree the exclusion among others, of aliens from acting as commercial agents without the express authority of the Minister of Economics.

4. Switzerland

The activities of the nazified National Front Party and other Nazi and Fascist groups have long been a disturbing factor in the political life of the country and a cause of anxiety to the Jewish community. In spite of, or perhaps because of, the reverses of the Frontists in municipal and provincial elections and the failure of Nazi agents to win over the mass of the German-speaking population, they
continued to agitate Swiss public life; while the Jews were
the objects of a violently defamatory campaign. This
became so outrageous that, on October 19, 1938, the Zurich
office of the Jewish Community was forced to issue a state-
ment denouncing the libellous accusations and misrepre-
sentations in the pro-Nazi press. In the latter part of the
year, this campaign subsided considerably, due both to
the pressure of public opinion and the strong action of the
Government.

Attempts by the Frontist chief, Deputy Tobler, to rouse
the people against the Government, which led to clashes
with the Zurich police on August 2, caused the Socialist
Party in Basle to circulate a petition asking for a ban on
all Nazi organizations in the country. Indeed, the increas-
ing Nazi activities, following the Munich settlement, forced
the President of the Swiss Federal Council to call an extra-
ordinary meeting, on October 4, of all chiefs of police to
map out counter actions. As a consequence, the head-
quarters of the Nazi and Fascist organizations were raided
by the police, who uncovered a mass of incriminating docu-
ments. On November 12, 1938, a nationwide raid on Nazi
agitators resulted in the imprisonment of more than a
hundred persons who were declared to have maintained
"suspicious relations with Germany." Likewise, the Gov-
ernment announced that it was drafting severe laws to
suppress Nazi agitation. On November 15, the first steps
were taken in this direction by the suppression of three
newspapers of Fascist-Nazi leanings.

Following up this initial campaign, the President of the
Republic, on December 3, 1938, warned the German Min-
ister against the activities of Nazi agents. At the close of
the month, the Government instructed the Attorney-
General to start legal proceedings against the Bund Treuer
Eidgenossen and the Volksbund, two of the three Nazi
and pro-Nazi organizations.

While the authorities were proceeding against the Nazis,
the National Front Party continued to suffer defeat at the
polls. In the elections of March 19, 1939, the Frontists
lost their six Zurich seats in the Grand Council of the Zurich
Canton. This event assumed added significance in view
of the German character of the Canton and the widespread Nazi propaganda which had been carried on there, and was interpreted in the press as an important demonstration of the voters' determination to maintain Swiss democratic principles. On May 10, the Frontists were again defeated in the Geneva Municipal elections, retaining only two of their former eight seats, out of a total of sixty-two.

Resistance against Nazi penetration found expression also in a variety of other ways. One example was the resolution adopted by a group of student corporations of the University of Berne, on November 27, 1938, expressing their determination to oppose all attempts to spread Nazi doctrines in the school.

A most distressing problem was presented by the refugees. In August, 1938, the number of Austrian Jews who had entered Switzerland clandestinely, increased from a few score to more than a thousand. This fact caused the Government to dispatch two companies of volunteers to guard the frontiers, which were strung with barbed wire, and to increase the rigor of its admission policy. On October 4, the Swiss Federal Council ruled that "holders of German passports who are not Aryans according to German law" must, hereafter, have Swiss visas to enter the country. In announcing these rules, the Council emphasized that Switzerland already harbored a large number of refugees and could not be considered other than a transit country. Although Lord Duncannon, representative of the Inter-governmental Refugee Committee, had, on a previous occasion, declared that Switzerland had done the maximum possible under the circumstances, the Government's measures evoked protests. However, while persisting in its refusal to admit large numbers of refugees, the Government stated that it would consider individual applications. The strict police control over refugees already in the country was mitigated by the concern of the Government for their welfare. On April 4, 1939, the conference of Jewish organizations, held at Zurich, appealed to Jews in Switzerland to continue their support of the refugees, in collaboration with the Swiss authorities and the Jewish organizations abroad.
Of all the Scandinavian countries, Denmark has been living under the most direct German pressure, owing to the peculiar position of Schleswig-Holstein and the existence of a well-disciplined Nazi organization. Thus, political life in Denmark has been disturbed by widespread Nazi propaganda and by implied and open threats that the country may meet the same fate as Czechoslovakia unless the Government "changes its 'Bolshevist' policies." These anxieties were naturally shared by the country's 6,000 Jews, especially since April 4, 1939, when the Nazis, who were regarded as having little chance to win a seat in Parliament, won three seats. For the first time in thirty years, too, the Social Democrats, although preserving a solid majority in Parliament, suffered losses. The degree of German pressure on Denmark was evident in May, when Denmark, of all the Scandinavian States, was constrained to accept Hitler's offer of a non-aggression pact.

As in Norway and Sweden, but with more success, Germany has been making efforts to "purge" Danish firms doing business with Germany, of their Jewish personnel. According to the Swedish press, such firms in a number of instances had consented to employ only "Aryans," rather than face the "sanctions" threatened by their German customers. But, as in the neighboring lands, the Danish Government made it clear that it would put a quick stop to any interference with Danish business, and would not "tolerate the inexcusable over-stepping of the bounds of propriety." There were also recorded cases of Nazi blackmail of large firms and businessmen who were threatened with exposure in the Nazi press. On October 21, 1938, eleven members of the Danish Nazi party were arrested on such charges.

The shadow of Nazism influenced to a considerable extent Denmark's attitude towards the admission of refugees. On September 27, the Danish police adopted strict measures to prevent the entry of Jewish refugees. A month later the Minister of Justice announced that because of prevailing unemployment, Denmark was unable to contribute to a solution of the refugee problem, and that even
temporary asylum could be granted only in individual cases, when a visa from another country was produced. In Parliament, the Conservative Deputy Purschel warned the Government against Jewish immigration.

6. Norway

The many attempts of the Nasjonal Samling, the Norwegian Fascist Party, founded in 1933, to win a foothold among the Norwegian people, made but little headway during the review period. The Jewish community of approximately 1,400 remained undisturbed by untoward developments. Indeed, on January 13, 1939, Premier Johan Nygardsvold, in referring to fascist agitators in Norway, said: "We have had some of these also, but since the last elections little has been heard of them. Our people are democrats, and a system which does not tolerate free criticism will hardly ever have any following in our country."

Nazi activities in Norway followed lines similar to those pursued in other democratic lands. The Government had to deal with charges that Norwegian firms dealing with Germany had been requested to supply confidential information regarding the racial origin of their owners and employees. The Norwegian Businessmen's Association advised its members not to reply to such questionnaires. On June 6, 1939, Norwegian Nazis staged a demonstration during a debate in the Storting, throwing firecrackers and handbills, urging Norway to leave the League of Nations, and demanding the resignation of the Premier and Foreign Minister. These agitators were found to belong to an insignificant party styling itself the Youth Organization of the National Union Party. They also made repeated attempts to stir up anti-Semitism which, however, were suppressed by the police. On December 11, 1938, a journalist displaying anti-Semitic posters was arrested by the police, who, on raiding his quarters, discovered a mass of incriminating documents.

Like other Scandinavian countries, Norway attracted refugees, who, however, were frequently barred by the
rigid immigration laws. The opposition against the admission of refugees was particularly strong among professional groups. The press tried to allay the fears of competition in medical circles, and on March 24, 1939, the Government officially announced the intention of admitting a small number of qualified Jewish refugee physicians to practice. On April 7, a meeting of Norwegian medical students requested the Government to bar refugee physicians from practicing in Norway. In this, the students were supported by the Medical Association. Nevertheless, the latter, while rejecting a proposal that twenty prominent refugee physicians be admitted to practice, proposed a substitute plan, whereunder ten medical scientists would be admitted for five years' stay to work in Norwegian hospitals to be paid from a special fund to be collected among Norwegian physicians.

7. Sweden

The Jewish community of 6,500 in Sweden has continued to develop normally under the Social Democratic regime, notwithstanding the persistent efforts of Nazism to gain a foothold in the country. As in other European democratic countries, Germany attempted to effect, also in Sweden, the "Aryanization" of the personnel of firms trading with Germany. These attempts were officially rebuffed by the Swedish Foreign Minister in a speech on December 8, 1938, condemning Germany's effort to impose its legislation beyond its frontiers, and warning that "this evil must be rooted out lest it expose the country to far-reaching consequences."

Disturbing events, however, occurred in connection with the refugee problem. The reported handing over to the German police of four Austrian Jewish refugees who had arrived by plane in Stockholm early in September, 1938, caused general indignation. General surprise was aroused by the order of the Government, on January 10, 1939, for all foreigners to report to the police between February 10 and 17 to answer a number of questions including one asking whether they were political refugees and whether one or both of their parents were Jews. Public discussion
prompted the Government to explain that, inasmuch as the Jewish problem was becoming an important factor in the international refugee policy, the Government desired to have statistics regarding foreigners visiting Sweden, but that it did not intend to depart from the fundamental principles on which Sweden had hitherto dealt with the refugee problem.

Public opinion was generally favorable to the admission of refugees. On September 17, 1938, the Congress of the Free Churches, attended by a German representative, adopted a resolution urging its members to be "conscious of their Christian responsibility and to consider the interests of the refugees as well as their own." On October 24, 1938, a petition signed by a group of 130 prominent persons including the Archbishop of Upsala, was submitted to the Government. The petitioners appealed for a more liberal policy on admission of refugees, and the granting of more landing, residential, and labor permits for such refugees, as well as the creation of facilities for the maintenance and training of refugees admitted for temporary stay. Apparently, the petition was favorably received for in the next two months, 2,000 refugees were admitted to the country, a majority of whom were parents of Swedish residents and persons admitted temporarily pending their emigration overseas. About half of the admissions were secured as result of efforts of the Jewish community.

On February 24, 1939, both houses of Parliament voted an appropriation of $125,000 for the purpose of assisting in the retraining of Jewish refugees in Sweden. On this occasion, Deputy Wallen of the Farmers' Union made a bitter attack on Jews, but was sharply rebuked by the leader of his own party, who declared that the Farmers' Union rejected anti-Semitism as an "intellectual plague." The press, too, rebuked the Deputy, pointing out that the political and religious refugees constituted the most valuable of settlers.

As in most other refugee-receiving countries, opposition against the admission of certain categories of refugees was voiced by professional organizations. On April 7, 1939, the Swedish Medical Association rejected a request that ten Jewish refugee physicians be admitted to practice, but
proposed instead the raising of a fund to aid such physicians to emigrate overseas, and another fund to maintain in the country elderly childless Jewish physicians. The Association also approved the extension of invitations to refugee specialists to lecture, for a limited time, at Swedish universities.

III. GERMANY

The year under review recorded the speeding up of the continuing process of liquidation of what still remained of Jewish life and interests in Germany. The series of laws enacted subsequent to the property registration decree of April, 1938, left no doubt that the Nazi Government was bent upon annihilating the last vestiges of the German-Jewish community. On November 22, 1938, Das Schwarze Korps warned that unless the German Jews were evacuated at once, they would be starved into crime and exterminated with fire and sword. This was more than a pointed comment on the events of November 10. According to Nazi reasoning the assassination in Paris of Ernst vom Rath, an attaché of the German Embassy, made all the Jews in Germany criminal accomplices to the act of Herschel Grynszpan and provided the occasion as well as the pretext for the application of a policy of fire and sword.

The events of the November days are too well known to need recounting here. The death of vom Rath was followed by a wave of pogroms throughout the Reich. Within a few days, close to 600 synagogues were reported to have been destroyed and the business premises of Jews looted and demolished. Tens of thousands of Jews were arrested; many were reported killed; others committed suicide. Cemeteries and ritual objects were desecrated and entire Jewish communities expelled from their homes and places of business. This outburst of brutality in the form of "spontaneous demonstrations" arranged and executed under the guiding hand of the Propaganda Ministry, was climaxxed by a series of new decrees and the imposition of an "atonement" fine of one billion Reichsmarks upon the Jewish population.
Much of German anti-Jewish policy had long since become a matter of routine, which tightened the net of restrictions and added insult to injury. By a decree of July 6, 1938, Jews, with but few exceptions, were prohibited from engaging in the occupations of commercial agents and salesmen, real estate brokers, property managers, real estate loan agents, tourist guides, and from serving as advisers on financial or other private affairs. A decree, issued on July 25, barred all Jewish physicians from practice. This was followed by two other decrees, of September 27 and October 31, which terminated the activities of Jewish lawyers. On November 7, all Jewish publications in the Old Reich, with the exception of one allowed to the Cultural League, were prohibited and all Jewish bookshops and publishing firms were ordered to liquidate. Many of these decrees supplemented existing legislation. Others, including a variety of local ordinances and regulations, dealt with the social segregation of Jews, the loss of citizenship by German exiles and the confiscation of their property. Special mention deserves to be made of the decree of August 17, according to which all Jews had to add "Israel" or "Sarah" to their given "Aryan" names, and "Aryans" were forbidden to employ "Jewish" names, a list of which is part of the law.

By November 10, Germany's anti-Jewish program had been all but completed. The little that was left to be done was accomplished by a veritable legal terror which followed immediately upon the heels of the excesses. On November 12, the Government decreed the total exclusion of Jews from economic life. By this and supplementary measures frankly titled "Decrees Regarding the Elimination of Jews from German Economic Life," Jews were barred, as of January 1, 1939, from retail trade and handicrafts, and their business, industrial, landed and other property were ordered liquidated or "Aryanized" at the expense of their owners. In addition, Jews whose business premises had been damaged or demolished during the excesses, were forced to make all necessary repairs at their own expense, while all insurance claims were confiscated for the benefit of the State as a part of the "atonement" fine. This fine, which was imposed upon all Jews still possessing property of 5,000 Reichsmarks and above, was the most crushing
of all the overt legislation and covert extra-legal acts which had until then been applied. On December 3, Jews were ordered to deposit all their stocks, bonds and other securities within one week, and were forbidden to acquire, pawn or sell objects of gold, platinum or silver, as well as precious stones and pearls and other jewels and objects of art exceeding 1,000 Reichsmarks in value; such property could be sold only to public purchasing offices established for this purpose. By a decree of February 23, 1939, the Jews were forced to surrender all such objects in return for compensation determined by the Ministry of Economics.

There seemed to have been no limit to the legal and extra-legal ways by which Jews were deprived of their possessions. In the last three months of 1938, for example, Jewish emigrants were reported to have paid the sum of 92,000,000 Reichsmarks in "flight tax." On November 18, Jews in Nuremberg were reported to have been forced to transfer their property to the Labor Front and to accept 10% of their liquidated assets. Early in December, reports had it that, in certain instances, the police were illegally levying heavy taxes on Jews for passports, allegedly to be used in behalf of poor Jews. Illustrative of this situation is the case reported on February 23, 1939, of a fine of 100,000 Marks that had been imposed upon Berlin Jews because the funeral coach of the Jewish Burial Society crossed the forbidden area of Alexanderplatz. Again on May 9, the German secret police made public a notice according to which funds and articles in possession of Jewish organizations may be confiscated on behalf of the State of Prussia. Much property was also lost to Jews, through the confiscation of the belongings of those who were caught trying to cross the border clandestinely. Perhaps the most flagrant of all cases of extortion was the ransom of staggering amounts demanded by the German Government for the release of Baron Louis Rothschild. But, exceeding all limits of comprehension, was the decision rendered by a Berlin-Charlottenburg court on March 4, and reported in Das Recht, according to which Jews must continue to pay insurance premiums on automobiles which, along with other vehicles, they have been forbidden to use, by a decree of December 4, 1938.
Adding insult to injury, a series of measures were taken, which could have no other purpose than to degrade Jews still further in the eyes of their neighbors. The most notorious of these perhaps, was the Berlin Ghetto Street Law, issued on December 5, 1938, by the President of the Police, banning Jews from streets, squares, parks, theatres, cinemas, concert halls, baths, etc., in certain areas in Berlin. The epidemic of ousting Jewish tenants during the period under review culminated, on May 4, 1939, in the adoption of a Housing Law segregating Jews from "Aryan" tenants, and the withdrawal of all legal protection from Jewish tenants on May 19. Preceding and following the actions of the central authorities, some municipalities went so far as to ban Jews from sidewalks. To make the segregation of Jews even more complete, some local authorities opened special ghetto provision shops to serve Jews exclusively. The banning of Jews from parks, swimming pools, and other places of recreation was legalized by the Government, on November 30, 1938, which gave the municipalities the widest latitude in this direction.

Though the November excesses were unprecedented in the Third Reich, the Nazi Government did not exclude violence as part of its anti-Jewish program. Disclosures of one kind or another revealed the murder of hundreds of Jews in concentration camps. On August 9, 1938, it was reported that, during the month of July alone, eighty Jews had died in the concentration camp at Buchenwald, as a result of inhuman treatment. At the height of the excesses in November, 200 Jews were executed in the same camp, according to estimates of the Manchester Guardian. On November 20, 14 Jews were killed in the Home for the Aged in Breslau. The occupation of Prague, on March 15, provided another occasion for the "spontaneous" outbreak of violence, accompanied by the frequent arrests of some Jews and expulsion of others at the bayonet point. The expulsion of Jews, primarily foreign and stateless, but frequently also native-born, constitutes a special chapter in itself. The unspeakably brutal expulsion of Polish Jews on October 28, 1938, and in the months of June and July, 1939, will be discussed in the chapter on Poland.

By July 1, 1938, many of the anti-Jewish laws in force
in Germany had already been extended to the Ostmark, or former Austria. Other legislation was introduced by degrees. But the gravity of the situation there was increased by the zeal of the local Nazis to accomplish in the shortest possible time what had been achieved in Germany proper over a period of years.

At the close of the review period, the exclusion of Jews from German life was virtually complete. All points of contact between the Jewish and non-Jewish populations were reduced to a minimum, and the Jewish community was left entirely to its own resources. The dissolution of the Jewish communities as public legal bodies, in March, 1938, was the first stage in the last phase of the liquidation of Jewish communal life. The subsequent centralization of Jewish organizations in the Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland was calculated to increase the efficiency of the liquidation process. Early in 1939, a further step towards centralization was made by the reorganization of the Reichsvertretung into the Reich Union of the Jews in Germany, which changed fundamentally the status of existing organizations. The Reich Union became an all-embracing body, incorporating several existing organizations and replacing all others. Its main function was to rally all existing forces around the most urgent needs, primarily the promotion of emigration, the caring for the aged and needy, and the maintenance of schools and vocational training centers, all at the cost of the Jewish population. All local Jewish communities, as well as the other organizations, lost their autonomy and, insofar as they were not dissolved, were reconstituted as business branches of the Union.

In the decree of July 6, 1939, which legalized the Union, its function according to press reports was stated to be to "speed up emigration and get the last Jew out of the Reich." A stupendous task was imposed upon the Union, as the Government disclaimed all responsibility of aiding Jews in any manner whatsoever. The Union was made to bear the full burden of Jewish social welfare and all other vital needs, as well as the responsibility of supplying emigrating Jews with the resources required of them by the countries of destination. As the overwhelming majority of the
German Jews have been reduced to destitution, the entire financial responsibility for the execution of this program was placed upon less than one-fourth of the Jewish population, already crushed under the burden of confiscatory legislation and the heaviest taxation.

The impact of the legal restrictions was not all; Jews were also victimized by Nazi commissars, many of whom were self-appointed. The plunder of these commissars reached such a point as to force the Reich Commissioner to dismiss many and to arrest twelve for misusing funds of Jewish firms. To a greater extent than in the rest of Germany until recently, the Jews of Austria have been living under a constant reign of terror and have been forced to liquidate their positions. The dissolution of the Jewish community, therefore, proceeded more quickly in the Ostmark than in the rest of Greater Germany.

The rapid decline in the Jewish situation in former Austria was revealed by the New York Jewish Morning Journal of March 13, 1939. Up to that time 3,741 Jews had committed suicide, 11,000 had been imprisoned, and 87,000 had emigrated. In addition, 12,000 Jewish apartments in Vienna had been vacated, 7,856 enterprises had been "Aryanized," and 5,122 were bankrupt. According to the Vienna correspondent of the Journal of the American Medical Association of June, 1939, the "Aryanization" of the medical profession has been completed with the elimination of about 2,000 Jewish physicians. On May 15, the Vienna edition of the Volksischer Beobachter announced that 100,000 out of the 180,000 Jews who lived in Austria on the eve of the Anschluss, had already emigrated. At the same time, according to semi-official sources, a total of 250,000 Jews had emigrated from Greater Germany between 1933 and March 1939. Most recent reports indicate great destitution, sickness and starvation among the remaining Jews in Austria.

The chief objective of Jews in Germany was to emigrate as speedily as possible. But in proportion as their situation grew worse, the opportunities for escape grew less. During the past year, the frontiers of many countries, both in Europe as well as overseas, were almost entirely shut to German refugees. The British White Paper on Palestine,
published on May 17, 1939, dashed the hopes of many and closed the land of greatest possibilities for immigration. This deepened the despair of German Jews, and thousands desperately sought any way out, no matter how slim the chance of escape. A pitifully tragic example of this feeling of desperation was the plight of the 900 passengers on the S. S. St. Louis, who, in June, 1939, vainly sought refuge in Cuba.

While creating the conditions making for emigration, the German Government did little, if anything, to facilitate such emigration. (The outcome of the negotiations with the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee will be discussed elsewhere.) On the contrary, by its manifold confiscatory laws, the Government only reduced the "Emigrationsfähigkeit" of those whom it slated for emigration, as no country was willing to admit people without means. Often it appeared as if Germany held the Jews as pawns in her game of international politics, by imposing conditions which other nations could not meet.

While the aim of the Nazi Government remained the "eviction of the Jews to the last man," its policy was to rid Germany, by all possible means, of those Jews of whom it could make no use, and to exploit the rest who remained. For, as war clouds began to gather over Europe, Jews were forced into compulsory labor, while the emigration of others, especially those of military value, was halted. Early in September, 1938, unemployed Jews were drafted as laborers in public works projects of demolition of buildings, and only the destitute received slight remuneration. On December 9, the Reich Commissioner for Austria announced the establishment of hard labor camps for Austrian Jews unable to emigrate. On March 5, 1939, the Ministry of Labor announced that Jews drafted for work will be employed primarily on outdoor projects, this time at the prevailing wage scale. In May, the Labor Front started registration of Jewish men and women of working age for service in projected special Jewish labor battalions. The shortage of labor in some cases forced industry to hire Jews, while others were reported drafted for work on fortifications. Although, by a decree of March 11, 1939, Jews were excluded from active and reserve military service, the
army command, on April 12, ordered the registration of Jews of military age, who are to be recruited for army work and are forbidden to leave the country. On May 26, it was reported that former Jewish army physicians had been ordered to report for service in case of emergency.

As heretofore, Germany did not rest with the annihilation of the Jewish community within her own frontiers, but sought, insofar as it was able, to visit the same fate upon Jews all over the world. As will be seen in other chapters, the conquests of Germany were invariably accompanied by devastation and destruction of Jewish life, liberty and property; and where German arms failed, German propaganda and economic pressure achieved its purposes. The year under review witnessed the decline of three Jewish communities — in Italy, Czechoslovakia and Hungary — and the undermining of many more within the area of German expansion.

IV. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In reviewing the events during the preceding year, Czechoslovakia was singled out as the only democratic country in a world of fascist and semi-fascist Central and Eastern European states, which had firmly stamped out overt anti-Jewish manifestations. Unhappily, the clouds which ultimately led to disaster had already then begun to darken the Czechoslovakian skies. Developments in that country must be reviewed in three separate sections, corresponding to the periods before and after the Munich pact of September 29, 1938, and the period since the establishment of the Protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia, and the independence of Slovakia.

1. Before the Munich Pact

During the three months preceding the Munich pact, the Jewish community in Czechoslovakia was preoccupied with two major problems: the mounting tide of anti-Jewish terrorism in the Sudetenland and the aggravating refugee situation. Another problem was to decide upon the position;
Jews should take to the Nationalities Statute which the Government was preparing.

The Jewish situation in Sudetenland steadily deteriorated long before this area was occupied by Germany. As soon as the Nazi Party began, in May, 1938, to press for autonomy for Sudeten Germans, Jews began to liquidate their business interests. During July, August and September, an increasing number of Jews transferred their commercial and industrial operations from Sudetenland to the interior of Czechoslovakia. Although this movement was denounced by Nazis as "robbery of German national property" and resented by some Czechs as defeatism, the political situation made it inevitable. The systematic campaign of terrorism and boycott against Jews and anti-Nazi elements continued to mount and to assume ever graver proportions, notwithstanding the frequent strong intervention of the central government.

The address of Hitler before the Nazi Party Congress in Nuremberg on September 12, 1938, was the signal for the mass exodus of Jews from the Sudeten area. During that night, Jewish property valued at several hundred thousand dollars was destroyed in the exuberance of Sudeten Nazi enthusiasm over their promised "deliverance." In the next several days, an estimated 8,000 panic-stricken Jews converged on Prague. By the end of the month, over 20,000 Jews had already evacuated the area. The fate of another 10,000 depended on the result of plebiscites on October 10 which were to determine the ultimate disposition of areas in which they lived. The events which accompanied the occupation of the district, belong to the chapter on Germany.

During this period, too, the refugee problem in Czechoslovakia was becoming more and more acute. The country at that time harbored many thousands of refugees, including several thousand Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria. In addition there were a number of Polish Jews who had become stateless. In August, the Czechoslovak police, acting on the report that the German Secret Police were smuggling Jews across the Czech border, ordered over 400 German and Austrian refugees to leave the country forthwith. This order was retracted after a number of
interventions, but it served to emphasize the seriousness of the refugee problem.

The financial burden of caring for the refugees taxed the resources of the Jewish community. The events in Sudetenland naturally added tremendously to the problem, especially as many of the Sudeten Jews did not succeed in salvaging their property. The Supreme Council of the Jewish Communities, the Jewish Party, and the Zionist Organization formed a variety of relief committees. On August 23, the Central Jewish Relief Committee announced that it had completed a camp in Moravia to house 1,800 refugees.

With regard to the Nationalities Statute, the Jews were interested in safeguarding their rights, especially in the projected autonomous provinces of Sudetenland, Slovakia and Carpatho-Russia. At first, the attitude of Jews was entirely passive, trusting that the Government would consider their interests without any need for pressure. When, in July, the Government invited representatives of the Jewish Party to state their demands, they indicated that they would request State subsidies for the Jewish school system, full protection for Jews in Sudetenland, and Government assistance in the transfer of Jews from that area into the interior of the country.

The publication, at the end of July, of the first statute, which contained full guarantees for the equality of rights of Jews, was greeted warmly. Indeed, when at the end of August, 1938, Lord Runciman, British mediator in the dispute over Sudetenland, invited representatives of the Jewish Party to discuss the position of the Jews, they officially replied that inasmuch as the Jews were not in opposition to the Government, his invitation was pointless. All these calculations were, of course, upset by the Munich settlement.

2. After the Munich Pact

The Munich settlement proved to be as disastrous to the Jewish population as to the Czechoslovak State itself. Not only did the pact utterly destroy the community in
Sudetenland; it also cast a dark shadow over the future of the Jews in the dwarfed Republic. The resignation of President Benes, on October 6, marked the beginning of the end of the Czechoslovak democracy and the rising of the tide of anti-Semitism. The next six months saw the rapid decline in the political and economic position of Jews. But, they also revealed the tragic position of the new Government which battled against external and internal pressure aimed at forcing it to compromise the traditions of the Republic. Because the Jewish situation varied in the newly-formed three autonomous states of Czechia, Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine, the conditions in each of these states must be discussed separately.

As has since become evident, Germany's occupation of Sudetenland was but the first step in her campaign to reduce Czechoslovakia to political and economic vassalage. A major point in this campaign was to force the Republic to adopt the Nazi brand of anti-Semitism. In these efforts Germany found willing tools among the native anti-Semitic groups, now freed from the restraints of the Masaryk-Benes regimes. The press immediately embarked upon an anti-Jewish campaign to force the Government speedily to liquidate the "pressing" Jewish problem. Physicians, lawyers, authors, journalists, actors, architects and other professionals, urged the Government to introduce the "Aryan" clause. Indeed, a number of professional organizations introduced such clauses on their own account. Anti-Jewish demonstrations occurred in Prague and in many other towns and cities. "Aryan" labels appeared on many Czech shops, while a press campaign for radical anti-Jewish legislation was under way.

Although the Government had, on many occasions, taken official cognizance of the Jewish question and promised a "satisfactory" solution, it refused to heed the growing demands for radical anti-Jewish legislation. It found it too difficult to decide upon such a flagrant compromise of the democratic traditions of the country, especially as anti-Semitism served to advance Germany's political and economic penetration. Therefore, all rumors and speculations concerning impending anti-Jewish legislation along German lines failed to materialize, and as the country slowly re-
gained its self-confidence, there were increasing voices counseling moderation on the Jewish question.

Nevertheless, Jews did not escape the serious consequences of the anti-Jewish campaign. On November 26, 1938, the Party of National Unity, which was to replace all the existing political parties, announced the exclusion of Jews from membership, which was tantamount to their exclusion from political life. About the same time, while Czech lawyers and physicians were demanding the exclusion of Jews from the liberal professions, a Government decree authorized the Bar and Medical Associations to restrict, at their discretion, the further admission of Jews. On February 1, 1939, two decrees, one ordering the revision of citizenship acquired after November 1, 1918, and the other requiring refugees resident on January 1, 1938 in the territories ceded to Germany, Poland and Hungary to leave within six months, severely affected the Jewish situation. In the meantime, the Government began to dismiss Jews from civil service, and countenanced similar measures by municipalities and semi-public and private institutions. By March 1, the number of Jewish employees in the municipalities and municipal institutions had been drastically reduced. Private banking, business and industrial enterprise followed suit, and the practice of dismissing Jewish employees became widespread.

Of particular urgency was the refugee problem, which had already become acute before September, 1938. The presence of about 15,000 Jewish fugitives from Sudetenland in and around Prague, the German expulsion of a number of the remaining 2,000 Jews from Sudetenland into "no man's lands" across the Czech border, and the influx of Slovakian and other Jewish refugees further complicated the situation. Each category of refugees, whose number early in January was officially placed at 20,000, required special treatment. The Government exerted all its pressure to spur their speedy emigration, frequently threatening to return them to their countries of origin. The early policy of the Government to seek the repatriation of the Sudeten refugees, threw the Jews as well as other anti-Nazi elements into great panic. This policy was
later embodied in the decree of February 1. The severity of official policy was, however, tempered by the relative leniency of its execution and the sympathetic attitude of the Government towards the refugees in the "no-man's land" camps. To contribute towards a positive solution of the problem, which was not restricted to Jews alone, the Government, on January 5, announced that it had decided to assist the emigration overseas of 10,000 refugees, Jews and non-Jews, to be financed largely out of the £10,000,000 British loan.

Much worse was the situation of the Jews in Slovakia, where the Government fell into the hands of the dominant Slovak Catholic People's Party, notorious both for its anti-Jewish and pro-Nazi leanings. Freed from the restraints of Prague, the Slovakian Government launched the new autonomous state with what amounted to a declaration of war against Jews, which was followed by a wave of legal and extra legal violence which has continued unabated until the present day. Reports that seeped through the censorship in October, 1938, revealed a desperate situation. "Foreign" Jews were expelled and dumped across neighboring frontiers, while others were thrown into prisons on alleged charges of hostility towards the state and the nation during the period of territorial adjustments. The Italo-German award of November 3, in which Slovakia lost territory to Hungary, was the signal for pogroms against Jews, who were blamed for Slovakia's dismemberment. In the midst of this agitation, Jewish students were expelled from the Bratislava University and Jewish professors and teachers eliminated from their posts. This anti-Jewish campaign was climaxed on December 13 with the burning of synagogues and the pillaging of Jewish property.

In the elections of December 18, from which Jews were excluded by official decree, the Catholic People's Party won a sweeping victory and an endorsement for the establishment of Slovakia as a totalitarian state. On January 17, Premier Tiso declared at a press conference that the Jewish problem was one of the State's foremost tasks and would be solved on a racial basis as soon as the land reform and
electoral laws had been disposed of. On March 10, the Slovakian Government had already completed the final draft of the projected legislation, when the Central Government in Prague deposed the Premier and appointed a new provisional Government. It remained for "independent" Slovakia to complete the task initiated by the autonomous regime.

The Slovakian Government early began to negotiate with Jewish leaders for the emigration of Jews, especially to Palestine. To facilitate these negotiations, the Government approved the formation of a central Jewish representative body, after the Slovakian section of the Czecho-Slovak Jewish Party had been dissolved. On January 19, an agreement providing for the emigration within three years of 5,000 Jews, and the transfer of their property up to $2,000,000 was reported to have been concluded between the Government and the Jewish Transport and Colonization Company.

While the laws against Jews were still being drafted and negotiations for their emigration were being carried out, the Government, the municipalities, and private professional and economic organizations hastened to eliminate Jews from political, economic and professional life. This was accompanied by violence and a vehement campaign in the press.

Except for the early outbreaks of anti-Jewish demonstrations in October, the Jewish situation in Carpatho-Ukraine was more tranquil than in the other parts of the Republic. On different occasions, Premier Augustin Volosin pledged maintenance of the equality of Jews, "who are regarded on an equal footing with the rest of the population." Later, he modified his earlier statements by alluding to possible legislation against "certain evils with which some Jews are connected." Little, however, was done in the way of legislative enactments against Jews. On the other hand, there was an attempt to exclude them from political life. Thus, the official list of candidates for the elections to the Diet made public on January 25, omitted all Jewish names, an act which was tantamount to the exclusion of Jews from the polls.
3. The Protectorate and Independent Slovakia

The dissolution of the Czechoslovak State brought to a head the fateful developments which began in September 1938, finally sealing the fate of the Jews on Czechoslovakian soil. The formation of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia left the Jews at the mercy of Germany. As we have seen, the establishment of the independence of Slovakia delivered them up to violence. The incorporation of Carpatho-Ukraine into Hungary placed them under a regime of far-reaching discriminatory legislation.

The ominous utterance of a Government spokesman in Berlin on the day German troops marched into Prague, that “the same principles which obtain with reference to the Jews in Greater Germany will, of course, be in vogue in our Protectorate too,” proved all too true. The enormities that have been committed against the Jews in Germany and in former Austria, were to be repeated in former Czechoslovakia. No sooner had the German invasion of that country been completed, than the Gestapo, supported by Czech Fascists of General Gajda’s school, let loose a campaign of anti-Jewish terrorism. Jewish institutions were shut down, their leaders arrested, and their funds confiscated. Within one week the number of Jews arrested reached into thousands. The closing of the frontiers threw the refugees who were trapped in the wake of the German invasion, into great panic and blocked the exit of many others preparing to flee. This was followed by the burning of synagogues, first in Brno, then in Olmutz and other towns; the desecration of Jewish cemeteries, and a variety of acts of violence, too well known to need description.

Within a few weeks, the Jews in the Protectorate were far on the road towards complete disfranchisement. All previous restraint, voluntary or compulsory had all but vanished. The “Aryanization” drive proceeded with full force. Administrative decrees were multiplied, ousting Jews from one position after another, and severely curtailing their professional and economic activities. By March 20, the last Jewish municipal employees had been dismissed. Three days later, Jewish physicians were ordered dismissed from all hospitals and public administration.
Notices of impending dismissal were also sent to Jewish engineers. Other public and private institutions, like the Wheat Monopoly, the Bar Association, the Chamber of Engineers, the produce and stock exchanges, the sugar refineries and the like, followed suit.

While the Government of the Protectorate was engaged in elaborating permanent anti-Jewish legislation, Germany made every effort to bring the Jews under her direct jurisdiction. Thus, before the Czech leaders could agree on the definition of a Jew, Baron Constantin von Neurath, the Reich Protector, spared them the trouble by practically taking the Jewish question out of their hands altogether. On the day after the establishment of the Protectorate, Jewish business and industry were placed under the control of Nazi Commissars. On March 20, the Reich Protector prohibited the illegal "Aryanization" of Jewish enterprises, as well as their transfer, whether to new owners or to trustees. Other orders to this effect followed. As it turned out, this "Aryanization" drive was calculated not so much for the "protection" of the Czechs as for the benefit of Germans, who were to be rewarded with the spoils.

On June 21, the Reich Protector issued a 12-point decree providing for the registration of Jewish property, both business and personal, in Bohemia and Moravia before July 31, pending which the transfer of such property without special permission of the German authorities was prohibited. The decree authorized the Protector to appoint trustees for Jewish firms, and ordered Jews, wishing to engage in business, to obtain written consent by July 31. New acquisitions by Jews of real estate, stocks and bonds as well as the opening of new businesses were prohibited. The decree defined a Jew in accordance with the Nuremberg laws and vested in the Protector the final authority on the Jewish question in the Protectorate.

In the measure as Germany tightened her rule over the Protectorate, Czech opposition increased. To stifle this opposition, Germany increased her encouragement to local Fascist groups. While many Czechs began to demonstrate increasing sympathy with the plight of the Jews, fellow-victims of Nazi persecution, the Czech Fascists boasted that, with German help, Czech anti-Semitism would con-
continue its "good work." This "good work" created a pogrom atmosphere early in April, which caused the Czech Party of National Unity to issue warning against uncontrolled elements said to be preparing violent assaults against Jews.

This wave of violence, however, was deferred to a later date. The shooting of a German policeman in Kladno, on June 9, was the signal also for renewed terrorism against Jews. In the next several days synagogues were burned down in many towns and cities throughout Bohemia and Moravia. On June 18, thirty-nine persons were injured in a bomb explosion in a Jewish cafe in Prague, which later resulted in two fatalities. Violence broke out also in other parts of the country, the most serious occurring three days later in Olmutz, where eight hundred local Fascists stormed the Jewish quarters, pillaging and destroying property. Repeatedly, the Czech Fascists placed themselves at the service of the Nazis, who under cover of anti-Jewish violence sought to destroy the last vestiges of Czech autonomy. The inclusion of General Rudolph Gajda, Fascist leader, in the Government party further aggravated the plight of the Jews in the Protectorate.

In Slovakia, the Jewish situation was fraught with even greater tragedy. The launching of the Separatist movement on March 9, was marked by bombing of Jewish shops and institutions, and the proclamation of independence was celebrated with the pillaging of Jewish homes and the burning of synagogues. This wave of terrorism continued throughout the rest of the year. Thousands of Jews were arrested and many others, so-called foreign Jews, were expelled into "no-man's lands." Hardly a day passed by without recording cases of pillage, blackmail, attacks and incendiarism, perpetrated by uncontrolled Hlinka Guards, egged on by the Carpathian German Party.

At the same time, the "Aryanization" drive in the civil service, the professions, and in business and industry, proceeded apace. Through the revision of citizenship, many thousands of Jews, estimated at one-third of the Jewish population, were threatened with expulsion. That Slovakia would introduce legislation along the lines of the Nuremberg laws, was a foregone conclusion. On April 19, the
Government promulgated the first of a series of anti-Jewish laws modelled on those of Germany. [On June 18, the Cabinet decreed the "revision" of Jewish property. This was followed, four days later, by a decree for the registration of Jewish property, similar to that enacted by the Reich Protector in Bohemia-Moravia.

At one time it appeared that the chaotic economic conditions would constrain the Slovakian Government to modify its Jewish policy. On June 2, at the unveiling of a monument to Father Hlinka, Dr. Geza Fritz, Minister of Justice, declared that the segregation of Jews under Slovakian law did not mean their elimination from economic life, and that loyal Jewish citizens would be permitted to engage in trade and manufacture. While this did not reflect the actual situation, it was interpreted as an indication of the Government's intentions to halt the impending economic catastrophe. But this interpretation was belied by subsequent developments. Indeed, on June 22, the Minister of Propaganda, Alexander Mach, declared at a public meeting that, within one year, Slovakia would be rid of all Jews.

V. HUNGARY

The recrudescence of militant anti-Semitism in Hungary coincided with the rise of Nazism to power in Germany. It steadily progressed in proportion as Hungary was drawn into the Nazi orbit. The first major concession to Nazism was the so-called "Jew Law" of May 24, 1938, which severely restricted the economic and cultural activities of the Jewish population. (See Vol. 40, pp. 218-221.)

When, on June 30, 1938, the first implementing decree was made public, it became evident that the Government intended to go beyond the original law in the severity of its application. It not only applied the 20% quota inequitably, but blocked Jews who had been thrown out of employment from seeking new livelihoods by refusing to grant them the necessary commercial and industrial licenses. The Government not only failed to equalize or attempt to equalize the proportion of Jews in the different occupations and professions, but desired to withdraw completely a large section
of the Jewish population from the economic life of the nation. The official estimate that the execution of the law would affect 16,000 Jews for whom, presumably, place was to be found in the general Hungarian economic life, was belied by subsequent events, as close to 60,000 Jews lost their livelihoods and never regained any employment.

The Law of May 1938 was part of a larger program of the Government to stem the tide of Nazism, which had won popular appeal with the slogans of frontier revision, anti-Semitism and land reform. The Government attempted to strike at Nazism by adopting many points of the Nazi program and by arresting the growth of the movement through the imprisonment of its leader, Major Ferenc Szalasi. But, while the law against the Jews was executed rigorously, the program of land reform proceeded slowly and the revision of frontiers depended upon circumstances over which Hungary had little control. As a result, efforts of the Government to weaken the Nazis by espousing anti-Semitism, met with but little success.

Meanwhile, the first partition of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent Italo-German arbitration award of November 3, 1938, which allotted to Hungary certain territories of the Republic and, ironically enough, added 75,000 to her Jewish population, both increased German influence upon, and enhanced the Nazi movement within, Hungary. These influences soon made themselves felt in the country. On November 16, Premier Imredy foreshadowed the tightening of the May Law in an address before the official Party of National Life in Budapest. This was followed by the appointment, several days later, of a special committee headed by De Tasnad, the Minister of Justice, to draft a program of radical anti-Jewish legislation to be submitted to Parliament. Soon thereafter, a campaign was launched to prepare the ground for the proposed legislation which was said to be necessary in order to "prevent anti-Jewish feeling from running too high."

On December 23, a bill embodying the main principles of the special committee's recommendations was introduced in the Lower House. The measure realized the worst fears of the Jewish population. Defining a Jew as a person with one or two Jewish parents, but excluding from the definition
quarter-Jews and half-Jews who were converted before January 1, 1938, the bill provided for the reduction of the 20% quota of Jews to 6% in the liberal professions and cultural pursuits, and to 12% in private commercial and industrial enterprises. In addition, Jews were to be barred from responsible positions in the press, theatre and cinema, and banned from all civil service positions. The bill also provided for limiting Jewish representation in the House of Deputies to 6% and for special Jewish elections thirty days after general parliamentary and municipal elections. Jews were to be deprived entirely of representation in the Upper House. Finally, the bill authorized the Minister of the Interior to deprive of their Hungarian citizenship all Jews naturalized after July 1, 1914; and empowered the Government to organize Jewish emigration and to deal with the question of transfer of Jewish capital, as well as to expropriate, with compensation, Jewish land holdings. By the terms of the bill, War Veterans decorated for exceptional bravery and incapacitated war invalids up to 3% of their membership were to be excepted from the general restrictions. A five-year period was allowed for the execution of its provisions, with the exception of those relating to the press, theatre and cinema which are to be enforced by the end of 1939.

In the ensuing months, the bill was the subject of heated arguments both in Parliament, where amendments for the better or worse were introduced, as well as in the country at large. In spite of the high degree of nazification of Hungary and the existence of latent anti-Semitism during the past several decades, the bill was so flagrant a violation of Jewish equality, and the patriotism of the Jews so widely recognized that the older Hungarian population could not lightly accept the drastic bill. Continuing their opposition which they had expressed during the discussion of the May Law, a number of deputies and senators condemned the Government’s attempts to appease the Nazis at the expense of the Jews; of “creating an atmosphere in which Christians are no longer judged by their honesty or by their honor, nor by their capacities, but solely by the degree of their anti-Semitism.” Others attempted to amend the bill in favor of different classes of Jews, such as war veterans, their
widows and orphans, and several other categories. In addition, various organizations with which Jews were affiliated, especially the War Veterans Associations intervened on behalf of their Jewish colleagues, at the risk of exposing themselves to reprisals on the part of the Government. A petition urging that Jewish war veterans be exempted from the bill’s provisions, was signed by army generals on April 18, 1939.

Because of its racist character, the bill also met with the opposition of the Catholic hierarchy. Early in January, the Synod of Hungarian Bishops approved the bill, but under reservation that “it do not conflict with the Church regarding the very principles of Christianity.” This position has been repeatedly stated by Cardinal Seredi, the Primate, who opposed distinctions between Christians, urging that “if intended to hamper Jewish immigration and end the social and economic preponderance of Jews in general, it (the bill) ought to have been based on other principles.” Although the Cardinal conceded the justice of “repressing alleged Jewish abuses in the social realm and the necessity of rejecting the Jewish spirit,” he urged that “exceptions be made for honest citizens who, whether of the Jewish or Christian religion, have achieved honest work.” More intransigent than Cardinal Seredi, the Bishop of Czanad declared that he could not admit that persons who had attained positions by legitimate means should be forced out of them, and protested against the “re-Judaization” of Christians as breaking the tradition of history.

However, neither the opposition of the sixty deputies of the three opposition parties, nor of the Church, availed against the pressure of events which, after the final dismemberment of what remained of the Czechoslovak Republic, irrevocably committed Hungary to the Nazi orbit. The liberal groups grew weary and discouraged. On May 29, 1939, Count Julius Karolyi resigned as president of the Senate because of his opposition to the anti-Jewish Law. The action of the Church was restricted by the desire not to cause any Governmental crisis: “We wish to stress our viewpoint in principle,” Cardinal Seredi declared in the Senate on April 16, “but we do not wish
to cause any difficulties to the Government or nation. Therefore, we consent to legitimate and justified repression of Jews for the protection of the nation." On May 3, Parliament adopted the bill with minor modifications. The most important amendment is that exempting from the restrictions of the law war veterans, and Jews whose forebears have been Hungarians since 1848 and who professed Christianity in or before 1919.

The cumulative effect of the legislation upon the position of the Jews cannot be calculated in terms of numbers and proportions, since the entire Jewish community of over 600,000 has been reduced to the status of second-class citizens and has been deprived of virtually all economic opportunities. It is estimated that the execution of the law will affect the livelihoods of a minimum of 250,000 Jews within the next five years. But there were reasons to fear that the process would be even faster. For one thing, experience of the past has shown that the Government tended to apply the law more severely than its provisions required. Furthermore, the anti-Jewish legislation is designed more to prevent the sudden upheaval in the economic and financial structure of the country which would result from an abrupt elimination of the Jews from economic life, than to safeguard the limited rights left to them. Thus, on January 9, while the new law was under discussion, Count Teleki, the Minister of Agriculture, announced in Parliament that measures were being taken to parcel all estates acquired by Jews after June 1, 1914, and to prohibit them from acquiring new land. Throughout the period under review, the Government issued additional decrees, orders and regulations, all tending to circumscribe the economic, professional and cultural activities of Jews and to bar them from gaining new livelihoods. In the recent elections, obstacles placed by the Government in the path of the Jewish electorate resulted in the return of only one Jewish deputy, instead of several to which they are entitled by law.

Of particular gravity was the situation of the 150,000 Jews in the newly acquired territories. There, the anti-Jewish laws seem to have been applied with particular severity and brutality. The application of the new laws to the Jews in the new provinces, perhaps the most impov-
erished Jewish community in Europe, reduced the Jewish population to actual beggary. There was a wholesale removal of Jews from their occupations. On May 31, 1939, the Ministry of Commerce cancelled over 80% of the licenses held by Jewish traders and artisans, who were ordered to close their shops by July 1, 1939. At the same time, the Ministry of Justice rejected 75% of the applications of Jewish lawyers for admission to the bar association, permitting them to continue their practice only until October 31.

The enactment of the first anti-Jewish law went a long way to undermine the foundation of a normal Jewish existence in Hungary. The law of May 3, 1939, completely destroyed it. Hungarian Jewry was now faced with the problem of caring for the mass of Jews who had lost their livelihood and of maintaining the Jewish communal institutions, the need for which was constantly growing. For these emergencies, the Jewish community was prepared neither organizationally nor financially. In the course of the year, however, a central relief organization was created with the aid of Jewish organizations abroad. In the beginning, the efforts of the Jewish community were concentrated on relieving the distress of those who suffered from the law of 1938. Thus, on September 19, 1938, the Orthodox Rabbinate proclaimed a "week for the redemption of lives," and urged every Jewish family to contribute at least one pengo a day. But, as time went on, the efforts shifted in the direction of the emigration and the retraining of Jewish youth. Early in January, 1939, a delegation left for Canada to investigate possibilities of immigration. The Government on its part encouraged these tendencies, and frequent demands were made for the establishment of a special government emigration department for Jews.

In the meantime, the Jewish community was troubled by the growing epidemic of conversions as a means of escaping the effects of the legislation. This epidemic assumed such alarming proportions that, on August 15, 1938, Jewish communal leaders considered the advisability of convening a congress to deal with the problem. These conversions were spurred by rumors that Cardinal Seredi had induced the Government to except from the restric-
tions of the law all Jews baptized before the end of the year. On December 2, 1938, the Catholic and Calvinist churches broadcast instructions to parish priests demanding that Jews seeking baptism be required to undergo at least three months of preparatory instructions and obtain special authorization from the hierarchy. Although the discussion of the law in Parliament showed no sign that the newly baptized would be favored, yet conversions continued because many hoped that a certificate of baptism would facilitate emigration. On May 13, the Union of Jewish Communities issued a proclamation calling upon the Jews not to desert their God and the people of Israel, and not to leave their homes, because the entire world was closed to them.

The period under review also recorded anti-Jewish demonstrations in which synagogues were defiled, Jewish houses bombed, and individual Jews attacked. The most serious event occurred on February 3, 1939, when a bomb exploded during the Sabbath service in the synagogue of Pest, injuring nine persons, two fatally. This outrage, which marked the renewal of Nazi terrorist activities, led to the discovery of the existence of a Black Front, whose aim was to intimidate Parliament against any favorable modification of the anti-Jewish bill. The Government declared martial law and began a campaign of repressing Nazi terrorism. On May 13, it sentenced five Nazis implicated in the bombing of February 3, to terms of imprisonment ranging from ten years to life.

The day the law was enacted, Premier Teleki and Foreign Minister Csaky returned from a state visit to Berlin. This ominous sign gave rise to fears that the new legislation, too, may be but a prelude to even worse things to come. Such fears were not quieted by the promise of the Premier that "no one is considering a third anti-Jewish law." The report of Count Csaky on his conversations in Rome and in Berlin revealed the far-reaching dependence of Hungary on Germany. At home, the Nazi elements scored great successes in the national elections on May 28 and 29, electing forty-five deputies out of a total of 260 as compared with six in the previous elections. Their gains
were mostly at the expense of the opposition parties, the
Agrarians, Socialists and Liberals.

While the Government maintained its position, gaining 54% of the total vote, these results gave rise to gloomy forebodings regarding the future. The day Parliament assembled, it was reported that the Government would propose the outright expropriation of Jewish-owned land as part of its land-reform program. In the meantime, the Nazis had unified their six parties behind a legislative program intended "to revolutionize Hungary's economic and political life."

Perhaps the best comment on the present situation in Hungary is to be found in the concluding sentence of the public letter of Count Stephen Bethlen announcing his retirement from political life: "I do not see the strong will and the clear-sightedness that this country needs. This cannot come from without but only from within."

VI. ITALY

The background of events which led to the fateful developments in Italy was presented in the preceding review of the year. For two years, persistent rumors circulated in Italy and abroad to the effect that the Italian government was about to embark upon an anti-Jewish policy. With equal persistency these rumors were repeatedly denied. But these denials could not explain the reasons for the rising vehemence of the anti-Jewish campaign in the Italian press. In retrospect, this press campaign appears to have been designed to prepare the ground for the developments of the past year. The dramatic proclamation on July 14, of the Italian racial dogma by a group of anonymous professors under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Popular Culture, portended ill for the future of the Jewish community in Italy.

A few days later, Virginio Gayda, foremost Fascist spokesman, initiated the new "era" by declaring that every nation has the right to racial purity and that the problem of race is of concrete and immediate importance. This
declaration was coupled with violent propaganda against Jews, who were accused of corrupting the best qualities of nations and of responsibility for the evils of the world. On August 6, the first issue of the *Difesa della Razza*, (Defense of the Race), a special journal devoted to the racial question, made its appearance with the official blessing of Premier Mussolini. Thus the “Aryanizing” machinery was set into motion.

At first, attempts were made to calm the anxiety of Jews by assertions that the adoption of racialism, which was declared to be a native Italian product originating with Mussolini himself, did not mean persecution. On August 7, the *Informazione Diplomatica*, mouthpiece of the Italian Foreign Ministry, ridiculed the “senseless” panic of the Jews on the ground that discrimination was not to be identified with persecution. At the same time the paper declared that the Jews must and will be required to accept a lesser status in life commensurate with their small numbers. Some officials even went so far as to deny that the new policy was directed against native Jews.

Indeed, the first to suffer were the foreign Jews. On August 3, the Government announced that beginning with the fall semester, foreign Jews would no longer be admitted to Italian universities. This was only a prelude to what was yet to come. On September 1, following a vehement press campaign against the Jewish “invasion” of Italy as a result of official disclosure of the presence of 1,559 German, Austrian and Polish Jews in Milan, the Government issued a decree prohibiting Jewish immigration and ordering all foreign Jews and those who were naturalized since January 1, 1919, to leave the country within six months. This decree, which applied also to Libya and the Aegean possessions, defined a Jew as any person, regardless of religious affiliations, both of whose parents are, or were, Jews.

But the course of events took an entirely different direction. Having banished all foreign Jews, the government turned its fire on the native Jews. Soon after the publication of the professorial racial declaration, Jews were dismissed from important positions, while others resigned “voluntarily.” On September 2, the Cabinet issued another
decree banning all Jewish teachers and pupils from the primary and secondary schools, and suspending others from all other positions in schools, universities and other academic, scientific and literary institutions. At the same time, Jews were also dismissed from semi-public and private institutions. All these and other measures were embodied in a comprehensive legislative program adopted by the Fascist Grand Council on October 7, 1938. In a series of decrees, the Council regulated the question of marriage between Jews and "Aryans," and defined a Jew as a person born of two Jewish parents, of a Jewish father and an "Aryan" mother, or of non-Jewish parents but professing the Jewish religion. Jews were barred from the Fascist Party, from entering Italian military service, and were prohibited from owning or managing enterprises employing more than a hundred persons, and from owning more than fifty hectares of land. The Council exempted from the disabilities of these decrees, except in the field of education, persons of mixed marriages who professed other than the Jewish religion on or before October 1, 1938, and Jews with meritorious records in Italian wars and in the Fascist cause. It was estimated that these exemptions applied to approximately 15,000 persons, or about one fifth of the Jewish population in the Italian Empire. The Council also voted pensions for Jews who had been excluded from public service, prohibited all forms of pressure on Jews to abjure their religion, guaranteed their religious freedom, and approved the establishment of special secondary schools for Jews. Foreign Jews over 65 years of age, as well as Jews who contracted Italian marriages before October 1, 1938, were excluded from the edict of expulsion of September 1.

The decisions of the Fascist Council were indeed far less drastic than was expected, but it was not long before the government found it opportune to change its course. Three days after the Council had guaranteed the Jews freedom of religious worship, the government prohibited Shehitah. On October 13, official notice was served on Jews that in the future they would not be granted licenses to open any kind of business, including restaurants, cafes and other public establishments. The announcement on October 16,
of the arrest of prominent Jews on alleged charges of conducting anti-Fascist activities served as the signal for a renewed campaign, which initiated the second phase in the development of Italian anti-Jewish policy.

On November 17, the Cabinet enacted a Royal Decree Law which virtually excluded Jews from political, economic and social life. This law defined a Jew as one, both of whose parents are of the Jewish race; or one of whose parents is of the Jewish race and the other of foreign nationality; or whose mother is of the Jewish race while the father is unknown; or a person of mixed parentage of Italian nationality but professing the Jewish faith. This was the final definition thus far of the term "Jew" and was extended to include persons of an Italian father and a Jewish mother of foreign nationality, or of an "Aryan" father of foreign nationality and an Italian Jewish mother. While persons of the Jewish race retained their Italian nationality, they were excluded from military service in peace or in war as well as from the Fascist Party and from all civil and military administration of the state, provinces, and the municipalities. They were also excluded from all public and semi-public institutions, agencies and enterprises, their subsidiaries and affiliates. Jews were also barred from owning, managing or controlling any kind of enterprise concerned with national defense, or of enterprises employing one hundred or more persons, as well as from being proprietors of lands having a combined value of more than 5,000 lire, and of urban buildings which have a combined taxable value of more than 20,000 lire. Finally, the decree exempted from the operation of the law certain categories of Jews, and guaranteed, under certain conditions, pensions to those who had been dismissed from civil service.

The effects of the law were far more profound than may have appeared on the surface. Under the Italian regime, practically every sphere of human activity can be qualified as public or semi-public in character. The expulsion from the Fascist Party is tantamount to the loss of every opportunity of engaging in the professions, handicraft or commerce. Aside from that, the action of the State encouraged similar actions on the part of private organizations. These, indeed, did not fail to follow suit, for the next several
months witnessed the wholesale dismissal of Jews from Italian employ. At the time the law was enacted, 15,000 Jews were reported to have been discharged from government and private positions. On January 23, 1939, a total of 25,000 Jews were reported dependent upon communal agencies for subsidies.

At the same time, the Fascist Party attempted to exclude Jewish war veterans from the Union of Ex-Servicemen in order to deprive them of their exemptions from the anti-Jewish laws. The Party also agitated for the exclusion of Jews from the professions. A bill along these lines was proposed at a cabinet meeting on April 30, 1939. On May 1, it was announced that no Jewish professional may serve "Aryans." This announcement was subsequently embodied in legislation. By a decree of December 11, 1938, a total of 20,000 Libyan Jews were deprived of their citizenship. But the final blow was delivered by the decree of December 16 requiring Jews to declare their real estate and industrial properties, and providing that such real estate, above a certain value stipulated in the Royal Decree Law of November 17, be turned over to a special body in exchange for 4% bonds. The disposition of Jewish industrial enterprises was governed by separate regulations. This was followed by a decree of February 11, extending the registration of Jewish property to commercial and business establishments. Thenceforth, the liquidation of Jewish property proceeded apace. This concluded the second phase in the evolution of Italy's anti-Jewish program. This thoroughgoing legislation was supplemented by a great many rules and edicts, private and official, too numerous for description here. On December 14, for example, the La Scala Opera House decided to cancel subscriptions to all Jews. In Florence, the police suppressed the publication of Jewish journals. Signs reading "Jews not wanted here" began to make their frequent appearance in restaurants, cafes and amusement places, while the label "Aryan" became a standard advertisement. The new official racist journal, the Defesa de la Razza, arranged various anti-Jewish exhibits; and the press at the same time sought to spread the "Aryan" mission to the farthest corners of the Italian Empire.
Meanwhile, March 12, 1939, the last day for the expulsion of foreign and denaturalized Jews, drew closer. While the majority of those slated for expulsion succeeded, in spite of the restrictions on the transfer of property, in emigrating, over 6,000 Jews, mostly stateless, were in no position to comply with the order. The government made every effort to spur their emigration. Intermittently, foreign Jews were rounded up by the police and warned to leave under pain of severe punishment. On February 24, the Foreign Exchange Ministry conceded to the local refugee committee the right to direct cooperatively the liquidation of frozen assets held by such Jews through the sale of goods abroad; such transactions involved very heavy losses to their owners.

As all these measures advanced but little the desired emigration, the Government was constrained to mitigate the expulsion order by allowing various extensions. Thus, for instance, on February 20, the expulsion of the Jews from Rhodes was postponed to April 15 and, later, extended another month. When the reprieve expired, from 1,500 to 2,000 Jews were either forcibly expelled or voluntarily fled to the French and Swiss frontiers. The press carried reports of the horrible experiences of the refugees who wandered through the Alps in deep snow, unable either to enter France or to return to Italy. Such expulsions, however, were fortunately isolated instances. On March 22, the Government re-admitted sixty Jews who had crossed into France illegally, and were sent back. But, though expulsions ceased, the expulsion order continued to remain in force, and the Government sought to bring about the voluntary emigration of foreign Jews. May 31 recorded the first deportation of a Jewish refugee to Germany.

If emigration was a pressing problem to the foreign Jew, it was also urgent to the native Jew. The latter, however, were at the mercy of the shifting attitudes of the Government. For, early in April, the Government began to refuse emigration passports to Italian Jews of military age or those possessing qualifications for war service. On April 10 many Jewish officers, most of them physicians or engineers, who had been dismissed from the army, were reported to have been reenlisted. Two months earlier, 5,000 Libyan
Jews were reported to have been conscripted by the Government for the building of the Tunis frontier fortifications.

Italy's anti-Jewish policy has all the earmarks of artificiality and imitation. For this reason, the policy failed to win the support of many sections of the Italian population. This fact was evidenced by the many expulsions from the Fascist Party of members who had shown a "bourgeois spirit" in indulging in demonstrations of "pity" for Jews. Another indication of its lack of popularity was the complaint in the press against the failure of the public to cooperate in implementing the "Aryan" policy. Apparently, the Government is finding it difficult to make the people race-conscious. A barbed commentary on the racial legislation was afforded on April 14, when Crown Prince Umberto, reviewing wounded Italian veterans of the Spanish war who disembarked at Naples, inadvertently chose a Jewish lieutenant from the ranks, extending to him special greetings and posing with him for press photographs. On March 2, Marinetti, noted poet and intimate of Mussolini, publicly denounced the anti-Semitic policies and called upon the people to disregard the racist decrees. Pressure by patrons also caused the La Scala Opera House to rescind its order canceling subscriptions to Jews. Last but not least, Professor Nicola Pende, one of the original signers of the racial manifesto, was compelled to protest against the extremes to which the State had gone in carrying out the doctrine. These and similar incidents, while significant, did little to impede the speedy deterioration of the once great Italian Jewish community.

VII. POLAND

At the opening of the year under review, the situation of the Jews in Poland took an extremely grave turn for the worse. Parliament, then in session, had just passed legislation curtailing still further the political and economic rights of Jews. Under consideration in the Senate was a bill passed by the Sejm, (See Vol. 40; p. 255) for the complete
prohibition of Shehitah (Jewish ritual slaughter of animals). This bill failed of enactment in the Senate as a result of the dissolution of Parliament during the crisis in Czecho-
slovakia.

Jews as well as Polish democratic public opinion greeted the decree of September 13, dissolving Parliament and welcomed the President's appeal for national solidarity as presaging a turning point in Polish internal and foreign policy. It was thought that the growing gravity of the international situation and the increasing tension in Polish-
German relations would, under the peculiar circumstances of Polish internal political relations, lead to a general demo-
cratization of the country and, with it, to a lessening in the intensity of the anti-Jewish campaign.

But no sooner had the election campaign for a new Par-
liament opened when all these expectations came to naught. There were two reasons for this change in the situation. First, the Munich Pact removed the immediate threat of external complications; and, second, Poland's territorial gains, as a result of the occupation of Teschen Silesia dur-
ing the Sudeten crisis, heightened the prestige of the Government to such an extent as to discourage all attempts to liberalize the regime. As a result, all major opposition parties, including Jewish groups, for the second time in four years, refused to take part in the elections, leaving the official Camp of National Unity as the sole major contest-
ant in the field.

The course of the campaign, which foreshadowed the character of the new Parliament, caused alarm in the Jew-
ish community. During October, a series of suggested legislative plans, frequently originating in quarters close to the Government, proposing that Jews be deprived of their equality of rights, were circulated throughout the country. Remembering their experiences with the preceding Parlia-
ment, Jews were apprehensive. Their fears were intensified by the vehemence of the anti-Jewish agitation then under way, in which the Government Party together with the Nationalist opposition took the lead.

In the elections on November 6, the Camp of National Unity returned an overwhelming majority to the Sejm, 90% of the elected deputies being enrolled members of the
Camp. While this was to be expected, the actual victory of the Camp lay in the fact that it succeeded, in spite of the boycott of the major opposition parties, to get 67% of the electorate to the polls. The Jews, elected five deputies.

It was not long before events appeared to justify the pre-election fears of Jews. On December 3, General Stanislaw Skwarczynski, head of the ruling party, announced in the Sejm that he was planning a law to reduce the number of Jews in the country, to free its economic and cultural life from Jewish influence, and to limit the proportion of Jews in certain professions. In the lobbies of Parliament, this announcement was interpreted as portending legislation akin to the Hungarian “Jew Law.” A resolution favoring such a course was adopted, on December 8, by the influential “Zarzewia” group, headed by the Vice-Premier and Minister of Finance, Eugene Kwiatkowski, and by Julius Urych, Minister of Communication.

In the meantime, without waiting for the Government, members of Parliament introduced a series of anti-Jewish bills. Returned to the Sejm because of his past “achievements,” deputy Dudzinski re-introduced his bill for the complete prohibition of Shehitah, which had lapsed because of the dissolution of Parliament in September. A group of independent deputies failed by a margin of three to obtain the required fifteen signatures to a bill that would class Jews as temporary citizens and deprive them of the franchise and other citizenship rights. In January, the Polish press, including the semi-official Gazeta Polska, reported that a far-reaching plan of anti-Jewish legislation was being formulated.

Before this project was made public, however, the German occupation of Prague on March 15, 1939, and the growing gravity of the Danzig-Corridor question, focused all attention on the problem of national defense. While this fact did not check rabid anti-Semitic groups from continuing to press their demands, or keep the Sejm from again passing on March 22, the bill prohibiting Shehitah, this time with the approval, with certain reservations, of the Ministry of Agriculture, yet the Government felt the time inopportune for anti-Jewish legislation. As early as February 1, the Polonia of Katowice reported that, believ-
ing that legal discrimination against Jews would interfere with his foreign policy, Colonel Beck forced the Government Party to abandon steps in that direction. On May 12, the Jewish press of Warsaw alleged that Premier Składkowski had advised the deputies not to embarrass the Government by pushing anti-Semitic measures. For the same reason, apparently, the Senate failed to consider the anti-Shehitah bill, the passage of which might have plunged the country into a constitutional crisis. Thus, for the second time, the legal situation of the Jews in Poland was saved by international events.

The proposals for discriminatory legislation marked only one phase of the anti-Jewish agitation, which continued to harass the Jewish population in practically every sphere of life. During the critical days of September, 1938, the Nationalist and Government press launched a campaign accusing the Jews of war mongering. The vehemence of this agitation was increased during the municipal election campaign, in which, as in the national election campaign, anti-Semitism played an important, and often the major role. But, as was not the case in the national elections, which were boycotted by the major opposition parties, in the municipal campaign, the Government Party had to compete with the opposition. The Nationalist campaign slogan of "ridding the towns and cities of Jewish control," was a direct challenge to the Camp of National Unity to make good its anti-Jewish profession. Although the progress of the elections proved disappointing to the Government, frequently disastrous to the Nationalists, and heartening to the democratic groups, the anti-Semitic slogans became even more vociferous.

This campaign of agitation reached a climax in the spring of 1939, in connection with the National Air Defense Loan. The Loan was launched on April 5, at a time when the international situation was growing acute and Poland's position grave. Along with the other masses of the Polish population, Jews responded to the appeal for subscriptions with great enthusiasm. While the loan drive was under way, the pro-Government, joined the Nationalist press in launching a violent campaign accusing Jews of lack of patriotism and of shirking their civic duties by inadequately
subscribing to the Loan. Although General Berbecki, the Commissioner of the Loan, openly denounced the campaign, arguing that there was no possibility of checking the nationality of the subscriptions at that time, the campaign continued unabated. When the drive was concluded at midnight on May 6, it was disclosed that Jews had subscribed fully 35% of the amount subscribed by the urban population. General Berbecki later called this showing “a touching manifestation.” Throughout the year, too, the Jewish population added its share to the general contributions to the National Defense Fund.

Under cover of anti-Jewish agitation, the process of elimination of Jews from economic and professional life continued relentlessly. On October 21, following a violent campaign in the Nationalist press, the Government Radio Company dismissed all but a few of the remaining Jewish musicians. When, in February 1939, the Minister of Justice made public the list of admissions to the Bar under the restrictions of the law of May 1938, no Jews were included. Continuing its practices of ordering Jews out of frontier districts, the Government uprooted an additional number, estimated at several hundred, of Jewish families who had been established in business, trade and professions for many years.

To these measures of the central government, must be added the practices of the municipalities, especially the practice of demolishing Jewish houses and places of business, ostensibly as part of a general program for beautifying the cities, which, during the past year, caused great hardship to many Jews. Whatever the motive, the effect of this campaign has been to remove Jews from economic life by depriving them of their business premises. But the most flagrant example of anti-Jewish acts on the part of municipalities was the decision of the Warsaw Municipal Council, on May 16, to dismiss “as far as possible” Jewish municipal employees, in addition to granting special subsidies to promote “Christian” trade and industry.

Polish professional and economic organizations, as has become customary, went about weeding out Jews from their midst and pressed their anti-Jewish demands in memoranda and suggestions to Government departments.
On March 26, for instance, in the heat of the international crisis, the Polish Merchants Union requested the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to reduce the number of commercial licenses to be issued to Jews to 10% of the total. Instances of this kind were too numerous to cite. Some of them received favorable consideration, and others had an indirect effect upon the Government's actions. All of them have had their share in the increasing impoverishment of the Jewish masses.

During the period under review, the Jewish population was less harassed by the economic boycott, in the form of picketing, than in preceding years. The boycott reached its height during the Christmas shopping season, when the Government Radio System broadcast appeals to boycott Jewish shops "as the most sacred national duty." All subsequent attempts to intensify the movement failed, owing in part to Government intervention, apparently in an effort to avoid the further economic disorganization of the country, and in part to the growing apathy of the population. There was also disagreement in Nationalist circles as a result of the many bankruptcies caused by their promotion of "Christian" trade. In a number of smaller towns, however, the boycott has become such a permanent institution as to escape public notice.

The decline in the boycott was, however, offset by the rise in anti-Jewish violence, which occurred in many localities throughout the year. Early in August an eight-year old Jewish boy was fatally wounded in anti-Jewish excesses in Ostrowek, near Warsaw. In the same month, another fatality occurred during attacks upon Jews in one of Warsaw's public parks. Violence reached a new high point in connection with patriotic demonstrations during the Sudeten crisis. On September 30, a Jew was stabbed to death in demonstrations in Krakow. The following day, a seventy year old Jew was fatally injured in anti-Jewish riots in Sokoly, near Bialystok. Three days later, a Jew was killed in riots in Brzesc. This wave of violence subsequently subsided but never died down completely. Intermittent acts of violence against Jews and Jewish property were reported throughout the rest of the year. Thus, on March 10, 1939, violent disorders broke out in the town
of Rypin, in the District of Torun, in which one Jew was stabbed and many others injured, and Jewish property damaged and plundered. These disorders assumed such proportions that Jewish stores did not reopen the following Monday.

Violence of almost unprecedented proportions continued to harass the Jewish student at the Universities and academic schools. "Ghetto benches" have become a permanent institution of Polish higher education. The registration during September 1938, revealed that a *numerus clausus* was an accomplished fact; in some faculties there was a *numerus nullus*. This situation failed to appease the Nationalists, who persisted in their attempts to oust the last Jewish student by force of violence. Thus, the opening of the winter semester was inaugurated by a wave of anti-Jewish excesses which continued intermittently until the end of the year. Retaliatory measures against Professor Bartel, former Prime Minister, whose classroom was bombed because he had admitted Jews to examinations, led to the closing of the Lwow Polytechnic Institute, on November 21. Four days later, two Jewish students were fatally wounded and three others seriously injured in attacks at the School of Pharmacy in Lwow. On November 30, classes were suspended at the University of Warsaw, following a violently enforced blockade against Jews.

Notwithstanding the intervention of the Government and the promise of an investigation into the entire matter of student excesses, the wave of violence continued unabated. On January 24, 1939, serious attacks took place at the Law School of the University of Warsaw. Grave rioting also occurred, on March 14, at the University of Lwow, which led to the closing of the school for an indefinite period of time. These outrages climaxed in the fatal wounding of a Jewish student at the Polytechnic Institute of Lwow on May 23, the third fatality within one semester.

These events finally aroused public opinion throughout the country, even in circles sympathetic to the Nationalist students, and caused the Government to act. Demands for the immediate suppression of criminality at the Universities increased and were voiced also in Parliament. A systematic campaign to force the Government to take
severe steps to end the "academic" terror was initiated by Senator Professor Bartel. On June 15, sixteen professors of the schools of Lwow, headed by Professor Bartel, in memoranda sent to the Premier, the speakers of the Sejm and Senate and the Minister of Education, Justice and Foreign Affairs, demanded that the Government put an end to the wave of terror at the schools. On the following day, the semi-official Gazeta Polska denounced the rampant crime at the Universities and urged the Government to take rigorous measures to restore order. At the same time, the Minister of Education dissolved eighteen student organizations at the University of Lwow because of an evasive reply to his request for an expression of condemnation of the slaying on May 23. Simultaneously, the Government pressed the drive to clean the Universities of the "decadent atmosphere."

It became increasingly evident, however, that it was impossible to dissociate the acts of terrorism from the general campaign against the Jewish student, within and without the University, of which these incidents were an integral part. The introduction of "ghetto benches," a frequent cause of disturbances, as well as the numero clausus and numero nullus, which won public praise, were so much encouragement to the Nationalists. In the midst of the wave of violence, for example, the Jewish-founded Wawelberg School of Engineering in Warsaw, upon reopening on December 13, ordered the Jewish students to leave the school unless they signed a pledge to abide by the "ghetto" regulations. This was perhaps the most flagrant case of the maltreatment of the Jewish student body at the hands of the academic authorities. Differences of opinion on this score led, indeed, to the resignation of Professor Aleksandrowicz, Vice-Minister of Education, following the slaying of the two Jewish students in November. Thus, the recent action of the Government fell far short of being a solution of the grave problem presented by the anti-Jewish excesses at the universities. It was under these circumstances that Professor Michalowicz, noted Democratic leader, warned that unless he succeeded in his efforts to abolish the "ghetto benches," he would resign his chair at the University of Warsaw.
Closely connected with the agitation and the efforts to introduce anti-Jewish legislation, was the question of Jewish emigration which, as in the past, continued to occupy a very prominent place in the discussion of the Jewish problem. This discussion reached its height in November and December, 1938, following upon the failure of Poland to induce the Evian Refugee Conference to include in its scope the question of Polish-Jewish emigration, and Germany's summary expulsion, on October 28, of over 12,000 Polish Jews. The world-wide reaction to the November excesses in Germany, which stressed the urgency of evacuating Jews from centers of persecution stimulated discussion of the question in Poland.

Following several days of sympathetic silence, a press and radio campaign to stimulate Jewish emigration was launched. It was climaxed on November 27, by inspired editorials in all Government newspapers hinting that "if other means fail," Poland might emulate German methods of calling international attention to her Jewish problem. The Nationalist press urged such legislation as would compel the Jews to interest international agencies facilitating their emigration from Poland. Both Government and Nationalist newspapers were unanimous in denouncing international public opinion for failing to heed Poland's demands and, allegedly, for bestowing a premium on brutality.

This campaign prepared the ground for the interpellation, submitted in Parliament on December 21, by General Skwarczynski on behalf of 117 out of 208 deputies, members of the Camp of National Unity, calling upon the Government to take action to reduce the number of Jews in Poland "to as great an extent as possible" and to secure their emigration "in such numbers as Poland's economic and cultural needs dictate." The interpellation urged the Government to secure for Poland participation in general emigration schemes corresponding to the numerical strength of Polish Jews, and to find the necessary territories and obtain international funds for mass settlement.

On January 23, the Premier, General Slawoj-Skladkowski,
replying to the interpellation, declared that the Government was working on comprehensive plans for Jewish emigration; that it would use its influence to obtain outlets for emigration by international action, would not accept the notion that new outlets will be opened only "as a result of catastrophes from which the Jewish people suffer."

Indeed, as heretofore, the Government continued, officially and unofficially, to press the question in the international arena. Early in July, 1938, the Polish League of Nations Society submitted a resolution to the International Federation of League of Nations Societies conference at Copenhagen, urging that the League call an international conference to facilitate the emigration of Jews. An official communication on November 18, 1938, stated that Poland had informed the United States Government on several occasions of the need for the emigration of Polish Jews, and that instructions had been given to Polish diplomatic representatives in London and other capitals to follow developments with the same end in view. Assurances that the Government "was doing everything in its power to solve the question by international agreement" were given by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in Parliament on February 9, 1939. Indeed, early in March, the Polish and Roumanian Foreign Ministers agreed to go hand in hand in pressing the question of Jewish emigration abroad. On March 12, Colonel Joseph Beck told the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee that "preventative" action must be taken to find outlets for Jewish emigration before the problem had become acute, and stressed the necessity of drawing the attention of the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee powers to the need for early action.

To win the cooperation of Jews for its emigration schemes, the Government encouraged the organization of various Jewish bodies to further its campaign abroad. In November, a Committee for Jewish Colonization, headed by Chief Rabbi Schorr, was organized. In the following month, two other bodies — the Committee for the Promotion of Jewish Pioneering and Colonization in Madagascar and Kenya, and the Committee to Promote
Emigration to Africa and Australia — were founded. On January 5, the Schorr Committee appealed to the Inter-governmental Refugee Committee to consider the "natural emigration needs" of Polish Jews as a link in the international problem of Jewish emigration. Later in the month, following a conference with Colonel Beck, the Committee left for London and presented its plans before the British Government and before Jewish organizations. These Committees were praised by Colonel Beck as supplying the need for a constructive Jewish emigration program to be carried out in collaboration with State organizations. However, they were repudiated by Jewish public opinion for playing into the hands of the Government by their acceptance of the principle of "emigrationism."

The Government's emigration efforts continued through the critical months following the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. In an official communiqué following the visit of Colonel Beck to London, early in April, the Polish Foreign Ministry stated that, in the course of the conversations in London, Colonel Beck had expressed the desire for international efforts to include the Jewish situation in Poland in the discussions of the general Jewish problem; had urged that Polish Jews have their due share in any opportunity for settlement which may be found; and had drawn attention to similar problems existing in Roumania. According to this communiqué, the position of the British Government, was that, fully appreciating the difficulties referred to, it "would at any time be ready to examine with the Polish and Roumanian Governments proposals for a solution of particular problems arising in Poland and Roumania, which are part of the major problem." On June 3, the Polish press alluded to a plan of Jewish mass emigration involving the liquidation of Jewish property, with the aid of an international loan to be repaid by additional exports from Poland, along the lines of the so-called "Schacht plan," discussed at one time in connection with the emigration of Jews from Germany. Although this report was not confirmed in informed quarters, the pro-Government press approved of the suggestion.
During the year, the Jews in Poland had to meet the difficult refugee problem as a result of the expulsion of Polish Jews from Germany. In the course of a few days beginning with October 28, over 12,000 Polish-Jewish citizens were forcibly transported across the Polish border on the pretext that Poland was taking measures to deprive many Polish Jews, resident in Germany, of their citizenship, in consequence of the denaturalization law of April 1938. They were concentrated in several camps, principally at Zbaszyn which housed over 5,000 refugees. The first reaction of both the Government and the local population, was one of great sympathy with the deportees. Government officials, railway authorities, the Polish Red Cross, and Jewish organizations cooperated in assisting them. The Red Cross was particularly active in administering first aid and in the distribution of clothing and food, while Jewish physicians were mobilized to assist the various relief units. At all frontier stations where the deportees had been admitted, the authorities were liberal in deciding passport questions, and turned waiting rooms and railway coaches into sleeping quarters. Free railway passage was provided for many refugees who went into the interior of the country. The 5,000 deportees at Zbaszyn, however, remained stranded on the border.

In the meantime, the Government entered into negotiations with Germany in order to halt further expulsions and to salvage the property of its expelled nationals by arranging the return of the refugees to Germany to liquidate their property interests. The Government was also prepared to repatriate other Polish Jews in Germany on condition that the Reich allowed them to remove 70% of their property. As the negotiations became protracted and appeared to be fruitless, the Government began to look upon the deportees as so many Jews crowding in upon overcrowded Poland and became still more adamant in refusing the admission of the Zbaszyn refugees into the interior of the country, in spite of all guarantees offered for their maintenance. At the end of November, the Polish authorities began to make determined efforts to bring the
question of the stranded deportees within the scope of the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee and also appealed for help to the British and French Governments. These steps coincided with the vehement press campaign for Jewish emigration, and constituted a strong weapon in the hands of the anti-Jewish press which protested against the renewed Jewish “invasion” of Poland.

By the close of the year under review, there were still 3,500 Jews left in Zbaszyn. They lived under the most pitiful conditions and were plagued by typhoid, influenza, and other diseases. The entire burden of support of these as well as of many other refugees in the interior of the country rested mainly on the Central Jewish Refugee Committee. For a considerable length of time, the Committee, with the aid of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the American Appeal for Polish Jews, as well as through the proceeds of its own appeals for funds, managed to care for the deportees. However, as the financial difficulties increased, the Polish Committee announced, in the middle of June 1939, that it would be forced to close its offices. These difficulties arose at a time when many more thousands of Jews were being expelled from Germany. As the Polish Government generally refused to admit the deportees into the interior, the tragedy of Zbaszyn is being repeated all along the Polish-German frontier.

As heretofore, Polish Jews have been forced to devote the greater part of their energies in a battle of self-defense against economic and administrative discrimination, agitation, violence and political chicanery. In this connection, one event stands out during the past year, and that is the united resistance of the Jewish community to the attempts to ban Shehitah. There were other events, however, no less important which do not fall precisely into this category. Of special interest are the events connected with the Palestine situation and the municipal elections.

The execution in Palestine of their compatriot, Shlomo ben Josef, plunged the Jews of Poland into profound grief.
and reopened the entire question of Jewish policy with respect to Palestine. Discussion led to constant strife between Revisionists and general Zionists. On July 19, the New Zionist Organization launched a nationwide campaign against the "Havlagah," or the non-retaliation policy of the Palestine Jews, bringing all differences of opinion into the open.

On August 16, the "Havlagah" policy was discussed at two conferences in Warsaw by the Zionist and New Zionist organizations. At the general Zionist Conference, the Revisionists were bitterly assailed for their attitude and were accused of misleading Jews into dangerous channels. On the other hand, Vladimir Jabotinsky, restating the position of the Revisionists on the non-retaliation policy, warned of the danger of civil war in Palestine, and called upon Jewish and non-Jewish public opinion to counteract this danger. He also proposed a round table conference between the World Zionist and the New Zionist organizations.

These differences of opinion led to factional strife in Poland between the Revisionists and general Zionists. In the first days of September, 1938, more radical Revisionists executed a series of raids on Zionist offices in Brzesc, Lwow and Pinsk, demolishing the interiors and destroying portraits and documents. This factional struggle became so intense that on September 11, a vendor of Der Kampf, the Labor Zionist paper, was stabbed in the streets of Warsaw.

Meanwhile, developments in Palestine took a new critical turn. On October 12, all sections of Polish Jewry, the local communities, Zionist organizations, the Agudath Israel, as well as other non-Zionist religious organizations, joined in convoking a Pro-Palestine Congress for October 30, to protest against any threatened infringement of the rights of the Jews in the Holy Land. A common declaration was thereupon issued, re-affirming the historic connections of the Jewish people with Palestine. The New Zionist Organization issued a manifesto under the slogan, "All Palestine for the Jews," and calling for the militarization of all Jews abroad for the defense of the Jews in Palestine. The conference on October 30 was attended by more than a thousand delegates representing all Jewish groups in Poland, except-
ing the Bund, at which a resolution was unanimously adopted expressing disbelief in Great Britain's proposed departure from its obligation, and declaring that Jews would never accept a minority status in Palestine.

The situation in Palestine continued to agitate the Jews in Poland. While the London Conference was in session, a special conference of all Zionist groups was convoked in Warsaw on February 5, 1939, to express the determination of Polish Jewry to combat any attempt to restrict Jewish rights in Palestine. Several days later, the Union of Polish Rabbis ordered prayers in synagogues throughout the country for the success of the London Conference. On February 13, the Agudath Israel called a special conference on Palestine, at which a resolution was adopted appealing to the British Government to "open the gates of Palestine to the sons of the Jewish people once driven from there and now ousted and persecuted everywhere," and declaring that "any attempt to curtail its rights for any reason whatsoever, will be regarded as an onslaught on the most sacred interests of the Jewish people." On March 17, the Zionist groups and the Agudath Israel joined in a cabled appeal to the British Government "not to betray the confidence of the Jewish people."

The publication, on May 17, 1939, of the White Paper in which the British Government outlined a new Palestine policy, stirred the Polish Jews profoundly. On May 22 a general strike was ordered for two hours, while a day of fast and of prayers was observed throughout the country. The failure of the Bund to join in the strike persuaded the Left Poale Zion to withdraw from the Trade Union Council in which it was jointly represented with the Bund, while the Right Poale Zion issued a statement condemning the Bund's attitude.

A peculiar situation arose within the Jewish community in connection with the municipal elections. These elections assumed national significance as they were turned into a touchstone of the relative popular strength of the Camp of National Unity and the various opposition parties. Similarly, the elections were seized upon by the Jewish masses to manifest their determination to fight for their equality of rights by supporting the Socialist candidates.
The first results of the elections, indeed, showed a striking success of the candidates of the Bund over those of the Zionist and other Jewish parties. This initial success, which continued in the next few months in a number of towns and cities, was interpreted by the Bund as a victory for its ideas and as a sign that the Jewish population was turning away from Zionism. A flood of polemics between the Bund and Zionists ensued, in which recriminations were hurled against one another. Although the final results of the elections were not yet finally analyzed and many sections of Poland were still to go to the polls, the successes of the Bund were generally interpreted as due to the failure of the Zionist organizations to work out a definite program for the safeguarding of the rights of Jews in Poland. Another explanation was that the Jewish masses desired to strengthen the hands of the Polish Socialist Party with which the Bund is intimately associated. Some ascribed the successful campaign of the Bund to its disciplined organization and the apathy of unorganized Jews towards the elections.

On one occasion, however, the Bund joined with all other groups of the Jewish population, namely, in the sixteen meatless days demonstration between March 14 and 20, which were proclaimed in protest against the anti-Shehitah legislation in Parliament. All sections of the Jewish population, regardless of their personal convictions, agreed that the bill was an attack upon the vital principle of religious freedom and equality of rights. For sixteen days every Jewish home and restaurant abstained from eating any kind of meat. The demonstration served to convince Polish public opinion that in the maintenance of their equality of rights the entire Jewish population is solidly united.

VIII. DANZIG

Although the political fate of Danzig had not yet been decided at the time this review was written, the Free City had, to all intents and purposes, long since become a province of Germany, especially insofar as the Jews were concerned. Many of the German anti-Jewish practices
were enforced in Danzig long before the Nuremberg Laws
were officially introduced there. The official introduction
of these laws, on November 24, 1938, sealed the fate of the
Danzig Jewish community.

To the accompaniment of violent outbreaks, which began
simultaneously with the November outrages in Germany
and in which synagogues were burned down, Jewish prop-
erty destroyed, and masses of Jews arrested, a series of
decrees implementing the Nuremberg laws followed in
quick succession. By December 31, 1938, the exclusion of
Jews from economic life and the professions was virtually
complete. The first day of 1939, for example, found all
Jewish business enterprises closed and all but two Jewish
physicians banned from practice. The Danzig Senate also
decreed the registration of all Jewish property. On Decem-
ber 2, it was reported that the Danzig Jews were even
forced to contribute to the "atonement" fine imposed upon
the Jews in Germany.

Envisaging the final exodus of the Jews from the Free
City, the Danzig Senate compelled them to liquidate their
last communal organizations and institutions. On Decem-
ber 19, in the presence of Senate representatives and the
Chief of Police, the Jews voted to dissolve their community
and to concentrate on a program of emigration. At the same
time, a number of stateless Jews were expelled, while Polish
Jews were ordered to leave the City by January 1, 1939.

Impatient with the slow process of Jewish emigration,
the Senate served notice, on January 11, to the 4,000 Jews
remaining, that the first 1,000 of them must leave Danzig
before the end of the month, or face serious consequences.
To cover the cost of transportation, the Senate confiscated
the property of the Synagogue Union in addition to im-
posing a special 25% tax upon private Jewish property.
Although the absence of a place which would receive these
refugees on such short notice, forced the postponement of
the expulsion, yet hundreds of Jews embarked for unknown
destinations in order to escape the threatened consequences
of failure to depart. In many cases, Danzig authorities
connived with adventurous ship captains to transport Jews
overseas. Those who did not succeed in escaping were
given up to a regime of the most barbarous oppression.
On March 27, the last three Jewish organizations which were allowed to function, the Zentralverein, the Front-fighters Union and the Union for Progressive Judaism, dissolved. This brought to an end every vestige of organized Jewish life in Danzig. The removal from Danzig, on April 27, of the antiques and art treasures of the Jewish Community Museum, including 51 scrolls of the Law, under the care of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, symbolized the end of the ancient and once prosperous Jewish community of Danzig.

IX. BALTIM COUNTRIES

1. Estonia

The Jewish community in Estonia, numbering approximately 5,000 persons, less than 0.5% of the total population, belonged, until very recently, to the steadily diminishing number of Jewish communities in the world free from anti-Semitic threats. The community's problems were mainly communal and cultural. The year 1936 marked the first attempts to stir up anti-Jewish agitation. These attempts were repeated intermittently for the next two years, but virtually ceased with the repression of the Estonian Fascist movement, the so-called "Fighters for Freedom," early in 1938.

During the period under review, however, the security of the Jewish population was undermined by international events. The adoption of the Hitler salute and the wearing of Sudeten German costumes, during the Czechoslovakian crisis in September, revealed the strong nazification of the German minority in Estonia.

Since then, Nazi activities steadily increased, culminating, on April 25, 1939 in the tarring by German-speaking youths of the statue of Kreutzwald, author of the Estonian national epic, whose memory is deeply revered. These and other manifestations aroused great apprehension in Estonia and gave rise to fears that Germany was employing the German-speaking population as a means of gaining influence in the country.
German pressure on the Baltic States increased, particularly after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. On June 7, 1938, Estonia and Latvia were forced to sign non-aggression treaties with Germany, which placed these countries at the mercy of their powerful neighbor.

These developments aroused apprehension both within the country and abroad, as to the future of the Jews in Estonia. On July 21, 1938, O. Kask, the Minister of Welfare, declared in a press interview that no more Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria would be admitted; adding ominously that the Jewish problem becomes acute only in countries where a small number of Jews exert a strong influence on economic life. On December 9, the Minister of Economics announced in Parliament that the “Estonianization” of industry should not be accomplished by a forcible change in ownership and that an opportunity for “free collaboration” would be granted to the minorities. As this statement lends itself to different interpretations, it only added to existing apprehensions.

2. Latvia

Like that of Estonia, the Jewish community of Latvia, numbering close to one hundred thousand persons in a total population of two million, has been relatively free of anti-Jewish agitation, which has been proscribed by law. The attitude of the Government continues to be expressed, as heretofore, by the far-reaching support it has given to the Jewish school system, which has been developed to a very high degree. But, for a number of years, and particularly in the past three, the Jews have been faced with very serious problems owing to governmental economic policies. The period under review has seen no improvement in this respect.

In no other State in Europe, with the exception of Russia, has economic intervention by government gone as far as in Latvia, where the government’s economic policy is inspired in the main by a desire to promote the interests of the agricultural population. Practically all industry is State property, and commerce largely a govern-
ment monopoly. The cooperative movement has been highly developed. Thus, hardly any large enterprises have remained in private hands. Such as have so remained are subject to a rigorous system of licensing, and private initiative is hampered further by cumbersome regulations and restrictions.

In view of the fact that 40% of the Jewish population has been engaged in commerce and traditional Jewish industries, which, along with others, have been taken over by the State, the Government economic policies resulted in reducing large sections of the Jewish population to unemployment and poverty. It would seem that, in formulating its economic plans, Latvia left no place for this section of its population.

Internationally, the situation of Latvia is akin to that of Estonia as both are living under the shadow of German expansion and are troubled by the agitation of their respective German minorities.

3. Lithuania

In Lithuania, the Jewish situation has been more complicated than in the other Baltic States. The Jewish community of 170,000 has been vexed by serious economic problems resulting from governmental economic policies, as well as by the existence of a rabid anti-Jewish movement, often directed against the regime as well as against Jews.

During the period under review, anti-Jewish forces were particularly active, sometimes also with the connivance of Government officials. The proposal of the Lietuvos Aidas, chief Government organ, on August 14, for the establishment of "ghetto" bathing beaches for Jews aroused indignation as well as alarm among the Jewish public. Although it was officially repudiated and the editor punished, the proposal of the Lietuvos Aidas turned out to be the beginning of an organized anti-Jewish campaign which continued throughout the year. Anti-Jewish incidents, instigated by the local press, were reported from many towns. Professional organizations, like the Union of Lithuanian Engineers, urged restrictions upon their Jewish colleagues,
while the campaign for the prohibition of Shehitah was renewed by the League for the Protection of Animals. On January 28, 1939, the streets of the capital were littered with proclamations calling upon Lithuanians to "shake off the influence of 'aliens' and neither buy from nor work for Jews." This campaign influenced even labor circles. On February 1, Darbas, the official organ of the Chamber of Labor, urged the adoption of legislation, modelled after the Nuremberg Laws, for the protection of "Lithuanian Honor" by prohibiting Jews from employing non-Jewish female domestics.

The tensity of the situation was partly relieved by the firm suppression of anti-Jewish demonstrations and by the repeated assurances of the Government that it would not tolerate any infringement of the equality of rights of Jews. On January 29, 1939, Premier Mironas called all leading editors into conference and warned them of the harmful effects of an anti-Semitic campaign. He also promised steps against the anti-Jewish boycott movement propagated by the Union of Traders and Artisans. Assurances to this effect were repeated by the Premier on February 10. At that time, he also promised to censor radio broadcasts against anti-Jewish attacks. In the course of the month, anti-Semitic articles in the Werslas, organ of the Traders and Artisans Union, were suppressed along with the boycott agitation. In this, the Government was aided by the Union of Lithuanian Writers and other democratic groups. Peaceful cooperation between Jews and Christians was also advocated by Bishop Butchia, on March 12, on the occasion of the presentation to the Catholic charities, of 10,000 lits by Jews, in memory of the late Pope Pius XI.

Meanwhile, the Memel problem was growing acute and with it, Nazi pressure on Lithuania. The occupation of that district on March 22, 1939, reduced Lithuania economically and politically to the virtual status of a vassal state and greatly emboldened the actual and latent anti-Semitic forces in the country. It was, therefore, not a mere coincidence that, simultaneously with the return of Memeland to the Reich, there was a sharp rise in anti-Jewish demonstrations and violence in all parts of Lithuania.
On March 23, for instance, all synagogues, as well as the Jewish Hospital in Kaunas, were stoned.

The new Government of General Czernius, however, made several moves to allay the fears of the Jewish population, as well as those of other minorities. In a public statement on March 29, the Premier declared that the Government would respect the rights of the minorities, that it would continue the century-old tradition of friendship between the Lithuanian people and these minorities, and that no one would be persecuted because of race or religion. On March 31, the Minister of the Interior committed eighteen persons, including some responsible for anti-Jewish excesses, to labor camps. On April 5, speaking in Parliament, the Premier warned that incitement against the minorities would not be tolerated. To a Jewish delegation, he declared that there would be no restrictions in the economic field. On another occasion, the Minister of the Interior stated that political and economic discrimination against Jews was out of the question, that they were a loyal minority, that they would continue to enjoy equality of rights, and that the Government was determined to suppress all attempts at Jew-baiting.

These assurances had hardly been made, when new cause for alarm was provided by the Congress of the anti-Semitic Werslinkai Traders' and Artisans' Association, which opened on May 2. In addition to adopting a series of resolutions to remove Jews from trade and industry, the Congress voted to support a move to prevent Jews with capital, especially former Memel residents, from establishing new enterprises in Lithuania. In this connection, the Congress was told of efforts that had been made to prevent Jews from setting up new factories, and from receiving import licenses and government contracts. What, however, caused the greatest alarm, was the pledge of the Premier that the Government would support the endeavors of the congress and that the cities must be “Lithuanianized” and occupied by Lithuanian industrialists, merchants and artisans. Other high Government officials stressed the need of replacing “alien elements” in the nation's industry and trade by “genuine” Lithuanians.

While the Congress was in session, serious anti-Jewish
excesses broke out in the town of Naumiestis, which required calling out the army to quell the riots. Simultaneously, the municipal council of Polangen prohibited Shehitah. The Government, on its part, promised to view with favor a bill establishing a Government monopoly over the flax industry, which would deprive several hundred Jewish families of their livelihood.

And yet, at the same time, the Government gave continued assurances that the rights of Jews would not be infringed upon. On May 7, General Sutkus, Minister of Finance, assured a Jewish delegation which expressed the concern of the Jewish population over the address of the Premier at the Werslinkai Congress, that the Government did not intend to eliminate Jews from economic life. Indeed, on May 18, Lietuvos Aidas, the Government organ, denounced economic discrimination against the minorities, and rejected the anti-Semitic resolutions of the congress by declaring that the Government would never consider anti-Jewish demands. At the same time, the Government annulled the action of the Polangen municipality prohibiting Shehitah.

In June, 1939, anti-Jewish violence again increased. On the evening of June 6, two synagogues burned down and fifty Jewish families were made homeless in the town of Uswentis, in a fire of suspicious origin. Anti-Jewish excesses occurring on June 29, in the town of Lepalingai, were followed by the arrest of ten persons who were sentenced to hard labor. On June 30, one woman was killed and scores of persons were injured in a fire of undetermined origin in the town of Silal, which razed the synagogue and forty-eight houses in the Jewish quarter.

One of the most vexatious problems confronting the Jewish community was that of the refugees. The Government repeatedly emphasized that it would not permit the entry of Jewish immigrants into Lithuania and ordered the refugees who did succeed in entering the country to leave on short notice. As most of these refugees were destitute, they required relief on the part of Jewish organizations.

The influx of Memel Jews added to the problem. The stream of refugees that converged upon Lithuania during
the German occupation, created difficult financial problems, as most of the refugees who had not succeeded in escaping earlier were destitute. The resulting difficulties caused the Government to deal more severely with the German, Austrian and Czechoslovak refugees.

The year under review closed with the hopeful assurance of General Scugas, the Minister of the Interior, that "the few recent instances of anti-Jewish excesses give no reason for a belief that an era of anti-Semitism has dawned in Lithuania." As a matter of fact, the Lithuanian Government took stern measures to suppress anti-Jewish excesses, and warned that persons guilty of participating in such disturbances would be severely punished. At the same time, the authorities took measures to prohibit the press from carrying on agitation against any particular section of the population.

Memel

The autonomous district of Memel has from the beginning of the Nazi regime been slated for return to Germany. As the nazification of Memel progressed, the position of the 5,000 Jews there became more and more unbearable. In October, 1938, the situation became extremely tense, because Nazi leaders, while agitating for a far-reaching program of self-government, demanded among other things, the introduction of the Nuremberg anti-Jewish laws. This led to an exodus of Memel Jews. When the election campaign was under way in December, Jews, fearing the worst, withdrew their funds from the banks; Jewish shopkeepers liquidated their stocks; and Jewish real estate owners sold their properties.

In the elections which were held on December 11, 1938, the Nazis scored a sweeping success, which sealed the fate of the Jewish community. In the next few weeks the Memel governing body resigned and was succeeded by a Nazi regime. By this time, about one-third of the Memel Jews had already left the district.

The occupation of Memel by the German army on March 22, 1939, trapped about 2,000 Jews who had remained. Immediately, hundreds of Jews were converging
on the Lithuanian frontier. Within twenty-four hours all but several hundred, most of them aged persons, artisans and small tradesmen, who had not been able to escape sooner, fled.

The occupation of Memel was accompanied by a wave of violence. Jewish houses and synagogues were pillaged and burned. All Jewish property, estimated as being worth $17,000,000, including Jewish communal institutions, was taken over by the Nazis. The last vestiges of the Jewish community were speedily erased as practically all laws obtaining in Germany were automatically extended to the newly won district. All remaining Jews were ordered to leave the territory on the pain of heavy punishment.

X. ROUMANIA

One of the most commonly advanced explanations of the sensational appointment of Octavian Goga as head of the Roumanian Government, was that he was made premier in order to discredit the extremist Nazi and fascist groups who were a constant threat to the peace and security of the throne and the State. On February 24, 1938, two weeks after the fall of the Goga regime, a new Constitution was ratified by popular vote, establishing a semi-corporate State, with the King as ultimate arbiter of Roumanian politics. On December 15, King Carol decreed the establishment of the Front of National Renascence as the sole political organization in the country. This completed the process which made Roumania into a full-fledged authoritarian State.

The outside world, which had a horrified remembrance of Goga's anti-Jewish measures and his still severer threats, tended to judge the new form of government largely on its treatment of the Jews. The first signs were favorable. Before the new order was promulgated, many of Goga's anti-Jewish decrees were repealed. Codreanu, leader of the notorious Iron Guard, was forced to disband his party. In the ensuing weeks, while the Government initiated a campaign of repression against all political parties, it lashed
out particularly against the Iron Guard, which it sup-
pressed with great rigor.

The hopes which the dismissal of Goga and the suppres-
sion of the Iron Guard raised among Jews, however, were
short-lived and turned out to have been nothing but wishful
thinking. In his manifesto of February 12, 1938, outlining
the program of the new regime, Dr. Miron Christea, head
of the Roumanian Church, the new Premier, promised
equal rights and justice for all citizens. But, in the same
breath, he announced that his Government would press
the execution of the fatal Goga de-nationalization decree
of January 22, 1938, and intimated international action
to further the emigration of Jews from Roumania. The
period under review revealed that if the anti-Semitism of
Octavian Goga was vehement and open, that of Dr.
Christea was concealed and silent but just as disastrous
for the Jews. With relentless rigor, the Jews continued to
be driven out of the political, economic and professional
life of the country.

Under the pressure of events connected with the Sudeten
crisis in Czechoslovakia, the Roumanian Government, on
August 5, 1938, decreed a new Nationalities Statute con-
taining liberal provisions for the several minority popula-
tions. This statute contained nothing novel, as similar
guarantees were already in the Constitution, in the Peace
Treaties and in the laws already in force. It was hoped,
however, that the new statute would also benefit the Jewish
population, and a promise to this effect was given by Pro-
fessor Silviu Dragomir, the Government Commissioner for
Minorities. However, it soon turned out that not only were
200,000 Jews slated to lose their citizenship but the
entire Jewish community was excluded from the provisions
of the statute. On October 26, the semi-official Roumania
declared that the new minorities guarantees would not be
applied to Jews and that the regulations of the Goga
Government would remain in force. This was confirmed
by preceding and subsequent events.

One of the provisions of the statute guarantees the minor-
ities the right to use their mother tongue in religious and
private affairs and in their press and schools, and to estab-
lish their own religious, social and educational institutions.
On August 31, when the above-mentioned provision was made known, the directors of Jewish schools were notified that they could no longer conduct classes on Sunday. On December 2, the local authorities of Cernauti closed down a number of Jewish schools, including a ninety year old institution operated by the community and several others supported by the Ort. Restrictions were also applied to Yiddish language newspapers.

These measures were accompanied by bans on the speaking of Yiddish and the observance of the Sabbath. On December 1, the Bukovina authorities began to enforce a decree, providing that the Roumanian language be used in offices and places of business, and that proprietors failing to display signs “Roumanian spoken here,” were liable to punishment and the closing of their business upon the third offense. Instances of the closing of shops, as well as legal proceedings against elderly Jews, because of the use of Yiddish, were recorded in many parts of Roumania. On December 15, the Governor of Bukovina issued a decree compelling Jewish merchants to keep their shops open on Saturdays and on Jewish holidays. This practice was later extended to the provinces of Bessarabia and Moldavia.

At the same time, Jews were deprived of their political rights as well as of legal political representation. For many years they had been represented by the Union of Roumanian Jews and the Jewish Party. In 1938, these were suppressed along with all political parties which were superseded by the Front of National Renascence. From this Front, which has become the sole party authorized to elect and present candidates for national and local elections, the Jewish population was excluded. On January 6, Foreign Minister Gregoire Gafencu disclosed that all minorities, except the Jews, were invited to join the Front where “opportunities will be given to them to voice their national demands.” As far as Jews are concerned, the Minister added, “their interests will be protected indirectly because the new party, being all-inclusive, would absorb the anti-Semitic factions and thus make them law-abiding.”

Mindful of the gravity of the situation, Jewish representatives, submitted a memorandum to the Government, on January 11, requesting permission to set up a repre-
sentative body of Roumanian Jews since they had been excluded from the official party. In the meantime, new parliamentary elections were decreed for May. Although the Government had assured the minorities liberal treatment in the election campaign, the Jews were uncertain whether or not Jewish members of professional organizations, which constitute the electoral bodies under the new Constitution, were eligible to vote. Later, the Executive Council of the Front of National Renascence refused to accept the Jewish candidates nominated by the Jewish economic organizations in Bucharest and Cernauti. When, therefore, on May 28, the list of candidates was made public, it contained not a single Jewish name, in spite of the fact that 75% of the eligible Jewish electorate had applied for registration as electors. Thus, the Jewish population has remained without an elected representative in the Roumanian Parliament. On June 6, Chief Rabbi Niemirower, as a member of the clergy, was appointed by the King ex-officio member of the Senate.

The most serious of the legacies of the Goga regime was the decree of January 22, 1938, concerning the revision of naturalization and citizenship, which the succeeding Governments of Dr. Christea and M. Calinescu have been rigorously enforcing. The citizenship of at least 150,000 Jews is subject to revision under this decree, although other estimates placed the number at 250,000. On July 4, the Ministry of Justice announced the appointment of a special commission to deal with all those persons who had already lost their citizenship. Although at that time the status of such persons had not yet been defined, the Ministry of the Interior ordered the registration of all denationalized Jews, who were henceforth to be regarded as foreigners who must apply to the police for permits to remain in the country. This status was confirmed in a decree published by the Ministry of Justice on September 21. At the same time, it was announced that denationalized persons who had lived in the Old Kingdom and who were foreigners prior to August 16, 1916, as well as persons who had settled in Bessarabia after March 7, 1918, and in Transylvania and Bukovina after December 3, 1918, were permitted to remain in the country for no more than three months;
others would be allowed to stay for one year. On March 1, 1939, the number of denationalized Jews was officially established at 43,000. The last day for the completion of the revision of citizenship was set for March 31, of that year. However, owing to the international situation and the partial mobilization of Roumania, publication of the results was postponed until the end of August, 1939.

The publication of the decree of September 21 threw the Jewish community into great panic and aroused a painful impression abroad. The following day, the Roumanian delegation to the League of Nations declared that there was no cause for alarm as the denationalized Jews would not be molested at least until 1940, and that even after the completion of the revision, which was to take at least one more year, the Government did not intend to take harsh measures, but would seek "humanitarian" means to secure their emigration.

While the danger of expulsion was, for the time being, averted, the denationalization decree brought incalculable hardship not only to those immediately affected by it but upon the entire Jewish community. Those whose citizenship had been revoked automatically lost the right to work, while the rights of others whose status was pending were restricted. Early in July, 1938, the Ministry of Transport barred all disfranchised Jewish engineers from practicing. In August, the Ministry of Finance decreed that only bona fide citizens would be allowed to renew their liquor and tobacco licenses. Late in November, 1938, the Chambers of Commerce annulled the registration of all firms whose owners had been denationalized, who were thus barred from continuing in their trade. Similarly, the Bar Associations expelled Jewish members whose citizenship had been either revoked or whose status was still in question. All this led to a sharp increase in the number of destitute Jews, making intolerable the already heavy burden of the Jewish community. In addition to all this, the Government, by a decree of June 12, 1939, imposed a special tax, ranging from 2,000 to 10,000 Lei annually, upon disfranchised Jews.

The economic drive, ostensibly directed against the disfranchised Jews, was extended also to others whose citizenship had either been validated or never even questioned.
This was the case particularly of businesses and trades depending upon Government or municipal license. Not even war veterans, war widows and descendants of veterans of the War of Independence were exempted. In addition, the economic and professional activities of Jews continued to be circumscribed by the Labor Law of 1934, which lays down the principle of "Roumanian" predominance in economic and professional life.

Having reduced the situation of the Jews to its present plight, the Roumanian Government, following the example of Poland, hit upon emigration as a solution of the Jewish question. On September 22, the Roumanian delegation at Geneva intimated that its Government might seek international action to find emigration outlets for the disfranchised Jews and others. The following day, the delegation began steps to induce the League of Nations to convene an intergovernmental conference to deal exclusively with the question of the emigration of Jews. On December 29, Foreign Minister Gregoire Gafencu, broadcast a statement declaring that his Government has already entered into contact with colonial powers in order to accelerate the emigration of Roumanian Jews.

Again upon leaving for Warsaw on March 3, Minister Gafencu declared that Roumania would seek a joint policy on Jewish emigration during his visit to Poland. At the same time it was reported that M. Gafencu had approached the United States Minister to Roumania in an effort to induce the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee, created by the Evian Conference, to include in its scope a study of the question of organized Jewish emigration from Roumania and Poland. On April 26, Minister Gafencu was said to have discussed the question with the British Government and to have received a promise, akin to the assurances reported given to the Polish Foreign Minister, that Great Britain would examine Roumania's proposals for Jewish emigration.

For this reason the Roumanian Government evinced great sympathy for Zionism. Replying to a delegation of Zionist leaders, headed by Chief Rabbi Niemirower, in the middle of January, 1938, M. Gafencu declared that he had always been keenly interested in the Zionist cause and that
he realized the importance of large scale emigration to Palestine. On January 16, he expressed the opinion that Poland and Roumania should cooperate on the solution of their Jewish problem through emigration, in which first consideration should be given to Palestine.

In line with this policy, the Government began negotiations with Jewish leaders with regard to organizing Jewish emigration. A preliminary meeting for this purpose took place on December 15. On March 1, 1939, a high Government official disclosed that Roumania was prepared to permit emigrating Jews to transfer their capital and property; that the Government had worked out, in collaboration with another power, a plan for the mass settlement of Jews in a territory outside of Palestine; and that 8,000 Jews would be settled there during the first year. The same official asserted also that Jewish leaders would be consulted on all emigration activities and that a special body would be set up to supervise the project.

The Government also suggested that the Jews organize an emigration council. The Jewish leaders were reported to have agreed, on these conditions: that the Government’s demand for an annual emigration of 50,000 Jews within the next three years be reduced to 7,500, or the equivalent of the annual Jewish birthrate; that the Government contribute about $3,500,000 to a fund to assist the emigrants; that it provide free transportation on Roumanian railways and steamers for the emigrants; that it assist in training prospective emigrants; that war veterans and war widows and orphans and the families of other Jews who have resided in the country for two and three centuries, be reinstated in their citizenship; and that it procure the cooperation of the Roumanian National Bank in facilitating the transfer of the capital of emigrants.

It was learned from Government quarters that while not all these conditions were acceptable to the Government, the principle of sharing the costs of emigration was recognized as justified. The Government was also said to be willing to give free transportation and to consider the transfer of property provided it did not injure the country’s finances.

The Government’s eagerness to promote the emigration
of Jews explains its attitude towards Jewish refugees and transients. Thus, at the end of December, 1938, all Jewish refugee offices were placed under police guard, and the authorities sought to deport several hundred refugees who had entered the country secretly from Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. About the same time, a party of 140 Hungarian Jews, who arrived on a cattle boat at Giurgiu, on the Danube, en route to Palestine, was not permitted, when ice blocked the ship, to land and continue by rail to Constanza.

In August and September, the Government instructed its consulates abroad not to issue transit visas to Jews. Inasmuch as Constanza has for a long time been a transit center for refugees en route to Palestine, the ban on transit visas resulted in great hardship to emigrants from central and eastern European countries to the Holy Land. Following representations by the Polish Gdynia-American Line, which had many ships plying between Constanza and Palestine, Roumania permitted the transit of Jewish passengers under the Company’s guarantee that they would proceed immediately to Palestine. On October 14, the Roumanian Minister of the Interior notified the Palestine Office in Bucharest that Jews going to Palestine from Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States would be permitted to cross Roumania, provided they held immigration certificates and steamship tickets.

As most of the refugees who enter Roumania come with the purpose of embarking for Palestine, the amendment to the Palestine Immigration Ordinance of May 4, 1939, increasing the penalties upon those aiding illegal immigration, caused an extremely tragic situation, since Roumania would not allow them to return. Already on April 2, the Government barred the debarkation of 269 refugees on a Roumanian steamer who returned from Palestine. Late in May, over 300 refugees were stranded in Roumania under the most pitiful conditions.

The period under review was also marked by a flare-up of anti-Jewish violence which was part of a new campaign of terrorism by the suppressed Iron Guard. On November 18, 1938, the synagogue of Ereschitza was dynamited and completely destroyed. This was followed two days later
by a violent explosion which wrecked the interior of the synagogue of Alba Julia. Several days later, serious anti-Jewish riots occurred in Transylvania and Bukovina in which synagogues were bombed and set on fire. In a number of towns, lumber yards owned by Jews were set on fire, and frequent attacks on Jews occurred in Cernauti. The continual bombing of synagogues forced the Government to station patrols in front of all the synagogues in Bucharest.

The most outrageous event occurred on November 27, when a bomb exploded in a Jewish theatre in Timisoara, killing three and injuring eleven. The renewed wave of terrorism reached its climax on November 28, when two Iron Guard students shot and killed Dr. Florian Stefenescu-Gonja, the rector of the University of Cluj, for his fight against the Iron Guard and for his suppression of anti-Jewish disorders, while Under-Secretary for Education. The Government retaliated with severe measures, which resulted in the slaying of Codreanu and thirteen aides in an alleged attempt to escape from jail, and in the imprisonment of many thousand other Guardists. Although the terrorism against the Jewish population continued for several days, strong measures on the part of the Government finally arrested it.

XI. OTHER BALKAN COUNTRIES

1. Bulgaria

Following several years of respite, during which anti-Jewish terrorism, which had been rampant between 1933 and 1935, subsided, such activities, instigated by Germany, increased once again. The period under review recorded extensive anti-Jewish agitation, boycott and, occasionally, violence also. On January 25, 1939, anti-Semitic handbills calling for "Death to all Jews" were distributed in Sofia. The economic position of the Jews, too, continued to decline.

The Bulgarian Government, however, continued its policy of preventing anti-Semitism from developing into
a political force. In this, it had the approval of responsible
groups in the country. On February 22, 1939, the Minister
of the Interior declared that Jews in Bulgaria enjoy and
will continue to enjoy the same rights as other Bulgarian
citizens. Reassuring statements were also made by other
members of the Government, which was active in sup-
pressing anti-Jewish demonstrations. It interned Professor
Kantardjieff, leader of the Bulgarian anti-Semitic organi-
zation, and committed ten of its members to trial in con-
nection with anti-Jewish disturbances. In order to put a
stop to anti-Jewish agitation in Bulgarian schools and
universities, the Ministry of Public Instruction issued, on
April 10, 1939, a decree requiring teachers and instructors
to take severe measures against instigators of such activ-
ities.

Like many other countries, Bulgaria, too, adopted an
attitude unfavorable to Jewish refugees. On January 31,
1939, the police issued an order requiring a large number
of German, Italian, Spanish and Greek Jews, including
many who had been residing in Bulgaria for decades, to
leave the country within a week or a fortnight. This order
gave rise to fears of possible wholesale expulsion of about
6,000 Jews. On February 22, M. Nedeff, Minister of the
Interior, denied the reports of wholesale expulsion, but
revealed that the expulsion orders had been temporarily
suspended and that a special commission had been set up
to collect data and recommend means of regulating the
refugee problem. On April 30, the Jewish Telegraphic
Agency reported that foreign Jews in Bulgaria had again
been ordered to leave within two to fifteen days.

Like Yugoslavia, Bulgaria has been confronted with the
choice of cooperating either with the Rome-Berlin Axis or
with her Balkan neighbors and Western Europe. While she
hopes that Germany might aid her in the revision of her
frontiers, yet she fears the price of German assistance.
In Bulgaria, as in Yugoslavia, pro-democratic sentiment
is strong, and the Government has frequently been com-
pelled to suppress anti-German and anti-Italian demonstra-
tions. It is obvious that the Jewish situation in Bulgaria
is closely bound up with Bulgaria's foreign policy.
2. Greece

Although, since 1936, Greece has been living under a dictatorial regime closely modeled on that of Germany, the country has been free of active anti-Semitism. Indeed, on many occasions the Premier-Dictator, General John Metaxas, reiterated that no anti-Semitism would be tolerated in Greece as long as he rules. This attitude has been maintained in spite of the close association between Greece and Germany.

At one time, notably in November, German pressure succeeded in causing the Greek Government to issue an order to the newspapers that they were not to publish any further news regarding the anti-Jewish activities in Germany, unless it came from German sources. This order was later relaxed to some extent. In the same month, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported that Greek consulates were instructed not to issue visas to Jews, including tourists and transients. Nevertheless, subsequent reports did not indicate any departure from the fair treatment accorded the Jews of Greece.

3. Yugoslavia

The position of the 75,000 Jews in Yugoslavia has been and continues to be threatened by the march of international events. Torn by political strife and by grave religious and national conflicts, Yugoslavia has been made the spearhead of the Rome-Berlin Axis drive into the Balkan Peninsula. The unpopular pro-German and pro-Italian policy of Prime Minister Milan Stoyadinovitch was continued by his successors. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and Albania's loss of independence rendered the international situation of Yugoslavia extremely grave. A persistent policy of encirclement finally forced Yugoslavia into the position of what has been diplomatically described as a junior partner of the Rome-Berlin orbit. These developments culminated, during the state
visit of the Regent to Berlin early in June, in the German
guarantee of the Yugoslavian borders.

These developments naturally aroused anxiety among the
Jewish population, which feared unfavorable internal
repercussions and the growth of the National Socialist
groups. These fears were intensified by the continuing
widespread Nazi agitation and the persistent rumors that
the Government was about to embark upon an anti-Jewish
policy. After the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the
apprehensions of the Jewish population increased still
further and found expression in the growing number of
conversions. Early in April, 300 Jews in Zagreb who,
though only 3% of the 9,500 Jews of the city, had hitherto
provided one-third of the Jewish community’s tax income,
were reported to have been baptized. These conversions
assumed such proportions as to persuade the Congress of
the Protestant Church, held on April 5, 1939, to restrict
the conversion of Jews by imposing more severe conditions
of baptism. The uncertainty of Yugoslavia’s position at
that time was reported also to have moved many Jews to
prepare for emigration.

The Government tried to allay these fears by assuring
the Jews that there was no danger of any infringement
upon their rights. Addressing a public meeting, in Septem-
ber, 1938, Dr. Anton Koroschetz, then Minister of the
Interior, declared: “We share with the Jews all the priv-
ileges that the laws of the country confer upon us.” On
November 2, Premier Stoyadinovitch assured Dr. Pijade
Bukic, president of the B’nai B’rith, that all rumors about
impending anti-Jewish legislation were baseless, as such
action was contrary to the Government’s policy, as well as
to his personal convictions. Assurances of this kind were
reiterated by other members of the Government. On
May 7, the Regent, Prince Paul, gave an audience to Chief
Rabbi Isaac Alkally, who informed him on the state of the
Jewish community.

While the Government emphasized its continuing respect
for the equality of the Jews in Yugoslavia, it made it clear
that as far as foreign Jews were concerned, Yugoslavia
would not wish an increase in its religious or linguistic
minorities by the immigration of Jews from other countries. Early in January, 1939, it was reported that Yugoslavia was planning to expel all Jewish refugees from Germany and Italy, who had come into the country during the preceding five years. On January 6, however, it was learned that the Government had cancelled deportation orders against Jews who had been in the country more than four years and had renewed their residential permits. At the same time, it was admitted that the gradual elimination of foreign Jews from Yugoslavia had been going on for months. According to statistics published by the Union of Jewish Communities, early in May, there were a total of 624 foreign Jewish families in Yugoslavia, numbering 2,182 individuals, in addition to 450 refugees.

The international position of Yugoslavia did not succeed in erasing the pro-French sentiment of large sections of the people, or in discouraging the persistent demonstrations for the restoration of democratic institutions. On April 24, 1939, the democratic students of the University of Belgrade, who constitute 90% of the entire student body, in a special issue of the Mlodost, condemned anti-Semitism, and appealed to the entire youth to combat racialism as the "grave of civilization." Coincidental with the Regent's visit to Italy, Belgrade students adopted a resolution which was widely distributed, calling for a solution of internal problems on the basis of democracy and equality by a fraternal accord between the Slavs, Croats and Slovenes within their common state.

Much of the energy of the Jewish community was devoted to assisting the refugees. It also followed with deep anxiety developments in Palestine. On April 27, 1939, the Seventh Congress of the Jewish Communities of Yugoslavia opened in Belgrade and adopted resolutions expressing sympathy with the refugees in all parts of the world and a desire to cooperate with the Jewish Agency in the upbuilding of Palestine. About the same time, the Ministry of Finance approved a Palestine transfer arrangement under which prospective emigrants may transfer their capital through the medium of Yugoslavian-Palestinian trade.
XII. PALESTINE

There were three distinct stages in the fateful development of the Palestine situation during the past year. The first stage was a period of suspense, during which the fate of the partition proposal of the Peel Royal Commission for Palestine was decided. It was brought to a close with the publication of the Woodhead Commission Report on November 9, and the official abandonment of partition by the British Government. The second stage continued through the Round Table Conferences in London, during which the British Government sought a solution to the Palestine problem through negotiations with Arab and Jewish representatives. With the publication of the White Paper on May 17, the Palestine situation entered a new phase.

During the time the Woodhead Commission was conducting its inquiries, the British Government maintained the position that partition offered the best and most hopeful means of solving the deadlock in Palestine. A statement to this effect was made in the House of Commons, on July 13, 1938, by Malcolm MacDonald, Colonial Secretary. The pro-partition sentiment in general was so strong as to cause the London Times to declare, in a leading editorial on August 3, that the Government could not commit itself absolutely to partition until it had considered the report of the Woodhead Commission and had obtained the sanction of the League of Nations for its ultimate decision.

Division of opinion among Jews on the question of partition continued much along the lines of the preceding year. At Geneva, the Permanent Mandates Commission, in its report of August 20, 1938, on the situation in Palestine took note of the fact that Great Britain still considered partition the best and most hopeful solution. Owing to the critical situation in Europe at that time, the Palestine question was relegated to a secondary place and was not a topic of extended debate either in the Council or Assembly of the League of Nations. However, much of the discussion
on Palestine before the Sixth Political Commission on September 20, was devoted to a frank criticism of partition. On September 23, the Assembly adopted a report declaring that the partition proposals continued to give rise to divergences of opinion, which sometimes amount to fundamental objections. The problem, the report continued, was made particularly complex by the importance attached, on the one hand, to the establishment of a national homeland for Jews scattered in all parts of the world, and, on the other hand, to the safeguarding of the rights of the population in Palestine. In the resolution adopted on the basis of the report, the Assembly expressed the hope that the problems relating to Palestine would be solved in the near future and that account would be taken of all legitimate interests at stake.

Emphasis on the urgency of a speedy solution of the future status of Palestine was a recurrent theme throughout this period, as much of the violence was attributed to the state of uncertainty. On July 20, 1938, the Colonial Secretary declared in the House of Commons that the Partition Commission would lose no time in completing its report. His statement was made in reply to a question whether the Commission had been asked to expedite its report in order that the British policy might be announced, as a first step to put an end to the terror in Palestine. The desirability of making such an announcement at the earliest possible moment was stressed both in Parliament as well as in the press. The imperative need of ending the state of uncertainty was also stressed in the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission.

The question of Jewish immigration continued to be a disturbing factor and a source of anxiety. On July 15, 1938, the Earl of Winterton, one of Great Britain's two representatives on the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee, stated before the Evian Conference that there was no foundation for the belief that the refugee problem could be solved by opening the doors of Palestine, because the country was too small and because of the special considerations of the Mandate and prevailing local conditions. Commenting on this statement, the London Times declared that the preservation of a "certain balance in the popula-
tion" in Palestine was more imperative than ever before. This reopened the question of the "political level" of immigration which the Government adopted for the interim period until the adoption of a final policy on Palestine. On July 20, Geoffrey Mander queried the Colonial Secretary as to the basis of Lord Winterton's statement at Evian and asked whether it indicated that the principle of economic absorption had been abandoned by the Government. The Secretary declared that the restrictions upon immigration were a temporary measure which had the approval of the Mandates Commission.

In the meantime, as the Woodhead Commission was drawing up its report, alarming rumors began to circulate regarding the Government's future policy. In the middle of August, the New Zionist Organization (Revisionists) declared, in a public statement, that influential political groups in London were endeavoring to persuade the British Government to formulate a solution which would render impossible any further large-scale immigration into Palestine. On September 3, at an extraordinary conference of the Keren Hayesod in Antwerp, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of the Jewish Agency, warned that Jews would reject any solution which would rob them of the hope of large-scale immigration. As the rumors that the Woodhead Commission would suggest a radical revision of British policy persisted, the Jewish Agency issued a statement on October 6, in which it reaffirmed the determination of Jews not to consider any solution involving a minority status, nor any arbitrary limitation of immigration. Continuing, the statement declared that, notwithstanding the Arab terror in the past two and a half years, the Jewish people were ready to cooperate with them for the general welfare of the country, but that compromises such as suggested would be firmly rejected. The tensity of the situation remained high, even though the Colonial Secretary disavowed these rumors on the same day that the Jewish Agency issued its statement. He declared that the Government could not yet have adopted a policy, as the Woodhead Commission Report was not yet completed, and that no final decision would be taken until the House of Commons had had a full opportunity to discuss and pass upon it.
On October 11, Moshe Shertok, head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, dwelt upon the gravity of the situation at a meeting, in Jerusalem, of the Smaller Actions Committee of the World Zionist Organization, as he described the machinations going on behind the political scenes in London. Several days later, Dr. Weizmann conveyed to the Colonial Secretary the information that the Yishub was solidly behind him in resisting any plans for a radical revision of Jewish rights in Palestine under the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. Foreshadowing the events which shortly followed, the London *Daily Telegraph* reported, on October 19, that the Colonial Secretary had decided to recommend the abandonment of partition in the light of the conclusions reached by the Woodhead Commission.

II

On November 9, the British Government made public the long awaited report of the Woodhead Commission and accompanied it by a statement of policy which summarily dismissed the recommendations of the Peel Commission and disposed of the entire question of partition. Rejecting the tripartite division of Palestine recommended by the Peel Commission, the Woodhead Commission formulated three plans of its own, of which only one received the support of the majority as the "best devisable" under the circumstances. This plan, designated as C, divided Palestine into three parts: a) Northern Palestine, to be retained under a Mandate; b) Southern Palestine, the Negev, also to be retained under a Mandate; and c) the Central part of Palestine, to be divided into Arab and Jewish states with Jerusalem as an enclave to be retained under a permanent Mandate. It was, however, evident that the Commission itself was dissatisfied with its conclusions. "Apart from political considerations," the Commission concluded, "the question whether partition is practicable or not concerns chiefly finance and economics. Taking into account the latter considerations, the Commission concluded that if they were to adhere strictly to their terms of reference, they would have no alternative but to report that they
were unable to recommend boundaries for the proposed areas which will give a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States." In order, however, "not to end their enquiry with a purely negative conclusion," the Commission suggested a modified form of partition called economic federalism.

In its statement of policy, the Government concluded that the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal for setting up independent Arab and Jewish states were so great that this solution of the Palestine problem was impracticable. As one alternative, the Government proposed to call a conference in London of Arab and Jewish representatives on the question of future policy, including the question of immigration, in the belief that "the surest foundation for peace and progress in Palestine would be an understanding between Arabs and Jews." Should the London discussions not produce an agreement within a reasonable time, the Government warned, it would make its own decision in the light of its examination of the problem and of the discussions in London, and announce the policy which it proposed to pursue. In settling its policy, the Government concluded, it "will keep constantly in mind the international character of the Mandate with which they have been entrusted and their obligations in that respect."

The interest in the Woodhead Commission's report was almost totally eclipsed by the public attention given to the Government's statement of policy. As a document, it was of course rejected by both Arabs and Jews. The Jewish Agency characterized it as a "travesty on the obligations undertaken on behalf of the League of Nations." The reaction of the Jews in Palestine was that of "profound amazement at the complete ignoring of Jewish rights and needs" by the Woodhead Commission.

While the rejection of the Report was greeted with satisfaction, the ambiguity of the statement of policy gave rise to serious forebodings. On the principle of the Conference, there was general agreement both among Jews as well as Arabs. The difficulties lay in the question of procedure, representation, and the basis of discussion. The question of procedure was soon disposed of. When it became evi-
dent that there was no possibility of bringing together the Arab and Jewish delegations, the idea of a Round Table Conference of the different parties was abandoned in favor of direct discussions with British representatives. The question of Arab representation came close to preventing the convening of the Conference. The last question, the basis of discussion, proved the greatest stumbling block and finally wrecked the Conference.

During the intervening period, between November 9, 1938 and February 7, 1939, the opening day of the Conference, Jews and Arabs were busily engaged selecting their delegates and formulating their programs. The announcement, on November 9, that the British Government would also invite representatives of the Arab states aroused grave apprehensions among Jews, who felt that these states had no special status vis-à-vis Palestine. The Hebrew press in Palestine expressed the fear that the participation of the Arab states forebode a new policy opposed to Zionist interests. Such participation was officially contested by the Jewish Agency. On November 16, the Zionist Actions Committee adopted a resolution voicing apprehension at the introduction of representatives of other Arab countries into the Arab-Jewish discussions. Criticism came also from other quarters. On November 10, the London Times deplored the intention of the Government to invite the neighboring Arab states "whose interference in 1936 was regarded both by Great Britain and the League of Nations as undesirable and embarrassing." On December 7, Mr. MacDonald announced that Egypt, Iraq, Saudi-Arabia and Transjordan, as well as the Jewish Agency, had agreed to send delegates to the Conference.

At that time the question of Palestine Arab representation had not yet been decided. In the statement of policy, the Government reserved the right to "refuse those leaders whom they regard as responsible for the campaign of assassination and violence." On the same day, the Colonial Secretary declared that Haj Amin el Husseini, Mufti of Jerusalem was unacceptable to the British Government as one of the Arab representatives. The Arab High Committee at first resented the exclusion of the Mufti, and
declared that under no circumstances would it enter into any negotiations with the Jews or with the British unless the Mufti were invited. Simultaneously, the Arab National Defense Party, representing the moderate elements in Palestine raised the demand for representation. This met with the adamant refusal of the Mufti, who threatened to withdraw his delegates from the Conference if the opposition were represented. It was only upon the insistence of the Arab Conference in Cairo and after the intervention of the British Government that the Mufti grudgingly agreed that two members of the National Defense Party be present, in an unofficial capacity.

As was noted above, the main difficulty was to evolve a common basis of discussion. The Arab extremists were intransigent in their position that the negotiations could not be brought about unless their demands were first granted in full. These included the nullification of the Balfour Declaration, the total stoppage of the immigration of, and of land sales to, Jews, and the creation of an Arab state with a Jewish minority under a treaty with Great Britain. The National Defense Party (Arab moderates) suggested a modified Legislative Council, and cessation of Jewish immigration and land sales as a condition precedent to the discussion of Arab-Jewish relations. A program along these lines was finally formulated at a week-long conference of Arab delegates in Cairo, which closed on January 20.

In its comments, on November 9, on the Woodhead Commission Report and the Government's statement of policy, the Jewish Agency had declared that "the Jewish Agency can be a party to further discussions only on the basis of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate." On November 11, a special conference of the Zionist Actions Committee, attended by 73 members from various countries, was convened in London for the purpose of drafting a program for the forthcoming Conference. This program was embodied in a series of resolutions, adopted on November 16, which rejected every thought of a Jewish minority status in Palestine, expressed the willingness to cooperate with the Arabs for the general welfare of the country, and reiterated that the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate
were the only bases upon which the Jewish Agency could participate in the discussions. In order to achieve unity among the different Zionist groups, the Actions Committee endorsed the course of the Executive in its negotiations with the Revisionists. Expressions of the united will of Jewry to resist any infringement on the National Home in Palestine, were reiterated at various Jewish conferences held during that time.

On January 27, 1939, the Jewish Agency designated a committee, representing Zionists and non-Zionists throughout the world, to aid in the discussions at the Conference; it later included the Agudath Israel, extreme Orthodox party. On January 31, the Jewish Representative Assembly in Jerusalem elected a delegation to proceed to London. In a statement announcing the election of the delegates, the Assembly declared that there could be no compromise on the historic rights of the Jewish people in Palestine, and insisted on an "integral realization of the Balfour Declaration and on immigration to be regulated in accordance with the absorptive capacity of the country, free from any restrictions that spell a minority status."

What disturbed the Jews so much, was the memory of past experience which showed that whenever the British Government had embarked upon a new policy, it was invariably followed by a further whittling down of the rights of Jews. The confidence in the Government's policy was further shaken by its adamant refusal to admit German-Jewish refugee children for whom place was being made in Palestine. The plan involved about 10,000 children who were listed for adoption by Palestine Jewish families, and was part of a general world-wide movement which arose out of the November outrages in Germany. A memorandum outlining the plan was submitted to the Government by the Jewish Agency on November 22, 1938. Two days later it came up for discussion in Parliament. Although the Government was sharply rebuked for imposing political restrictions on the Palestine immigration policy, the Colonial Secretary refused to heed the requests for relaxing the policy as a step toward the solution of the refugee problem. Summarizing the case for the Government, Lord Winterton declared that the Intergovern-
mental Refugee Committee did not propose to force immigration into Palestine without regard to local conditions. The only concrete proposal during the debate came from Winston Churchill. He offered a ten-year program, in which Jewish immigrants would number about 30,000 per year and which would be equitable both to Jews and to Arabs. Should the Arabs disagree, he urged that the Government go on with this program notwithstanding Arab opposition.

In the Palestine debate in the House of Lords on December 8, 1938, prominent speakers joined in pleading for enlarged immigration. Initiating the debate, Lord Snell declared that he failed to understand why the Government did not allow greater Jewish settlement in Palestine, especially children whom Palestine Jews were prepared to adopt. The Archbishop of Canterbury made a fervent plea that the Government approve the plan for the immigration of German-Jewish children. The debate was extended to cover general questions regarding Palestine as Lord Snell emphasized that the Balfour Declaration remained intact and that the Government could not alter it. Other speakers criticized the ambiguity of the Government's policy. Winding up the debate as Government spokesman, Lord Dufferin declared that the Government was entering the Conference on the basis of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. Continuing, he said that he appreciated the moving appeal of the Archbishop of Canterbury and of Lord Reading for the admission of 10,000 children, but he felt that the Government must consider the danger of prejudicing the deliberations of the Conference whose success was in the interest of the Jews themselves.

The firm attitude of the Government in refusing to consider the granting of immigration certificates for immediate needs of German-Jewish children aroused the greatest resentment both in Palestine and abroad. On December 13, 1938, the British Zionist Federation joined representatives of the Jewish Agency, the Vaad Leumi and other Zionist and non-Zionist organizations, in a statement that under such circumstances there must be serious doubts as to the advisability of participation in the Conference by the
Jewish Agency. The following day the Colonial Secretary again rejected the plea, adding that this did not necessarily mean that the request of the Jewish Agency had been permanently refused. He rejected the request, he stated, in order not to prejudice the Conference, and admitted that the Government was under pressure by Arab quarters for a complete stoppage of Jewish immigration pending the outcome of the Conference.

The action of the Government in refusing the admission of the refugee children aroused uneasiness in Jewish circles, as it was felt that it was an indication that the Government was approaching the Conference with a prejudiced mind. Indeed, on February 3, Mr. MacDonald told members of the press that the Government had already certain ideas for the solution of the Palestine problem but had not formed any definite plan nor would it do so until after the discussions. Although Mr. MacDonald had emphasized that the Government would enter the Conference bound by the obligations of the Mandate, but prepared to hear arguments from all sides, the actual course of the Conference realized the worst fear of the Jews.

The heralded conference opened in St. James Palace in London on February 7 with an address of welcome by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain on behalf of the British Government and replies by the various heads of delegations. In virtually identical addresses to the Arab and Jewish delegations, the Prime Minister referred to the Colonial Secretary's statement of November 9, in the House of Commons, that the Government was entering the discussions bound by its obligations under the Mandate—obligations to both Arabs and Jews—and bound by its duty to Parliament, to other members of the League of Nations and to the United States. "But," he added, "the Government would not seek to prevent either Arabs or Jewish representatives from presenting arguments, if they are so disposed, as to why the Mandate should be changed." The Government, the Prime Minister concluded, would not offer its own views until both Arabs and Jews have been given a full opportunity of putting their case. He expressed the hope that peace may be restored to Palestine.

Acknowledging the address of welcome, Dr. Weizmann
emphasized that it had always been the aspiration of the Jewish people to have peace in Palestine "which is compatible with the maintenance of our fundamental rights," and that the hopes and prayers of the Jews throughout the world were centered on the Conference "with unshaken confidence in British good faith." Speaking on behalf of the Jewish Community in Palestine, Isaac ben Zvi, President of the Vaad Leumi, expressed its determination to continue in all circumstances to devote its energy to the work of reconstruction and to do its utmost to preserve peace and justice in that country. Dr. Stephen S. Wise, speaking as an American, recalled the historic relations of the United States to the policy embodied in the Balfour Declaration and reaffirmed in the Palestine Mandate, to facilitate the establishment of the Jewish National Home. Prince Mohamed Abdul Moneim of Egypt expressed the hope that the Conference would arrive at a decisive as well as just solution of the Palestine problem and that the British Government "would effectively cooperate with us in finding a way to peace."

The Arab and Jewish positions had, as was noted above, already been made clear before the Conference was opened. On February 8, Dr. Weizmann restated the Jewish position in four principal demands: 1) continuation of the League of Nations Mandate; 2) Jewish immigration in accordance with the principle of economic absorptivity; 3) an active policy of development in Palestine; and 4) effective safeguards against a minority status for Jews. The Arab case was presented the following day and included demands for the abrogation of the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration, the banning of the immigration of, and land sales to, Jews, and the creation of an independent Arab State in Palestine. The position of the British Government was summed up thus: it felt obliged to help in the upbuilding of the Jewish National Home but it was not certain whether it was prepared to defend that Home at the point of a bayonet.

As the Government appeared to make no headway in the matter of reconciling the demands of the two delegations, it decided early to take matters in its own hands. On February 26, 1939, in an effort to break the deadlock,
the Government submitted to the consideration of the delegates its proposals for the solution of the problem. The main feature of these proposals, as revealed in the unofficial text, was the ending of the Mandate and the establishment of an independent Palestine State, in treaty relations with Great Britain. All details were to be worked out at a future Round Table Conference composed of British, Arab and Jewish representatives.

Coming in the wake of all kinds of prognostications and rumors to the effect that the British Cabinet accepted in principle the creation of an independent Arab State with a Jewish minority, these proposals caused deep dismay in Jewish and pro-Zionist circles. In Palestine, the Arab extremists interpreted the British proposals as a concession won by their campaign of violence, and their jubilant demonstrations inspired increased terrorism. As a consequence, Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald made a statement in the House of Commons, on February 27, in which he characterized the press reports concerning the Government's intentions as "misleading." He appealed to the public in England and in Palestine to suspend judgment until an authoritative statement could be made. He refused, however, to give an assurance that the Government was not departing from the principles of the Mandate in its proposals, on the ground that it would be premature to make a statement while the discussions were still in progress. To quiet the apprehensions of many members, Mr. MacDonald assured the House that the Government would not depart from its Palestine policy before gaining its approval.

The assurances of the Colonial Secretary that the Government proposals were not the last word could not remove the impression that British policy was prejudicial to Jewish interests. The persistent refusals of Mr. MacDonald to give definite assurances that the Government would fulfill the obligations under the Mandate served to enhance this impression. In the next several days, the Jewish delegation was weighing the decision to withdraw from the Conference. In order to avert such withdrawal, the Government, on March 2, submitted compromise proposals to the Jewish delegation. Evidence of the desire to avert the withdrawal
of the Jews and to appease public opinion was also seen in the statement of the Colonial Secretary in the House of Commons on March 8, in which he declared that the British Government considered itself bound by the terms of the Mandate.

Although the Jewish conference committee decided to postpone its dissolution, the situation remained fundamentally unchanged and the position of the Jews unaltered. Indeed, on March 8, the Zionist Organization of America officially recalled its delegates "in view of the Government's proposal to establish an independent state with an Arab majority — which plan offers no basis for any further discussion." On March 10, the Jewish conference committee addressed a letter to the Government outlining in clear terms its attitude towards the proposals placed before the Conference. It rejected all suggestions theretofore made by the Government and declared that the Jews did not consider useful any further discussions on the basis of these proposals.

Throughout the sessions of the conference, British public opinion agreed that, in the end, the Government would be obliged to impose its own policy on both Jews and Arabs. But public opinion was not prepared for the Government's going so far as to abandon the Mandate and all that it implied. On March 6, the News Chronicle of London published the result of a survey by the British Institute of Public Opinion on the question whether it was desirable for Great Britain to continue its policy of settling Jews in Palestine. The results showed that 60% of the people were in favor of it, 14% opposed it, while 26% held no definite opinion. Interpreting these results, the News Chronicle declared that British public opinion was markedly pro-Jewish in the present dispute over Palestine and that any departure from the Balfour Declaration would have unfortunate consequences. Other newspapers commented in a similar vein. In an effort to salvage the Jewish National Home, a deputation of British parties led by Leopold S. Amery, former Colonial Secretary, called on Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, on March 13, pleading that he continue the policy of establishing a Jewish National Home
in Palestine, and deprecating in particular the proposal for the creation of an independent Arab state.

On the evening of March 15, the Government made public its final proposals which envisaged the ultimate independence of Palestine, and a permanent minority status for the Jews, to be maintained by the restriction of Jewish immigration and of land sales to Jews. Specifically, the plan provided for the admission of 10,000 Jewish immigrants annually for the next five years, with an additional 25,000 refugees to be allowed to enter Palestine at any time provided they could be easily absorbed. Special measures were to be adopted to stop illegal immigration. The High Commissioner, according to this plan, would be given special powers to prohibit and regulate the zones of purchase of land by Jews.

This was the main feature of the Government's plan to break the deadlock, reached at the parallel conferences between British representatives and the Arab and Jewish delegations. The plan spelled the doom of the conference and paved the way for the ensuing White Paper. The fact that the independent Arab state demanded by them, was not to materialize at once, was, in itself, sufficient cause for the rejection of the Government plan by the Arabs. In addition, their demand for the complete stoppage of Jewish immigration and land sales had not been met. For the Jews, the most staggering feature of the plan was that it condemned the Palestine Jewish community to the status of a permanent minority, whose number was not to exceed one third of the total population. For these reasons chiefly, both the Arab and the Jewish delegations definitely and officially rejected the British plan, and the conference was brought to an unsuccessful conclusion.

To the Arabs, whose demands were not fully satisfied, the outcome of the Conference was undoubtedly a profound disappointment, but for the Zionist cause the outcome was a disaster. The Jews in Palestine reacted to the Government plan by proclaiming a twenty-four hour strike for March 20. International developments in connection with the Czechoslovakian tragedy, however, compelled its postponement. On April 24, reporting to the Smaller Actions Committee of the World Zionist Organization, in Jeru-
salem, David Ben Gurion declared that the Jews would rather be killed than surrender. The Committee recorded the sentiments of the Jewish community when, on May 4, it resolved to spare no sacrifice in life and property in opposing any regime which tended to undermine the Jewish National Home. Throughout the rest of the world, the plan aroused indignation and dismay at the British Government's disregard of the vital interests of Jews. On May 13, Professor Selig Brodetzky, head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency Executive in London, outlined a six-point program of resistance before the 39th Annual Convention of the English Zionist Federation.

Meanwhile, the Government made preparations for the issuance of the White Paper setting forth in detail the objectives of its new policy. On March 22, the Government made public the conclusions of the Hailsham Commission, which had been appointed to study the 1915 correspondence of Sir Henry McMahon with Arab leaders, in order to determine whether Sir Henry's letters could be rightly interpreted as including Palestine in the territory promised to the Arabs. The Commission concluded that Palestine had definitely been excluded. This fact, the Colonial Secretary declared in the House of Commons, on April 5, was of the utmost importance in any discussion of the Arab claim to independence for Palestine.

At the same time, some of the points of the Government plan were put into practice. On April 5, the Palestine Gazette published an amendment to the Immigration Ordinance, giving the High Commissioner broader powers in controlling immigration, which envisaged a tightening of the "political level" principle. Its legality was contested by the Jewish Agency which demanded that the Ordinance be submitted for a ruling to The Hague Court. Again, the Government clamped down on illegal immigration, when the Colonial Secretary announced, on April 26, that the High Commissioner was authorized to deduct from future immigration quotas the number of illegal and undeportable entrants. The ratification by the British Cabinet on May 10 of the future Palestine policy, brought to a close the second stage in the fateful developments during the review period.
The White Paper was made public on May 17. There is no need of outlining its contents here, as it followed almost identically the text of the Government proposals of March 15. (For the text of the Palestine White Paper see *Contemporary Jewish Record* Vol. II. No. 3). Its sense and meaning were set forth in a solemn declaration made by the Jewish Agency for Palestine on the same day, reading in part as follows: "The new policy for Palestine, laid down by the Mandatory in the White Paper now issued, denies to the Jewish people the right to rebuild their National Home in their ancestral country. It transfers the authority over Palestine to the present Arab majority and puts the Jewish population at the mercy of that majority. It decrees the stoppage of Jewish immigration as soon as the Jews form a third of the total population. It puts up a territorial ghetto for Jews in their own homeland." The declaration concluded with the reaffirmation of the will of the Jews "never to accept the closing to them of the gates of Palestine nor let their National Home be converted into a ghetto." (For complete text, see issue of *Contemporary Jewish Record* cited above.)

Profound as was the disappointment of Jews outside of Palestine with the turn of affairs, to Jews in Palestine it was nothing short of disaster. Their feelings found expression in a riot during the first days after the publication of the White Paper, but more so in the nationwide demonstrations on May 18, which were marked by a general strike, fasting and prayer. During dramatic demonstrations in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa, in the streets as well as in the synagogues, the Palestine Jewish Community vowed: "For the sake of Zion, I shall not hold my peace."

The keynote of the future Jewish action was struck in the manifesto, addressed from Jerusalem by the Keren Hayesod to the Jews of the world, on May 21, in which it counselled that the answer the Jews of the world must give to the White Paper was an enlarged constructive program to accelerate the upbuilding of the Jewish National Home through spurring immigration, increasing the purchase of land, expanding the number of settlements, and stimulating
every phase of economic growth. At the same time, the Jews in Palestine launched a movement of non-cooperation with the Palestine Government. On May 21, a five-point program was discussed by the Vaad Leumi which provided for making the Jewish economy independent of imports, and the Jewish local self-governing bodies, independent of the central Government. Other points provided for the suspension of payment of taxes, for restriction of the use of profit-bearing public services, and for resistance to the domination of the Jerusalem Municipal Government by the Arab minority. The final point called for the training of younger elements for emergency service in order to strengthen the self-defense ability of the Yishub. Registration of all Jews between eighteen and thirty-five years of age, begun several days earlier, had received the widest response.

The White Paper was unfavorably received by the English press and was denounced by wide sections of British public opinion. The London Times expressed doubt whether the new policy would succeed and urged partition as still the best solution. The Manchester Guardian characterized the new policy as disastrous, while the Daily Herald declared that the Jews were being sacrificed. On May 22, in a letter to the Times, Sir Horace Rumbold, Sir Morris Carter, Sir Harold Morris and Professor Reginald Coupland, members of the Peel Royal Commission, sharply criticized the White Paper, expressing their belief that federalism would be the best solution. On May 20, Sir Archibald Sinclair and Lord Meston, Liberal Party leaders in the House of Commons and the House of Lords respectively, issued, on behalf of their Party, a statement of unqualified disapproval of the White Paper, charging that the Government was surrendering to violence and discrediting the British name at home and abroad. The opposition of the Labor Party had been recorded as far back as March 8, when Sir Arthur Greenwood, deputy leader, pledged the Party's determination to fight for the integrity of the Jewish National Home. Opposition was also strong within the ranks of the Conservative Party, although the official position of the Party was that circumstances made the new policy inevitable. All this opposition was reflected
In the stormy debate in Parliament, which opened on May 22.

In moving that the House adopt the Government’s policy for Palestine, Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald repudiated the charge that there had been a breach of faith. After an hour’s resume of the entire situation, he concluded by stating that while he agreed that the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations must be consulted with regard to the policy, he felt that delay was dangerous and accordingly urged the House to give a majority vote in favor of the policy.

In the debate which followed, issue was taken on practically every point of the Colonial Secretary’s defense of the Government’s policy. The debate saw both Arab and Jewish causes vigorously defended. The underlying argument in defence of the proposed policy was that all neighboring Arabs enjoyed independence and there was no reason why the Arabs in Palestine should not also have that right. The underlying argument in opposition to the policy was, to use the words of Tom Williams, Laborite, who opened the debate for the Opposition, that “whatever the interpretation of the Jewish National Home, the stoppage of Jewish immigration or the relegation of the Jews to a minority status must be excluded, because that would place them in a position of being in Palestine on sufferance and not as of right.” A particularly strong impression was made by the statement of Leopold S. Amery. As a former Colonial Secretary, he said, he could testify that when the Balfour Declaration was made, the Government was fully aware of the existence of the Arabs in Palestine. Nevertheless, it proceeded with its policy because, in its view, it saw a vision of justice. The White Paper now issued, he continued, was a repudiation of the pledge under which the Jews had built a tremendous structure. Colonel Josiah C. Wedgwood characterized the White Paper as the antithesis of honor and emphasized that he was glad that Mr. MacDonald had not mentioned the word in defending the policy. Other speakers stressed the fact that the White Paper was at variance with the British tradition, that it was illegal and that it was unworkable. In the House of Lords, the debate was initiated by Lord Snell, leader of
the Labor Party. The White Paper was scored by a number of other prominent members including Lords Samuel, Lytton and Reading. The most striking speech was that of the Archbishop of Canterbury, who appealed to the Government "not to commit this injustice to the Jews."

When the vote was finally taken, in the House of Commons, it showed 268 in favor of the Government's policy and 179 opposing it; 110 Conservative members deliberately abstained from voting, while over 20 others followed the lead of the two former Colonial Secretaries, Lieutenant Colonel Amery and Winston Churchill by voting against the Government. Commenting upon the results of the vote, the English press termed it a virtual defeat for the Government and pointed out that but for the fact that a vote of confidence was involved, the White Paper would have been rejected.

The scene now shifted to Geneva. The position of the British Government, as stated in the White Paper, was outlined before the Council of the League of Nations, on May 22, by Viscount Halifax, British Foreign Secretary. The Council, thereupon, agreed to defer its decision until its next session in September, in order to have the benefit of the opinion of the Permanent Mandates Commission. The latter opened its discussions on Palestine on June 14, with the hearing of the Mandatory's Annual Report. It also had before it a memorandum on the legal aspects of the White Paper with a covering letter by Dr. Chaim Weizmann, on behalf of the Jewish Agency, in which he expressed the hope that the competent organs of the League would not endorse the "complete reversal of the original policy authorized by the League of Nations in the Palestine Mandate." (The texts were published by the Jewish Agency under the title "The Jewish Case Against the Palestine White Paper," London, June, 1939. See also Contemporary Jewish Record, Vol. II, No. 4).

On June 15, the Commission heard the defense of the White Paper by Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald. In a two-hour statement, Mr. MacDonald analyzed the White Paper point by point to show that the policy formulated therein harmonized with the provisions of the Mandate. He began by saying that the British Government
had been unreserved in its work for the Jewish National Home in Palestine. The load had been troublesome, he maintained, but "it had been borne to assure fulfilment of the great trust of the Balfour Declaration, viewing with sympathy the facilitating of the Jewish National Home." Continuing, he denied that the Mandate mentioned the principle of economic absorptive capacity to regulate immigration, and emphasized that "sooner or later, the Mandatory Power, which is charged to safeguard the rights and position of the Arabs, is in duty bound to take serious note of the passionate protest of the Arabs." The alternative to Arab consent to further Jewish immigration, he added, would be force, which would violate the spirit of the League of Nations. The immigration restrictions, the Colonial Secretary concluded, did not envisage a minority status for Jews, for Great Britain would not, he assured the Commission, withdraw from Palestine before adequate safeguards had been made for the Jews. He defended the restrictions on land sales to Jews on the ground that such sales affected the interests of the Arabs. Concerning the constitutional set up of Palestine, he declared that it would be premature to formulate the character of the Constitution. One principle, however, was already established, Mr. MacDonald concluded: No subjection of either the Arabs or the Jews. (For text of Mr. MacDonald's address, see Contemporary Jewish Record, Vol. II, No. 4).

The following day, the Jewish Agency issued a statement in which it categorically denied that the new policy was consonant with the provisions of the Mandate. Pointing out that the Royal Commission had definitely stated that "the primary purpose of the Mandate as expressed in its Preamble and Articles is the establishment of the Jewish National Home," the Jewish Agency maintained that "a National Home condemned by artificial restrictions and forced to assume a permanent minority status cannot be regarded as a National Home." No amount of argument, the statement continued, can prove that the obligation to facilitate Jewish immigration means that such immigration may be stopped if the Arabs do not consent to it. Inasmuch as "the White Paper represents a policy of concessions to Arab terrorism and force," the Jewish Agency concluded,
"the Jewish population, whose strength in Palestine is admitted by Mr. MacDonald, is strong enough to prevent consummation of a policy which artificial argumentation can neither justify nor render compatible with either the spirit or the letter of the Mandate." (For full text of this statement, see Contemporary Jewish Record, Vol. II. No. 4).

As the sessions of the Mandates Commission were held behind closed doors, little could be divined of the sentiments of its members. Observers familiar with the procedure of the Commission saw signs of disapproval of Great Britain's new policy. On June 15, the Journal de Genève, which is held to express the sentiments of League circles, strongly denounced the White Paper, asserting that immigration must be facilitated and not curtailed. What influence the opinion of the League may have in determining Britain's course, remains to be seen.

On June 7, Prime Minister Chamberlain told the House of Commons that if there should occur any dispute "among those concerned with the Mandate" as to the validity of Great Britain's policy, it would be submitted for a ruling to the Permanent Court of Justice. But in the confidence that the Permanent Mandates Commission would find the new policy conforming with its treaty obligations under the League of Nations, the British Government immediately began to put the White Paper into practice. Thus for example, on June 10, the Palestine Government published an Order In Council for the immediate enforcement of those sections in the White Paper dealing with land sales, retroactively as of May 18. The amendment to the Immigration Ordinance of April 5, has already been noted above. The concentrated drive against illegal Jewish immigrants, begun on March 22, was intensified in the following months. Other measures to establish the new order followed in quick succession.

As the period under review closed, the battle against the new policy was still in its first stages. The inflexible determination of the British Government to proceed as it had begun held out little likelihood for an early improvement in the Palestine situation. Once again, as so many times before, Jewish interests are being sacrificed to British Colonial policy and Arab demands prevail over the rights
of Jews. The sad, perplexing situation was not without effect upon internal Jewish relations. For within the closed ranks of the Jews, united in their emphatic opposition to the White Paper and all it implies, signs of differences of opinion and divided counsel on the prosecution of the Jewish case are beginning to make their appearance.

In the background of the political developments was, of course, the raging Arab terror in Palestine. In the early days of July, 1938, the country was gripped by a renewed reign of terrorism. By the autumn of the same year, the guerilla warfare against Jews and British officials and troops had developed into a large-scale revolt, directed by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem from his refuge in Beirut, Syria. His adherents established a provisional government, ruling over many villages, towns and outlying districts. In the middle of October, Arab bands even ventured to seize control of the Old City in Jerusalem. At the same time they intensified the campaign of assassination and terrorism against Arabs hostile to the rebellion and its leaders, as Arab villagers began to show signs of weariness of the guerilla exactions and oppressions. The terrorists lashed out especially against members of the Arab National Defense Party, who continued to contest the right of the Mufti to speak in the name of all Arabs in Palestine.

On July 7, 1938, the British Government was reported to be considering the imposition of martial law in order to stamp out the reign of terrorism. Opposition to introducing martial law apparently was too great. But, on September 8, new emergency powers to cope with the disturbances were granted Sir Harold MacMichael, the Palestine High Commissioner. These included the power to take possession of land or property for demolition or removal for purposes of defense against, and the suppression of rioting, as well as to tighten the censorship of the press. Additional powers were granted to him in the middle of October, after consultation with the Government while in London. On October 18, virtual martial law was proclaimed as the military replaced the civil authorities throughout Palestine.

Measures for increasing their power for self-defense were simultaneously taken by Jews. On October 31, 1938, the
"Jewish Defense Day" was observed throughout the country, with a nationwide census and demonstration of unity. An intensive drive was begun to raise a defense fund of £P25,000 monthly, and a manifesto was read calling upon the Government to make use of Jewish youth to restore order in the country.

The official list of casualties claimed by the reign of terrorism from June 1, 1938 to June 30, 1939 showed a total of 1,967 killed and 1,643 wounded. Of the total number killed, 1,592 were Arabs, 320 Jews and 55 British. The total number of wounded included 806 Arabs, 672 Jews and 165 British. To this bloodshed, must be added the widespread destruction of, and damage to, property.

The Jews have for years repeatedly expressed their dissatisfaction with the Government's dilatory tactics in fulfilling requests of the Jewish Agency for enlarged security and demands for the increase in the Jewish defense forces in Palestine. On September 10, 1938, for example, the Vaad Leumi declared that the Palestine Government's attitude towards demands for the increase in the Jewish defense forces was not compatible with the gravity of the hour. This declaration caused members of extremist groups, especially Revisionists, to intensify their campaign for answering terror with terror and reopened the entire question of the "Havlagah," or non-retaliation policy pursued by the Jews throughout the years of Arab violence.

The danger of the extremists' campaign lay perhaps more in their verbal expressions than in their actual deeds, which were comparatively few. On the one hand, the campaign damaged the position of the Yishuv, whose need for self-restraint was greater than ever before. On the other hand, it opened an avenue for provocations, which was exploited by Arab bands. It was therefore natural that responsible Jewish leaders in Palestine and abroad should voice their strongest warnings and condemnation against perpetrating acts of violence which, they declared, could be only detrimental to the Jewish National Home. On July 7, the Executive of the Vaad Leumi issued a stern manifesto condemning the outbursts of reprisals against Arabs as blemishing the Yishuv and endangering its security, and declaring that "the only way open for the Yishub is that
of self-defense and up-building." Horror at retaliatory acts by individual Jews was expressed also by the Chief Rabbi, the General Jewish Federation of Labor, the Palestine Jewish Labor Party, the Agudath Israel, and other Jewish bodies, which emphasized that the alternative facing the Yishub was either self-control or self-destruction.

This attitude was maintained throughout the entire year, in spite of the fact that retaliation as a means of securing Jewish objectives was bankrupt. The vital importance of the consistent opposition to retaliation was shown in the closing months of the period under review. The initial Jewish rioting, which followed the publication of the White Paper, created a dangerous atmosphere; the Palestine Government was quick in fixing the responsibility for the murder of an English official in Jerusalem, on Jews. The riot opened the way for repressive measures against Jews, in spite of the contention that the Jewish origin of the crime had in no way been proved, as the outrages blamed on Jewish perpetrators may have been the work of provocateurs, as had been the case many times before. The Vaad Leumi and Jewish leaders, therefore, reminded the Yishub that the attitude of the central national institutions was one of determined opposition to the shedding of innocent blood, and pleaded with Jews not to copy methods of Arab terrorists. On August 27, 1938, the Smaller Actions Committee in Jerusalem unanimously adopted a resolution emphatically condemning such acts of violence as liable only "to stain the purity of the Jewish people's struggle for freedom."

In spite of the adverse developments during the period under review, the Jewish economic structure in Palestine once again demonstrated its vigor and power of resistance, which had characterized it throughout. In the memorandum to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations on the development of the Jewish National Home during 1938, the Jewish Agency for Palestine pointed out that, during that year, the balance of trade improved, owing to the progressive development in the economic structure of the country. The investments made during the preceding years gradually produced dividends. Imports of capital continued uninterruptedly, and even surpassed in amount...
such imports during the preceding year. Agricultural colonization steadily progressed, and fourteen colonies were newly established in different regions. The cultivation of citrus fruits was further extended, and the exports of oranges and grapefruits attained a new record. Other agricultural products were progressively developed, in spite of the obstacles engendered by the Syria-Palestine commercial treaty, which permits the free import of considerable quantities of eggs and vegetables. Unemployment remained stationary, but declined to a very low figure towards the end of the year. In spite of the absorption of more than 50,000 Jewish immigrants in the course of three years, while terrorism was raging, unemployment at the close of 1938 did not attain the high level of 1936. Industry, too, progressed steadily, although it was regarded as being still in the beginning of development of its potential capacities. One factor which favorably influenced the economic expansion during 1938, the Jewish Agency indicated, was the noteworthy amount of technical ability, initiative, and experience brought by the German, Austrian and Czechoslovak immigrants. This is making possible the introduction of numerous and important industries producing articles for export, in which these immigrants excelled in their countries of origin. The extension of agricultural colonization, the increase in exports and production, as well as the increase in investments and the development of banking enterprises and cooperatives — the Jewish Agency concluded — sufficiently proved the solidity of the economic structure of the Jewish National Home and its steady development, in spite of the protracted period of unprecedented difficulties.

Data for the first half of 1939 still need to be compiled. There is no doubt, as was pointed out by the Jewish Agency, that political uncertainties have had an unfavorable effect on the economic development of the country. But events throughout the year revealed the strong determination of the Yishub to go on undeterred with the development of the National Home.
XIII. LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

1. Introduction

Events during the period under review revealed certain tendencies, long in the shaping, which are fraught with great significance for the future of Jews in Latin America. Although the situation of the Jews varied in the different countries, it presented characteristics common to all of them. These may be discussed under the general headings of the growth of anti-Semitism, the rise of nationalism, and the increasing antagonism to Jewish immigration.

The economic penetration of Germany and Italy, with its definite and deliberate by-product of political influence, has been the subject of world-wide discussion. For a number of years now, the countries of Latin America have been subjected to a terrific pressure of Nazi and Fascist propaganda. The success of this pressure has been promoted by the existence of latent anti-Jewish prejudices which are part of the Spanish-Portuguese heritage. It is being fostered by the commercial classes, frequently recruited from among the German and Italian settlers, which resent the competition of Jews. The anti-immigration sentiment is also spread by the same element. The fact that anti-Semitism has become a political issue after the fashion of European countries, the ease with which newspapers have taken up the anti-Jewish campaign, as well as the increasing frequency of anti-Jewish manifestations, are sufficiently indicative of the delicacy of the Jewish situation in Latin America.

Behind the anti-Semitic movement, however, is the existence of an assumed commercial rivalry between Jews and the local populations. At the behest of the chambers of commerce and industry, legislation has been enacted in a number of Central and South American countries which makes it difficult for immigrants to engage in commerce. Although this legislation is directed against immigrants in general, Jews bear the brunt of it, not only because of
their predilection for commerce, but also because they are singled out for special treatment. In 1937, Peru, for example, outlawed peddling on the alleged ground that "Polacos" and "Rumanos," who are identified as Jews, are spreading propaganda. A subsequent decree, providing that no more than 20% of commercial licenses could be issued to foreigners, was applied chiefly to Jews, including those naturalized. In November 1938, the Colombian Senate had before it a bill authorizing the Government to protect national industries from competition by Jews, Poles, Chinese, Turks and Syrians. On February 28, 1939, the Guatemalan Government introduced a law for the protection of established business enterprises against competition from recent and future immigrants, which provides for a special licensing system and for the closing of shops and stores of all immigrants who made their entry into the country on condition not to engage in commerce. Agitation for the introduction of such legislation is widespread throughout Latin America. It is most vehement in Mexico and in Argentina.

Another factor of serious consequence to the Jews is the resurgence of nationalism in Latin America, a nationalism which is jealous of its prerogatives and strives for cultural monopoly. It came in the wake of German and Italian penetration, as a reaction against the encroachments of the totalitarian states. The awakening of national pride is manifest in the legislation adopted in a number of Central and South American countries, especially Brazil, Argentina and Guatemala. Characteristic of this legislation is the attempt to uproot the last vestige of foreign influence. In the consciousness that the lack of national coherence in Latin America has made it an easy prey to German and Italian ambitions, these States have launched a policy of enforced assimilation, which found classic expression in the legislation of Brazil. The new nationalism is also expressed in the immigration policies which require the assurance of assimilability as one of the conditions for the admission of immigrants and settlers.

It is perhaps too early to foresee the cumulative effect of these developments upon the young Jewish communities in Latin America. The rise of anti-Semitism, the ban on
Jewish immigration and the prosecution of a policy of forced assimilation, however, threaten to arrest their growth and undermine the development of their cultural and communal life. Of immediate importance is the question of immigration. In view of its special character, it will be discussed in connection with the refugee problem.

2. Cuba

With the legalization of the Communist Party on September 13, 1938, after it had been proscribed for thirteen years, the Cuban Government took the first step towards liberalizing the regime. On October 20, two other parties, the Right Wing of the "Joven Cuba" and the National Fascist Party, received legal standing. About the same time, the Cuban Nazi Party was given legal recognition, but only after it had complied with the Government request that it delete from its program clauses advocating racial discrimination. It soon became evident that many of these parties exploited their newly-won freedom of action to turn against the very Government which made their existence possible. The Government's action also had deplorable effects on the Jewish situation.

Before long, the various fascist groups embarked upon a violent anti-Jewish campaign and flooded the country with proclamations calling upon the people to rise against, and boycott, the Jews. The victory of General Franco in Spain strengthened the position of the influential but reactionary Spanish nationalists, and with them, of the entire reactionary front in Cuba. Their help was solicited by the Cuban National Fascists, headed by ex-President Grau San Martin, to create a common front against the Jews. At a meeting of the Fascist Party in Havana on May 8, 1939, which was attended by 40,000 persons, and the proceedings of which were broadcast over a national radio hook-up, Primitivo Rodriguez, executive member, openly incited the people to fight the Jews until the last one is driven out of the country. These developments caused deep depression among the Jewish population, especially in view of the fact that the National Fascists constituted
the strongest single opposition party. Following the fascist meeting, representatives of fourteen Jewish organizations organized themselves into a Defense Committee.

The results of the political developments manifested themselves most conspicuously on the arrival, in the port of Havana, of the German liner S. S. St. Louis, bearing upwards of nine hundred refugees. A few days before the arrival of the ship, the reactionary press raised a cry against their admission. When the St. Louis arrived, the President's office was flooded with telegrams threatening serious consequences if the refugees were permitted to land. The case of the St. Louis was but the most spectacular example of the many changes which had taken place since the initiation of the new democratic policy. While the St. Louis was on its way back to Europe, Pedro Mendieta, chairman of the Cuban House Immigration Committee, demanded, on June 7, an investigation of the status of all political refugees. On July 3, Representative Fumero introduced a bill providing for a census of Jews who had entered Cuba since January 1, 1937, as preparation for their eventual expulsion. In addition, the bill barred Jewish would-be immigrants from engaging in commerce or industry in competition with Cubans.

As the anti-Semitic campaign continued unabated, Dr. Fernando Ortiz, president of the National Association Against Racial Discrimination, issued a manifesto on June 23, urging the public not to pay attention to the anti-Jewish campaign being conducted through the radio and the press.

3. Mexico

The period under review marked a distinct deterioration in the Jewish situation in Mexico. A serious depression in the textile industry, which set in early in July, 1938, and reports that the Government was studying the question of admitting Jewish refugees, provided the occasion for a renewed campaign against Jews. In November, this campaign assumed such proportions as to cause great alarm among the Jewish population. The incessant anti-Jewish
attacks in the press, were supplemented by mass meetings and street demonstrations. Leaflets distributed by the Vanguardia Nacionalista Mejicana calling the people to "kill the Jews to save our beloved fatherland," combined to produce a veritable pogrom atmosphere. All this agitation led up to the events of January 26, 1939, when, for several hours, Mexico City was the scene of anti-Jewish riots, the immediate cause of which was a quarrel between a Jew and a non-Jew. These riots revealed the degree of Nazi penetration in Mexico, where it had found a ready ally in the hypersensitive Mexican nationalism. The extent of this penetration was also revealed in the nature of the comments in some newspapers, and in the complete lack of comment in others. With one exception, the Mexican press failed to say a single comforting word for Jews.

Much has been said of the emotional susceptibility of Mexicans to anti-Semitism, owing to the chauvinistic character of Mexican nationalism and the jealousy of the native caused by his exaggerated notion of the apparent success of Jews in business. These and other popular misconceptions were brought out at the Government-sponsored Mexican Population Congress, which convened on December 16, 1938, at Mexico City. The debate on the "Jewish question," which occupied a prominent place on the agenda, was opened by requests from the floor that the Government representative reveal the truth about reports in the American press to the effect that Mexico was about to admit large masses of people "of a race which had lived for thousands of years in a ghetto." This was followed by a series of tirades against Jews, who were accused of inability to assimilate, of controlling and dominating Mexican economic life, and of employing unfair business methods. The counselor of the Government went so far as to charge that Jews failed to adopt Mexican foods, while at the same time selling them in market places.

The most violent attack on Jews was levelled by the leader of the Asociacion Nacionalista who proposed a twelve-point program to bar the further admission of Jews under all circumstances, and to circumscribe the rights of those already resident in the country. His program vividly reveals Nazi influence; its provisions bear striking
resemblance, even in detail, to that which has been put into effect in Germany. It proposed that citizenship be denied to Jews; that they be placed under strict police supervision; that they be forbidden to change their names without special authorization; that they be deprived of the right to engage in the liberal professions and to deal in medicaments; that Jews be forbidden to have more than three shops in one street, and that no Jew be permitted to have his industrial establishment on the same premises as his living quarters; that only the Banco de Mejico be authorized to accept deposits from Jews; and that one-third of Jewish capital be devoted to colonize Mexicans deported from the United States. Finally, the Nationalist leader proposed that the Jewish population in Mexico be permanently restricted to three per cent of the total. The final point prompted many delegates to point out that this quota would allow for about half a million Jews. (The number at present in the country is estimated at about 20,000.)

No delegate at this Congress rose in defense of Jews, although a number of speakers opposed specifically anti-Semitic legislation as a stain on the honor of Mexico. Instead, they proposed general laws against all unassimilable foreigners. The only voice which pleaded for tolerance, was that of Señor Trejo, chairman of the Congress and Director of the Government Population Department. Admitting the difficulty of the problem, he denied that there was a Jewish "menace" in Mexico. Consequently, he proposed the substitution of the word "foreigner" for the word "Jew" in the various resolutions.

Up to the anti-Jewish outbreaks on January 26, 1939, the position of the Government on the hostile agitation was, at best, unclear. Although President Cardenas and several of his Ministers condemned the spread of racial hatred, the Government's toleration of anti-Jewish agitation in the press and in the streets, was sharply criticized. The Government was also assailed for permitting Nazi and Fascist propaganda to go on freely. At the end of January, the Mexican Confederation of Labor, an outspoken protagonist of the Cardenas administration, issued a manifesto criticizing the President for giving too much freedom to
the Fascist groups and warning that unless the Government takes strong measures against them, the workers will take the situation into their own hands. The manifesto charged that, behind the anti-Semitic outbursts, the reactionary forces were attempting to instigate an insurrection against the present regime.

The January events, finally forced the Government to abandon much of its passive attitude. On January 31, Der Weg, Mexican Yiddish daily, announced that the Government had promised to guarantee the life and property of Jews throughout the country against anti-Jewish outbreaks. At the same time, General Montez, Chief of Police, assured a Jewish delegation that the events of January 26 would not be repeated, and stationed guards in front of Jewish communal buildings. Through its Ambassador in Washington, the Government disclaimed all responsibility for the riots and reaffirmed its emphatic opposition to racial prejudice. The arrest of twenty-four persons implicated in the riots, and the banning of open air meetings and demonstrations without special permission, considerably eased the situation. On February 1, the Jewish Central Committee, organized in November as a representative body of the entire Mexican Jewish community, was able to report that, although the panic among the Jews had not disappeared completely, they were assured that the Government was behind them and that it had done everything to prevent outbreaks and would continue to do so in the future.

No untoward incidents were reported in the next months to indicate any change for the worse in the Jewish situation. Yet, the Jewish community long remained with the impression of the January happenings. German and Italian propaganda, which showed no signs of slacking, succeeded in creating a fictitious Jewish question. One of the most potent means employed in creating hostility toward Jews was emphasis on the alleged disproportionate share of Jews in the country’s business. This device led, for example, to the declaration of a boycott on hosiery produced by Jewish manufacturers. The reaffirmation by the “United Opposition” on February 19, that it would not rest “until all the Jews are driven out of the country,” showed that anti-
Semitism had not lost its potency as a political platform. The effect of the anti-Jewish campaign was to discourage Jews from settling in the interior of the country, and to stimulate a gradual exodus from the provinces into the capital. On June 3, 1939, M. Goldberg, editor of Der Weg, reported a drastic decline in the settlement of Jews outside Mexico City.

Towards the end of the review period, however, a growing reaction against Nazi and Fascist penetration was noticeable, not only among workers but among other sections of the population as well. On February 24, for example, anti-Nazi outbreaks occurred in Tampico, upon the docking of a German liner. At the end of the month, the disclosure of an investigation of suspected Nazi espionage activities, heightened anti-German feelings. The victory of General Franco in Spain, which brought a new foreign propaganda agency into the field, led to violent anti-Fascist outbreaks on April 4. These caused the Government to issue an official warning against the promotion of Franco propaganda and an order dissolving pro-Franco groups. Illustrative of this reaction, also, was the announcement on April 9, by a group of Mexican Senators, of their intentions to introduce a resolution in the Congress inviting Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia of New York City to Mexico City as a mark of appreciation of his anti-Fascist stand.

4. Argentina

During the period under review, the Jews celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of Jewish colonization in Argentina and looked back with pride upon their economic, cultural, religious and social achievements. Their celebration was marred, however, by the shadow of anti-Jewish agitation which, it was feared, would strengthen the hold of anti-Semitism upon many sections of the population. As was the case in Mexico, the Argentine Government exhibited a high degree of tolerance in permitting the anti-Jewish campaign to go on undisturbed. At the Congress against Racism and anti-Semitism, which opened on August 6, at Buenos Aires, speakers stressed the fact that, although the
President repeatedly emphasized the need of defending the democratic institutions and frequently condemned intolerance against creeds and races, he failed to implement his utterances by concrete action. This absolute tolerance on the part of the authorities, speakers pointed out, was encouraging the spread of propaganda of hatred. Other speakers charged the Post Office with being an indirect accomplice, insofar as it allowed inflammatory pamphlets to pass as works of culture entitled to reduced tariffs. As a matter of fact, sometime in October a court in Santa Fé handed down a decision in which it ruled that insulting Jews collectively and carrying on propaganda against them did not constitute a violation of the law but constituted freedom of opinion.

Remembering the "tragic week" of January, 1918, the incessant anti-Jewish campaign caused considerable nervousness among the Jewish population. Perhaps more than in any other Latin American country, the campaign against Jews in Argentina was carried on by well-organized groups, including the Anti-Semitic Action; the Social Party of Restoration; the Nationalist Youth Alliance; the Federation of Commercial Employees; and the Union of Clothing Cutters, Measurers and Finishers, the latter two being affiliates of the General Confederation of Labor. Argentina also had its own "radio priest" in the person of Father Virgilio Filipo, whose Sunday radio broadcasts spread anti-Jewish propaganda throughout the country. Jewish delegations, as well as the Committee against Racism and Anti-Semitism, made energetic representations to the Government to call a halt to the widespread agitation. On October 10, 1938, the Government ordered the police to ban anti-Jewish public meetings and instructed the Ministry of Posts and Communication to stop the anti-Semitic radio broadcasts by censoring the speeches of Father Filipo. These measures apparently proved of little avail. In November, the anti-Jewish campaign reached such a point as to cause *La Prensa* to warn, in an editorial entitled "Dangerous Symptoms," against emulating the example of Germany, which would "bring only ruin and destruction to the Argentinian State." The agitation subsided to some extent in the following months, as attention was diverted
to the Government's concentrated action against the activities of Nazi agents.

Already in June 1938, the Government had closed down a number of Nazi schools which were teaching allegiance to Hitler rather than to Argentina. By a decree of September 30, 1938, the Government banned the teaching of foreign ideologies in schools operated by foreign organizations, and required that directors of such schools be Argentinian citizens. These steps did not deter the Nazis from continuing their anti-Jewish agitation, which the Government still tolerated. The disclosure of widespread Nazi espionage, and the uncovering of an alleged document implicating Germany in a move to sever Patagonia from Argentinian sovereignty stirred the Government to take drastic measures against Nazi activities. On May 4, 1939, the Federal Prosecuting Attorney handed down an opinion declaring that the Nazi invasion of Argentina had reached dimensions that constituted an affront against the sovereignty of the State, and that the local Nazi party's activities were completely illicit and contrary to the Constitution, and called for urgent protective legislation. On May 15, President Ortiz decreed the dissolution of the Nazi Party and all other parties directed from abroad, including Italian and Spanish Fascist groups. They were given ninety days within which to incorporate democratic principles in their by-laws. All foreign organizations were ordered to register with the Ministry of the Interior and with the police. The decree also banned all foreign political insignia, uniforms, banners, or songs, and prohibited all activities for or against political institutions of foreign countries. It also barred foreign subsidies or donations of any kind whatsoever from abroad. Finally, the decree provided for the mandatory use of Spanish in all documents and statutes of organizations.

Although it is too early to ascertain the effects of this legislation upon the shaping of the internal relations in the country, there is ground to believe that Argentina's experience would follow along the lines of that of Brazil. As far as the Jews were concerned, their freedom of the use of Yiddish has been severely restricted. There were a number
of cases of police interference with Jewish meetings at which Yiddish was spoken, and other cases where permission for the use of the language was granted on condition that anti-Semitism would not be discussed. On May 25, 1939, the Jewish population was embittered over the barring of the display of the Zionist flag on the occasion of the national holiday on that day, on the ground that it represented no state.

Jewish communal life in Argentina during the past year showed signs of lively activity. Early in September, 1938, the Jewish Chamber of Commerce outlined plans for a census of Jewish commerce and industry. At about the same time a campaign for 1,000,000 pesos was begun, for the support of Jewish refugees in the country. It was also a year of conferences. At their fourth convention, early in November, 1938, the Jewish Agricultural Colonists decided to organize a Jewish Agriculture Bank to finance the settlement of Jewish refugees. On June 12, 1939, a congress of delegates of all Jewish financial institutions opened in Buenos Aires for the purpose of establishing a colonization fund. Pro-Palestine activities occupied a prominent place. On April 30, 1939, Friends of the Hebrew University opened a drive for 400,000 pesos to establish a chair, in the name of the Argentine Republic, at the Hebrew University. Developments in, and relating to, Palestine provoked wide reaction. Numerous meetings were held in Buenos Aires and in a number of provincial towns, at which protests against the change in Great Britain’s Palestine policy were heard.

Joining with the other Jewish communities throughout the world, the Argentine Jews, on November 20, 1938, decreed a week of mourning over the November 10 outrages in Germany. On November 22, Jewish shops closed in Buenos Aires; many Christians joined in this demonstration. A week later, a huge mass meeting, attended by over 30,000 persons, demonstrated in Buenos Aires against the persecution of the Jews in Germany, adopted a resolution to boycott German goods, and urged the Government to open the doors of Argentina to refugees. On December 13, deputy Americo Gioldi introduced, in the name of the
Socialist deputies, a resolution requesting the Chamber of Deputies to express to the Government its desire to ease the restrictions against Jewish immigration.

5. Brazil

The attempted revolt against the Vargas regime, on May 11, 1938, spurred the Government to launch a campaign to stamp out the last vestiges of Nazi-Fascist influence in Brazil. The campaign continued throughout the year, as the Government pressed its program of "nationalizing the country." In a series of decrees, the Government tightened the restrictions upon the industrial, commercial, and professional activities of unnaturalized foreigners, whose political activities had already been outlawed. Communities made up entirely of immigrants of one nationality were thenceforth banned. A number of foreign schools, operating in "disrespect" of Brazilian law, were closed down, and the penalty for teaching foreign languages to children under fourteen years of age was increased. On April 4, 1939, the Mayor of Rio de Janeiro decreed that only the singing of the Brazilian national anthem and national songs, and songs of other American nations shall be allowed in the public schools. All these and other measures were part of a vast program to prevent the rise of national minority problems and to hasten the assimilation of foreigners, especially children.

With the outlawing of Nazi activities and the disruption of the Integralist movement, the anti-Jewish campaign died down too. All manifestations of anti-Semitism, which had followed in the wake of years of Nazi propaganda, were suppressed. Energetic activities were carried on by the League against Anti-Semitism and by another representative group of intellectuals, both of which assisted the Government in combating anti-Jewish manifestations. In the course of the year, a number of anti-Nazi books, translations and original studies, made their appearance in Brazil. One book in particular, entitled "Against Hitlerism—for the Integrity of the American Nations," written by Simfranio de Magallanes, a high official in the National
Department of Propaganda, received much attention. Strong anti-Nazi feeling throughout the country was evidenced during the celebration on November 9, 1938, of the first anniversary of the establishment of the Corporate State in Brazil, as a wave of nationalism was surging over all provinces. In a special interview on the same day with a representative of the *New York Times*, President Vargas reiterated the determination of Brazil to combat all foreign "isms" and racial prejudice, and to continue its Pan-American collaboration policy. The events in Germany during that period, were widely denounced in the Brazilian press. On November 20, a thirty day period of mourning over the persecution of Jews in Germany was initiated at services attended by more than 2,000 persons of all creeds, including Government representatives, at Sao Paulo.

Strangely enough, the suppression of Nazism carried in its train untoward consequences for the Jewish community, threatening the foundations of its normal existence. It will be recalled that, according to the so-called Alien Law of April 19, 1938, only those organizations have legal standing whose membership is composed of a majority of citizens and whose executive bodies are wholly composed of such citizens. Excepted from these restrictions were religious and philanthropic institutions. This law, which admitted of a variety of interpretations, brought Jewish social and cultural life to a practical standstill. On August 4, 1938, the Minister of Justice dissolved the Zionist Federation on the ground that its advocacy of the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine qualified it as a foreign organization, even though it was composed of Brazilian citizens. By the same token, the ICA, (Jewish Colonization Association), which had also become a center of Jewish social activity, engaged in assisting refugees and in a variety of cultural activities, was forced to give up many of its functions as it declared itself a Brazilian society. Similarly, the Jewish Relief and Immigrant Protection Society in Rio de Janeiro, had to abandon its work on behalf of the immigrants and to limit itself to philanthropic and social welfare activities. In view of the fact that not all Jews in Brazil had become naturalized, the law threatened a number of other institutions, built up by immigrant Jews,
which were awaiting Government approval. This period of waiting resulted in deplorable consequences, as it penalized these agencies and made it impossible for them to carry on their work, largely for the benefit of their own membership.

6. Uruguay

Because of its liberal Constitution, Uruguay has been known as the “Switzerland of South America.” In these circumstances, the Jewish community, although barely two decades old, has made remarkable progress. Its institutions have been an example to all other Latin American communities, and they have shown a great degree of maturity and understanding in meeting the different problems confronting them. During the past year the long cherished dream of establishing a collective agricultural colony for Uruguayan Jews began to take concrete form. In September 1938, the Jewish Bank in Montevideo, the center of economic, social and cultural life, decided to revive the Jewish Colonization Institute and received the approval of President Alfredo Baldomir for its projected colony.

Uruguay was perhaps the only country in South America where the Chamber of Deputies, as a body, went on record as condemning the Nazi pogroms in Germany. A resolution to this effect was introduced by Socialist Deputy Frugoni and unanimously adopted by the Chamber on November 16. Editorials assailing the anti-Jewish excesses in Germany appeared in almost all sections of the Uruguayan press. On November 24, protest demonstrations were held throughout the country under the auspices of the very active Institute Against Fascism, Racism and Antisemitism. On the same day, a half-day protest strike, proclaimed by the Jews in Montevideo, received a wide response among the Christian population also, as many Christian shops closed in expression of sympathy with the Jews. At the end of the month, the Congress of Democratic Writers in Montevideo adopted a resolution protesting against the events in Germany and urging the boycott of German goods. Similar resolutions were adopted by the
Uruguayan Christian Evangelic Federation, the Executive Committee of the Batallista faction of the Colorado Party, the Central Committee of Independent Nationalists, and by many professional and syndicalist organizations. A manifesto against racial hatred and anti-Semitism was also issued by the Uruguayan Committee of the World Congress of Youth. An appeal calling upon the Uruguayan youth to stand in the first line of the fight against racism and anti-Semitism, was made public in the *Lucha*, organ of the Uruguayan students.

Unfortunately, signs of growing anti-Semitism began to make their appearance. Early in July, 1938 the *Deutsche Wacht*, which has been carrying on pro-Nazi propaganda, but which made no specific point of attacking Jews, launched a campaign against them on the ground that Jews were active in promoting an anti-Nazi campaign. This was soon taken up by local anti-Semitic groups and led to several attempted attacks on the Jewish Community House in Montevideo and other Jewish institutions. As anti-Jewish agitation intensified and became more and more aggressive, Government intervention was sought to put an end to it. On October 21, 1938, the Minister of the Interior declared that "there should be no place for anti-Semitism in Uruguay, not only because of the liberal mentality of the people, but on humanitarian grounds as well." In the same month Colonel Serafin Martinez, Chief of Police, was reported to have banned inflammatory propaganda against Jews.

Meanwhile, the refugee problem, which became especially acute after November 1938, and which opened anew the entire question of immigration into South America, precipitated a heated discussion in the Uruguayan press, which degenerated into a general anti-Jewish campaign. This campaign failed to die down even after the Government instructed its consuls to refuse visas to Jewish refugees. Nevertheless, the Government refused to heed the demands of the press against the admission of the stranded refugees who were barred from Paraguay in January, 1939. But President Baldomir emphasized that the action with regard to the admission of refugees did not mean that the Government was deviating from its stand on anti-Semitism. The
refugee discussions revealed the existence of anti-Jewish prejudice even in Government circles.

Discussing the Jewish situation in Uruguay, the Montevideo Yiddish Folksblatt, of January 14, 1939, pointed out that an increasing number of important newspapers have taken on a racist anti-Semitic tone. Among these, El Debate, which had previously opposed anti-Semitism, was especially noteworthy, because it is identified with a political party (Blanco-Herrerista) which has three Ministers in the Government and commands about 50% of the votes in Parliament. If this party should decide to adopt an anti-Semitic policy, the Volksblatt concluded, the Jewish situation in Uruguay would be rendered highly precarious.

XIV. OTHER COUNTRIES

1. Finland

The Jewish community of Finland, only 1,500 in number, has continued to develop peacefully. On November 23, 1938, the Finnish Fascist Party, known as the Patriotic National Movement, which had continued the antidemocratic agitation of the previously dissolved Lapua Movement, was dissolved by a decree of the Minister of the Interior. The dissolution of the party, which was campaigning to replace the present system by a Fascist regime based on the leadership principle, and which had had 40 deputies in Parliament, was welcomed throughout Finland. However, the courts refused to recognize this decree as constitutional on the ground that although some utterances of party members were objectionable, they must be tolerated in a democratic country. Although Nazi and Communist agents have continued their activities, no fear was expressed that the democratic institutions of the country would not be able to resist their agitation.

On August 18, the Government's decision to restrict the issuance of permits for Austrian Jewish refugees to enter Finland came into force. Forty refugees, on their way to
Finland, from Stettin, Germany, had to remain there. At that time, over 100 Jewish refugees were found in the country and were cared for by the local Jewish refugee committee, which aided them in obtaining permits to leave for overseas, as they were in danger of expulsion.

Official policy, however, failed to dampen the sympathetic attitude of the Finnish people towards the refugees. On February 3, 1939, a number of prominent Finnish citizens of all parties started a nation-wide collection of funds for the support of the refugees.

2. Soviet Russia

The period under review saw the liquidation of the Comzet, Government commission for the colonization of Jews on land; and the discontinuance of activity in Russia of the Agro-Joint, or American Jewish Joint Agricultural Corporation, the ICA, or Jewish Colonization Association, as well as the ORT. These events brought to a close a decade and a half of one of the largest Jewish colonization enterprises in the world. The Soviet Government thereupon decided to reimburse the private organizations for their investments. The past year, too, according to reports, witnessed the further decline in the influence of the Yevsektsia, Jewish Section of the Communist Party in Soviet Russia, and removed the whip which had oppressed the Jews for many years. The decline of the Yevsektsia brought with it a religious revival which was manifested in the feverish preparations for the celebration of Passover. Attempts were also made during the past year to intensify the upbuilding of Biro-Bidjan, which had been brought to a virtual standstill as a result of initial failure in the work of colonization, as well as the drive against the "enemies of the people." On September 23, 1938, it was officially announced that, among others, a counter-revolutionary Zionist movement in Biro-Bidjan, Crimea and Ukrainia, had been liquidated.

The discontinuation of the Moscow Yiddish daily, Emes, towards the end of 1938 attracted great attention, as it
shed some light on the internal conditions of the Jewish population. The reason given for the disappearance of the publication, main organ of the Yevsektsia, was that it lacked readers. As this was coupled with the reported decline in attendance of Jewish children in Yiddish schools, it revealed the rapid growth of the process of assimilation among the Jews in Russia, a process which has been proceeding apace for a long time.

For the first time in years, following the November anti-Jewish outrages in Germany, the Soviet press came out with a strong condemnation of the persecution of Jews in Germany, thus departing from a fixed tradition not to mention the word "Jew." On November 27, a number of protest meetings were held in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and other cities. The Moscow meeting, which set the tone for the others, adopted a resolution in which it declared that the people in Soviet Russia joined with all of humanity in their expression of sympathy for the victims. The Pravda of November 28 expressed the attitude of the Communist Party in an editorial in which it declared: "Soviet Russia looks with profound indignation and disgust upon the unprecedented degeneration to which the Fascist pogrom-makers have led Germany. This disfranchisement of the Jews is the external expression of the disfranchisement of the German people."

The failure of Soviet Russia to evince interest in the refugee problem, however, came as an anti-climax. The reasons advanced for Russia's attitude in this regard have been manifold and at variance with one another. According to a report in the Jewish Morning Journal of New York, on January 16, 1939, the Jewish refugee question aroused differences of opinion in official Soviet circles. The report disclosed that, immediately after the November outbreaks, a plan for admitting Jewish refugees was proposed, but met with strong opposition. The opposition based its argument mainly on the failure of the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee to take the initiative in requesting Russia's cooperation.

No definite statement is possible on the situation of the Jews in Russia, inasmuch as news about Jewish life originates from colored or biased sources.
3. Turkey

Since the establishment of the Republic, the Jewish population in Turkey, estimated at from 80,000 to 90,000, has been enjoying full equality of rights. The frequent attempts of reactionary forces in the Republican People's Party, led by Deputy Junus Nadi and his son, to stir up anti-Jewish agitation, were frustrated by the strong action of the Turkish Government.

In August, 1938, the Jews of Istanbul were thrown into panic as a result of a campaign of revenge started by an Austrian cafe owner when Jews refused to patronize his cafe because of his Nazi activities and his display of the Nazi flag. This episode was exploited by Nazi Germans to stir up anti-Jewish sentiment, which resulted in untoward incidents in the old section of the city, in which several Turkish students participated. At the same time, in a vehement editorial Deputy Nadi denounced the "disrespect" of the Jews for the German flag and, attacking Jews in general, demanded the introduction of legislation against them.

Again, exploiting the uncertainties which followed the death of Kemal Pasha on November 11, 1938, the reactionary forces in the Republican Party began an agitation against foreign and refugee Jews, at the same time demanding discriminatory legislation for Turkish Jews. On February 25, 1939, acting on instructions from unauthorized sources, the police ordered about 400 German, Austrian, Polish and Italian Jews who had lost their citizenship, to leave the country within from two weeks to a month. These attempts to create a Jewish problem in Turkey were frustrated by the prompt action of Ismet Inonu, the new President. Speaking through Deputy Husein Jalchin, one of the most noted Turkish political publicists, the President declared that the police had erred in ordering the expulsion of foreign Jews and that, in view of the fact that this action had given rise to various interpretations regarding the existence of a Jewish problem in Turkey, he deemed it advisable to make it clear that such a problem has never existed in the Turkish Republic. The Jews, he continued, are equal with all other citizens and there is no conscious-
ness of any difference between Jews and Moslems. Regarding foreign Jews, the President stated that Turkey regards them from a generous humanitarian viewpoint, and that Turkey is proud to have given asylum to prominent Jews who fled barbarous persecution. Concluding, the President declared that the spirit of justice and tolerance which characterizes the Turkish people, as well as its ideas of morality and humanity, make it impossible for Turkey to harbor anti-Semitism.

Turkish policy of admitting refugees was based on strict selectivity. She admitted mainly intellectuals for whom places had been provided in the universities and scientific institutions. She also admitted a number of foreign Jewish students.

Although the equality of the Jews in the Republic has not been questioned and all attempts to stir up anti-Semitism have been opposed by official action, yet the national cultural policies of the Government continue to impede the development of Jewish communal life, which has continually deteriorated during the past seventeen years. These policies also encourage a flourishing assimilationist movement. Thus, for instance, on Rosh Hashana (September 26–27, 1938), a manifesto urging Jews to use exclusively the Turkish language, issued by the Association of Turkish Culture, founded by young Jews to spread Turkish customs and the Turkish language among Jews, was read in all synagogues. Praising the attitude of the Turkish Government, the manifesto urged Jews to consider Turkish as their native tongue, as "we constitute an integral part of this noble nation and there should be nothing to distinguish us from our brothers."

Turkey's position on Zionism has always been of particular interest. On September 5, 1938, during a visit to the Palestine Exposition at the Smyrna Fair, the Premier expressed sympathy with Jewish colonization in Palestine and hope for the success of Jewish activities there. On November 30, for the first time since the World War, Dr. Weizmann, President of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, paid a formal visit to the Turkish Government. Its position regarding the political future of Palestine was less clear. It was reported that Turkey's opposition to the establish-
ment of a Jewish state in Palestine influenced members of the British Government in the formulation of British policy as set forth in the White Paper issued on May 17, 1939.

Early in July, 1938, the press reported a strong tendency of thousands of Turkish Jews to emigrate to Alexandretta in expectation of the return of this province to Turkey.

4. Other Near Eastern Countries

The situation of the Jews in the Arabic countries was directly influenced by events in, and relating to, Palestine. The prevalent antagonism towards Zionism, as exemplified by the official proscription of the movement in Egypt, frequently was expressed in demonstrations against, and attacks upon, local Jews. In the early months of the period under review, the situation looked very threatening. On August 9, 1938, the Iraq Society for the Defense of Palestine requested the leading Moslem ecclesiastical authorities to issue a “Fatwa,” or a summons for a Holy War, on behalf of the Palestine Arabs. Ominous enough was the warning addressed to Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, by the Arab Defense Committee in Damascus, on October 10, reading: “Your attitude will lead you and Jews of the East to the worst of calamities that has been written in history up to the present.” In Cairo, Moslem students demonstrated against Zionism and convened a congress in defense of their Arab brethren in Palestine.

Indeed, in July, 1938, strong police guards had to be posted in the Jewish quarter in Beirut, Syria, as a precaution against the spread of the Palestine disorders to this tension-gripped city. In South Lebanon, Arab terrorists were putting to the torch fields belonging, or suspected of belonging to Jews. On August 7, Palestine terrorists bombed a Beirut synagogue. In Iraq, on October 22, three Jews were injured in a bomb explosion in the Radoury Club. Scattered attacks on Jews occurred throughout these months. It would seem that the invitation of the Arab lands to be represented at the London Conference kept the situation from assuming the grave proportion
threatened by the Arab Defense Committee. At that conference they hoped to achieve by political threats what others hoped to achieve by violence.

To the extent that the Arab lands were the center of Italo-German intrigue, anti-Zionism, under the stimulus of their propaganda, spread by the two countries, was often made to assume the character of Western anti-Semitism. This was particularly evident in Egypt where anti-Jewish publications were widely circulated and had a marked effect on University circles. The resulting unrest and disorder caused the Egyptian Government, on March 27, 1939, to ban Colonel Ulrich Fleischauer's Weltdienst, anti-Semitic news service published in Erfurt, Germany, and to proscribe "anti-Semitism" in general.

Although the Italian subjugation of Ethiopia and of Moslem Albania somewhat discredited the Rome-Berlin Axis in the Islamic world and led to a decline in Italian cultural influence in Egypt, there was no appreciable decline in the Rome-Berlin propaganda campaign. Naturally, the totalitarian states did not fail to exploit the anti-Zionist sentiments to arouse the Arabs against both the Jews and British. The past year's Palestine developments provided numerous occasions for such exploitation.

**XV. THE REFUGEE PROBLEM**

No year since the advent of the Hitler regime has been as cruel or as discouraging for German refugees as the twelve months between the Intergovernmental Refugee Conference at Evian, France, held on July 6, 1938 and the meeting of the permanent committee, set up by the Evian conference, in London on July 19, 1939.

The Evian conference brought with it high hopes that the democratic nations of the world were at last ready to take the first firm steps toward a permanent solution of the refugee problem. The months that followed, however, brought only graver political problems, severer burdens.

*This section was written by Nathan Caro Belth.*
upon the philanthropic organizations engaged in refugee work, unusual and fantastic episodes of human suffering.

But at the year's close a note of hope was again struck, for at the London conference of July 19, 1939, the British Government expressed the view, which had long been held by those engaged in refugee work, that the problem was insoluble if the financing of a solution is left to private initiative alone. Britain announced that it stood ready to discuss with other democratic governments a plan for granting governmental financial assistance towards a permanent solution to the refugee problem.

In the twelve months between the two meetings, the plight of the refugees from Germany was accentuated and dramatized by the German annexation of the Sudetenland in September 1938 and the subsequent further dismemberment of Czechoslovakia; the mass expulsion of Jews of Polish origin from Germany to Poland in October; the pogroms throughout Germany in November as a result of the shooting of a German embassy official in Paris, and the accompanying punitive governmental action; the great outpouring of Jews from Austria and other territories that came under German domination; the creation of refugee "no-man's-lands"; the closing of the gates of Palestine to refugee and other immigration; the investigation of mass colonization projects, notably British Guiana; the mass rescue of refugee children; the incident of the S. S. St. Louis, and similar wandering boatloads of rejected immigrants; and finally, the establishment of a foundation to implement an accelerated and orderly emigration of Jews from the Reich.

These are the incidents which created a spectacular background for the more prosaic efforts of governments and public and private organizations to alleviate the suffering of the refugees. The Intergovernmental Refugee Conference at Evian served to emphasize once more that no nation was ready to throw open its gates willingly and unreservedly to an influx of refugees from Germany. Each nation, in diplomatic language, rationalized its position. But the conference did express the determination of the democratic nations to find some formula for the humane solution of the refugee problem and to establish the neces-
sary machinery to achieve that end. (See Vol. 40, pp. 345-48). The concrete achievement of the conference was the establishment of a permanent Intergovernmental Refugee Committee with headquarters in London. A less tangible, but equally important achievement, is implicit in the establishment of the permanent committee: the democratic nations had come to the conclusion that the refugee problem was no longer a problem for private philanthropic organizations alone, but that if it is to be solved, liberal governments must take a leading role in that solution.

The first meeting of the Committee was held on August 3, 1938, and its first task was to obtain from the Reich an agreement whereunder emigrants would be permitted to take part of their capital with them, and a guarantee would be given that "normal" treatment would be accorded Jews while still residing in the Reich.

The committee named George Rublee, an American, and a close friend of President Roosevelt, as director of the permanent bureau and set for him the task of obtaining from the Reich the necessary agreement that would lead to an orderly, accelerated emigration program from Germany, and safety for those potential emigrants who would be forced to reside in Germany for some years to come. The difficulties that beset Mr. Rublee were formidable. His efforts to deal with a power that was unwilling even to consider any negotiations on the subject were complicated, on the one hand, by the grave political crisis that preceded the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and, on the other, by new and violently repressive measures taken by the Nazis against the Jews in Germany.

These measures resulted in such conditions that, for the first time since the World War, the term "no-man's-land" was heard again in Europe — only now it had a different, even more cruel meaning. Not battlefields were these new no-man's-lands, but narrow strips of territory bordering on two or more countries, often nothing more than an open field or a ditch. Not soldiers were their inhabitants, but helpless, miserable refugees, men, women and children, whom no land would admit — blazing indictments of the
brutal lengths to which anti-Semitism could go. The first of these no-man’s-lands was an old vermin-infested barge anchored in the Danube near the Hungarian shore. On it were some sixty Austrian refugees, ranging from children to old folk, who had been expelled from Burgenland.

Perhaps, in a truer sense, the first no-man’s-lands were on the borders of dismembered Czechoslovakia. With the frontiers undetermined for weeks, groups of Jewish refugees, large and small, were shuttled back and forth in an inhuman game. One group of 300 spent weeks in zero weather in an open field between Mischdorf in Austria and Bratislava. Other no-man’s-land camps were situated at Nitra, Tapolcany, Lilina, Michalovce, Prestany and Zilino. Thousands were marooned in these places. When, in October, 1938, Slovakia was granted autonomy, and a large slice of it was ceded to Hungary, anti-Semitic Hungarians rounded up 10,000 Jews in the newly-acquired territory within four days and dumped them over the new border. The largest group found itself near the city of Kosice. Slowly these no-man’s-lands were liquidated through the efforts of Jewish refugee organizations and the easing of official restrictions.

The largest of the no-man’s-lands, however, was created not on the Czech, but on the German-Polish frontier when Jews of Polish origin residing in Germany were rounded up on the night of October 28, taken across the border, and left to their fate. The numbers involved were variously estimated as from 12,000 to 18,000 people. The pretext for the action was a decree issued by the Polish Government requiring Polish citizens resident abroad to obtain renewal of their passports by October 29. The decree would have denationalized thousands of Polish Jews in Germany and would have left Germany with a large group of “stateless” Jews.

Without warning or explanation, on the night of October 28, thousands of Jews throughout Germany were roused from bed, many permitted to take nothing more than the clothes they wore, put aboard special sealed trains and buses and taken to the border, where they were forced out and over the frontier. Many of the deportees, although
Polish nationals, had been living in Germany more than twenty years; some of them had even been born in Germany and were Polish nationals *de jure* only.

The greatest concentration of these unfortunates was near the little town of Zbaszyn. Overnight, its population of 5,000 was literally doubled. Refugees slept in the streets, in open fields, in tents, and in abandoned stables. Similar were the conditions near Poznan, Lodz, Lwow, Cracow and other border towns. The situation was unprecedented, the hysteria general. The very barest necessities of life were not available. Within twenty-four hours, however, officials of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in Warsaw organized a relief corps. Physicians and nurses arrived, and truckloads of food, clothing, medical supplies were brought to the scene. Stables were converted into barracks; food kitchens and first aid stations were set up. Slowly the no-man's-lands in all areas except Zbaszyn were liquidated. Those who were not permitted to enter Poland proper were concentrated at Zbaszyn. In the face of this emergency, impoverished Polish Jewry itself rose to heroic heights and in special campaigns raised 2,000,000 zlotys (about $400,000) for the aid of the deportees. Approximately 13,500 deportees were registered by the relief committees, and as the year drew to a close nearly 11,000 still required direct relief, although some had been permitted to enter the interior of Poland and some others, as a result of Polish-German negotiations, had been permitted to return to Germany for short periods to liquidate their property.

The shock of the Polish border incidents had hardly subsided, when the world was horrified by an event even more outrageous — mass pogroms throughout Germany. The pretext for these excesses was grounded in the events on the Polish border. Among the thousands of Jews at the Zbaszyn camp were a couple named Grynszpan. To their son, seventeen year old Herschel Grynszpan, residing with relatives in Paris, they sent a postcard telling of their plight. On November 8, the youth walked into the German Embassy in Paris and shot down Ernst vom Rath, the third secretary of the embassy. The death of vom Rath two days later was the signal for nationwide riots, which
had all the earmarks of having been arranged in advance, and for a billion-mark fine imposed collectively on the Jews in Germany, and for other punitive measures.

These events, while they further complicated the efforts of George Rublee and the Intergovernmental Committee, shocked the democratic nations into renewed efforts on behalf of the refugees and potential refugees. President Roosevelt on November 15 recalled the American Ambassador to Germany in order to get a first hand view of the situation. President Roosevelt also took steps to alleviate the plight of refugees by issuing an order extending for six months the visitors' permits of 15,000 German and Austrian Jews temporarily in the United States, on the ground that it would be "cruel and inhuman" to send them back to probable imprisonment or internment in concentration camps. He also urged Myron C. Taylor, vice-chairman of the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee to go at once to London for a meeting of the Committee; and the State Department, in a public statement, urged the various democratic governments to redoubled efforts in finding a solution to the refugee problem.

The following week, Prime Minister Chamberlain, speaking before the House of Commons, offered to open two British colonies to refugee settlement, and to admit an increased number into the United Kingdom. The colonies in question were (1) British Guiana, where the Prime Minister offered 10,000 square miles (later increased to 40,000 square miles) in the interior to be leased "on generous terms under conditions to be settled hereafter" for agricultural development subject to surveys by British representatives and voluntary organizations; and (2) Tanganyika, British-mandated former German colony where 50,000 square miles were offered for settlement. In England, itself, Mr. Chamberlain said, admission of refugees depended upon the ability of private organizations to maintain them; and Home Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare revealed plans to admit several thousand refugee children. A movement, headed by Viscount Samuel was launched to establish camps that would house 5,000 children. France and the Netherlands also came forward with offers to open some of their colonial possessions to settlement.
In the meantime, it became evident that Mr. Rublee was at last making headway in his efforts to negotiate with Germany. In mid-December, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht visited London to confer on economic matters with the Governor of the Bank of England, but at the same time presented a plan to Mr. Rublee and Lord Winterton, Chairman of the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee, whereby refugee emigration would be fostered through clearing arrangements that would also promote the sale of German goods abroad. Mr. Rublee was invited to continue the conversations in Berlin in advance of the plenary session of the Intergovernmental Committee in January. But as this further meeting lagged, the Committee sessions were set over to the following month. On January 10, Mr. Rublee and two associates met again with Dr. Schacht in Berlin. After two days of conversation, further meetings were postponed to allow the German Government time to study the modifications proposed by Mr. Rublee, which would eliminate the fostering of German exports. On January 21, 1939, Mr. Rublee received a revised plan from Dr. Schacht which differed radically from the original scheme, and a further meeting was scheduled for the following day. The next day, however, the meeting was called off and shortly afterwards it became known that Dr. Schacht had been removed as president of the Reichsbank.

The negotiations had failed at what seemed a most encouraging point. That night, however, the American and British Embassies asked the Foreign Office whether the talks would be continued and on the following day Mr. Rublee was received by General Goering. Mr. Rublee then left for Paris to confer with officials of the Intergovernmental Committee, announcing that the discussions in Berlin would be resumed with Dr. Helmut Wohlthat, of the Economics Ministry, on his return. The discussions were concluded the following week when Mr. Rublee received a memorandum from Dr. Wohlthat which stated Germany's position and the extent to which it was willing to cooperate. (For summary of this plan, see Contemporary Jewish Record, Vol. II, No. 2.)

The memorandum was presented to the plenary session of the Intergovernmental Committee in London on Feb-
ruary 12. At the close of its sessions, the Intergovernmental Committee issued a communiqué which authorized the director to inform the German Government "that, acting independently, it has been and is using, and will use its best endeavors to develop opportunities for permanent settlement of involuntary emigrants." The communiqué, in effect, also approved a project for "formation of a private international corporation which will serve as the agency for financing emigration from Germany and for maintaining such contacts with the German authorities as might be necessary for this purpose." At the same time, it was revealed that Mr. Rublee, feeling his task completed after five months in office, would resign and that he would be replaced by Sir Herbert Emerson, who, in September 1938, had been named League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; thus the work of the Committee and of the League would be under the same direction.

Coincidental with the issuance of the Intergovernmental Committee's statement was the departure of an Anglo-American Commission, sponsored by President Roosevelt's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees, to survey British Guiana, in line with Prime Minister Chamberlain's offer of the previous November. The commission consisted of Dr. Edward C. Ernst, Dr. Anthony Donevan, Dr. Joseph A. Rosen, Col. Howard U. Nicholas, Mr. Emil C. Bataille and Mr. Desmond Holdridge as American members; and Sir Crawford Douglas Jones, Sir Geoffrey Evans and Dr. D. W. Duthie as British members. After a two months' survey, the Commission reported that "...while the territory offered for settlement in British Guiana is not an ideal place for refugees from middle European countries, and while the territory could not be considered suitable for immediate large scale settlement, it undoubtedly possesses potential possibilities that would fully justify the carrying out of a trial settlement project on a substantial enough scale that would make it possible to determine whether and how these potential possibilities could be realized."

It was the especial recommendation of Dr. Joseph A. Rosen, in which the commission concurred, that a two-year project, costing approximately $3,000,000 and in-
vollving some 5,000 young settlers, should be initiated. Settlements would be established at certain strategic points which would test the feasibility of large-scale settlement and acquire information which could not be ascertained by a small commission in two months. It was the opinion of Dr. Rosen, however, that British Guiana should be considered only for large-scale settlement, since more advantageous spots could be found for small-scale immigration.

The attitude of the British Government toward the report was expressed by Prime Minister Chamberlain in a statement before the House of Commons on May 12. Mr. Chamberlain declared that the British Government stood ready to offer the fullest facilities for any settlement decided upon by refugee organizations. He pledged a large measure of local autonomy and adequate representation in the colony’s government, should a large new community be established. The Government, he said, would retain control of general services, such as security, communications and revenue. Concerning the important factor of communications, he said that if the prospects of development are good and capital is forthcoming adequate for the needs of large-scale settlement, the Government would be prepared to provide needed communications.

During the course of the year, numerous projects and lands for settlement, in addition to those already mentioned, were suggested. While many of them were being investigated by various agencies, none had received as thorough consideration or as favorable a report as British Guiana, though preliminary reports on the island of Mindanao in the Philippines showed favorable colonization conditions. The chief disadvantages faced by most of the projects were complicated political situations.

The general problems of refugee emigration during the period offered far greater difficulties than in previous years. Complicating factors were the territorial changes affecting Czechoslovakia and the anti-Jewish legislation in Italy and Hungary, which created several new classes of refugees. Furthermore, many of the refugees from Germany, during the latter part of 1938, were forced to leave the country hurriedly. Such unfortunates were
rarely in possession of legal documents which would regularize their stay in the countries of asylum, a condition which added to the complexities of an already confused situation in the lands neighboring on Germany. In addition, the emigrants of 1938 and 1939 were the poorest of all the refugees, for even those who had been comparatively well off in Germany had lost the bulk of their possessions as a result of the November decrees, and had been forced to leave the remainder in Germany.

According to a report by Sir Herbert Emerson, between 120,000 and 140,000 refugees left Germany during 1938, including one-third of the entire Jewish population of Austria, many of these being helped to do so by philanthropic organizations. In the first four months of 1939, an estimated 30,000 additional emigrants were assisted to leave Germany. To this number must be added a considerable group that did not seek aid. As of February, 1939, the official German Government estimate of Jewish population in Germany, Austria and the Sudetenland was 600,000, of whom 200,000 were considered too old to emigrate.

Domiciled in European lands were upwards of 150,000 refugees of whom approximately 60,000 were dependent for sustenance upon the various refugee committees. Probably the largest number lived in France. At the beginning of 1938, there were about 10,000 refugees in that country, but, by the end of that year, the number had grown to 25,000 and was further increased during the first half of 1939. French officials estimated that perhaps 10,000 of these were so-called "illegals" subject to deportation, and took steps to check the further entry of such refugees. The Interior Ministry was reported to be willing to legalize the stay of these "illegals", if the refugee organizations would agree not to press for the admission of additional numbers. Permission to work as farm laborers or in the defense industries was also to be granted the refugees. As mentioned in another place in this review, many of the refugees offered to serve in the French armed forces during the mobilizations in the Fall of 1938 and Spring of 1939. (See section on France, above.)

The various refugee committees operating in France
took steps during the course of the year to coordinate their work more fully, and a centralized body was organized. The major refugee group expended approximately $170,000 during 1938 in assisting some 11,000 relief cases and in other services.

Very humane treatment was accorded the refugees in the little countries of Belgium and Holland, which permitted large numbers to enter. Following the events of November 10 in Germany, there naturally was an accelerated influx into these countries. To help the refugee organizations cope with the situation, the governments established camps to house the refugees. Similar institutions were established in England and France. In several of these camps rudimentary vocational retraining courses were organized to enable the refugees to fit themselves for new occupations.

More than 1,500 refugees were housed in Dutch camps. In addition 1,200 children were admitted into the country and housed in special lodgings. In the Spring of 1939, it was estimated that there were 22,000 refugees in Holland, of whom 11,000 were permanently settled in the country. The Dutch Jewish communities contributed $1,080,000 during 1938 for local refugee aid.

Belgium was greatly affected by the sudden flight of Jews from Austria and, in the period from May to December 1938, over 13,000 Austrians came to Brussels and Antwerp. The problem raised by this sudden influx was met in part by the establishment of a number of camps by the government and, when relief funds ran short, the government for a time took over the care of about 3,000 refugees. In addition the government permitted 500 children from Germany to enter the country and to be housed in children's camps. During 1938, the Belgium Jewish communities raised $55,000 for refugee work, and large sums were contributed by foreign Jewish organizations.

Similar conditions were faced during the year by the small Jewish community of Switzerland. During 1938, a total of 9,000 refugees required assistance from the community, and the average relief load was 3,000 cases. Here, too, the government took a liberal attitude and
provided public buildings for the use of refugees. The Swiss community of 18,000 Jews raised $340,000 during 1938, and additional subventions came from outside sources. The Scandinavian countries, Yugoslavia, Portugal, Luxembourg and Albania also had refugee problems, though of much smaller compass. In all countries, the refugee committees maintained vocational training facilities and other services to help prepare the refugees for permanent settlement. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee expended a total of $778,000 in 1938 in support of the refugee committees in all European lands.

In the efforts to aid refugees, England played an even larger part than any of the continental countries. Not only did England admit larger numbers of refugees, but through the Council for German Jewry British Jews raised huge sums which were expended for work within England itself, as well as for the work of committees in Palestine, Germany and Austria, and in other European lands. The German Jewish Aid Committee of England estimated, that in May 1939, 28,000 refugees were residing in Great Britain. This number included some 3,000 children, cared for in special children's camps, as part of the general program to evacuate Jewish children from Germany after the November 10 riots, and perhaps an equal number of adult refugees housed in transit camps. The local refugee committee reported that while it had registered 8,500 in 1938, that number had grown to 18,000 by May 1939.

The British Section of the Council for German Jewry conducted two major fund-raising campaigns during 1938, the Austrian Appeal and its regular campaign for aid to German Jews. The former drive received public contributions of £592,000 of which £145,000 was appropriated up to the end of the year. In addition a non-sectarian drive known as the Lord Baldwin Fund, headed by the former Prime Minister, raised upwards of £250,000 for general refugee assistance.

The hopes of the refugees for permanent settlement naturally centered about the overseas countries. For the first time since the establishment of its quota system, the
United States permitted its German quota to be filled. As a result 27,000 German immigrants entered the country from July 1, 1938 to June 30, 1939. In the same period, Palestine admitted approximately 7,000 refugees from Germany under the immigration schedules and an unknown number of 'illegals.' (See Section on Palestine).

Another of the great hopes were the countries of Latin America. From 1933 to the end of 1938, some 40,000 refugees found homes in these lands, half of them in Argentina. The remainder were scattered throughout the other countries of South and Central America, and the West Indies. As long as the influx was comparatively small, local committees in these lands, with some aid from the Joint Distribution Committee, the Hias-Ica Emigration Association, and the Jewish Colonization Association, were able to cope with the situation. A major problem arose from the fact that, while the Latin American countries chiefly needed agricultural workers, most of the refugees were not trained or suited for farming.

During 1938, a small country such as Cuba, with a Jewish population of only 10,000, accepted 3,000 refugees, and by July, 1939, this number had increased to 6,000. A considerable number of the new arrivals were penniless and forced to seek assistance. Employment possibilities were few since Cuban law requires that 90% of all labor must be native. There was a major relief problem in Cuba, therefore, which had to be met very largely with funds from the United States. In San Domingo, there were 125 refugees during the year, and Costa Rica and Honduras had 100 each. The tiny island of Trinidad which, prior to 1932, had only a Jewish population of 10, permitted 450 refugees to enter in the last six months. In Chile, where there are 20,000 Jews, 2,000 refugees gained admission. However, on May 5, 1939, a decree was issued suspending all immigration for a year. In Colombia, 1,200 refugees found havens and the average number of new arrivals was 50 to 60 each month. Paraguay virtually stopped all immigration in September 1938 after it had admitted about 1,000 refugees. In Peru, the Jewish population was more than doubled by the immigration of 2,000 refugees, most of whom were admitted on temporary
visas, while Uruguay admitted about 3,000 refugees, 2,000 of whom held transit visas. Bolivia, with an original Jewish population of perhaps 100 admitted 6,000 refugees up to the end of the year.

As in other parts of the world, there was a sudden increase in the number of refugees clamoring to enter these countries after Germany's annexation of Austria and the riots of November 10. The panicky flight caused Latin American countries to bar their doors. They raised the requirements for admission, demanded guarantees and head taxes, and applied all their normal regulations with greater severity. But so great was the pressure that refugees became the easy victims of unscrupulous steamship agents and consuls. Frequently, refugees obtained inadequate or invalid documents from consuls in Europe that were not honored by the central governments represented by these officials. Sometimes regulations were changed while refugees were on the high seas and, as a result, whole boatloads of refugees wandered from land to land and port to port seeking admission.

A shocking example of such a boatload of unfortunates, which focused the attention of the entire world upon this phase of the refugee problem, was the Hamburg-American liner S. S. St. Louis, which sailed from Germany for Cuba on May 15, 1939, ten days after a decree had been issued by the Cuban Government voiding all landing permits previously issued by the Cuban commissioner of immigration. Nine hundred and seven of the passengers on the St. Louis held such permits. The Hamburg-American line, however, announced that it had been assured that the landing permits would be honored because they had been issued before the date of the decree. But when the boat arrived in Havana on May 27, the passengers were not permitted to land. Efforts to obtain a reversal of this order failed, and American relief organizations sent representatives to Cuba to cope with the situation. On June 1, President Laredo Bru of Cuba ordered the ship to leave Havana and threatened to have it towed out by gunboats if it did not go under its own steam. He refused to entertain any further representations in behalf of the refugees until the ship had left.
On June 2, therefore, the ship sailed out of the harbor and wandered for more than a week in Caribbean waters while representatives of the National Coordinating Committee and the Joint Distribution Committee sought to obtain permission for the landing of the refugees. On June 5, President Bru announced that he would grant a temporary haven for the refugees if relief organizations would be willing to provide guarantees, in the form of deposits of $500 each for all refugees admitted. Arrangements to meet these guarantees were then made by the Joint Distribution Committee, but before they could be completed, the offer was rescinded on the ground that the time set for meeting the demands had elapsed. Further efforts to open the question in Cuba failed, and the Joint Distribution Committee turned its attention to finding a haven for the refugees in European lands.

In London and Paris, officials of the Joint Distribution Committee, in conjunction with local refugee committees, petitioned the governments of England, France, Holland and Belgium to admit groups of the St. Louis refugees. Financial guarantees that these refugees would not become public charges and that they would eventually re-emigrate were offered by the Joint Distribution Committee and, on the basis of these guarantees, the refugees were admitted by these four countries.

Seeing its entire program of aid to refugees and other distressed Jews endangered by the heavy costs of such incidents, the Joint Distribution Committee, on June 21, four days after the landing of the refugees in Europe, issued a statement of policy declaring that it would not be in a position to offer similar guarantees again, because of the heavy financial and administrative burdens involved, which would disrupt its normal program.

A similar statement was made by a spokesman for the Liaison Committee of the League of Nations High Commission for Refugees who declared: "One thing we must state is that if these [the St. Louis passengers] are taken care of by certain governments, it is not to constitute a precedent for other shiploads."

South America was not the only place on the globe
where these wandering ships sought to land their human cargoes. Dozens of ships with thousands of refugees wandered in the Mediterranean trying to land their passengers along the Palestine coast, despite the restricted Palestine immigration schedule. The activities of these ships finally prompted the British government in July to shut down all Jewish immigration to Palestine, effective October 1939. The port of embarkation for the refugees on these ships, mostly cattle and cargo boats, ill-fitted for passenger service, was Constanza, a Rumanian harbor on the Black Sea.

When all other doors were shut and when efforts to land their passengers on Palestine soil failed, the ships sometimes made the long trip to Shanghai. Several ships with refugees went directly to that city, so that during the course of the year, Shanghai became a major refugee haven, war-torn symbol of the desperation of these people. Chief reason for this was the fact that Shanghai is a free port where the refugees had no difficulty in entering, though they could not proceed to the interior of China. In this city 10,000 refugees were concentrated by July 1, 1939. Opportunity for employment was small indeed and, as a result, a grave relief problem was created with which the local community alone naturally could not cope. Substantial subventions, however, were made by the British Section of the Council for German Jewry and by the Joint Distribution Committee. Some further relief was afforded the community by the fact that the Philippines accepted several hundred refugees from Shanghai and others were enabled to go to Hong Kong, Singapore, Colombo and Bombay.

Such was the refugee picture when the members of the Intergovernmental Committee met in London in July, 1939. Out of that meeting came three important announcements: the first, already referred to, stated the British Government’s willingness to consider giving governmental financial help for refugees; the second revealed the formation of a “coordinating foundation” which would implement the “Rublee plan” for orderly emigration of Jews from Germany; and the third declared that sufficient
funds had been raised to finance a trial settlement in British Guiana, though on a much smaller scale than originally recommended.

The establishment of the foundation had been forecast by the communique issued, in February, 1939, by the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee after it had heard Mr. Rublee’s report on his negotiations with the German Government. The foundation was incorporated in London as a £200,000 non-sectarian company to cooperate with governmental and refugee bodies in improving the conditions of the refugees; to insure an orderly emigration from Germany; to cooperate in the investigation of settlement possibilities; and to facilitate the transfer from Germany of part of the possessions and assets of the immigrants.

It was stressed in the announcements that such transfers would consist only of goods to be used by the refugees themselves, and that under no conditions would the foundation engage in the transfer of goods meant for resale in the world markets, nor would it engage in any other activities for the benefit of the German economy. It was also emphasized that actual resettlement or colonization projects were beyond the scope of the foundation and beyond its financial powers.

To guide the activities of the foundation, a board of directors consisting of ten Americans, eight Britons and two citizens of European countries, both Jews and Christians, was established. The American members named were Paul Baerwald, chairman of the Joint Distribution Committee which underwrote the foundation up to $1,000,000; John W. Davis, former Ambassador to Great Britain; Dr. Rufus Jones, president of the American Society of Friends (Quakers); Nathan L. Miller, former Governor of New York; Dave Hennen Morris, former Ambassador to Belgium; Joseph M. Proskauer, Lessing J. Rosenwald, Lewis L. Strauss, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, and Owen D. Young.

The British members named were the Earl of Bessborough, Viscount Bearsted, Harold Butler, former director of the International Labor Office; Anthony de Rothschild, Sir Horace Rumbold, former Ambassador to Germany;

Such new hope as could be mustered in the refugee situation at the close of the year, then, lay in the establishment of the foundation and in the statement of the British Government that "unless the work of the [Inter-governmental Refugee] committee was to be seriously obstructed and countries of refuge were to be left with large numbers of refugees who could not be absorbed, it would be necessary to depart from the principle agreed upon unanimously at Evian that no participating government would give direct financial assistance to the refugees." Such a departure Great Britain proposed.