INTRODUCTION

The year 1951–52 will undoubtedly go down in history as one of the most turbulent and disturbed periods in the annals of the Middle East. A whole region of newly independent peoples seemed to be rising against foreign influences in an upsurge of violent emotion in which rabid nationalism was exacerbated by religious fanaticism and primitive xenophobia. The result was a revolutionary movement led by extremists who incited mobs and in turn were driven by them to new extremes; a movement that, disregarding existing treaties, contracts, and international considerations, had only one definite aim—to expel the foreign powers from their last political, military, and economic footholds. It was inevitable that such a movement should cause a deep socio-political shift in most of the countries of the Middle East—a shift with important consequences for the Jewish communities, although their effects could not everywhere be directly measured.

The period was characterized by political assassinations of kings and prime ministers (Jordan’s King Abdullah, Lebanon’s Riadh as-Sulh, and Persia’s Ali Razmara), and by military coups such as took place in Syria when that unhappy country was taken over in its fourth military coup in three years by an officers’ junta and settled down to a military dictatorship. Egypt, which shared the distinction with Yemen of being the only Middle Eastern states with a royal dynasty more than a few decades old, witnessed the abdication of its king, and a coup d'état which dismissed its parliament and established a military dictatorship. In Lebanon, whose very existence depended on the maintenance of a delicate equilibrium between rival minority communities through the complete avoidance of force and a careful distribution of governmental power, there were large elements that felt that the parliamentary system had failed and a dictatorship was the only resort. Parliamentary rule in Iran was cast into the shade by Premier Muhammad Mossadeq’s virtual dictatorship.

The autocratic régimes of medieval Sa’udi Arabia and Yemen seemed to be the only government systems in the Middle East except for Turkey and Israel that were unaffected by internal crises and revolutions. Iraq’s internal crisis, although always present and real enough, did not during the period under review lead to any convulsions comparable to those of the other Middle Eastern states.

Though at the end of the period under review (July, 1951 through June, 1952) stability seemed to have returned to Iran, Egypt, and Syria under dictatorships, it could not be concluded that a stable solution had been found. Apart from the instability inherent in any dictatorship, the three countries
had embarked on far-reaching and ambitious programs of social and agrarian reform. Such programs, however praiseworthy, commendable, and indeed vitally necessary they might be, were more easily proclaimed than carried out. It is to be feared that any attempt on the part of the dictators really to implement these reforms may lead not only to critical dislocations of social and economic life, but also to sharp clashes of interest and further upheavals. On the other hand, an abandonment of these ambitious reforms would not only leave the basic socio-political problems of the countries concerned unresolved, but might well result in further revolts. Yet, the concentration of the new régimes on internal reforms and development, particularly in Egypt, might be viewed as hopeful signs for the Middle East.

**Middle East Defense**

The general political atmosphere of heated nationalist emotions was distinctly unfavorable to the attempt of the Western Powers to establish a Middle Eastern Defense Organization or Command, to be closely linked with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and with the active participation of the Middle Eastern states themselves—in the case of Egypt even as a “founding member” with special status. Egypt, to whom the Western proposal was submitted a few days after her unilateral cancelation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 on October 8, 1951, rejected the proposal outright. At that time, and during most of the period under review, the governments of Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan were reliably reported to favor the establishment of the proposed command and their own countries’ participation in it (with or without certain reservations and conditions). Yet none of them accepted the West’s tentative informal proposals. Moreover, no Arab government openly admitted its desire to join the planned organization. When a Syrian Prime Minister stated that he believed the Western scheme to be desirable, he was denounced and deserted by his own cabinet, and fell. Both the general anti-Western atmosphere and the Arab states’ reluctance to “abandon” Egypt in the interests of pan-Arab solidarity (although Egypt’s rejection of the Western plan without prior consultation with the other Arab states was bitterly resented and denounced), prevented the Arab statesmen from openly supporting a policy they recognized as correct.

**The Arab League**

The Arab Collective Security Pact, originally signed in April 1950, but never ratified and implemented and subjected to continuous debates and differences, was signed again in an amended version in February 1951 (without Jordan); it was duly ratified by Syria (May 1951) and Egypt (June and July 1951). After further delay, Jordan reversed its previous decision not to join the pact and ratified it in March 1952. Ratification by Iraq’s parliament followed the same month, and the official instrument of Iraq’s ratification was
deposited—after an unexplained further delay of six months—in August 1952. King Ibn Sa'ud ratified the pact in August 1952, and it officially went into effect on August 23, 1952. Lebanon and Yemen have not as of July 1952 ratified the pact but their ratification was confidently expected.

The Collective Security Pact is significant partly because it attempts to secure full military cooperation among the various Arab states against any prospective enemy (Israel has been designated both by responsible leaders and by general public opinion as the main, or the only, prospective enemy), and to establish permanent bodies and blueprints to ensure proper coordination. But this is not its primary importance. Cooperation and coordination are determined by political, military, and social factors that are little affected by pacts on paper and by standing committees and coordinating groups. If wholehearted and efficient military cooperation was lacking during the Arab-Israel war of 1948, it was certainly not for the lack of committees, clauses, and resolutions on cooperation. But the pact has most certainly been used in Arab counterproposals to the Western plan for Middle East defense, and will almost certainly be further used as an important bargaining asset in further negotiations with the West.

The true significance of the Security Pact, however, is to be found in the basic constitutional change it makes in inter-Arab relations. While heretofore no decision adopted by the Arab League was binding on its member states (in the language of the Arab League charter, the member states were bound only by those resolutions for which they themselves had voted), the statutes of the Security Pact provide that decisions adopted by a two-thirds majority shall bind all the members. The Collective Security Pact is therefore the first pan-Arab instrument giving the inter-Arab alliance power over its member states, whatever the effect of the reservations stated by Iraq and Jordan.

Apart from the ratification of the Security Pact, however, the Arab League continued to lead an ineffective shadow existence. Its Council held the semiannual sessions prescribed in its covenant, but it wielded no real power, no influence over the policies and attitudes of its member states. At the United Nations General Assembly, for instance, Arab unity was apparent only in questions involving Israel or related to colonial or non-selfgoverning territories. On most political problems, including the vital East-West conflict, the Arab states usually took conflicting positions (Lebanon and Iraq consistently voting with the West, while the other Arab states generally maintained a neutralist attitude). On the vital problem of the Palestinian Arab refugees, Lebanon differed sharply from the other Arab states, demanding the transfer of the refugees now sheltered in Lebanon and their resettlement in Syria and/or Iraq. On the Tunisian and Moroccan conflict Syria and Lebanon refused to join the “Arab-Asian” Bloc in its outspoken support of nationalist demands and its anti-French agitation, but preferred a neutral position (which they maintained until Arab-Asian pressure forced them to rejoin the camp). Inter-Arab conflicts and rivalries continued unabated. Moreover, tension between Syria and Iraq mounted, and at the end of the period under review (July 1952) Iraq had not yet recognized the régime of Col. Adib Shishakly and had no official contact with it. Relations between Syria and Lebanon were none too cordial, although the rupture of economic relations
of March 1950 had been patched up by a new economic agreement in February 1952. Unusual tension and mutual suspicion had developed even between Jordan and Iraq—heretofore closely associated as Hashemite sister states in a common front against the anti-Hashemite Egyptian-Sa'udi Bloc. This was due to reported Iraqi plans (emphatically denied by the Iraqis) to use King Abdullah’s death and the resulting period of instability in order to annex Jordan, and to various rumors that certain Iraqi politicians and members of the royal family were actively taking sides in the internal struggle for the succession to Abdullah’s throne.

The fact that the Arab League had ceased, in fact, to be an active and decisive factor in Arab politics was further borne out when it became apparent that on the major political problems rocking the Arab world that have been mentioned above the Arab League Council and Political Committee did not even hold serious discussions. In fact, when several member states repeatedly demanded that the League Council be convened to consider these major problems, the Egyptian masters of the League succeeded in preventing such a meeting with the active help of Azzam Pasha, the Secretary General. The ordinary semi-annual meetings of the League Council, provided for by the League’s covenant, could only be arranged after it had been agreed that the real political problems would not be touched upon and that the Council would confine itself to ceremonial sessions and speeches and to the few subjects on which general agreement was to be assumed.

The Arab League had in fact become a conservative force in the Arab world, bent on preserving the existing state of affairs in respect both to inter-Arab politics (e.g., the sovereignty of the member states) and to social structure. The new mass movement in the Middle East had simply by-passed the League, developing on different levels of social and political emotion and action. The events of 1951–52 threw into still sharper relief the impotence of the Arab League.

Yet despite its eclipse as a real political force, the Arab League continued to appear vis-a-vis the external world as a united body representing all the Arab states at international meetings—their population of forty million, the strategic importance of their territories, their combined voting strength. It was because the Arab League was useful in this respect that the Arab states continued to foster and support it and refrained from any move that might endanger its existence.

**Pan-Islamic Conferences**

The movement for a greater measure of political, economic, and cultural cooperation between all the Islamic nations gradually subsided during the period under review. This attempt to include the non-Arab Muslim states (Persia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia) started with the two all-Islamic Economic Conferences of Karachi (1949) and Teheran (1950) and continued with the Conference of the Islamic World Congress (Karachi, February 1951). Incidentally, it posed quite a problem to Arab, but non-Muslim, Lebanon. A number of Islamic sages and politicians continued to call for further con-
ferences and congresses, but no representative gathering could be convened; the few conferences that took place in Karachi during 1951-52, were unrepresentative and unimportant, arranged on the private initiative of a few politicians—mostly disgruntled ones—and not supported by governments. The only pan-Islamic meeting of consequence that was planned—a conference of the prime ministers of all the Muslim states to be convened by Sir Muhammad Zafrullah, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan—did not materialize.

Refugees

The biggest and most important single socio-political problem in the entire Middle East as a whole, the resettlement and reintegration of the Palestinian Arab refugees, came little nearer to a solution during the period under review. Although the UN General Assembly on January 22, 1952, voted funds that could go a long way towards a constructive settlement (a three-year program of $50,000,000 for relief and $200,000,000 for resettlement—the amounts to be spent on nonconstructive relief gradually to decrease within the specified period of three years), only the allocation for relief was being spent. The only Arab state prepared to allow large-scale refugee resettlement within its boundaries, and even to cooperate, was Jordan. Resettlement schemes to the amount of $11,000,000 were blueprinted during the summer of 1952, although their execution has not yet begun. Experts on the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), however, took a highly skeptical view of the prospects and possibilities of large-scale settlement in Jordan and preferred to use most of the agency's efforts and funds on resettlement projects in Syria (mainly its northeastern part, Al-Jazirah), and, to a lesser extent, in the northwestern part of Iraq (adjoining Al-Jazirah). Iraq, however, has so far adamantly rejected even the idea of refugee settlement within its boundaries. Nor has Syria so far given an affirmative reply. Negotiations with Syria have, indeed, been going on for a considerable period (they started with the present dictator's predecessors). But in spite of conflicting reports as to Syria's "final" approval or "final" rejection of UNRWA's settlement scheme, the negotiations do not seem to have been terminated. Lebanon would like, as has been stated above, to see the refugees now in its own country permanently transferred to Syria, but its leaders have not so far advocated general resettlement, nor would their opinion carry much weight in pan-Arab counsels. Egypt, which has no refugees in its own proper boundaries, has on its hands some 200,000 refugees in the Gaza strip occupied and administered by it (an area which barely supports its 50,000 to 70,000 permanent inhabitants). But in spite of plans for the resettlement of moderate numbers in the Sinai peninsula, nothing seems to have been done.

Thus, Israel is the only country in which Arab refugees have been resettled and integrated. Some 30,000 Arabs found in Israel at the termination of the hostilities and classified and registered as refugees (since they had left their places of domicile in an attempt to flee, but were overtaken by the advancing Israeli army) were resettled; the last of them ceased to be "refugees" on July 1, 1952. In addition to these, some 3,000 Arabs, most of them
refugees, were allowed to re-enter Israel under the Reunion of Families scheme; some 25,000 "infiltrated" back into Israel and later received permission to stay; an additional 18,000-20,000 infiltrators were estimated to be residing in Israel without legal permission. The number of refugees Israel took back and integrated into its economy and society is, therefore, around 75,000—some 40 per cent of Israel's Arab population of 180,000.

Relations with Israel

There was no change in the general Arab attitude to Israel. Several Egyptian public leaders and popular newspapers for the first time publicly expressed the opinion that ultimately the Arabs would have to make peace with Israel and to recognize its existence as a permanent Middle Eastern body politic. But this eventuality was made contingent on Israel's fulfilling certain conditions and these opinions seemed to have no influence on the official Arab attitude, which continued to be one of refusal to enter into discussions or negotiations on a possible approach to peace. At the same time, the Arabs continued to demand the return of all the refugees to Israel and the reduction of Israel to the territory and frontiers envisaged by the original UN decision of November 1947.

Apart from their political struggle against Israel, the main weapon of the Arab states remained a strict economic boycott. A pan-Arab Boycott Bureau was reorganized, and branches of the bureau were in the process of establishment in the various Arab capitals. There was also an energetic effort to enforce a much broader concept of the boycott: it was not only Israel goods and services that had to be boycotted, but also foreign, non-Israel companies and firms which maintained agencies or representations in Israel or which had close and active business contacts with Israel. When some Arab governments suspected that Israel industrial products were being marketed in the Arab countries under the guise of products of Turkey and Cyprus—with the cooperation of Turkish, Cypriote, and Arab merchants and firms—they decided to ban all imports from Turkey and Cyprus.\(^1\) The concept of the boycott of the goods and services of Israel proper was continually being broadened: not only the Arabs should refrain from selling anything to Israel, but their friends and whoever wished to maintain close business contacts with them should do the same. Thus, all the oil companies producing oil in the Arab countries were required to undertake that none of that "Arab" oil should ever reach Israel—and they complied.

Anti-Jewish Discrimination

To an ever-increasing degree foreign citizens of Jewish faith were included in various discriminatory regulations originally connected with the anti-

\(^1\) As Arab publicity and information services do not generally distinguish clearly between bills and regulations that have been proposed, between those that are in a drafting stage, under discussion, or in preparation; those that have already been adopted and become law; and those that are already being enforced, it is not always easy to determine to what degree the regulations discussed here are already being enforced. It would seem that most of them are not. The Arabic press, however, refers to them as to actually existing regulations.
Israel boycott. In various Arab ports and airports foreign passengers, including transit passengers, were required to indicate their religion, and if they were Jewish, they were in many cases subjected to certain restrictions of freedom of movement or to special supervision. Although there were no openly admitted regulations denying visitors’ visas to the Arab countries to foreign Jews, many foreigners of Jewish faith or even foreigners with Jewish-sounding names experienced difficulties not encountered by their non-Jewish compatriots.

The only Arab state sufficiently inexperienced in modern international usage and ethics openly to enact such anti-Jewish (as distinct from anti-Israel) measures, was Sa’udi Arabia. It had become customary for the Arab states to demand, when importing goods from any foreign country, “certificates of origin” endorsed by their own consular offices to prove that the goods did not originate in Israel. In the spring of 1952, however, the government of Sa’udi Arabia demanded that the “racial origin” of the manufacturing firm be stated in such certificates—with the clear implication that “Jewish” firms would not be permitted to export to Sa’udi Arabia. It was obvious from later exchanges of statements that the anti-Jewish character of this request, although not publicly stated, had been officially made known to the foreign governments concerned. It was the government of Italy that first protested against such discriminatory practices; at the end of May 1952, it bluntly informed Sa’udi Arabia that the racial origin of manufacturing firms in Italy could not be stated since such a statement would be contrary to the constitution of Italy. The government of the United States had earlier, as became known in February 1952, given in to a Sa’udi regulation barring Jews from entry into Sa’udi territory and had in practice informally excluded American Jews from recruitment as technicians, laborers, etc., for the construction of American bases on the coast of the Persian Gulf. The National Community Relations Advisory Council, representing six national American Jewish organizations and twenty-seven Jewish community councils, had strongly protested against this discrimination. Now, however, although there was no report of a “protest” on its part, the United States attempted to obtain a change in the Sa’udi regulations by negotiation. In early June 1952, the State Department made it known that it had obtained “modifications” in the Sa’udi decrees, according to which American firms—except for those maintaining agencies or representations in Israel—would be exempted from the anti-Jewish discriminatory regulations. No further news was published on this subject, and it remained unclear whether or not the United States was content with this achievement. At the same time the World Jewish Congress raised the issue of Sa’udi discrimination against foreign Jews before the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

Middle East Jewry

During the period under review Middle Eastern Jewry outside Israel and French North Africa continued to shrink in numbers and in social, spiritual, and political status and importance. After the almost complete liquidation
of the Jewish community in Yemen, the transfer of the great bulk of the community of Iraq, the most ancient and most deeply rooted Jewry of the East, was completed during the year under review. Emigration from Turkey to Israel was not very significant in numbers, and in view of the considerable numbers of Turkish Jews returning from Israel, Turkish Jewry maintained its numbers and status. Iranian Jews continued to go to Israel in increasing numbers. The emigration of Egypt's Jews also continued in a small but unceasing trickle, while a similar trickle reduced the number of Jews in Syria. Lebanese Jews, too, continued to emigrate to some extent; but since most of the Jews of Syria leaving that country came to the Lebanon for permanent or temporary residence the number of Jews in the Lebanon seems to have remained more or less stationary.2

The general socio-political atmosphere mentioned above produced a profound feeling of insecurity among the Jews of the Middle Eastern countries. They felt themselves deeply affected, actually or potentially, by the growing anti-foreign excitement; events like Black Saturday in Egypt (see below) inevitably added to such fears. In most of the Arab countries no clear distinction is drawn between Israel on the one hand and the local Jewish community on the other, so that de facto, if not officially, much of the anti-Israel propaganda and measures affect the local Jewish communities, too. (See below, parliamentary debates on this subject in Lebanon.)

The investigation and trials of the alleged “Jewish-Zionist spy ring” in Iraq (see below) produced a crop of rumors and reports of similar investigations in other Arab countries and of joint pan-Arab measures. Iraqi investigators claimed they had discovered that the Jewish “spy-ring” had branches in other Arab capitals, too, with headquarters in Beirut; a senior Syrian police official was reported to be observing the Iraqi trials. Arab news agencies reported that Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq were preparing joint measures against this Jewish danger, Lebanon reportedly having taken the initiative. Following these reports—mostly dated June and July 1951—there was no further news of consequence, although the matter was repeatedly mentioned in parliamentary debates, speeches, and the press.

Reports of the imminent freezing or confiscation of Jewish property in the Arab countries did not materialize. In August 1951, the Arab News Agency reported that consultations among the seven Arab states on this subject were in progress and that the forthcoming meeting of the Arab League’s Political Committee was to adopt a decision; it was mentioned as a possibility that the frozen funds might be held as security for the eventual compensation to be paid by Israel to the Palestinian Arab refugees. But the League’s Political Committee did not, as far as is known, consider any practical proposal in this direction.3 Although similar suggestions continued to be made in various Arab countries—the Lebanon again taking the lead—no decision to freeze or confiscate properties of such Jews remaining citizens and residents of the Arab countries seems to have been taken.

---

2 For a detailed account of immigration to Israel from the Middle East, see below and p. 426 and f.
3 At the Arab League Council session of September 1952, a formal proposal to freeze Jewish property was submitted by the head of the Iraqi delegation, Fadhel al-Jamali. The head of the Egyptian delegation, ex-Premier Ali Maher, vehemently objected even to the discussion of such a proposal, as contrary to the Egyptian constitution.
The year 1951–52 witnessed the culmination of both the Anglo-Egyptian crisis and Egypt's permanent internal crisis—that of the struggle for power among the Wafd, the King and the political parties supporting him against the Wafd, and the newly emerging extremist mass movements of the Muslim Brothers, the (Fascist) Egyptian Socialists, and similar bodies. This struggle developed against the background of decades of rule by a land-owning and industrial class notorious for its indifference to the basic social problems of an unjust and harmful system of land distribution, appalling state of health, widespread illiteracy, and malnutrition.

On October 8, 1951, the Wafdist government, then in power unilaterally, declared the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the 1899 agreement on Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in the Sudan null and void and proclaimed the union of Egypt and the Sudan. Almost simultaneously, it rejected a proposal submitted by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Turkey for the establishment of an Allied command for the defense of the Middle East with an invitation to Egypt to be a “founding member” of this command. Since the British did not evacuate their troops from the Suez Canal zone (an evacuation that was the main aim of Egypt's declaration of October 8 and the alpha and omega of Egypt's national aspirations), growing tension developed in the Canal Zone. This led to sporadic clashes between British troops and nationalist guerrilla squads encouraged by the government. Finally an uninterrupted sequence of such clashes culminated, at the end of January 1952, in the Battle of Isma'ilia. The Egyptian police were unable and unwilling to enforce law and order, or even cooperated with the Liberation Squads; the Egyptian army took no part in the clashes. On Black Saturday, January 26, 1952, a Cairo mass demonstration against the British developed into a full-scale riot. After some hours of arson and the wilful destruction of a large number of stores, cinemas, hotels, and offices, in Cairo's modern business center, the army was called out and put an end to the riots. These acts of arson and destruction were by no means confined to British businesses; many establishments belonging to other foreigners, to members of minority communities (Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Egyptian Copts), and in the end even to Moslem Egyptians, were destroyed. Observers were under the impression social revolution had broken out in Egypt.

The next day King Farouq dismissed Nahas and his Wafdist government and called the conservative independent Ali Maher to the premiership. Maher successfully concentrated his efforts on an attempt to restore internal security. However, he made no progress towards a solution of the Anglo-Egyptian crisis, and he failed to solve the problems posed by the internal political situation by either dissolving the Wafd-controlled Parliament and making an alliance with the anti-Wafdist parties or coming to terms with the Wafd. On March 1, 1952, he resigned and the ex-Wafdist independent Naguib al-Hilali took his place. Hilali dissolved Parliament and took a firm anti-Wafdist line; he also initiated an attempt to purge Egypt of the corrup-
tion that had taken firm roots in both government administration and political and public life. At the end of June 1952, Hilali resigned under circumstances that have not been fully clarified (there seems to have been some degree of rapprochement between the palace and the Wafd), and Hussein Sirry—an independent who had the reputation of always preparing the ground for a return to power of the Wafd—became prime minister. His resignation on July 20, apparently following differences between him and the King, was followed by a coup d'état by Major-General Mohammed Naguib and a group of younger army officers reported to be in close contact with the Muslim Brotherhood and the extreme right-wing Socialists. A few days later came King Farouq's forced abdication and the establishment of Naguib's dictatorial regime.

**Anti-Jewish Outbreaks**

The Jewish community of Egypt did all it could to avoid any offense to Egypt's heatedly sensitive nationalism. The chief rabbi and the leaders of the community expressed their loyalty to Egypt in its struggle against Britain and their solidarity with that struggle at all occasions customarily calling for such demonstrations of loyalty.

There were nevertheless several anti-Jewish outbreaks, which should be interpreted as both an expression of customary, deeply ingrained anti-Jewish feeling and as one of the by-products of the overstressed nationalism of this period. The strict censorship maintained in Egypt prevented exact and detailed news of such outbreaks from reaching the world outside. On July 15, 1951, however, it was admitted that a bomb had been thrown at the Old Synagogue of Alexandria. On December 17, 1951, the Minister of the Interior told Parliament that the extremist Liberation Squads had caused 122 "outrages against Egyptians and non-British foreigners," between October 16 (the start of the intensified nationalist campaign) and December 6, 1951. These included cases of robbery, extortion of money, threats, incitement to murder, and pressure on Egyptian employees and labor to leave work. The Minister did not give a breakdown of the 122 cases officially acknowledged. (It may safely be assumed that there were more cases, especially of extortion of money, that were not brought to the knowledge of the government.) Since Jews constituted a large percentage of the business community of Cairo and Alexandria, they must inevitably have formed a large portion of the victims of such cases.

No official details or lists of the victims of the riots and outrages of January 26, 1952—Black Saturday—were published. Obviously, however, the shops and establishments destroyed on that day (468, according to Al-Ahram) contained many Jewish-owned businesses. Jewish sources claimed "nearly all" Jewish-owned shops, stores, and cinemas in the business center of Cairo had been destroyed; damage suffered by Jewish establishments alone on Black Saturday was estimated at more than 9,000,000 Egyptian pounds ($25,000,000 to $26,000,000). In addition to privately owned establishments, the Jewish school in the 'Abbassia district, considered one of the finest Jewish schools in the world, was totally destroyed.
Anti-Jewish Measures

The Egyptian press in June and July 1951 reported searches and criminal investigations of "Jewish-Zionist espionage" in Egypt. According to one press report, a Jewish officer of the Egyptian Army had been arrested as involved in this spy ring. There was, however, no further news, and the investigations seem to have been discontinued.

Although the main wave of arrests and detention of those Jews suspected as Zionists had receded after the termination of the Palestine war and most of those detained had been released, there were isolated reports of new arrests of Zionists. In some cases the "leftist" character of the prisoners' political convictions was stressed; "Zionism" and "Communism" were often deliberately confused, and arrested or detained persons were described as "Zionist Communists." While it was obvious from a study of the names of those arrested as members of Communist cells that they contained a fairly high percentage of Jews, this was also sometimes expressly stated and stressed by the press (cf. Al-Akhbar al-Jedidah, July 26, 1952).

The Egyptian press continued to complain that Jews were using illegal means to smuggle funds and currency out of the country (cf. Al-Ahram, September 19, 1951). Rumors circulated that a government measure freezing or confiscating all Jewish funds in the country was impending. Such rumors were not only spread by various press organs, but found further nourishment in the utterances of responsible government leaders (cf. speech of Farid Za'loud, Minister of Propaganda, at the Interparliamentary Conference in Monaco, March 1951). But no action of this type was taken during the period under review. On the contrary, Egypt strongly rejected and denounced a proposal to this effect (see above).

Emigration

The emigration of Egyptian Jews to Israel continued in a small trickle, according to Israel figures. While during the first half of 1951, 944 Egyptian Jews had arrived in Israel, the corresponding figure for the second half of 1951 was 1,142, and for the first half of 1952, 423. There are no reliable figures for the emigration of Egyptian Jews to other countries than Israel during 1951–52, but it may be assumed that it also continued to some extent.

IRAN

The Anglo-Iranian crisis brought to a head by the nationalization of Iran's oil industry and installations, as finally passed by Iran's legislative and executive bodies in April and May 1951, dragged on during the whole period under review. Neither direct negotiations, American mediation, nor an appeal to international judicial or political bodies succeeded in providing a so-
lution acceptable to the conflicting parties. Amidst violent scenes of anti-British (and anti-foreign) excesses and fanatical nationalist enthusiasm, the refineries of Abadan, the biggest in the world, were shut down. Crude oil and refined products were still available in Abadan's storage tanks, but could not be marketed because of the British blockade against the sale of Iranian oil and the lack of tankers. Even the production of crude oil, which the Iranian nationalists were confident they could manage without British experts, managers, and financiers, came to an almost complete standstill. The ensuing financial crisis, in which Iran found herself deprived of the oil income that had constituted most of her regular government revenue, substantially added to the gravity of the country's socio-political crisis.

The nationalist extremists and Moslem fanatics led by Iran's Prime Minister, Muhammad Mossadeq, and his religious guide and colleague, Ayatullah Abu'l-Qassem Kashani, did not stop at the measures prescribed and actions taken by these leaders. To their right, there grew up still more fanatical and more violently nationalist organizations, that fought the government and simultaneously prodded it into uncompromising attitudes. These included the Fedayan-i-Islam (against whose fanatical Islamic influence on the masses Kashani organized his own Islamic stormtroops, the Mujahid Muslim), the National-Socialist Party (Sumka) with truly Nazi ideology and methods copied from Nazi Germany, and the Pan-Iranian Party. To their left, the Communist Tudeh Party and its front organizations also used fanatically nationalist slogans. (The borderline between the extreme right and the Communists was somewhat blurred, anti-imperialist cooperation and violent street fights alternating.) Growing tension between the government leaders and the Shah and his court added further complications to the picture. The results of this increasing polarization of the internal scene became apparent when, in July 1952, an attempt was made to lead Iran back to more moderate ways of policy. The attempt to replace Mossadeq by a more amenable leader met with violent riots jointly conducted by the extreme right and the Communists, and ended in Mossadeq's triumphant return to power as a dictator able to do without a parliament that had in any case been obediently submissive.

Relations with Israel

Both the increasing internal nationalism and Islamic fanaticism and Iran's growing dependence on the support of the "anti-colonial" bloc, of which the Arabs formed a substantial and influential portion, inevitably led to a certain degree of anti-Israel feeling. During May 1951, the subject of Iran's de facto recognition of Israel was repeatedly raised in the Iranian Parliament, and several deputies dissociated themselves from that recognition and recommended that the government should "reconsider" it. When the Iranian Consulate in Israel was closed on July 7, 1951, the Iranian Government denied Arab reports that this amounted, or was preparatory, to the withdrawal of Iran's recognition of Israel. But the emotional significance of that step for Iranian, Arab, and Israel circles alike was not greatly diminished by this official denial. This
anti-Israel attitude was further stressed by a growing unfriendliness of Iranian representatives in international gatherings.

**Jewish Community**

In spite of the growing nationalist and Islamic fanaticism, there seems to have been no change in official government policy toward the Jews of Iran. The latter continued to express their solidarity with Iran’s anti-imperialist struggle (cf. Radio Teheran, September 20, 1951; *The New York Times*, July 14, 1952), and the government did nothing to direct popular fanaticism against the local Jewish communities. Its policy regarding freedom of emigration also continued to be liberal, as did its helpful attitude to Iraqi Jews in need of transit through Iran. During July and August 1952 Arab sources reported that Iran was preparing legislation to deprive the Jews of Iran of their citizenship and provide for their compulsory transfer to Israel. Although no formal and official denial on the part of the Iranian Government came to the knowledge of this reviewer, the reports were obviously baseless. They might have referred to preparations then being made by the Jewish Agency and other Jewish institutions, with the approval of the Iranian Government, to increase the number of Iranian Jews to be transported to Israel. There were also reports that government and public circles had brought heavy pressure to bear on the Jewish community to induce it heavily to subscribe to the government-sponsored internal loans; a specific target was reported to have been fixed for what amounted to a forced loan levied on the Jews of Iran.

While, as stated above, there was no encouragement from the government for anti-Jewish movements and propaganda, such propaganda was distinctly noticeable on the part of various nonofficial organizations. It certainly contributed to the growing feeling of insecurity among the Jews of Iran. Extremist pro-government circles and organizations, and especially their religious wing under Kashani, cannot be fully exonerated from a certain amount of anti-Jewish feeling and speech (cf. *The New York Times*, July 19, 1952). But the bulk of openly anti-Semitic instigation—mostly in truly Nazi style—came from the opposition group of the extreme right, the National-Socialists (Sumka), and the Pan-Iranians. This anti-Semitic propaganda increased when in August 1951 the Sumka Party established a newspaper of its own.

**Jewish Emigration**

With the termination of the airlift of Iraq’s and Iran’s Jewry to Israel, the authorities explored the feasibility of surface transport. Several groups of Iranian Jews traveled by bus and rail to Turkish ports and took the boat thence to Israel—a route that is not passable during the winter. Early in 1952 a land route to the Turkish port of Iskanderun (Alexandretta) was established and it was expected that immigration from Iran would in future take this way. The number of Jewish emigrants from Iran was close to 5,700 dur-
ing the second half of 1951, and about 2,900 during the first half of 1952. The number of Jews remaining in Iran was estimated by Moussa Baral, the Jewish member of the Iranian Parliament, at 70,000. Other estimates put the figure somewhat higher.

IRAQ

Iraq's political life during the period under review was comparatively quiet. One of the two major problems disturbing Anglo-Iraqi relations was settled when a new agreement was signed, on August 13, 1951, between the Government of Iraq and the Iraq Petroleum Company. The agreement not only provided for half of the company's profits to be paid to Iraq, partly in oil and partly in cash, but also committed the company to increase its production of oil considerably, a commitment for which Iraq had pressed for several years. Production is expected to reach at least 30,000,000 tons in 1955, and Iraq's revenue from that production is estimated at ID (Iraqi dinars) 23,000,000 ($64,400,000) for 1952, ID 45,000,000 ($126,000,000) for 1953, ID 59,000,000 ($152,600,000) for 1955. Seventy per cent of the income from oil is earmarked for development schemes, according to an ID 165,000,000 ($462,000,000) five-year plan. In December 1951 this agreement was supplemented by an additional agreement with the Khanikin and Rafidain Oil Companies, subsidiaries of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, providing for the gradual taking over by the Government of Iraq of certain refining and marketing operations previously handled by the two companies.

The other major outstanding Anglo-Iraqi problem, that of a revision of the Treaty of 1930, which still has three years to run, was only briefly touched upon in official statements by both parties concerned. There were, it seems, no full-fledged negotiations on this subject, but only semi-informal talks during one of the frequent visits of Nuri es Sa'id, then Prime Minister, to London. The statements published breathed a moderate and conciliatory spirit uncustamory and slightly unreal in the atmosphere prevailing in the Middle East.

The same conciliatory spirit, however, did not prevail in Iraq's opposition circles. Two right-wing parties, one middle-of-the-road group whose opposition to Nuri es Sa'id seemed to be based mainly on personal-factional considerations, and one party considered as leftist, were all united in denouncing the agreements with the Petroleum Company, in demanding that Iraq's oil be nationalized, and in insisting that Egypt's example be followed and the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty unilaterally cancelled. There was a general clamor for a more pro-Egyptian line in inter-Arab politics, and a neutralist and anti-Western attitude in world politics. The insistent demand for Nuri es Sa'id's resignation was, of course, always included.

In July 1952 Nuri es Sa'id resigned, after having been in office for nearly two full years, a tenure almost unprecedented in Iraq's constitutional history. The country is now preparing, under a neutral transition government, for general elections.
Jewish Emigration

Although the organized transfer of the bulk of Iraq's Jewish community to Israel was more or less completed by June 1951, small groups of stragglers continued to arrive. The number of emigrants from Iraq during the second half of 1951 was about 5,700; during the first half of 1952 it was about 520. The number of Jews remaining in Iraq, having chosen to retain their Iraqi citizenship, was estimated by the Government of Iraq in February 1952 at 12,000, and in June 1952 at no more than 6,000. Most of them resided in Baghdad, the smaller provincial communities having been completely liquidated.

Property Restrictions

Those Iraqi Jews who had chosen to stay were supposed not to be affected by any measures taken against the legal status and properties of the emigrants. But there were in fact a large number of borderline cases (for instance, Iraqi Jews legally resident abroad). In all these and similar cases the government took the severe rather than the indulgent view and rigorously enforced numerous restrictions. In June 1951 it was announced that Iraqi Jews legally residing or traveling abroad were required to return to Iraq within three months. Otherwise they would lose their citizenship and their property would be frozen. In November 1951 the Government of Iraq replied to inquiries made by other Arab governments concerning the status of Iraqi Jews residing in their respective countries (e.g., about 500 Iraqi Jews in Aleppo), that those Jews were to be regarded as stateless, since they had lost their Iraqi citizenship. In December 1951 it was learned that 610 Jews, having failed to return to Iraq within the period specified, had been deprived of their citizenship and property.

The Iraqi Government also seemed to have applied considerable pressure on Jews regarded as undesirable (chiefly for their Communist political convictions) to give up their citizenship and emigrate to Israel. At the end of February 1952 some 160 Iraqi immigrants arriving in Israel claimed they were Communists who had no desire to come to Israel but had been forcibly transported by the Government of Iraq from jail to the airplane bound for Israel; they demanded to be "repatriated" to Iraq (cf. Jerusalem Post, March 5, 1952). On May 7, 1952, it was announced that 30 "Jewish criminals" were to be expelled from Iraq.

Foreign Jews resident in Iraq were also greatly affected by various restrictions and discriminatory regulations. At the end of April 1952 it was reported that all foreign Jews resident in Iraq had been ordered to leave the country within five days; about 200 individuals or, according to other Arab sources, 54 families, were affected.

From various statements, announcements, and warnings published during the year by the custodian of frozen Jewish property it became apparent that
the orderly administration of that frozen property was made difficult by at least two widespread irregularities. First, the property of Jews who had not opted out of Iraqi citizenship and for emigration was illegally frozen in many instances (cf. custodian's warning of January 7, 1952, that no steps should ever be taken before it was completely clear that a certain person had given up or had been deprived of his citizenship). Second, there were many instances of Iraqi individuals, firms, and companies “taking over” Jewish properties, although the law provided that all properties of Jewish emigrants were to be taken over by the custodian only (cf. custodian's warning of July 15, 1951). The value of all Jewish property frozen was estimated—in this writer's opinion grossly underestimated—by government circles at ID 4,000,000 ($11,200,000).

In order to make it easier for all concerned to distinguish between those Jews who had given up their citizenship and those who had not, it was decreed in January 1952 that all Jews remaining in Iraq should be provided with new identification documents. (This measure was regarded by some observers as anti-Semitic in character since it supplied all Jewish citizens with specially marked documents.) The liquidation of most of Iraq's Jewry caused a great deal of anti-Jewish feeling, which was intensified by the unceasing publicity and suspicions concerning the “Jewish spy ring,” arrests and trials, etc. Those Jews who had given evidence of an extraordinary Iraqi patriotism by deciding to retain their citizenship and remain in that country in spite of all that had happened and was happening, were also greatly affected by the wave of general hatred and suspicion. Leaders of right-wing circles felt on some occasions compelled to warn their followers and the government that those Jews remaining in Iraq were as good citizens and patriots as their Muslim and Christian compatriots and should not be molested (cf. speech in Parliament by Faiq Samerai, Al-Ahram, February 3, 1952).

Representation

Prior to their mass exodus the Jews of Iraq were represented in Parliament by six deputies and one senator (according to the Iraqi Constitution there is one seat in parliament for every 20,000 male inhabitants; in the case of the Jewish and Christian minorities this clause was interpreted broadly and generously so as to provide one parliamentary seat for every 20,000 inhabitants.) Following the conspicuous decrease in the number of Jews in Iraq, various circles began publicly to demand a corresponding decrease in Jewish parliamentary representation or even its abolition. Such demands were voiced mainly by leaders of the Istiqlal Party, the right-wing opposition. During the first half of 1952 there were conflicting reports as to whether the government intended to abolish Jewish representation altogether, or to retain one parliamentary seat for the Jewish population; the number of Jews remaining in Iraq was then given as some 12,000. In the meantime, all Jewish deputies had resigned their seats and the only Jewish senator, Ezra Menahem Daniel, had died (in March 1952). In June 1952 the government submitted the question of Jewish representation to a Special Supreme (Administrative) Court estab-
lished, in accordance with the constitution, by the senate. On June 22, 1952, this court ruled that all Jewish representation should henceforth be abolished, as the 6,000 Jews retaining Iraqi citizenship were not entitled to special representation. On June 29, Parliament approved this decision. The forthcoming parliamentary elections will therefore result in the first Iraqi Parliament with no Jewish member.

In December 1951 the Jewish religious courts, which according to Middle Eastern custom had jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to the personal status of members of the Jewish community, were abolished by the Ministry of Justice.

**Arrests and Trials**

In June 1951 there began a wave of arrests of Iraqi (and foreign) Jews accused both of "crimes" that are more or less plausible and understandable, such as belonging to illegal Zionist organizations and/or self-defense groups (Haganah), and of crimes which it is hard to believe they could ever have committed, such as terrorist outrages and bomb-throwing directed at Jewish synagogues and shops. The first arrests took place at the end of May and beginning of June 1951. Official announcements claimed on June 18 that hand grenades and explosives had been found in several Jewish houses and even in two synagogues, that a "Zionist terrorist gang" had been discovered, and that several of the arrested had confessed that they belonged to a Zionist "spy ring" and "terrorist gang." Among the arrested, whose number, according to the Arab News Agency, reached eighty-five by the end of June, were several notables. They included the well-known lawyer Khabbaza, brother of the secretary of the Jewish community of Baghdad, and a British Jew by the name of Robert Rodny. An official list of the crimes of which the arrested men were accused included bomb-throwing and dynamiting. At the same time it was reported that ramifications of the "Zionist gang" had been discovered in other Arab capitals, that joint all-Arab investigations would be held, and that a high-ranking Syrian police official was already participating in the Baghdad investigations.

The first trial, in which there were twenty-seven defendants, began on October 24, 1951. On November 5, two of the accused, Shalom Saleh Shalom and Yussuf Avraham Basri, were sentenced to death by hanging for having thrown bombs at the United States Information Service, at the Mas'uda Shem-Tov Synagogue, and at several Jewish shops in Baghdad. It transpired that there was no evidence at all against the two condemned, except for the "confession" of one of them, which had been extorted from him by torture and other police measures, and which he denied and retracted during the trial.

Even in the strictly censored Iraqi press there was sufficient evidence to prove that Shalom and Basri had not had a fair trial and that, in fact, a miscarriage of justice had taken place (cf. *Ash-Sha'b*, Baghdad, November 23, 1951).³

---

³The American Jewish Committee, in its appeal to the United States State Department in December 1951 to intervene on behalf of the condemned, cited "six diversions from usual legal practice": (1) the accused were tortured to obtain a confession; (2) there was a trial by special tribunal instead of the Criminal Court; (3) the president of the court was not a professional judge, but an ex-prosecutor especially appointed to the
Intercessions on behalf of the two condemned men by a number of Jewish and non-Jewish humanitarian organizations, including, after the death sentence had been confirmed by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, an appeal to stay execution on the part of Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico, then the president of the United Nations General Assembly, were of no avail: the two men were publicly hanged on January 21, 1952. (All Israel delegates left the sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and its committees for one day in protest, after having explained this demonstration by quoting the verbatim report of the trial as published in the Iraqi press.)

A second trial, of another group of twenty-one defendants, started on November 10, 1951, before a special tribunal. These were accused of belonging to an illegal Jewish defense organization (Haganah), and of having conspired with enemies of the state and caused the disclosure of state secrets. Among the accused was an Israel subject, Yehuda Tajer, who confessed to having been sent to Iraq “by the Israel Foreign Office to collect economic and financial information.” On December 13, 1951, Tajer was sentenced to prison for life; three other defendants (including Shalom and Basri who had been condemned to death in the other trial), to twenty years’ hard labor; eight, to five years’ hard labor; three girls, to five months in prison; six defendants were acquitted. Except for Tajer, the accused had not confessed. In this trial, too, one of the attorneys for the defense (an Iraqi Muslim) charged the police with having falsified evidence, brought false witnesses before the court, and tortured the prisoners (cf. Ash-Sha’b, Baghdad, November 29, 1951).

A third trial, again before a special tribunal, began on January 15, 1952, and ended on January 21. The seventeen defendants included eight Iraqi Jews, seven Muslim Arabs, one British subject, and one Israeli (the same Yehuda Tajer mentioned above). Tajer, the British subject Robert Rodny, and two Iraqi Jews were sentenced to five years’ hard labor for “espionage for Israel”; the thirteen other defendants were acquitted.

LEBANON

Lebanon suffered, during 1951–52, from a growing internal political crisis that overshadowed the many unsolved external problems. Among these were economic and political relations with Syria, Lebanon’s desire for closer relations with the West and its hesitation to give expression to that desire in view of the attitude of the other Arab states, and the increasing desire to see the Palestinian refugees transferred from Lebanon to some other country. The internal crisis grew mainly out of increasing internal friction within the faction backing the President and most cabinets (the Constitutional Bloc); a growing defection from that group of disgruntled leaders; and sharpening conflicts between the various personalities and factions dominating the Lebanese political scene in ever-varying combinations. There was also a sharp deterioration in the economic situation. A change of cabinets in December

court for this trial; (4) the accused were denied the right of defense; (5) there was no prosecution witness who could claim that he had actually witnessed the accused commit the crime; (6) the sentence was based on the confession of one of the accused that was not read in court and was denied by the accused as having been extorted from him by torture.
1951 brought no solution to these problems. At the end of the period under review there was a steadily growing clamor for dictatorship or Presidential rule without parliament. This internal crisis, aggravated by the constant charges and countercharges of corruption, nepotism, and maladministration, may explain the surprising revelations of anti-Jewish feeling in the Lebanese Parliament during 1952.

**Jewish Community**

Lebanese circles not only took part in the outcry against the "Jewish spy ring" in the Arab capitals, but according to some sources took the initiative in an attempt to bring about all-Arab cooperation and joint investigations to combat that alleged activity. Simultaneously, various circles in Lebanon pressed the government to confiscate or freeze Jewish properties in the country. An interpellation to this effect was tabled, for instance, by Deputy Nazem al-Qadri in Parliament in July 1951; among the reasons for his demands, al-Qadri claimed that all Jews are *ipso facto* Zionists, and therefore enemies of the state. The same line of reasoning was taken by Deputy Emile al-Boustani (parliamentary sessions of February 26, February 28, and March 28, 1952). Boustani suggested that the Jews of Lebanon, being, as hidden Zionists, co-responsible for the deeds of Israel, should be punished for border violations on the part of Israel police and soldiers. Lebanese Jews should be regarded as citizens of Israel and should no longer receive equal treatment as citizens of Lebanon. Boustani was sharply rebuked, both on the subject of border incidents in general (the Minister of Defense stressed that most of these incidents were caused by Lebanese shepherds crossing the frontier with their flocks and that never had Israel security forces wilfully crossed the border), and more particularly on the subject of equality of all Lebanese citizens, irrespective of race or creed. Boustani returned to the subject, however, at the next meeting of Parliament on February 28. A month later on March 28, he demanded that all Jewish government and army personnel immediately be dismissed as unreliable and disloyal, and that all Jewish property should be confiscated. (He took the opportunity to reveal that there were two Jewish officers serving in the Lebanese Army: a Jew of Russian extraction as commander of an artillery unit, and a Greek Jew as head of the Medical Council.) Boustani was again rebuked. The Defense Minister and others regretted that he should have brought up this subject "affecting the honor of the Lebanese Army" at a public meeting of Parliament, and sharply objected to Boustani's proposals. A motion further to debate his proposals was defeated by a vote of 85 to 16. Part of the Lebanese press (e.g., *Al-Hadaf, Ad-Diyar, Al-Yaum, Ash-Sharq*) eagerly supported Boustani. These periodicals, with a total circulation of approximately 7,000 to 8,000, or about one-fourth to one-third of the Lebanese press, were not the most important in the country.

While the government thus upheld the banner of equality and nondiscrimination in public debate, it does not seem to have applied the same principles with equal firmness in its own dealings with Jewish problems. While the Defense Minister, for instance, so sharply rejected a proposal to dismiss Jewish
army officers, the Prime Minister told the Damascus paper Al-Ayam (April 28) that "although he continued to regard the demand as unjustified" he had given orders to dismiss the two Jewish officers concerned. (The dismissal was confirmed by the Minister of Defense—cf. As-Sayad, August 7, 1952.) Reports that the government was "tightening its control" of Jewish emigration were not denied. Nor was there a denial of a United Press report in May 1952 that, following a complaint from the Syrian Government, the Prime Minister had given orders to prevent Lebanese Jews from going to Cyprus (a popular summer resort) as they were suspected of using their stay in Cyprus to smuggle goods and information to Israel.

The Jewish population of Lebanon, in which emigration was offset by an influx of Syrian Jews, seems to have remained at somewhat less than 6,000.

SYRIA

The year 1951–52 brought Syria no relief from its almost continuous internal crisis. There was unceasing mutual suspicion and hostility between the biggest and most influential parliamentary group, the People's Party (Ash-Sha'b), and the Army High Command, since December 1949 under the control of Col. Adib Shishakly. Because of the army's veto the Sha'b Party, in spite of its plurality in Parliament, could not form a government, and cabinets were formed one after another by "independent" politicians who were dependent on the goodwill of the army and a precarious balance of power between various smaller factions in Parliament. It was suspected that some circles and factions were working towards a union with Iraq (aided by this very instability). There was growing friction between peasants and land owners, and tension between pro-Western and neutralist or anti-Western politicians. All this inevitably led to the final crisis of parliamentary government during October and November 1951, which was "solved" by Syria's fourth coup d'état within three years, when Col. Shishakly dismissed cabinet, president, parliament, and Supreme Court and became the military dictator of the country. During the first half of 1952, Col. Shishakly gradually overcame the opposition offered by political groups and factions. Relying on the army officers' corps and an ambitious, though as yet unimplemented, program of social and agrarian reform, he now seems to be firmly in the saddle.

Jews in Syria

While the Jewish community of Syria dwindled (in December 1951 unofficial Syrian estimates put their numbers at 6,000; in August 1952 at 2,889), the remnants of the erstwhile prominent Jewish communities of Aleppo and Damascus underwent the same treatment as had become customary in the other Arab countries. Though the only large-scale trial of persons accused of espionage for Israel did not involve any Jews (most of the accused were Druses), reports of an investigation of Jewish espionage activities, and the eventual freezing of all Jewish property, recurred in Syria. Following the Iraqi "disclosures" the Jews of Syria were, according to an Arab report late
in June 1951, put under “close supervision.” In December 1951 the Arab News Agency reported that the Syrian Ministry of Justice had ordered the preparation of legislation for the freezing of all Jewish property “on Iraqi lines.” This legislation was reported in September 1952 to have entered the final stage of government ratification. In January 1952 the Zilkha Bank of Damascus, the only remaining Jewish-owned business establishment of importance in Syria, was closed by the authorities and forced to wind up its business and liquidate by April 1, 1952.

SH. YIN'AM

GERMAN COLLECTIVE INDEMNITY TO ISRAEL AND THE CONFERENCE ON JEWISH MATERIAL CLAIMS AGAINST GERMANY

The Federal Republic of Germany undertook obligations at the negotiations in The Hague in the summer of 1952 which are often erroneously referred to as the payment of “reparations.” The term “reparations” is reserved, in international legal terminology, for compensation by agreement between former belligerent states for war and occupation damages inflicted upon an occupied country, usually by a vanquished aggressor state.

In order to distinguish the nature of the new obligations of Germany from that of her other, already existing obligations for the amelioration of the material losses suffered by victims of Nazi aggression, it is necessary to review briefly the character of the earlier German commitments.

Restitution

The term “restitution of property” is self-explanatory, in the sense that it encompasses the restoration of properties confiscated or alienated under duress from their rightful owners. Restitution in the Western zones of occupation of Germany was provided for by separate zonal statutes enacted in their respective zones by the three Western occupation powers, the United States, Great Britain, and France. However, these Allied statutes, of which the United States zonal law is the most advanced and satisfactory, provide only for the restitution of existing and identifiable properties. They notably fail to provide for the return of properties that the Third Reich confiscated directly, most of which were unidentifiable. The reason for this serious omission was that at the time of the enactment of the United States zonal restitution law, no central successor state authority existed in Germany to satisfy the claims of owners of property confiscated by the Third Reich.

Indemnification

“Indemnification” is a collective term covering the settlement of a variety of nonproperty damages, deprivations, and losses inflicted upon individuals. These range from damages to life and limb, and to health, through depriv-