North Africa

ALGERIA

ALGERIA'S calm during the year under review (July 1, 1952, through June 30, 1953) contrasted sharply with the often dramatic political and social crises in Morocco and Tunisia. But this seeming peace was illusory; there was also a crisis in Algeria, but it was less violent than in the neighboring countries. Because Algeria was a colony, in fact and in law, Algerian nationalism had evolved differently from the nationalist Istiqlal movement in Morocco and the neo-Destour movement in Tunisia. The Algerian Popular Party of Messali Hadj and the Democratic Union of the Manifesto led by Ferhat Abbas shared these characteristics: 1. They were a reaction against the colonial and assimilationist policy of France and the more or less conscious racism of a large part of the colonists. This critical attitude led the Algerian nationalists to demand basic social reforms. 2. They had a religious and sentimental solidarity with Arab and Islamic movements throughout the world. This led them to demand basic political reforms leading toward independence.

The steps which these parties were taking toward the realization of their programs were necessarily indirect; they were subordinated to the settlement of the Moroccan and Tunisian problems. The Algerian nationalist parties carried on a subterranean existence and would not reappear in full daylight until general conditions changed.

Civic and Political Status

These considerations explain why the year under review was especially peaceful for the Algerian Jewish community, but filled with anxiety and troubles for its coreligionists in Morocco and Tunis. For the Jews of Algeria, the year 1953 was the tenth anniversary of the gravest crisis in their history. Under the pressure of the German and of a section of the Algerian colonists the Vichy government had, by the law of October 7, 1940, withdrawn from them the French citizenship which they had enjoyed since the Crémieux Decree of October 24, 1870. From 1940 to 1943 the Jews of Algeria were in a critical situation, and their freedom and property were gravely imperiled. This situation was not immediately changed by the American landing of November 8, 1942. Paradoxical as it may appear, the anti-Semitic
measures continued in full force subsequent to that date. It took a vigorous press campaign, the strong pressure of public opinion, and the personal intervention of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to put through the measure of October 20, 1943, restoring to them their full rights as citizens.

Since 1943, the only unsolved political problem had been the civic and political status of the Jews of the M'zab (Ghardaia) (see AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1953 [Vol. 54], p. 370-71).

At the moment of writing (July 1953) the 2,000 Jews of the M'zab remained completely without any regular civil status or possibility of establishing one, since the law of 1882 on Algerian civil status applied exclusively to the native Moslems. The law of September 20, 1947, had given the right to vote to all Algerians, dividing them into two electoral colleges, that of the Europeans and that of the Moslems. The Jews of North Algeria voted with the Europeans. Those of the M'zab were entitled to vote with the Moslems, but had actually abstained from any part in the elections in order to avoid finding themselves in open conflict with the Moslems. Thus they were in practice deprived of all political rights. Finally, the Jews of the M'zab were subject to rabbinical law in respect of personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance), and cases affecting them were judged not by French tribunals according to French law, but by a rabbinical tribunal presided over by Rabbi Moshe Sellem, and in certain instances by French tribunals deciding in accordance with rabbinical law. Hence, the status of Jewish women in the M'zab remained an inferior one; they might be unilaterally repudiated by their husbands, and they were sacrificed in all questions relating to rights of inheritance.

This status of juridical inferiority had significantly retarded the emancipation of this group; it had remained the poorest and sickest section of the Algerian Jewish community.

The means used to aid these poor people had been very inadequate. The basic solution lay in giving the Jews of the M'zab the full rights of citizenship. Since 1882 they had been calling for the ending of the discrimination to which they were subject. The Jewish organizations of France and Algeria had intervened repeatedly in an effort to secure a solution. Fearing the political repercussions that a special law might have under present conditions, the government had thought of solving the problem by a law on the departmentalization of the Territories of the South. This law had been supposed to come before parliament in 1951-52, and again in 1952-53. The delay had prolonged the serious crisis from which the Jews of the M'zab suffered.

**Jewish Population**

Approximately 140,000 Jews lived in Algeria, constituting 1.75 per cent of the total population of Algeria and 12.7 per cent of its European population. They formed 28 per cent of the Jewish population of North Africa; 51 per cent lived in Morocco and 21 per cent in Tunis. The Jewish popu-
The westernization of the Jews of Algeria had progressed further in the départements of Oran and Algiers, where European influence was preponderant, than in the département of Constantine, where the Jewish population still remained under native influence. The Jewish population, like the general European population of North Africa (82 per cent of which was concentrated in the cities), was essentially urban. The three cities of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine contained 55.3 per cent of all the Jews of Algeria. In the eleven most important cities of the country there were 85,756 Jews. But despite this urban concentration, the 140,000 Jews of Algeria were scattered among eighty-eight centers in the département of Algiers, sixty-one in the département of Constantine, and sixteen in the oases of South Algeria. The heaviest concentration of Jewish population was in the département of Oran, near the great Moroccan reservoir.

The Jews of Algeria were engaged primarily in commerce. Economic fluctuations had therefore had a marked effect on the internal migration of the Jewish population. Thus the city of Tiaret in the département of Oran had a Jewish population of 21 in 1921; ten years later this had risen to 3,075, only to fall back to 1,586 in 1941. Since the end of World II the number had again been growing steadily, as a result of the commercial development of the region, and it had almost reached its peak in 1931. The Jewish population of Colomb-Bechar, in South Algeria, rose from 186 to 2,153, as a result of the opportunities for work offered by the military bases which were being constructed there.

These shifts of population from the North to the South were nevertheless negligible in comparison to the major currents which were carrying the Algerian Jewish population from the South to the North, from the small centers to the large cities, and to a greater extent each year, from Algeria to France. It was impossible to give the exact number of Algerian Jews settled in Marseille, Lyons, or Paris, but it was constantly increasing. Algerian Jews came to France principally in order to find work, and to live under more advanced social legislation and in a freer and more agreeable atmosphere than that which predominated in the colony. There had been practically no departures for Israel during the year under review; only a few families, mostly from the Territories of the South, had gone there.

Economically, the abnormal situation in which the Algerian Jews lived as an inferior group in Moslem cities had been normalized as they had
become westernized. It was estimated that 85.11 per cent of the Jewish labor force was gainfully employed. Unemployment was highest in the regions where French influence had been smallest. Thus, it stood at 13.4 per cent in the département of Algiers, 18.6 per cent in the département of Oran, 27.7 per cent in the département of Constantine, and 45.4 per cent in the Territories of the South. The condition of those unemployed was often wretched.

Of the Jewish working population, 30.8 per cent were employed in commerce. In certain branches (leather and hides, textiles), they were dominant. There was also an important artisan class (jewelers, woodworkers, and ironworkers), and although an agricultural class was practically non-existent, a beginning had been made (approximately 1.3 per cent of the Jewish population owned approximately 1 per cent of the total rural land).

At an increasing rate, Algerian Jews were entering on intellectual careers, often with notable success. But in Algeria, where political emancipation had preceded social emancipation, the latter was accompanied by a strong tendency toward dejudaiization and assimilation.

Community Organization

At the head of each Algerian Jewish community there was a Consistoire, elected in accordance with the law of 1905. These bodies had a specifically religious role, that of organizing worship. They were not supposed to represent the community and played no social role, their activities being carried on by a constantly decreasing minority of the faithful, who were chiefly occupied with the organization of the synagogues, the nomination of rabbis, the organization of religious instruction, and the administration of cemeteries. Although in some cities the Algerian government contributed toward the salaries of the rabbis, the budgets of almost all Consistoires suffered from chronic deficits. In order to remedy this weakness of the local Consistoires, a Fédération des Communautés Juives d' Algerie had been set up in April 1947 with sixty affiliated communities, and had become a member of the World Jewish Congress. The Fédération had established a rabbinical school in 1948, in order to train the rabbis and community leaders Algeria lacked. Of its thirty-four students, thirty lived at the school, whose curriculum consisted largely of traditional Jewish studies—Hebrew, the Bible, Talmud. The establishment of this school was the first and most important sign that Algerian Jewry was becoming conscious of its responsibilities. It was directed by Grand Rabbi M. Fingerhut, under the supervision of the Grand Rabbi of Algeria, Maurice Eisenbeth, and the Supreme Rabbinical Council. The success of this first effort encouraged the Fédération to plan the construction of a large modern school in the Bouzareah area. This project was abandoned as too costly, and in 1953 the Fédération voted to build a more modest school in the center of the city.

Alongside the Fédération, at present headed by Benjamin Heler, and the consistoires, there was also the Algerian Jewish Committee for Social Studies. This body, whose president was Henri Aboulker, had been founded just after World War I, with the aim of defending Algerian Judaism. It carried
on cultural activity by organizing conferences and by publishing Information, the only Jewish newspaper appearing in Algeria, edited by Jacques Lazarus.

There were also throughout Algeria committees of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, the World Jewish Congress, the Keren Kayemeth, the Zionist Federation, the Organization for Rehabilitation Through Training (ORT), the Jewish boy scout movement Eclaireurs Israélites, the Union of Jewish Students of France, and the Women's International Zionist Organization (WIZO). These attempted to stir up cultural and social activities, but despite their laudable efforts the results remain limited.

**Interfaith Relations**

Algeria was losing its reputation as the chosen land of French anti-Semitism. It is worth noting that those responsible for the anti-Semitic crises from which the Jews of Algeria had suffered had always been Europeans, never Moslems. Especially from 1933 to October 7, 1940, the date of the abrogation of the Crémieux Decree, the relations between the Jewish community and the reactionary elements of the population were difficult and sometimes had bloody consequences, as in the massacre at Constantine in August 1934. This period ended with the reestablishment of republican legality on October 23, 1943. Since that date relations with the Christians had been good. The activity of the Union of Monotheistic Believers (L'Union Monothéiste des Croyants) had played a useful role in this respect. The Algerian Jews also won the sympathy of all progressive elements of the population by the major role which they played in the preparations for and the carrying out of the American landing of November 8, 1942.

In addition, the awakening of Moslem nationalism had deterred the reactionary elements from carrying on an open campaign against the Jews. Nevertheless, the anti-Semitic press (Rivarol, Aspects de la France) grew bolder every day in its campaigns against the Jews. These papers, printed in Paris, had regrettable echoes in Algeria. In the spring of 1953 a plaque on the central post office of Algiers, commemorating a hero of the resistance, Lieutenant Dreyfus, was smashed by anti-Semites of European origin. Its replacement in April 1953 was the occasion of a moving ceremony in which all the civil, military, and religious authorities were represented.

The relations between Christians and Jews became tense between February and July 1953, as a result of the repercussions of the Finaly Affair (see p. 183). Numerous meetings were organized in Algeria to protest the baptism of the two Jewish children, and the failure to return them.

It was necessary for the members of the Comité Juif Algérien d'Études Sociales (Algerian Jewish Committee for Social Studies) to make representations in regard to the scarcely concealed anti-Jewish orientation of an important daily newspaper of Algiers.¹ These representations were successful.

It is noteworthy that during the year under review not a single anti-Jewish

¹L'Echo d'Alger, winter 1953.
comment appeared in any Arab or pro-Arab newspaper. At a time of heated passions, particularly in Morocco and Tunisia, there was profound peace between Arabs and Jews in Algeria. The three Jewish members elected to the Algerian assembly, Dr. Edgar Amouyal, André Bakouche, and Marcel Belaiche had always taken a conciliatory position between the Moslems and the French; their role as mediators appeared to have been appreciated by both sides.

This role of mediation was the more necessary because the religious groups in North America had a strong sociological structure. Religion was not only a matter of faith, but corresponded to a definite social position. Because of this fact the religions tended to isolate themselves from one another, and it was necessary to surmount real difficulties in order to overcome past prejudices, particularly in less developed communities.

**Education**

Algerian Jews received a general education in the government schools. Hence the Alliance Israélite Universelle, the major part of whose activity was in Morocco and Tunisia, had no schools in Algeria. However, it proposed to name a director of education for the Talmud Torah of Algiers whose function it would be to reorganize Hebrew education in Algiers and in the interior.

ORT, under the presidency of André Chiche, continued to conduct in Algiers a trade school for boys, a textile and dressmaking school for girls, and an apprenticeship service with complementary evening courses. At Constantine it had another trade school for boys and an apprenticeship service with complementary evening courses, and planned to open a school for girls shortly. There had been no progress toward carrying out the plans to extend the activity of the ORT to Oran and Tlemcen. This fact, due undoubtedly to financial difficulties, was none the less regrettable. Even limited to 200 students, as it was during the year 1952-53, the work of ORT had been of the greatest value in Algeria. It was also regrettable that the OSE health organization has been unable to develop its activities in Algeria, especially in the poorer areas, like the M'zab.

**Zionism**

Algeria was undoubtedly one of the countries of the world in which Zionist activities were least important. Despite the lack of response by the Jewish communities of Algeria to appeals from Israel, the State of Israel sent increasing numbers of emissaries, five of whom came during the year under review, to rekindle the zeal of the communities. The amounts raised by the Jewish Agency (70,000,000 francs from Algeria, Tunis, and Morocco) were far below the real capacity of the country. There were numerous reasons for this lack of interest—the assimilation and dejudaization of a
large part of the community, the fear that Zionist activity would risk endangering hard-won positions, and above all, the egoism of many of the well-to-do (cf. article by Jacques Lazarus, Information, September 1952).

The North African Zionist Conference met in Marseille from February 8 to 10, 1953. It was attended by fifty delegates from Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Problems connected with migration were discussed, particularly in connection with the assimilation of the recent North African immigrants to Israel. Algeria was represented at the conference by Sayag of Oran, vice president of the Zionist Federation of Algeria.

A Commission Culturelle Juive d’Algérie (Jewish Cultural Commission of Algeria) was recently set up to arrange for Jewish radio programs over Radio Algeria, organize lectures, open libraries, etc. Information, the organ of the Algerian Jewish Committee for Social Studies, continued to appear monthly and remained the only Jewish periodical in Algeria.

Andre Chouraqui

TUNISIA

THE struggle between the Tunisian nationalists and the French Protectorate authorities continued at a bitter and costly impasse during the year under review (July 1, 1952, through June 30, 1953).

Political Developments

On July 28, 1952, the French Resident General, Jean de Hauteclocque, presented to the Bey the French government’s amended reform plan, insisting upon his immediate acceptance. The Bey refused, demanding time for study and reflection. Not until December 20, after prolonged ministerial discussions and an exchange of letters between the Bey and President Vincent Auriol of France and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, did the Bey reluctantly affix his seal to the reform plan.

The reform plan, to be instituted over a five year period, included:

1. A gradual transfer to Tunisian ministers of all portfolios except those for foreign affairs, police and military, and finance, which were to continue under French control.
2. A gradual replacement of French civil servants by Tunisians.
3. Democratic municipal elections, eventually leading to the establishment of an elected national legislature, after the five-year period.
4. The immediate setting up of two appointed “legislative” bodies as advisory councils to the Bey. One was to be composed entirely of Tunisians, the other of an equal number of Tunisians and French, to concern themselves with financial matters.
5. A diminution in the power of the French Resident General who, however, was to retain the veto and complete reserved powers.

2November 1952.
The nationalists of the Neo-Destour Party had asked for:

1. Complete internal autonomy except for foreign affairs and police and military powers.
2. An increase in the number of Tunisians in the civil service.
3. An elected Tunisian Legislature.

VIOLENCE

Providing a dramatic and violent background to these ministerial negotiations, the bombings which had begun in January 1952 became more frequent and widespread. Until April 1953, cafes, shops, pharmacies, banks, and travel agencies, were blasted and wrecked by day and by night. More than a hundred people were killed and hundreds wounded. A retaliatory pattern seemed to mark the course of the bombings and it became the daily custom to predict that since an Arab shop or cafe was the victim of Monday's bombing, a French "locale" would be visited on Wednesday. The Neo-Destour Party disclaimed responsibility and blamed French "provocateurs." The French denied the charges and blamed the nationalists. Few of the bomb-throwers were caught and even those arrested gave little information.

On November 15, 1952, in an ambush near Gabes, four French soldiers were killed. On December 5 the well-known leader of the Tunisian labor movement, Farhat Hached, was assassinated. His assailants remained unknown.

The Easter holidays in April 1953 saw a sudden change. The bombings ceased and were succeeded by a series of well-organized and neatly executed assassinations of prominent Tunisian Francophiles. On May 2 the terrorists struck down one of the most prominent Francophiles, Chadly Kastally, vice president of the Municipal Council of Tunis. On July 1 Prince Sidi Azzeddine Bey, cousin of the Bey and next in the line of succession to the throne, was assassinated in his palace at La Marsa.

ELECTIONS

The municipal elections provided for under the reforms were held in May 1953. The Neo-Destour Party condemned the elections as undemocratic and called for a boycott. Anonymous threatening letters were received by candidates and by prominent personalities. The president of the Jewish community of Sousse received such a letter, threatening his life if he voted, as well as advising him to dissuade his co-religionists from going to the polls. De Hautecloque demanded that the Bey issue a proclamation urging his people to ignore the boycott and to vote en masse for their candidates. The Bey's response was a mild request to his people to participate in the elections and maintain peace and order.

Voting in the interior was much heavier than in Tunis, where in one district a candidate was elected by a total of 25 votes cast out of a potential of more than 3,500. In Tunis, three Jews were elected to the municipal council: Meyer Bellity and Rene Cohen Hadria on the Tunisian list and Felix Samama on the French list. In Gabes, Richard Mimoun was elected on the Tunisian list, and in Sfax Azria Roger was elected on the Tunisian list and
Charles Saada on the French list. Several other Jews were elected in the smaller towns on Tunisian and French lists.

**Effect on Jewish Community**

Although throughout these twelve turbulent months the Jews of Tunisia were successful in maintaining friendly relations with both sides, they were nonetheless concerned about the uncertain future. Economically they were hard hit by the months of violence and frequent strikes and by a growing Arab nationalism which urged Arabs to trade with Arabs. Credit became tight, the flight of capital to safer havens outside Tunisia further strained an already marginal economy, and unemployment increased. The frequent changes of government in France added to the uncertainty and financial difficulties.

**Tunisia in the United Nations**

On June 20, 1952, thirteen Arab-Asian members requested a special session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly to consider the situation in Tunisia. In the course of one month, twenty-three states, including the thirteen Arab-Asian members, expressed their support of the request, twenty-seven opposed it, and two indicated their abstention. No special session was convened, since the request of a majority of members was required.

In an explanatory memorandum accompanying a letter of July 30, 1952, the thirteen Arab-Asian states again requested that the Tunisian question be included in the provisional agenda of the seventh session of the General Assembly. They stated that the situation in Tunisia had deteriorated further since the Security Council's failure to include the question in its agenda, and that the question was being referred to the General Assembly in order that a just and peaceful settlement be achieved. When the General Committee considered the request on October 15, the representative of France stated that his government could not accept the interference of the United Nations in matters exclusively within the national jurisdiction of France. On October 15 the General Assembly decided to include the Tunisian question on the agenda, and on October 17 referred it to the First Committee for consideration and report.

The First Committee considered the question at ten meetings between December 4 and December 12, 1952. One draft resolution was submitted by the thirteen Arab-Asian delegates, another by eleven Latin-American delegations. The Arab-Asian draft resolution was rejected by 27 votes to 24, with 7 abstentions. The Latin-American draft was approved by the First Committee by 45 votes to 3, with 10 abstentions. On December 17 the General Assembly concurred in this decision by 44 votes to 3, with 8 abstentions. The effect of this vote was to leave the Tunisian question exactly where it had been when on April 14, 1952, the draft resolution of Pakistan to include the Tunisian question in the agenda of the Security Council had been defeated. The intent of the Latin-American proposals left the situation *status quo* since it conformed with the declared position of France toward Tunisia.

On March 16, 1953 fourteen Arab-Asian members charged in a letter to
the president of the General Assembly that the Government of France was insisting that negotiations should proceed only on the formula of its own choice and only with a Tunisian government of its own making. The letter further stated that France had intensified its policy of repression and had taken no effective measures to curb the campaign of terrorism directed by underground organizations against national leaders. The fourteen delegations requested the president of the Assembly to place the letter before the French government and to urge it to take the prompt and liberal measures required by the situation. They requested in particular that the president should intercede to secure a stay of execution for thirteen prisoners sentenced to death by French military tribunals in Tunisia. In accordance with the request, the letter was referred to the French minister of foreign affairs for the consideration of his government.

In a letter dated May 29, addressed to the secretary general of the UN, the representative of the Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia and the secretary general of the Istiqlal Party of Morocco stated that in Tunisia it was becoming more evident that the French government was not prepared to bring about a relaxation of tension necessary to enable negotiations to be resumed. Numerous instances were given of the coercive measures which, they charged, were being taken by the French authorities to smother resistance and to break the spirit of the Tunisian people. At the request of fifteen Arab-Asian members, copies of this letter were transmitted to the governments of all member nations.

**Jewish Population**

According to the last census (1946), the population of Tunisia was estimated at about 3,500,000, of whom more than 3,000,000 were Moslems and approximately 100,000 Jews. The most recent figures of the Jewish population (1953), obtained from the Jewish communities, totaled 100,264. Some 70 per cent of the Jewish population was believed to reside in Tunis.

The latest government figures on the occupational distribution of the Jewish population were published in 1948. Jewish workers and artisans, constituting 46.5 per cent of the gainfully employed, were employed chiefly in the shoemaking, tailoring, woodworking, and light metal trades. Commerce and small businesses (33.1 per cent) traditionally had occupied a large place in the economic life of the Jews.

Infant mortality was on the decrease for Tunisian Jews. This decline was due to the excellent work of OSE-TUNISIA, which in 1949 had established a chain of clinics throughout the country where none had previously existed. Manned by local Jewish doctors and nurses, these clinics received the major part of their funds, as well as modern drugs and antibiotics, from the American Joint Distribution Committee (JDC). Particular emphasis was placed on prenatal care. Adjacent to the clinics, showers were installed, and obligatory bathing of all children instituted. These measures helped to decrease infant mortality and contributed to the slow rise in the Jewish population. Jewish families traditionally had been large, numbering at
least five children per family among the poorer classes in the hara (ghetto) of Tunis and in the extreme south of the country.

Emigration

There had been a sharp decline in the number of Tunisian Jews emigrating to Israel since 1951. In 1951, the number of emigrants had been 2,600; in 1952, 2,314; and from January through June 1953, it was 196. Despite the tense political situation and bad economic conditions and the liberalization of eligibility requirements, there was no enthusiasm for quitting Tunisia. Such emigration as took place was for the most part occasioned by the desire to be reunited with family members already resident in Israel. The overwhelming majority of the emigrants originated in the small towns of the interior and came from the lowest economic level. For most of them, the Jewish Agency paid transportation expenses.

Two reasons were advanced for this decline: the austerity program and difficulty of obtaining work and housing in Israel, and the alleged discriminatory treatment of North Africans. Letters from relatives and friends in Israel advised against any movement until conditions improved. The Hechalutz pioneer movement was similarly affected. Few of the youth evinced a desire to settle in Israel and membership in the several Zionist youth movements dropped sharply. So long as France retained power in Tunisia and Arab-Jewish relations remained as they were it was unlikely that the rate of emigration would increase.

From January 1951 through June 1953 approximately 200 persons returned to Tunisia from Israel. For those without means, passage was paid by the French consul in Tel Aviv. As of January 1953, the French government demanded that the Jewish Agency deposit a written guarantee assuring payment of return passage for every emigrant leaving Tunisia for Israel. Emigrants leaving Tunisia for Israel encountered no difficulties in obtaining passports and other travel documents.

Civic and Political Status

The Jewish population of Tunisia fell into three nationality categories: Tunisian, French, and foreign. About three-quarters of the Jews belonged to the first category; most of the remainder were French.

Tunisian nationality antedated the French Protectorate, which came into existence in 1881 under the Treaty of Bardo. Tunisian nationality was defined in the basic treaty of September 10, 1857, and in the Tunisian Constitution of April 26, 1861. The Treaty provided:

Article 4: Jewish citizens are not required to change their religion and shall be permitted to practise their religious rites.

Article 8: No distinction is to be made between Tunisian Moslems and Tunisian Jews.
Article 86 of the constitution of April, 1861, stated:

All subjects of the Tunisian Regency, no matter of what religion, have the right to complete security of person, property, and of honor.

The constitution also provided for permanent allegiance to the Regency. It stated that all Tunisians who left the country for whatever reason, whether or not they had been naturalized in another country, would become Tunisian subjects whenever they returned to the Regency. All Jews born in Tunisia and unable to establish a foreign nationality were considered Tunisian under the law. The one exception to the principle of permanent allegiance was the provision that a Tunisian could become a citizen of the Republic of France upon individual application.

Under various laws of the Regency the Jews had the rights of freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, and freedom to form trade unions and to establish Jewish organizations for any legal purposes. For Tunisian Jewish citizens the law governing personal status, such as matters of marriage and inheritance, had been expressly reserved to the Rabbinical Court. The Rabbinical Court was composed of rabbis appointed by the state. This court applied the Mosaic laws and had the right to decide on questions of fact and law. Its decisions were enforced by the Tunisian governmental authorities. Cases outside the jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Court were tried in Tunisian courts, if they involved Tunisian Jews. For other nationalities, the French Consular Court had jurisdiction.

Anti-Semitism

Concomitant with the growth of Arab nationalism and with the decrease in Arab patronage of Jewish businesses, more complaints of anti-Semitism began to be heard. Jewish workers complained of being discharged from firms for no apparent reason. Their jobs were taken shortly thereafter by non-Jews. Complaints in regard to housing and education were fewer. Anti-Semitic pamphlets, originating from Egypt, with pictures and cartoons bearing a striking resemblance to those published by the Nazis, appeared in the country clandestinely. Vigorous protests were made to the French censorship bureau by the president of the Tunis Jewish community, as well as by influential Jewish personalities. The French showed genuine concern over the appearance of these pamphlets and promised to do their utmost to stop their entry. Neo-Destour leaders denounced the pamphlets and reaffirmed their desire for Arab-Jewish friendship.

Community Organization and Communal Affairs

Although a Federation of Jewish Communities of Tunisia had existed since 1948 under the presidency of Charles Saada, president of the community of Sfax, a second, rival federation was created in May 1955 under the sponsorship of Charles Haddad, president of the Tunis community. The country's Jewish communities were then split into two hostile camps: eighteen com-
munities remained with the federation headed by Saada, eight communities joined the newly formed federation, and the affiliation of four others was still in dispute.

The original federation had never been able to obtain legal recognition, because the largest community, Tunis, had refused to become a member. Confronted with two federations, the French took the position that they could not favor one as against the other, thereby retaining a neutral status vis-à-vis demands made upon them for financial aid. This division made it impossible for either federation to meet the needs of the communities of the interior and to provide a unified voice for the Jewish people of the country.

**Fund Raising**

Neither federation had sufficient funds to carry on its activities, nor could they agree on a unified fund-raising campaign for the entire country. In November 1952, an accord was reached between the Community of Tunis, Nos Petits, and the local representatives of OSE Tunis and ORT-Tunisia, whereby the first six months of 1953 were given over to fund raising for Israel and the last half of the year to fund raising for the local organizations. Since a unified campaign for the country was blocked by the struggle between the two federations, OSE-Tunisia, ORT, and Nos Petits banded together and decided to run their own campaign during the second half of 1953.

The Jewish communities were financed by tax monies collected by the government from kosher meat and Jewish sacramental wine. The government allocated this money on the basis of population figures. The communities also received funds from contributions made in the synagogues, from religious rites at the cemeteries, and from special appeals made during Passover and the High Holy Days.

Independently of the organized communities, a multiplicity of small local organizations carried on specialized programs such as maintaining canteens, providing trousseaux, Bar Mitzvah clothing, blankets, etc. These organizations were financed by membership fees and periodic social affairs. Most of them received assistance from the JDC either in the form of supplies, technical assistance, or cash. Nos Petits, which had formerly served about 800 children with daily hot lunches in Tunis, was able to expand its facilities to accommodate about 2,000.

The Jewish communities of Tunisia had maintained active contact with many foreign and international Jewish organizations, notably the Jewish Agency, the JDC, the World Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, the World Sephardic Union, ORT, and OSE.

**General Education**

According to the government's figures, 15,052 Jewish children of school age attended the French schools during the school year 1952-1953. The Alliance Israélite Universelle operated five schools, three of them in Tunis, one in Sousse, and one in Sfax. These had an attendance of about 3,500
Jewish children. Attempts to enroll Jewish children in the French schools in the extreme south of the country, notably on the island of Djerba, were not favored by the Rabbinate. Throughout the south, religious and Hebrew education for boys was conducted in the traditional unclassified chedarim while no provision was made for girls of school age. Under the aegis of OSE-Tunisia, two nursery schools for 100 children were opened in Djerba in June 1953, one at Hara Sghira and the other at Hara Kebira.

Increasing demands for more nursery schools for the greater Tunis area led the Tunis community early in 1953 to purchase with the assistance of the JDC a building in La Goulette where they planned to accommodate 150 children in three classes. The nursery school at Ariana increased its enrollment from thirty to sixty children. An increasing number of children were entering the French public schools and the Alliance schools on leaving the nursery schools at the age of six. Special provisions were made by the three Alliance schools in Tunis to enroll six-year-olds from the Garderie Israélite, the largest nursery school in Tunis. The percentage of Jewish students eligible for secondary education and vocational training was growing. Education in the private schools had also shown an increase. To help meet the demand for more competent nursery school teachers, the JDC-sponsored Paul Baerwald School of Social Work of Paris assigned two of its instructors to Tunis to train teachers. Two intensive practical and theoretical three-month courses were conducted at the Garderie Israélite for employed teachers and new candidates. This teacher training program showed good results in raising the level of instruction and in imparting some sorely needed basic concepts of child psychology. Continued in-service training was scheduled to take place periodically.

Jewish Education

Many notable educational reforms were accomplished during 1952-53. Chedarim were eliminated in some of the villages of the extreme south. In their place centrally located schools were opened in Hara Sghira, Medinine, Zarzis, and Foum Tatahouine, and equipped with modern school furniture and school supplies by the JDC. Homogeneous classes were established, providing for the first time an orderly progression from elementary to more advanced studies. The content of the school syllabus was enlarged to include elementary arithmetic, geography, and modern Hebrew, in addition to religious training. Teachers were encouraged to use Hebrew as the language of instruction rather than Judeo-Arabic. Other towns had requested help in instituting the same reforms. Efforts to induce the rabbinate in Hara Kebira to follow suit proved fruitless.

In Tunis, the community reached an accord with the Alliance to increase the number of teachers of modern Hebrew from eight to thirteen, and to reorganize the entire program of Hebrew education. In collaboration with the Religious Department of the Jewish Agency and the JDC, the Tunis community engaged an educator from Israel for one year, beginning June 1953, to reorganize Hebrew instruction in the schools maintained by the
community. Three hundred students attended the Or Thora school full time and about 500 youth and adults attended the special evening courses in Tunis and the suburbs. Courses in modern Hebrew and Jewish history, given by the Zionist youth movements, reached another 1,100 students.

The school at La Goulette, when completed, would provide, in addition to the three nursery schools, four classes in modern Hebrew and Jewish history for about 260 students. In order to meet the need for additional well-trained Hebrew instructors, the community sent seven of the most promising theological students to attend the teachers' training school opened in March 1953 in Ramsgate, England.

ORT-Tunisia completed the second section of its boys' school during 1952-53, thus making it possible for an additional 120 boys to receive vocational training. A third section was begun in May 1953. This would fulfill the original plans to provide a full three-year course of vocational instruction, and bring the student body to over 300 boys. The needle trades school, with 60 girls, was handicapped by lack of space and ORT was considering enlarging it to accommodate a long waiting list.

In addition to its vocational training classes, ORT-Tunisia operated an apprentice placement program with considerable success. Boys and girls, whose level of education would not permit them to attend the regular courses, were placed in jobs in private industry. Where wages were below a minimum of 2,000 francs ($5.71) per month, the community and ORT contributed the balance. Enrollment in this apprentice program was about 700 during 1952-53.

**Religious Life**

Jewish holidays and customs were strictly observed in Tunisia. The Mosaic laws governed marriage, dowry, and inheritance. The government respected this communal religious life, and contributed financially toward its upkeep. A very active rabbinate was headed by the chief rabbi, who was appointed by the Bey of Tunis. At the same time, however, the youth of the middle class had been abandoning the strict Orthodoxy of their elders.

**Zionism and Relations with Israel**

While the general sympathy and enthusiasm for Israel continued, membership in the Zionist Federation showed no increase, and membership in the Zionist youth movements declined. A summer camp program, organized by the Zionist Youth Federation and assisted financially by the JDC, sent some 1,200 children to the beaches and to the mountains.

The fund-raising campaign for Israel, which ran from January through June 1953, raised the same amount as in 1952—20,000,000 francs ($57,000). The campaign was well-organized and covered most of the main cities and towns in Tunisia.
Two daily Arab newspapers, Azzohra and Ennahda, neglected no opportunity to attack Israel in their columns.

**Social Services**

All Jewish communities in Tunisia took care of their poor. Known as *hallouk*, their relief work took the form of cash assistance on a weekly basis. In 1952-53 the Tunis community spent about 20,000,000 ($57,000) for approximately 5,000 persons. Individual grants ranged from 300 to 700 francs weekly. In the smaller and poorer communities the amounts ranged from 100 to 300 francs per week.

Stimulated by the JDC, the leaders of the Tunis community agreed to establish a social service department staffed by trained social workers with a view to reorganizing its welfare program along the lines of modern social service. Five young women were trained for one year at the Paul Baerwald School in Paris.

This team of social workers, increased to nine during the past year, made significant contributions to the rationalization and reorganization of the welfare services provided by the community. More effective assistance was rendered to the aged, the orphans, unemployable tubercular heads of families, and nonrecurrent emergencies. A foster home placement service for abandoned children provided homes for seventeen boys and girls. Studies of the *hallouk* case-load were begun in order to provide more accurate information about the needs and resources of long-time recipients.

An in-service training program for the social workers of the community and OSE was conducted by a teacher from the Paul Baerwald School. For the first time new candidates were trained, on the spot, for the social service departments of the community and OSE-Tunisia. In addition, two social workers were assigned to Sousse, one for the community and one for OSE-Tunis. Another was assigned to OSE-Tunisia at Sfax. It was planned to carry on this in-service program at regular intervals.

Through its chain of clinics, OSE serviced more than 16,000 children and infants. OSE-Tunisia made outstanding progress in its campaigns against the three widespread contagious diseases, trachoma, tinea, and tuberculosis. Plans were drawn up for the erection of a modern two-story clinic in the *hara* (ghetto) of Tunis. Construction was to begin in September 1953.

On June 10, 1953, the Caisse Israélite Relevement Economique (loan society) began its operations. Financed by the JDC and the Jewish Colonization Association, the Caisse was to provide loans at low interest to artisans and small businessmen. This institution was expected to go a long way toward improving the economic level of the poorest artisans.

**Cultural Activities**

During 1952-53 a weekly Jewish half hour on the radio was the only outlet for Jewish expression. Neither of the two Jewish newspapers which ceased
publication the previous year—*Gazette d'Israel* and *l'Echo Juif*—reappeared on the newsstands. Exhibitions of paintings by Israel artists were well received and warmly supported.

HENRY L. LEVY

FRENCH MOROCCO

In September 1952 the French resident general proposed a major program of reforms to Sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef. Under this plan, the sultan's legislative authority was to be transferred to the Council of Viziers and Directors, composed of the sultan's Moroccan advisers and the French officials heading the protectorate administration. (This did not in any way affect the ultimate authority of the French resident general under the protectorate treaty of 1912.) Within this council, which was to have a French majority, there was to be set up a Limited Council, or cabinet, of six members. Three of these were to be Moroccans named by the sultan, and three French. This Limited Council was to be the central executive authority. The advisory Government Council, previously composed of equal numbers of appointed Moroccan members (including six Jews elected by the Jewish communities) and elected and appointed French members meeting separately, was to be made entirely elective, and the two groups were to meet either jointly or separately. The council's powers, however, were to remain entirely advisory. Local and regional self-government on a limited scale was also to be established, through elected councils. The regional councils and those of the larger cities were to have equal numbers of French and Moroccan members; in the smaller towns and rural areas, the division of seats between French and Moroccan members was to be based on the relative numbers of the two groups in the population.

The system of justice was to be radically revised, by separating judicial and administrative authority at all levels. (Hitherto, they had in general been combined locally in the pashas and caids, and on the highest level—at least nominally—in the Sultan himself.) Now there was to be a completely independent system of local magistrates and regional courts of appeal, and final judicial authority was to rest with a sherifian supreme court. Judges were to be recruited from the graduates of the Moroccan School of Administration, and temporarily from the Moroccan bar. These courts were to apply civil and criminal codes, whose promulgation was also a part of the program of reforms. In all branches of the government qualified Moroccans were to be admitted to the civil service on the same basis as Frenchmen.

The sultan refused to sign these decrees. Instead, he condemned the protectorate treaty in a speech delivered on November 18, 1952. In general, he took the same position as the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, which had for some years been agitating for independence, both among the population in Morocco itself and through its representatives abroad. At the instance of the Asian-Arab bloc, the Moroccan question was placed on the agenda of the December 1952 session of the United Nations General Assembly.
On December 7 and 8, large-scale riots took place in Casablanca, inspired by extremist groups. They were suppressed by French and Moroccan troops. Subsequently Thami El Mezouari Glaoui, Pasha of Marrakech and a leader of the Berber tribes of the South, demanded that the Sultan publicly disavow the Istiqlal; when the Sultan failed to do so, El Glaoui broke with him.

On May 27, 1953, the Pashas, Caids, and Khalifas (headmen of cities, villages, and tribes) of certain districts sent the French government, via the press, a demand for the abdication or deposition of the sultan. A group of religious leaders refused any longer to consider the sultan as their spiritual chief and allied themselves with the campaign conducted by El Glaoui. The crisis became sharper during July and August, and on August 21 the resident general proclaimed the deposition of Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef and his replacement by Sidi Mohammed ben Moulay Arafat, also a descendant of the ruling Alaouite dynasty. On the same day the deposed Sultan was deported to Corsica. The reform decrees were signed by the new Sultan, and they were being put into effect.

These decrees referred to "Moroccans" without making any distinction among Jews, Arabs, and Berbers. Thus Jews were now not theoretically barred from the offices assigned to Moroccan Moslems.

Political and Civic Status

Moroccan nationality could be acquired neither by birth on Moroccan soil, nor by marriage. In the absence of a constitution and a nationality law, the following were Moroccans:

1. Those Arabs and Berbers who lived in the country and had no other nationality were subjects of the Sultan of Morocco, joined to him by religious and temporal ties.

2. The Dhimis, or Jews whose ancestors had lived in Morocco for several generations, and who had no claim to any other nationality, were "proteges" of the Sultan.

For both the subjects and the proteges of the sultan, nationality was inherited, irrespective of the place of birth. Moroccans naturalized abroad could keep their new nationality if they returned to Morocco. Under article 15 of the Convention of Madrid of 1880, as interpreted by the Court of Appeal of the protectorate, the sultan reserved to himself the perpetual allegiance of his subjects, and they could not surrender their Moroccan nationality without his consent. Thus, a large number of Moroccans who had emigrated to South America since 1880, and had had children born there, possessed a dual nationality, that of the country where they lived and that of Morocco. The latter was the only nationality recognized if they returned to Morocco. This principle applied equally in the French and Spanish zones and in Tangiers. Naturalization in the United States, however, was an exception; it was definitive and not subject to the approval of the Sultan.

Jews descended from foreigners, even though their families had lived in
Morocco for several generations, preserved their original nationality without question and were subject to the laws of their original country. It is to be noted that although the number of non-Moroccan Jews was certainly no more than 25,000, their influence on the Jewish population of Morocco was substantial. They took an active part in the committees of the Jewish communities and in philanthropic work, both financially and socially.

Moroccan Jews sat in the municipal commissions and the Council of Government, and were voters and officers in the chambers of commerce. More and more, the authorities had been tending to consider the Moroccan Jews as a group separate from the Moslem population. They were neither completely Moroccan, not being Moslem, nor foreign, since they lacked any claim to a foreign nationality. The Jews of Morocco manifestly needed legal definition of their rights and obligations.

**Jewish Population**

The results of the census of 1952, based for the first time on lists of names submitted by all heads of households, were only beginning to become available. They indicated that there were approximately 199,200 Jews in French Morocco out of a total population of 8,004,000.

The decrease in the Jewish population since 1947 (when it was about 203,800) was due to the emigration of approximately 50,000 persons to Israel.

Until November 1950, registration of births and deaths had not been compulsory for Moroccan Jews and Arabs. Because of the registration of recent births along with the new ones of 1951 and 1952, the statistics cannot be regarded as completely accurate. According to available official statistics, Jewish births recorded from November 1950 to December 1951 exceeded deaths by 3,359, indicating a high rate of natural increase. Figures for deaths in the Jewish community of Casablanca, representing about a third of the total Moroccan Jewish population, showed a substantial decrease in infant mortality. The community had no complete statistics on births. All that was definitely known was that there were more births than deaths.

By a regrettable error the figures of births and deaths published in the American Jewish Year Book, 1953 [Vol. 54], p. 387, were given as 40,000 and 24,000, instead of 4,000 and 2,400 respectively.

**Economic Situation**

A small number of Moroccan Jews were wealthy. For the most part they were engaged in the export and import trade, especially in commodities used by the native masses, such as tea, sugar, and cotton goods. Their children, after studying at the French universities, seldom followed the trades of their fathers. Most of them became lawyers, doctors, architects, or practitioners of the other liberal professions.

A large group consisted of bank and commercial employees, small businessmen, and manufacturers in the corn and leather trades, often operating
with capital supplied by the purchasers. Their children attended European schools, from the primary grades to the university, and it was their ambition to enter the liberal professions.

The great mass consisted of very small-scale businessmen who sold food, cloth, or other commodities in stalls which they rented in the market, and which they set up in the morning and removed at night. In addition, there were such artisans as shoemakers, tailors, barbers, and leather workers, who worked at home, earning barely enough to live on, and had large families, with five or ten children. This group lived in the *mellah* (ghetto). As far as the granting of commercial licenses was concerned, there was no discrimination between Jews and non-Jews. Beside this urban population, groups of Jews ranging from 25 to 2,000 lived in the backward inaccessible *mellahs* of the Atlas mountains. They numbered in all between 15,000 and 20,000. These rural Moroccan Jews were peasants, petty dealers in grain and olives, and porters transporting goods from one *mellah* to another on donkey-back. Their standard of living was the lowest in North Africa, lower even than in the most isolated communities of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania.

**North African Rehabilitation Project**

In July 1952 the American Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) and the Jewish Colonization Association (ICA) of London reached an agreement to aid the artisans of Morocco and Tunisia. A local organization called the Caisse Israélite de Relevement Economique (Jewish Fund for Economic Rehabilitation) was set up. Its budget was guaranteed by advances from the North African Rehabilitation Project and by locally raised contributions. Its purpose was to give technical and financial aid to artisans who lacked the means to purchase raw materials. This aid was to take the form of advances which the artisan was pledged to repay, and raw materials and tools furnished at wholesale prices. The technical aid consisted in improving the skill of the artisans through evening courses for adults and model workshops. This fund, set up in July 1953, had so far received 131 requests, of which 22 had been granted after investigation. The administrative council, headed by J. R. Behazerof, was assisted by a consultative committee drawn from the artisans aided. It was expected that in the course of the next few years this project would substantially raise the standard of living of the poor artisans of the *mellah*.

**Religious Life**

The rabbinical tribunals had jurisdiction over cases of personal status arising among Moroccan Jews. The council of rabbis met under the presidency of the grand rabbi of Morocco at the seat of the High Court in Rabat. Rabbis delegated from all the cities of Morocco presented their proposals for changes in the laws in due form. Once these proposals were
approved by the council, they were posted in every synagogue in the country and ratified by all the members of the communities. A single negative vote was sufficient to defeat the proposal. After the period for opposition had passed, the proposals were submitted, through the inspector of Jewish institutions, to the councillor of the sherifien government for the final ratification which gave them the force of law. The sole basis of the law applied by the rabbinical tribunals was the Talmud and the subsequent commentaries. There was no codification of the decisions of these tribunals. Thanks to the council of rabbis, the takanot (laws) had been put in order, bringing up to date the procedure in regard to inheritance, status of women, and divorce.

In Casablanca and the majority of Moroccan cities, the rabbinical tribunals were located in quarters altogether unworthy of their dignity. In Rabat, however, the French government had constructed a magnificent modern building, during 1952-53, for the High Rabbinical Tribunal (the court of appeal for all tribunals in Morocco), the Tribunal of First Instance, and the headquarters of the council of rabbis.

The rabbinical retirement age was set at seventy, and recruits to the rabbinate had been drawn from the forty-to-forty-five-year group. In a few years young rabbis graduating from the Institut des Hautes Etudes Hebraiques would be able to become rabbis and sit on the tribunals.

French lawyers, both Jewish and non-Jewish, might plead before these tribunals in French, an interpreter translating their pleadings into Judaeo-Arabic. But their task was difficult, because they only knew certain general principles of Talmudic law, and in each particular case, in the absence of any codification of decisions, the lawyers were dependent for the interpretation of Talmudic law on the judges. The inspector of Jewish institutions had the right to review even the decisions rendered on appeal by the High Rabbinical Tribunal. The French government keeps its hands off these matters.

Education and Child Welfare Service

Until 1939, the number of schools opened by the Alliance Israélite Universelle and by the Protectorate government sufficed for the education of all the children of school age. But in 1940 all the Jews, Moroccan and non-Moroccan, affected by the numerus clausus imposed under Vichy's laws, were thrown back on the schools of the Alliance. Restrictions due to the war had also interrupted the building of schools. Hence many unclassified chedarim were opened in the filthy and unhealthy hovels of the mellah, and parents paid high tuition fees to leave their children in them under wretched conditions.

The fight against the chedarim began in 1948, and had been largely won. Those chedarim which still remained open were under supervision of the communities and the public health authorities. Every cheder closed by the community on health grounds remained permanently closed. Beginning in 1953, the opening of new chedarim was prohibited. This achievement had
been made possible by the effective action of the JDC in collaboration with the presidents of the communities, the Alliance, local organizations, and the Protectorate authorities.

All-day kindergartens for children between three and six from among the poorest families of the mellah were finally opened during 1952-53. On lands made available by certain families and by the government the JDC had built temporary structures, and supplied them with modern equipment.

La Maternelle, the first local service for children, had been headed for thirty years by Mme. A. Benazaraf, who was to receive the Legion of Honor for her work. It was raising funds locally to add a new story to its all-day nursery for children of working mothers.

**Primary Education**

The Alliance Israélite Universelle, during 1952, educated 26,095 boys and girls in its own schools and also furnished teachers of French to 2,193 in annexes. In fact, the Alliance took care of the teaching of French in the majority of the other communal schools (Talmud Torahs) and private schools (Ozar Hatorah, Em Habanim, Maghen David), as well as those conducted by the ORT and OSE.

There were still 7,368 children of school age for whom school facilities were not available. Of these, 4,500 were in Casablanca; 793 in Fez; 315 in Sefrou; 300 in the district of Marrakech; 1,290 in Meknes; 90 in the Meknes district; 21 in the district of Oujda; and 59 in Ouezzane. Annexes had been set up to take care of them as far as possible and keep down the number of illiterates until the classes operated by the Alliance and the Franco-Jewish Schools would be adequate to absorb them.

**Secondary Education and Teachers’ Training**

The Lycée was open without discrimination to all children of whatever nationality, religion, or race who had passed its entrance examinations in the sixth grade (at the age of ten to twelve). They remained until they received the baccalaureate, at a minimum age of seventeen. The students in the schools of the Alliance remained until the age of sixteen or seventeen and received an elementary certificate which permitted them to become teachers. The Alliance schools, in addition to a curriculum the same as that of the French secular schools, taught their students Hebrew. Some parents, however, preferred to give their children an education weighted further in the direction of Hebrew rather than secular studies. This was one of the reasons for the growth of the chedarim. The Ozar Hatorah, the Talmud Torah, the Em Habanim, and the Maghen David were completely in accord with the wishes of the parents in giving the children, with the aid of the Alliance, an education in the French, Arabic, and English languages. The chief difficulty facing the schools was the lack of qualified teachers.

The Hebrew Normal School, a model boarding-school of the Maghen David and Alliance in the suburbs of Casablanca directed by Rabbi A. Rouche, had already furnished instructors with modern training to teach Hebrew in the schools.
During the 1952-53 school year ORT admitted 410 students to the Ain Saba boarding-school for boys and 430 to the Val d'Anfa day school for girls. Students were being admitted to these schools on the basis of their work qualifications rather than need. Their purpose was to develop skilled workers with government certificates after three years of study. During 1952-53 ORT also set up an apprenticeship service for children who were either too old for admission to the school or lacked the minimum educational requirements. ORT had served seventy-four such children. The Women's Committee of the ORT, founded by Mme Rachel Attias, was active in the collection of funds locally and in social work in the schools. It was helped and subsidized by the Women's American ORT. ORT had large-scale projects planned for 1953-54 if its budget permitted. It had received a subsidy of 10,000,000 francs ($43,000) from the French government during 1952-53, and a lottery had been authorized to bring in another 10,000,000 francs.

Medico-Social Services

During 1952-53 the dispensary of the nursery run by the OSE had added to its previous activities a milk station and a center for the diagnosis and treatment of trachoma for both children and adults in the entire mellah of Casablanca. It was planning a specially equipped center for the treatment of trachoma and ringworm of the scalp; the land had already been acquired and plans for construction were under study. The president of the OSE, Jack Sabah, was conducting an active campaign to raise the necessary funds for this institution. A modern clinic for the Jews of Morocco had been erected entirely with government funds. Situated near the new quarter of Casablanca, it was under the control of the directorate of public health.

The council of Jewish communities of Morocco had laid the cornerstone of a tuberculosis sanatorium for 100 patients at Ben Ahmed. Its construction was to be financed by the council, by local donations, and by the JDC. The JDC was covering one-third of the cost of the first section of the work; the other two-thirds were being paid for by the council of communities and by local donations. On the building's completion its equipment and maintenance were to be taken care of by the directorate of public health.

The social workers trained by the JDC's Paul Baerwald School in Paris helped to improve the various services during 1952-53. Their presence and work was indispensable in the kindergartens, the dispensaries, the vacation camps, and all the private and communal welfare activities.

Housing

A few new buildings were put up during 1953 to house families coming from the mellah. Fifty-five hectares (136 acres) had been acquired by the government for a Jewish housing development. Roads were under construc-
tion and running water was to be installed, but funds were insufficient for the rapid construction of the apartments necessary to replace the hovels and to rehouse all the Jews who lived in the mellah. Certain groups of financiers were studying the possibility of building houses at their own expense on the land acquired by the government and leasing them at rents controlled by the state. The levelling of the mellah would lighten the budget of every medical service.

Cultural Life

The newspaper Noar ceased publication for financial reasons. La Voix des Communautés was the sole remaining Jewish publication. The council of communities broadcast a radio Hebrew Hour every Friday and on Jewish holidays. Jacques Dahan was largely responsible for La Voix des Communautés and for the radio broadcasts.

Hélène Cazes-Bénatar