Review of the Year

UNITED STATES

OTHER COUNTRIES
Civic and Political

Intergroup Relations and Tensions in the United States

The events of 1968 presented a picture of social upset and unrest that was alarming in its magnitude and implications. The violent deaths of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Senator Robert F. Kennedy, both national leaders and important spokesmen for the minorities and the poor, stunned and stirred the nation. They symbolized the deep conflicts in American society.

Bleak analyses of race relations and the warning of the danger of widening economic and racial cleavages in America's cities by the National Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission) were given support by the findings of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, impaneled after the assassination of Senator Kennedy. A national trend toward the growing militancy of urban Negroes was evident in matters of welfare rights and housing, but particularly in the area of education. The drive in New York City for the decentralization of the school system and the institution of community control produced unprecedented expressions of overt antisemitism by some blacks. As the dispute continued during the lengthy teachers' strike, social commentators and particularly Jewish spokesmen openly debated the seriousness and significance of this wave of antisemitism.

College and university campuses across the nation also were the scenes of serious disruption, as students demonstrated against the Vietnam war, and for major reforms in higher education.

Reflecting the mood of the nation, the two major issues dominating the 1968 presidential campaign were the war in Vietnam and the matter of law and order. These issues, reinforced by the third-party candidacy of George Wallace, were the catalysts for expressions of divisive intergroup and interracial hostilities. In the campaign, as elsewhere, the viability of traditional means of resolving social conflict was seriously tested.
In the Jewish community the reaction to all this was a significant increase of Jewish self-awareness and concern over antisemitic prejudice in America.

**Patterns of Antisemitism**

While American Jews continued to be cautioned that "anti-Semitism is embedded in many of the social structures of our culture and in the attitude of many individuals"; that "in latent form, it is chronic to our society"; that "its overt manifestations fluctuate, being aggravated by social tension," and that severe social conflict may "cause it to become acute," they were told there was "no hard evidence" or a significant general increase or intensification in 1968. Despite the strong manifestations of overt antisemitism, including its appearance in the black communities (pp. 76–86) and among intellectuals of the New Left (p. 72), antisemitism was believed to continue at a low ebb.

Corroborating this view were the findings of an October Harris poll. At the request of the American Jewish Committee, a question probing public attitudes for antisemitism or expressions of anti-Jewish hostility at the peak of the 1968 election campaign was included in the survey. Asked whether they thought each of ten groups in a given list, among them the U.S. government, Communists, Negroes, Jews, and others, were "responsible" or "not responsible" for the country's ills, only 6 per cent of the 1,675 respondents across the nation blamed the Jews. Eighty-two per cent specifically said that Jews were "not responsible." Thus, according to an American Jewish Committee analysis of the poll, the Jews emerged not only as the group least likely to be blamed for the country's troubles, but also the one "most readily absolved of blame, in explicit fashion." However, this finding must be considered within the context of the fact that the survey was conducted at a time when public attention was focused on the election campaign, the violence accompanying the Miami and Chicago conventions, the Vietnam war, riots in the cities. This, as well as the increasing reluctance to give public voice to anti-Jewish sentiments, were factors tending to reduce the percentage of respondents who blamed the Jews.

**Student Activism, New Left, and Antisemitism**

On and off the campus, college students fomented a variety of protest activities symbolic of the politics of the New Left. Since the public reaction to student agitation was largely unfavorable, the continued presence of Jewish students in the ranks of the protestors again was noted as a possible impetus to antisemitism. Sociologist Nathan Glazer, in an article for a

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1 Statement adopted by a conference on Combating Anti-Semitism Today, held in September 14–16, 1968 under the auspices of the National Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC).
special edition of *Fortune* magazine on American youth, took a sanguine view of the problem. In his view, this period in American history did not pose "much danger that Jews will suffer from unequal treatment, prejudice, or discrimination." If it were, he said, he would hesitate to discuss in a non-Jewish publication "the interesting and peculiar phenomenon" that Jews, who in all likelihood were the most prosperous religious group in America, now were so prominent among young radicals, both on and off campus. Glazer saw the issue not as "why are Jews radicals?", but as "why are there so many Jews among the relatively small number of student radicals?" He estimated that there were 325,000 Jews, among 6.7 million college students of all kinds. Of the small number of committed, identifiable radicals on the most active campuses probably one-third to one-half were Jews, which, Glazer concluded, "at the very most comes to 3 to 4 per cent" of all Jewish students.

Jewish students' propensity for radicalism, Glazer explained, was in part rooted in the Jewish politico-cultural heritage of liberal and Socialist thought, and the influence of liberal and/or radical parents. At the same time, he noted, "today's Jewish radicals differ in the matter of awareness of being Jewish." There was little evidence that their concern for the Vietnamese, Biafrans, or American Negroes was grounded in their recollections of the extirpation of the Jews in Nazi-dominated Europe. Glazer also pointed out that, on the whole, Jewish radicals stood on the more intellectual rather than the violent side of radicalism.

The Spring 1968 issue of *Columbia College Today*, the publication of and by the Association of the Alumni, was entirely devoted to a minute account of the spring riots at Columbia University and their aftermath. The article titled "Six Weeks that Struck Morningside Heights" and written by its editor, George C. Keller, touched off a controversy over what some felt were its antisemitic overtones. In a formal complaint in January 1969, Paul O'Dwyer urged the New York City Human Rights Commission to investigate the publication for "promoting antisemitism." Among the passages he cited to support his contention were references to Jewish suburbs, Jewish mothers, life in the kibbutz. Keller's statement that "Nearly all of the leaders and many of the members of Columbia's SDS chapter are of the Jewish faith," O'Dwyer maintained, was aimed at casting "aspersions on the SDS or the Jews or all of them."

In December Rabbi Benjamin M. Kahn, national director of B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundations, the campus organization for Jewish college students, cautioned the Jewish community against "confused judgments" over the character and number of Jewish college youths in the New Left. He noted that many Jewish leaders had shown "excessive preoccupation" that "has been compounded by their inadequate understanding of the attitudes and

convictions" of Jewish youths who were attracted to radical student movements.

Another dimension of the role of Jewish students in the disorders was gleaned from interviews with Jewish students and faculty members at Columbia. The impression of the interviewer was that "academic Jews are now completely at home in the university world," and that, at Columbia, "there is not one serious concern voiced about the reincarnation of campus antisemitism."

A research report issued by the American Jewish Committee dealt with the problem as it affected the Jewish community. Here the concern was over "the alienation from the Jewish tradition of the many bright, socially conscious young people," who joined the New Left movement, "the self-destructiveness of the hippy way of life" which a good number of them adopted, and "the possible support the youthful dissenters seem likely to give to anti-Israel factions and black antisemitism."

Indeed, young Jews in the New Left, off and on the campus, mouthed their respective groups' views of events in the Middle East. An American Jewish Committee analysis of Arab Appeals to American Public Opinion Today (July, 1969) covering the last two years gave this picture: "Groups aligned with Moscow see the Soviet Union as the protector of the exploited Arabs and the only force for peace in the Middle East. Maoists, Trotskyites and Third World groups sympathetic to the Arab guerrilla movements distrust the Soviet Union as a protector of bankrupt regimes."

As for the campus New Left, it "is generally anti-Israel, anti-Zionist and anti-U.S. without being aligned with foreign ideologies." What united the entire far left movement was "its condemnation of Israel and of the 'imperialist powers' siding with her . . ."

The propaganda material of the various official and unofficial Arab propaganda agencies—ranging from the Arab Information Center, with five offices in the United States, to the militant Palestine Liberation Organization, committed to the destruction of Israel—found their way into the publications of the far left, as well as those of the militant black and outright antisemitic groups in this country.

The American Jewish Committee report devoted a special chapter to the Organization of Arab Students, founded in 1952, which claimed "8,000 members and over 100 chapters in universities across the U.S. and Canada." Describing its purpose as cultural and educational, the organization's main activity in fact was "strident propaganda, as is shown by its record." In line with resolutions passed at its 1967 convention, the student group formed and strengthened "alignments with black militants, anti-Vietnam war groups and the New Left." The Organization of Arab Students was particularly active

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3 Geraldine Rosenfield, "Faculty Thoughts on the Jewish Role in the Student Disorders at Columbia University," The American Jewish Committee, November 1968, mimeo.

on the Wayne, California, Chicago, and Michigan university campuses. Becoming more militant, increasingly supporting al-Fatah, and seeking to exploit black antisemitism, its success varied from campus to campus, depending on the climate and opportunity to influence student leaders and professors.

**Vandalism and Violence**

For the most part, incidents of antisemitic vandalism and violence showed a characteristically random pattern in 1968. However, a series of acts in New York City in the fall and winter months, which occurred in the emotionally charged atmosphere of the school controversy, aroused great public concern.

**April:** A fire set to Beth-El congregation in Bethesda, Maryland, presumably by youthful vandals attempting burglary, caused severe damage, estimated at $100,000.

**May:** A rash of antisemitic abuse, ranging from outspoken refusals to rent to Jews, to garbage dumped on a local rabbi's lawn, was reported in Hollywood, Florida, a resort city north of Miami.

**June:** A bomb exploded outside a synagogue and study building of the Hebrew Theological College in Skokie, Illinois.

A suspected bomber was seriously wounded, and his woman companion killed, by police guarding the home of a prominent Jewish businessman in Meridian, Mississippi. The suspect, Thomas Tarrants, 3rd, was regarded as a "prime suspect" in a series of bombings in Meridian and Jackson, Mississippi, that destroyed the home of Rabbi Perry Nussbaum of Jackson, and damaged his synagogue (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], p. 238). A notebook found in Tarrant's possession had this entry: "I have committed myself totally to defeating the Communist-Jew conspiracy which threatens our country—any means necessary will be used."

**August:** More than 200 tombstones in the Linden Hill Central Synagogue Cemetery at Maspeth, Long Island, were damaged; obscenities were scrawled on others. Total loss was estimated at $20,000.

**September:** Members of the hasidic congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar and Puerto Ricans engaged in a rock-and-bottle-throwing fight in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn as congregants were walking home after Rosh Ha-shanah services.

**October-December:** Acts of vandalism were perpetrated against 11 Jewish houses of worship and schools in New York City. Fire bombs and rocks were hurled at the Yeshivot Torah Vodaath, Mesifta Tifereth and Ahi Ezer in Brooklyn. The last was damaged beyond repair.

A fire of suspicious origin broke out in the Hebrew Institute of University
Heights, the Bronx, which also housed a synagogue and a YM and YWHA. Swastikas were painted on the exteriors of the buildings.

Congregation Toirei Zonov in the Bronx was destroyed by fire, the eleventh synagogue to be desecrated in the New York area within three months.

The synagogue of the Yeshiva of Eastern Parkway in Brooklyn was gutted by fire, and many sacred scrolls ruined or damaged. Total damage amounted to several million dollars. Some of the lost religious articles were irreplaceable.

Jewish religious leaders voiced their anger and outrage at this wave of incidents. The Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations demanded that attacks against Jewish institutions be halted. Rabbi Zev Segal, president of the Rabbinical Council of America, the representative body of the Orthodox rabbinate, urged that a day be set aside for prayer and fasting to mourn the burnings and desecrations. Mayor John V. Lindsay and Police Commissioner Howard Leary announced the formation of a special police unit to look into the vandalism. In an attempt to allay fears, Lindsay visited some of the sites, and met with religious leaders to assess the extent of damage. The occurrence of these events at a time of general concern over black antisemitism led some to conclude that they were related. However, investigations by the police department and the commissioner of human rights uncovered no evidence that blacks were involved in any significant way. The vandalism was generally attributed to rampaging youths including whites and even a Jewish boy.

BLACK ANTISEMITISM

The overwhelming concern with antisemitism was focused in New York City, where the response to a series of related events in the area of education was virulent anti-Jewish attitudes among some Negroes.

Hatchett Affair

The first of these events centered around John F. Hatchett's appointment, in July, as director of the Afro-American Center, established in memory of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., at New York University. Hatchett, then a substitute teacher at Junior High School 35 in Harlem, had written an article entitled, "The Phenomenon of the Anti-Black Jews and the Black Anglo-Saxon: A Study in Educational Perfidy," in the November-December 1967 issue of the African-American Teachers Association Forum. The gist of the article was that the Jews, who, according to Hatchett, constituted 90 to 95 per cent of all employees in the New York City public school system (the best estimates put the figure below 60 per cent), "dominate and control [its] educational bureaucracy," and daily practice "misery, degradation, racism and cultural genocide against my people." After more rambling accusations, he issued this call: "Arise you Black teachers and
cast off the chains of fear and frustration, the fight will be bloody and long, but we will win. Black Power to you all.” Hatchett had been discharged by the Board of Education in February when, in violation of orders, he took his class to a Malcolm X memorial service at I.S. 201 in Harlem.

New York University’s announcement of Hatchett’s appointment as director of the Afro-American Student Center brought forth sharp criticism and demands for his removal. NYU President James Hester asked former Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, then president of the American Jewish Committee, for counsel. Goldberg hoped to “alleviate rather than exacerbate tensions” by advising Hatchett’s retention, under the supervision of Judge Constance Baker Motley, who was to serve as chairman of the center’s board. In Goldberg’s view, “As a result of my frank and candid talk with Mr. Hatchett, I believe he now understands the injustice and dangers inherent in the kind of criticism he voiced in the article. Mr. Hatchett strongly denies he is anti-semitic, although the expressions in his article can be so regarded.” This endorsement moved the NYU administration not only to reconfirm its appointment, but to defend Hatchett. Goldberg made it a point to say that he was acting solely as an individual, and not as a spokesman for any Jewish communal group. Indeed, the New York chapter of the American Jewish Committee, in a statement to NYU Chancellor Allan M. Cartter, strongly opposed the choice of Hatchett, “a man who in his public statements appeals to racial hatred” and sullies “the institution with which he is formally associated.”

The controversy continued as Hatchett made other inflammatory statements. In a talk to 700 students at the NYU Bronx campus in October, in the midst of the presidential campaigns and the school controversy, Hatchett called then Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey, Richard M. Nixon, and Albert Shanker “racist bastards.” Dore Schary, national chairman of the Anti-Defamation League, chided the university for continuing “to tolerate or apologize for the unbridled bigoted mouthings of a staff member who holds an ostensibly responsible position in a sensitive area,” and urged Hester to “reconsider” Hatchett’s appointment. Among others calling for Hatchett’s ouster were Rabbi Maurice N. Eisendrath, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Bronx Congressman James H. Scheuer (Dem.-Lib.), and the Jewish Labor Committee.

Shortly thereafter, Hester removed Hatchett. His announcement said that many of Hatchett’s actions and public statements were incompatible with a major objective of the center, “to work toward improving relations among all religious and ethnic groups,” and that it was impossible to reconcile his behavior with that objective.

Giving strong support to NYU’s decision was an editorial in the Negro newspaper, New York Amsterdam News (October 19):

The university hired him [Hatchett], giving him, in his own words, “the opportunity to be judged on the merits of what I will do at NYU.”
He showed them what that was last week. The university relieved him but made no effort to silence him as an individual. We feel the recklessness and obscenity of Mr. Hatchett's remarks thoroughly justify the university's action.

Commenting on the affair in *Midstream* (November 1968), the well-known writer Marie Syrkin saw the Hatchett episode as highlighting "the intellectual confusion which befalls decent, well-intentioned people as to what constitutes anti-Semitism. Though they condemn the evil, they have difficulty in spotting its extreme, let alone refined, symptoms." Miss Syrkin maintained that "Anti-Semitism is latent and endemic, and can become epidemic whenever social tensions seek an easy focus for their discharge," that only some twenty years ago Germany showed how it is done, and that in Eastern Europe today "Zionist' conspiracies deflect all discontents." She warned that, "To allow Negro extremists, without meaningful opposition, to utilize this familiar technique because Negroes, in a paradoxical sense, have become untouchables, is a dangerous development, boding good neither to Jews or Negroes, nor to the country as a whole."

"Harlem on My Mind"

Illustrating this point was the controversy over the catalogue of New York Metropolitan Museum of Art's exhibition "Harlem on My Mind," which opened on January 18, 1969. The preface to the booklet, written by 18-year-old Candice Van Ellison, read in part:

Behind every hurdle that the Afro-American has yet to jump stands the Jew who has already cleared it. Jewish shopkeepers are the only remaining "survivors" in the expanding black ghettos. The lack of competition in this area allows the already exploited black to be further exploited by the Jews. Another major area of contact involves the Jewish landlord and the black tenant. Our contempt for the Jews makes us feel more completely American in sharing a national prejudice.

Indignation was widespread, and the situation was aggravated by the museum's quasi-public status. Museum director Thomas P. Hoving refused Mayor Lindsay's demand for the immediate deletion of the preface. He thought the piece expressed "the truth," and, "If the truth hurts, so be it." The catalogue's publisher, Random House, sided with Hoving. American Jewish Committee New York chapter president, Theodore Ellenoff, hailed the Mayor's stand and, at the same time, expressed his organization's dismay at the Museum's failure "to sense the grave potential harm coming from such an article at this time, when intergroup tensions are at such a critical point." Among other Jewish leaders who pressed for deletion was Dore Schary of the Anti-Defamation League, who called Hoving's defense "careless and capricious," and rejected his "cavalier assessment of what is obviously an insult and attack on Jews who, despite the hasty appraisal of a few blacks, have been a central core in the fight for black freedom,
equality and opportunity." Arthur J. Lelyveld, president of the American Jewish Congress, accused Hoving of having given "credence and support to the most slanderous and irresponsible of charges" by his defense of the "anti-Semitic material" in the introduction to the catalogue. Speaking for the Jewish Labor Committee, its chairman David I. Ashe wrote to Hoving that, while Miss Van Ellison was "constitutionally entitled to her views, no matter how misguided and bigoted," a museum, which relied on public funds, "has no right to disseminate racial falsehoods and Nazi-like propaganda, no matter under what guise."

With some effort, the young woman was persuaded to make a disclaimer of racism, which was hurriedly inserted in the catalogue. However, after continued pressure from Jewish organizations and political leaders, the museum withdrew the catalog on January 31.

NEW YORK CITY SCHOOL STRIKE

The series of New York City school strikes during the first half of the 1968-69 school year and the events surrounding them exacerbated intergroup tensions. The strikes pitted the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) against the governing board of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville experimental district. The sides in the dispute coincided in large measure with ethnic alignments: The union was largely Jewish in its membership, and the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district was predominantly Negro, with large Puerto Rican minorities.

The Ocean Hill-Brownsville district was established in the summer of 1967, with the aid of a Ford Foundation grant, as an experiment in decentralization of the educational process. At the outset, when the district was still in the planning stage, teacher representatives actively participated in the deliberations of the planning council. But from the beginning, when parent representatives began consultation with the militantly anti-union Herman Ferguson, who had been indicted for conspiracy to assassinate NAACP leader Roy Wilkins, relations between teachers and others on the planning council started to deteriorate. In September 1967, after the refusal of the district's governing board (elected in August 1967) to support the union's strike and its attempt to keep open the schools in the district, relations between the union and the board were so seriously ruptured that the union forbade its members to become members of the board.

The ensuing months, during which tensions did not abate, witnessed attempts to define the authority of the local governing board and the local district. Drawn out negotiations took place between the governing boards of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville and the two other districts created as part of the same experiment (Two Bridges and I.S. 201), and the Board of Education over the powers to be delegated to the districts. In February the Board of Education proposed guidelines drawn up by a special committee on decentralization, headed by John Niemeyer, president of the Bank Street
College of Education. Although the guidelines provided for the delegation of substantial powers, they did not satisfy the districts which offered counter-proposals in March for more sweeping powers. The Board of Education held that, under the law, it could not grant many of the powers demanded by the districts and that, in fact, some of them were powers the board did not itself possess. In the absence of agreement on this matter, the Ocean Hill-Brownsville board continued without *de jure* status. It nevertheless exerted *de facto* control over the schools in the district.

However, the effective authority of the district remained unclear and, in an attempt to establish it in dramatic fashion, the governing board of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, on May 7, sent the following letter to 19 teachers and supervisors:

The Governing Board of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville school district has voted to end your employment in the schools of this district. This action was taken on the recommendation of the Personnel Committee. The termination of employment is to take effect immediately. In the event you wish to question this action, the Governing Board will receive you on Friday, May 10th at 6 P.M. at I.S. 55.

The consequences of this notice were conflict, bitter and acerbic, between the office of the superintendent of schools and the governing board, as well as between the power of UFT to protect the jobs of its members and the power of the governing board to dismiss unwanted personnel.

The various attempts to settle the conflict peacefully were not successful. The Ocean Hill governing board rejected the report of Judge Francis E. Rivers who, as trial examiner, heard and dismissed the charges against the teachers—reduced to ten by voluntary transfers and otherwise. Similarly, the recommendations of mediator Theodore Kheel were not accepted by the governing board.

By September 9, the opening day of the following school year, no agreement had been reached regarding the reinstatement of the ousted teachers, and UFT went out on strike. Two days of negotiation brought an agreement on September 11 between the Board of Education and UFT, extending the regular grievance procedure, based on binding arbitration, to all dismissals and transfers by local boards, and providing for the return of the "disputed teachers" to their classes. But the returning teachers, met by harassing and threatening mobs, were not assigned to their normal teaching duties. Rhody McCoy, the unit administrator, announced that he could not guarantee their safety.

On September 13 the union struck again, demanding enforcement of the original contract. A new agreement, reached on September 30 as a result of Mayor Lindsay's intervention, provided for the return of the teachers and the presence of observers with the power to close down the schools, if necessary. But it also permitted the Ocean Hill board to retain its new
teachers, giving it a large number of extra teachers for special educational projects.

After the schools reopened, a dispute again arose regarding the classroom assignments of the returning teachers and climaxing in a call by UFT for a new strike. The third and final strike began on October 14. A settlement was finally reached and the strike ended on November 18, 1968.\(^5\)

Before the 1968 school strikes, the use of antisemitic epithets had, on occasion, entered the developing struggle between teachers and militant community dissidents. As early as May 1967, antisemitic remarks were hurled at the principal and some teachers of P.S. 284 in Brownsville by demonstrators urging their transfer. And a month later, 30 of the 50 teachers at the school sought transfers because of antisemitic literature, threats and harassment by community groups. At the time of the 1967 UFT strike, teacher-pickets at Ocean Hill complained of antisemitic remarks, abuse and threats.

However, during the 1968 strikes, antisemitism erupted as a full-fledged issue, creating a mood of approaching hysteria in many Jewish middle-class areas. Handbills, signed and otherwise, appeared, warning “Middle East murderers of colored people” to get out “or your relatives in the Middle East will find themselves giving benefits to raise money to help you out from under the terrible weight of an enraged black community.” Another circular charged that the “So-Called Liberal Jewish Friend . is Responsible For the Serious Educational Retardation Of Our Black Children.” The leaflet carrying this last charge was widely circulated by UFT as the “verbatim text of leaflet distributed by the Parents Community Council of J.H.S. 271.” Its authenticity was later challenged on the grounds that J.H.S. 271 had no such community council.

UFT came under attack from many quarters for its role in spreading the hate literature throughout the city. An official of the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) charged that the teachers’ union was the major source of extremist leaflets being circulated in the school dispute. Aryeh Neier, NYCLU executive director, called the UFT action “a smear tactic reminiscent of the McCarthy era against the governing board in an attempt to create guilt by association.” Whitney M. Young, Jr., of the National Urban League charged that “Shanker created the issue of racism and anti-Semitism and is trying to smear the local board with such charges.” William Booth, then chairman of the City Commission on Human Rights, asserted that the statement “reproduced on a flyer by the UFT as representing the opinion of the governing board and the Negro community at large has undoubtedly contributed to the rising tension.”

The union defended its actions, claiming that it sought to educate the

public to the "really extremist things that go on" in the district, and insisting that the hate literature was symptomatic of the "impossible climate" in which union teachers were being asked to work. A UFT spokesman said, "It's absolutely shocking that people in high places are more intent on keeping the people of New York from learning the extent of the hate literature being produced than in doing something about the people who are producing it."

Tensions continued at a high level. Extremists continued to denounce the "Weinsteins and Goldbergs" for miseducating Negro children, calling white teachers "blue-eyed pigs." Angry shouts, such as "Jew pig" and "You will go out in a pine box," were hurled at Jewish teachers at the daily picket lines, as striking teachers, community people, and others confronted each other. Comparable threats and epithets were leveled at teachers opposing the strike.

Other sources also contributed to the high level of tension. Oliver Ramsey, educational director of the city's Council Against Poverty, denouncing Mayor Lindsay's part in the second settlement (September 29), charged that Lindsay had been told by the "Jewish Mafia" of UFT that if he wanted to become governor "You've got to kill Ocean Hill-Brownsville." ADL and the Jewish Labor Committee responded by urging Mayor Lindsay to take prompt action against Ramsey.

Attempts were made by many to dispel the mounting hysteria about anti-Semitism by denying or denouncing its existence. Thus, in September, Rhody McCoy invited striking teachers and people from all over the city to visit the district's schools, talk with the faculties, and see for themselves "that we're not anti-Jewish, we're not anti-white." The Ocean Hill governing board pointed to the fact that half the teachers it had hired were Jewish. Keith Bard, director of Afro-American studies in Ocean Hill and chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of Teachers for Community Control, stated that whoever had introduced the hate literature was attempting to create strife and destroy the "natural alliance" between Negroes and Jews.

Some 350 teachers from Ocean Hill-Brownsville published a full-page statement in New York city newspapers (November 11), which sought to set the record straight, as they saw it. It pointed out that of the 541 teachers in the district, 70 per cent were white, and 50 per cent of those were Jewish, and that of 350 new teachers hired by the governing board during the summer, more than 50 per cent were Jewish. It deplored tactics used by UFT to publicize its position, pointing to the Civil Liberties Union's condemnation of UFT for apparently using two separate pieces in what it claimed to be the reprint of one leaflet. These teachers strongly supported the governing board, which, they felt, clearly had shown its opposition to antisemitism by both word and deed. The ad concluded: "We all feel that education is one of the best ways to curb anti-Semitism and racism. But there is an even better way through the establishment of trust and confidence between both groups in day-to-day relationships."
ADL issued a statement indicating that it found no evidence of any organized effort behind the antisemitic literature being distributed, which it characterized as sporadic in content and issuance.

Whitney Young, in his column, "To Be Equal," which appeared in more than 70 newspapers in the third week of September, stated that the friction in New York was not to be interpreted as a case of black antisemitism. "Jews who are caught in such conflict," he wrote, "aren't singled out because they are Jews but because they are whites whose presence in some ghetto institutions is resented." In January 1969, with tensions remaining high, Young stated, "We are certain that the great mass of Jewish inhabitants of New York know that most black people are not anti-Semitic, and vice versa. We cannot emphasize too strongly that all oppressed minorities have a common stake in defending one another from the corrosive effects of bigotry."

On October 19 five clergymen, including Archbishop Terence J. Cooke of New York and Rabbi Gilbert Klaperman, president of the New York Board of Rabbis, issued a joint statement deploring the racial and religious bigotry aroused by the school crisis and calling upon all parties to "remove bigotry, discrimination and violence from our lives and particularly from the present school crisis."

And later, Bayard Rustin, director of the A. Philips Randolph Institute, writing in the New York Amsterdam News (February 8, 1969), urged Negroes and Jews not to use against each other "the same weapon [of prejudice] which the white majorities of the West have used for centuries to crush and deny both of them their sense of humanity." He appealed to the Negro community "that just as we call on Jews to continue their dedication to democracy and social equity, that we pledge not to ignore or excuse any manifestation of anti-Semitism in the black community."

Despite the various attempts to defuse the atmosphere, incidents resparking tensions tended to occur. Thus, in December 1968, after UFT threatened to bring as many teachers as were necessary to escort nine teachers through a mob that was keeping them out of a school in the I.S. 201 complex, Jesse Gray's Tenants Rights Party issued a leaflet that said:

Zionists kill black people in their own land in the Middle East. They run the people out of their own communities.

Now, here, SHANKER is trying to use the same tactics and throw us out of our community.

HARLEM WILL NOT STAND BY WHILE THESE RACIST, RUTHLESS, ZIONIST BANDITS (SHANKER & THE UFT) AND HIS PUPPET THE POLICE RUN US OUT OF OUR OWN COMMUNITIES.

After the strike, Leslie Campbell, vice president of the African-American Teachers Association, appeared as a guest on a radio program conducted by Julius Lester on radio station WBAI. He read and praised as beautiful and true a poem which, he said, had been written by a 15-year-old girl
student. Called "Anti-Semitism" and dedicated to UFT President Albert Shanker, it read in part:

Hey, Jew boy, with that yarmulka on your head
You pale-faced Jew boy—I wish you were dead;
I can see you Jew boy—no you can't hide,
I got a scoop on you—yeh, you gonna die....
I'm sick of seeing in everything I do
About the murder of six million Jews;
Hitler's reign lasted only fifteen years....
My suffering lasted for over 400 years, Jew boy,...
When the UN made Israel a free independent state
Little 4- and 5-year-old boys threw hand grenades.
They hated the black Arabs with all their might,
And you, Jew boy, said it was all right.
Then you came to America, land of the free,
And took over the school system to perpetuate white supremacy.
Guess you know, Jew boy, there's only one reason you made it—
You had a clean white face, colorless and faded.
I hated you, Jew boy, because your hang-up was the Torah,
And my only hang-up was my color.

The United Federation of Teachers and various organizations protested to the Federal Communications Commission. WBAI's defense was that it "exposed" the antisemitic material by presenting it and that, in any case, freedom of speech was involved. As a result of the controversy, WBAI's board of directors adopted a statement to the effect that the responsibility of a radio station to give the public access to opinions, facts, ideas, and persons, representing the full range of contemporary history and social reality, involved the presentation of views repugnant to everyone connected with the station. The statement added that "the anti-Semitic views expressed over WBAI are deeply repugnant" but suppressing them would "fall into the trap of those who would refine the rawness of truth in order to make it socially convenient." But the statement recognized the station's responsibility "not only for presenting views contrary to those expressed by anti-Semites, but for establishing a forum of public discussion and education in which the dangers of bigotry are counteracted by informed and enlightened analysis of what the social and educational problems really are."

Rabbi Klaperman called for Campbell's dismissal, as did Board of Education member Rose Shapiro. Mayor Lindsay declared that Campbell did not belong in the school system. UFT President Shanker, however, said that he would lean over backward to establish the principle that a teacher should only be judged by his activities in school.

The events connected with the school strike unquestionably increased intergroup tensions and caused strains in the relationships between Negro and Jewish groups. But these relationships were not destroyed; cooperation between the leading Jewish and Negro organizations in the fields of civil and human rights continued. Such Negro leaders as Roy Wilkins and Bayard
Rustin did notable work in combating antisemitic tendencies in the Negro community, while the major Jewish organizations worked to prevent the development of “Jewish backlash.” It seemed likely that, though there would be some residue of heightened intergroup tension for some time to come and an occasional repetition of incidents causing this tension, Negro-Jewish cooperation would suffer no long-term damage.

**Botein Commission and ADL Report**

In October 1968, as interracial and intergroup hostilities escalated, Mayor Lindsay appointed a Special Committee on Racial and Religious Prejudice, under the direction of Bernard Botein, a presiding justice of the New York State Appellate Division, to study the problem and report to the city. In mid-January the Botein commission, which was provided with ADL staff service, issued an 11-page report that found “an appalling amount of racial prejudice—black and white—surfaced in and about the school controversy.” It cited the “dangerous component of antisemitism” but, at the same time, also condemned the manifestations of anti-black bigotry, which, though expressed “in more sophisticated and subtle fashion,” was “equally evil, corrosive, damaging and deplorable.”

The commission warned that, unless the city administration immediately undertook adequate measures to improve interracial relations, “the school controversy may be only the first” of a number of similar confrontations. The panel felt that civic and community leaders had been too slow in responding to the racial tensions, and in speaking up “for the vast majority of citizens committed to an orderly process of change in a dynamic democratic society.” Their failure to do so “early, clearly and sufficiently . . . was in itself a contributing factor to the exacerbation of hostilities.” Specifically, the report recommended that the Mayor appoint a permanent committee to continue the work of the panel, and “to anticipate imminent racial or religious disturbance.”

Shortly after the Botein commission issued its report, the ADL, on January 23, 1969, released a more detailed study of *Anti-Semitism in the New York City School Controversy*, warning that “raw undisguised antisemitism is at a crisis level in New York City schools where, unchecked by public authority, it has been building for more than two years.” It maintained that “there is a clear and present danger that schoolchildren in the city have been infected by the anti-Semitic preachings of Negro extremists who, in some cases, are teachers and to whom these youngsters increasingly look for leadership.”

Specifically, the 23-page report charged that black separatists and other militants involved in the school dispute have deliberately created a pattern of antisemitism to further their objectives toward greater control within the public school system. It listed incidents in a dozen schools, as well as at school district headquarters, the majority of which involved “Sonny” Carson
and others connected with Brooklyn CORE. (During the strike, the Ocean Hill-Brownsville board officially cooperated with Carson and named him an "observer" on its behalf. Carson was also involved in a number of projects receiving public and foundation funds.)

The ADL report also noted a number of antisemitic statements by officials of the city's Council Against Poverty. It pointed out that, on several occasions, witnesses testifying at Board of Education hearings had made antisemitic remarks without being rebuked by Board members present, although some of these had not hesitated to interrupt and take issue with critics of the Board's decentralization proposals.

RESPONSE AND DEBATE IN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

Responses to antisemitism, in the New York school crisis and elsewhere, indicated a considerable division of opinion among leaders of the Jewish community. Some felt that an exaggerated reaction might bring on a backlash and hasten the development of political antisemitism. Others were concerned less with antisemitic manifestations than with the situation of the Negroes. Political scientist Leonard Fein of the Joint Center for Urban Studies, Harvard-M.I.T., believed that some Jews have responded to the antisemitism in a "slightly paranoid manner"—although he added, "we come by our paranoia honestly." 6

On October 27, Arthur Goldberg, then president of the American Jewish Committee, cautioned that "the great body of Negroes do not share the opinion of the few extremists within their own community," adding that Jews should be "particularly sensitive" to the consequences of racial or religious discrimination against any group. Going a step further, Bertram H. Gold, the Committee's executive vice-president, maintained simultaneously, "Just as we call upon Jewish leaders to stamp out every trace of anti-Negro sentiment and action within the Jewish community, so we call upon black leaders to militantly combat anti-Semitic sentiment and action within the black community."

In October Rabbi Bernard Weinberger, a leader of the Orthodox Williamsburg community and a member of the city's antipoverty program policymaking board, urged Orthodox Jews to give up "exploitive businesses in ghetto areas," and to avoid interfering in the efforts of Negro communities to decentralize the schools. He suggested a new strategy of disengagement to ease racial tensions in urban slums. In a letter to the editor of the New York Times, November 9, Harry Golden offered another perspective when he suggested that Negro antisemitism was peripheral to the main issue, i.e., that "the Negroes achieve first-class citizenship and that their children are uninhibited by segregation and discrimination."

Speaking to the General Assembly of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds on November 17, United Jewish Appeal president Max M. Fisher rejected black antisemitism as an excuse for Jewish withdrawal from the battle for equal rights and justice for Negroes: "If Jews truly believe that advancing social justice is a Jewish obligation, there can be no lingering doubts that helping people in the inner city—which is largely what we mean when we say 'meeting the urban crisis'—does represent a genuine Jewish commitment."

The Synagogue Council of America, representing the rabbinical and congregational bodies in the United States, issued a statement in November which condemned "irresponsible and reckless individuals" for "exploiting the tensions created by the school dispute to fan anti-semitic and racial animosities." While racism and antisemitism must be condemned, no matter what their source, the statement continued, "Equally imperative is that responsible leadership on both sides not permit the uninformed and the reckless to obscure the real issues. To dismiss the legitimate goals of the teachers' union as motivated by anti-Negro racism is as false and immoral as to distort the legitimate desires of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville local board as anti-white racism or anti-Semitism."

A disquieting appraisal of the situation was offered by Earl Raab, sociologist and San Francisco Jewish community leader. His thesis was that black militants, frustrated by unrealized social and economic expectations, were developing "an antisemitic ideology" as part of their political strategy. Militants, he held, could find allies among politicians willing to pacify extremism at the expense of the Jewish community. Though he could find "no serious trace of political anti-Semitism in America" in the last quarter of a century, in his view the emergence of antisemitism in the black power movement and the reaction of the extreme right to the rise of the New Left have combined to change the nation's mood of political tolerance. "Three obvious conditions that coincide to produce a period of political anti-Semitism," he added, were "the kind of political and social instability that makes anti-Semitism useful; a political leader who is willing to use it; a mass population that is willing to embrace it."

Raab cautioned that the belief in the obsolescence of antisemitism as a cultural form in America, which gives Jews their greatest sense of security, was itself obsolete. One need not be an antisemite, he said, in order "to engage in or support anti-Semitic behavior." Thus, though many middle-class blacks were horrified by the antisemitic utterances of the black militants, they were likely to feel that they could not oppose it on the community level "where the pressure is," because this would be construed as "an attack on the militant movement itself." Raab took issue with the tendency to dismiss the antisemitism of black power leaders as "just poetic excess," since even murderous political antisemitism has always been expressed in precisely

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this manner. The black power movement was in fact developing an antisemitic ideology.

Raab maintained that Jewish leaders, who minimized Negro antisemitism as confined to a radical minority and constituting only part of a broader anti-white attack, ignored the fact that it “already succeeded in reintroducing political anti-Semitism as a fashionable item in the American public arena—with what consequences no one can yet tell.” It would be “a repetition of old mistakes,” he said, “to think that if a black movement used anti-Semitism, anti-Semitism must therefore be rejected by anti-black whites.” Raab’s alarming conclusion was that the increasing dominance of the Negro population in the major cities and the continued use by black militants of antisemitism as a political weapon could force the establishment to seek a political truce, possibly at the expense of the Jewish community.

The general debate also dealt with the concern over rising antisemitism, as it affected the relationship between Jewish organizational leadership and the rank and file of American Jewry. Bertram Gold discussed this aspect at the American Jewish Committee’s annual meeting in May:

Jews are beginning to feel that their own national leadership is more concerned with bettering intergroup relations than protecting the interests of the Jewish community. Though we must reject demands for withdrawal from the civil rights struggle, the Committee’s leadership would not fulfill its function if it were to ignore the legitimate demands for greater power by the Negro community at the expense of hard won gains made by individual Jews.

Milton Himmelfarb carried further the analysis of antisemitism and the reaction it stirred, by posing the question, “Is American Jewry in Crisis?” He pointed out that, despite the generally high level of education and income, Jews maintained their singular support for the 1968 Democratic presidential nominee and the liberal policies he represented. Pro-Wallace far-right support among Jews was two per cent. Himmelfarb pointed to the continued liberalism of the Jews despite antisemitism from the New Left and among blacks. Mounting social pressures of this kind, he noted, have driven others to the political right.

Questioning what was alleged to be root of anti-Jewish hostility among Negroes, Himmelfarb maintained that Negro shopkeepers and black leaders, too, were criticized for actions upon which this hostility was said to be based: overcharging by shopkeepers in black neighborhoods, and earning a livelihood in these neighborhoods, while residing in more affluent communities.

The reintroduction of a quota system to insure adequate participation of blacks in higher education and elsewhere was seen as a deplorable development. The article pointed out that Jews have been particularly successful in the meritocracy (which would be replaced by quota systems); therefore, “the

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8 Commentary, March 1969, pp. 33–42.
reasoning goes, then the whole thing is unfair, a Jewish conspiracy in effect if not in original intention.”

Two elements in the pattern of response to the reappearance of anti-Semitism were equally disturbing to Himmelfarb. Jews not only had no real allies among other whites—as manifested in the failure of public agencies, such as the New York City Board of Education, to respond to overt anti-Semitism—but Jews, themselves, were distracted and disunited in their responses to the problem. And yet Himmelfarb was somewhat sanguine as he analyzed the outcome of the Metropolitan Museum incident and the broader political implications:

Politics are still democratic. The calculus of votes and grievances still operates, the normal office-holder still hesitates to write us off. Jews are not quite so lacking in the instinct of self-preservation. What we will need for a while is a little bit of luck.

THE URBAN CRISIS

The summer of 1968 saw no recurrence of the unprecedented 1967 rioting and violence in America’s cities. To be sure, civil disorders continued, but nowhere were they as widespread and intense as before. The most violent disorder occurred in Washington, D.C. in April, after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. For three days and nights a 57-block area was ravaged by riot. It took the lives of nine persons, eight black and one white. More than 1,200 were injured. Damage and destruction of 909 businesses and 283 housing units represented a loss of millions of dollars.

Civil-Rights Legislation

Federal troops were still in Washington to help patrol sections of Negro neighborhoods, where tension continued to persist, when President Johnson, on April 11, signed the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which was intended to end racial discrimination in the sale and rental of 80 per cent of the homes and apartments in the United States. It had been introduced in Congress in 1966 (AJYB, 1967 [Vol. 68], p. 84), and rescued from a Senate filibuster in February 1968, by a vote of 229 to 195. In both houses, Republicans provided the margin needed to pass the bill because of defections among Southern Democrats. Though civil-rights supporters held that the legislation would have passed in any event, the prevailing feeling seemed to be that Dr. King’s assassination influenced the outcome.

The Civil Rights Act lowered housing barriers in three stages. It immediately barred discrimination in federally-owned housing and multi-unit dwellings insured with federal funds. Effective December 31, 1968, it covered all multi-unit dwellings and homes in real estate developments, except those occupied by owners with four or fewer units, such as boarding houses.
Effective January 1, 1970, it was to extend coverage to all single-family houses sold or rented through brokers.

The act also provided stiff federal penalties for persons convicted of intimidating or injuring civil-rights workers and Negroes engaged in schooling, housing, voting, voter registration, jury duty, and in the use of public facilities. It made it a federal crime to travel from one state to another, or using TV or radio, or other interstate facilities, to incite a riot. It made it a federal crime to manufacture, sell, or demonstrate the use of, firearms or explosive devices meant for use in riot or other civil disorders.

On June 17, two months after the first open-housing provision of the act went into effect, the Supreme Court turned a civil rights law of 1866 into a sweeping fair-housing statute in a 7-to-2 ruling prohibiting racial discrimination in all sales and rentals of property. The decision grew out of a suit brought by Joseph Lee Jones, a St. Louis Negro, and his white wife, against a real estate owner in a suburb of the city for refusing to sell them a home site because he was a Negro. The Court held that the 1866 law guaranteed to all citizens in all states and territories of the United States "the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." In effect, the Court created a fair housing law going beyond the 1968 act in that it included sales or rentals by private houseowners, as well as dwellings containing fewer than five units.

The Report of the National Commission on Civil Disorders

In March the Kerner Commission issued its report on the 1967 civil disorders, underscoring its major conclusion with a statement that jolted the nation:

Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal. Reaction to last summer's disorders has quickened the movement and deepened the division. Discrimination and segregation now threaten the future of every American.

This deepening racial division is not inevitable. To pursue our present course will involve ultimately, the destruction of basic democratic values.

The alternative, the report held, was not "blind repression, or capitulation to lawlessness," for "the community cannot—it will not—tolerate coercion and mob rule." What was required was "commitment to national action—compassionate, massive and sustained, backed by the resources of the most powerful and the richest nation on this earth." Segregation and poverty, the report continued, have created in the racial ghetto a destructive environment totally unknown to most white Americans." Yet, white institutions created the ghetto and were maintaining it.

The extensive report gave a detailed profile of the disorders and an analysis of the behavior patterns involved. It traced the basic causes to 1)
the underlying pattern of pervasive discrimination and segregation in employment, education, and housing that have resulted in the continuing exclusion of great numbers of Negroes from the benefit of economic progress; 2) black in-migration to, and white exodus from the central city, that have produced massive and growing concentrations of impoverished Negroes in our major cities, creating a growing crisis of deteriorating facilities and services and of unmet human needs; 3) black ghettos, where segregation and poverty converge on the young to destroy opportunity and enforce failure, resulting in crime, drug addiction, dependency on welfare, and bitterness, and resentment against society in general, and white society in particular.

The commission felt that these factors contributed to a mood of violence among many urban Negroes. It urged "a commitment to national action on an unprecedented scale," whose "primary goal must be a single society, in which every citizen will be free to live and work according to his capabilities, not his color." The only possible choice for America, it said, was the adoption of a policy combining ghetto enrichment with programs designed to encourage the movement of substantial numbers of Negroes out of central city areas, and their integration into the larger society.

**Supplemental Studies**

The Kerner Commission published three supplemental studies to its report in July. The most dramatic, and probably the most meaningful, for white Americans was *Who Riots? A Study of the Participation in the 1967 Riots*. It deals with the "riffraff theory," which held that the riots were fomented by only a tiny, nonrepresentative faction of the Negro community and some outside agitators. According to the authors, Dr. Robert M. Fogelson, associate professor at M.I.T., and Dr. Robert B. Hall, associate of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, the "riffraff theory" was used by police chiefs and city and state officials to explain the 1960's riots, and the explanation was widely accepted because it was reassuring to most white Americans.

The reason for its acceptance, the authors suggested, was that "If, indeed, the rioters were a tiny fraction of the Negro population and opposed by a large majority of the ghetto residents, the riots were less ominous than they appeared." Also, the riots were considered "a function of poverty, which in American ideology is alterable, rather than race, which is immutable; in which case too, they were peripheral to the issue of white-black relations in the United States." If the theory were true, there would be no need for radically changing American cities and its basic institutions, or seriously inconveniencing its white majority, in dealing with the riots. However, the authors challenged the theory after studying the Negro communities and 10,000 arrest records in Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Grand

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9 *Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (Washington, D.C., July 1968).
Rapids, Newark, New Haven, Boston, Plainfield, and Phoenix, where rioting occurred in 1967.

They found that, in six of the ten cities, about 18 per cent of the Negro residents, who were fairly representative of their communities, participated in the disorders. Also,

1. The overwhelming majority of rioters, and about three-fourths of those arrested had jobs.
2. More than two-thirds of those arrested were over 18 years of age; 90 per cent of them men. It was also found that many women participated in the riots.
3. Most rioters were native to the area. Older migrants from the South tended to join the disorder only in its later stages, but they, too, participated in the arson and looting.
4. Although 40 to 90 per cent of those arrested had records of prior arrests, criminal elements were not over-represented.

The study concluded that the 1967 riots were carried out by a "small but significant minority of the Negro population, fairly representative of the ghetto residents," which was "tacitly supported by at least a large minority of the black community." This the report interpreted as indicating that they were "a manifestation of race and racism in the United States, a reflection of the social problems of modern black ghettos, a protest against the essential conditions of life there and an indicator of the necessity for fundamental changes in American society."

A second supplemental study, *Racial Attitudes in 15 American Cities*, conducted by Professors Angus Campbell and Howard Schuman of the Institute for Social Research, of the University of Michigan, supported these findings at least in part. Interviews with more than 5,000 Negroes and whites in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Gary, Milwaukee, Newark, New York (Brooklyn only), Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, St. Louis, and Washington, aimed at analyzing the Kerner Commission's charge of white racism, found that there was "no universal pattern of racial conduct among white people in this country." On the contrary, the survey disclosed a "fundamental and perhaps growing schism between those whose basic orientation toward Negroes is positive and those whose attitudes and behavior are negative." It even found various patterns in, and attitudes toward, different aspects of racial issues.

The surveyors rejected neat characterization of the white population as racist or prejudiced. They also regarded simple and oversimplified distinctions between prejudiced and unprejudiced whites as inaccurate: "Racial prejudice is not a matter of either-or but of more-or-less." While the authors found that "only a very small percentage of the Negro population define the riots as essentially criminal actions to be suppressed by public force," only about one-third of the white population agreed with Negroes that the riots were a revolt against real grievances; an equal number regarded them as
criminal acts, inspired by radicals, to be dealt with only by police power. The subject of the third study, conducted under the direction of Prof. Peter H. Rossi of the department of social relations, Johns Hopkins University, was institutions operating in the Negro slums. In the cities surveyed by the Michigan team, six occupational groups—the police, teachers, retail merchants, welfare workers, political party workers, and employers—were asked about their attitudes toward, and knowledge of, life in black neighborhoods. The findings strongly suggested that "the delivery system of the central institutions of our local communities serve the ghetto poorly and are insensitive" to the plight of urban Negroes. From this the report concluded: "If these are the faces that American institutions present to the ghetto, then the alienation of the ghetto from the main community is scarcely to be wondered at."

**National Commission on Urban Problems**

In July the National Commission on Urban Problems, chaired by former Senator Paul H. Douglas of Illinois, released a study showing that, if current trends continued, "America by 1985 would be well on the road towards a society characterized by stratification along racial and economic lines as well as geographic separation." Conducted by Patricia Hodge and Philip Hauser of Chicago University, with technical assistance from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the study's population projections indicated that, by 1985, central cities will have gained 10 million nonwhites, a 94 per cent increase, while the suburbs will have gained 53.9 million whites, a 104 per cent increase. At the same time, the nonwhite population in the suburbs was expected to rise from 2.8 million in 1960 to 6.8 million in 1985, a 1 per cent increase in the total population. The central cities will have lost 2.4 million, or 5 per cent of their whites. "These projections vividly portray the geographic fulfillment and the fears expressed by the President's Commission on Civil Disorders—that the American society is becoming an apartheid society." When the study was released, Douglas said, "the further division of our cities by racial groups raises the most compelling questions for a democracy." It was his hope that the publication of these trends would enable the American people to judge "the greatest threat to our social order and then take the necessary steps to alter them." Douglas urged suburban areas to make a conscious effort, "in the interests of peace," to absorb Negroes in larger numbers.

**Campus Disorders**

American higher education was at the center of turmoil, as many demands for change had direct political implications and some racial undertones. The campus-wide upheaval at Columbia University, that erupted when
dissident students occupied and barricaded themselves in the dean's office, on April 23, was symptomatic of the problems in academia. The issues—opposition to the Vietnam war and to white racism allegedly practiced by colleges and universities—were those around which the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and other militant students generally rallied. The particular focus was on Columbia's plan to construct a gym in Harlem's Morningside Park and the university's relationship with the Institute for Defense Analysis. Several buildings were occupied by students in a series of campus strikes during which black students preferred to act independently of militant whites.

At San Francisco State College, the campus unrest began in November, partly as a result of a demand for "black studies," an autonomous program of Afro-American historical and cultural studies, with students to determine curriculum and faculty appointments. The strike often was accompanied by violence in police-student confrontations.

Several volatile ingredients combined to spread student activism and rebellion to colleges across the country. Demands for university reform and greater student participation and decision-making, along with demands for "black studies" and opposition to the Vietnam war, provided the basis for protests and strikes and a potential for violence also at Harvard, Berkeley, Howard, Queens, City College, Radcliffe, Wisconsin, New York University, Minnesota, Brown, Washington University (St. Louis), Fordham, and elsewhere.

While the debate engendered by student rebelliousness revealed the magnitude of some of the basic problems in higher education, no resolution was immediately apparent. However, few issues held more potential for intergroup divisiveness than the "black studies" question. Nor was there agreement on this matter among Negro leaders. In January 1969 Roy Wilkins, executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), called these demands simply "another version of segregation and Jim Crow," and stated that his organization was prepared to challenge in the courts separate facilities and programs for blacks. On the other hand, Dr. Nathan Hare, director of the Negro studies program at San Francisco State College, declared at the annual meeting of the Association of American Colleges that Negroes must be taught from a "black perspective" how to solve the problems of American society. He said that Afro-Americans "must first blackwash—revamp—the existing educational system and revolutionize America's youth, black, yellow, brown and white." United Negro College Fund president Dr. Stephen J. Wright criticized Hare's views as expressing "a kind of separatism that isn't going anywhere."
THE POLITICAL ARENA

The 1968 political campaigns were the catalysts for the expression of a variety of intergroup hostilities, and gave rise to unusual incidents of violence.

Republican National Convention

As the Republicans met in Miami, Fla., August 5-9, to reunite their national party, with Richard M. Nixon as its standard-bearer, rioting took place among Negroes in a 20-block area six miles from the convention hall. The major cause was the failure of Governor Claude R. Kirk to make a promised appearance to discuss grievances with the rioters. The disorders, which lasted for several days, were met with a show of strong force, including Miami policemen and the National Guard. Three blacks were killed and five critically wounded as policemen exchanged gunfire with snipers. One hundred and fifty blacks were arrested in what was the first major riot in Miami's history.

Democratic National Convention

The Democrats assembled in Chicago, August 26-29, with battle lines having been drawn within the party and in the city. Senator Robert F. Kennedy's assassination in June had shaken the party and narrowed the nomination to Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey and Senator Eugene J. McCarthy. Despite a threatened telephone strike, that would have severely hampered news coverage, and a possible strike of cab drivers, Mayor Richard C. Daley was determined to have the convention in his city. At the same time, Chicago was to be host to a convention of the Yippies (Youth International party), who were joined by thousands of other young people converging on the city to support McCarthy, as well as the anti-Vietnam, pro-peace position at the convention. Daley had made preparations to accommodate and protect convention delegates and to control the anticipated demonstrations.

As the Democrats bitterly debated the Vietnam platform plank, as well as the seating of contested delegations from Mississippi and Georgia inside the convention hall, unprecedented violence erupted between police and demonstrators in Chicago's streets and parks. The use of raw physical force to keep noisy Vietnam-war critics, including collegians, clergymen, hippies and Yippies, away from the hotel headquarters of the candidates and the convention hall, became an issue at the convention, as delegates registered sharp criticism of Daley and of the police for its repeated use of tear gass and indiscriminate attacks on demonstrators and innocent bystanders alike.

A study of the convention violence was undertaken for the President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence by a study group under the direction of Chicago attorney Daniel Walker. Released in Decem-
ber, the study report, *Rights in Conflict*, charged the Chicago police with perpetrating a "police riot" in response to mounting provocation. It described the response as "unrestrained and indiscriminate police violence, on many occasions, particularly at night," made all the more shocking by the fact that "it was often inflicted upon persons who had broken no law, disobeyed no order, made no threats." According to the Walker study, news- men and photographers were singled out for assault, and their equipment deliberately damaged.

The report cautioned that to characterize the crowds as "entirely hippy- Yippie, entirely youthful political dissenters is both wrong and dangerous," though such stereotyping "helps to explain the emotional reaction of both police and public during and after the violence."

It also held Mayor Daley's precautionary measures in anticipation of strife and his April order to the police to "shoot to kill arsonists and shoot to maim looters" responsible for the violence, as it did the excessive provocations of the demonstrators. When the report was released, Walker accused the Chicago police department of dropping a "blue curtain" on the disorders, and of failing to "root out and punish" most of those who had used "unrestrained and indiscriminate violence.

The debate over the report and its findings highlighted the problem of how police could cope with mass dissent without infringing on the constitutional rights of citizens. Mayor Daley, at a news conference called shortly before the report was released, said that "over-all it is an excellent study," though he had some reservations about the summary. Albert E. Jenner, Jr., a Chicago corporation lawyer and member of the President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, also felt that the language of the summary was too strong. He doubted whether the term "police riot" had been "backed up" in the report. Representative Richard H. Ichord (Dem., Mo.), acting chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, which was conducting hearings on the demonstrations, said the Walker investigators "overreacted" to the evidence and wrote a report that "read like a novel instead of a fact-finding report." In his view, newsmen were as guilty of "overreaction" during the disorders as were "a small minority" of Chicago policemen. "If the police attempt to enforce the law," he continued, "they consider that they have the right to use force to defend themselves, as they put it."

*The Presidential Campaigns*

As the presidential campaigns proceeded, pollsters Louis Harris, George Gallup, and others were measuring the attitudes of the electorate. According to Harris, the two issues dominating the voters' outlook were the Vietnam war and "law and order." He reported that 81 per cent of the public believed that "law and order has broken down," and 84 per cent that "a
INTERGROUP RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

strong president can make a big difference” in this matter.\textsuperscript{10} Harris’s data also showed that 58 per cent of the electorate rejected most of the usual stereotypes about black Americans, and that the remaining 42 per cent continued to harbor some form of personal prejudice which could contribute to political polarization in the presidential election.\textsuperscript{11} In 1968, for the first time in modern political history, divisions created over race were directly reflected in the national political campaign. A large majority of those still believing in stereotypes favored Nixon or Wallace. Humphrey led among those whose attitudes towards Negroes had softened.

The importance of the traditionally liberal Jewish vote in what was expected to be a close election was highlighted by one aspect of Nixon’s campaign strategy. In September, at the convention of the Zionist Organization of America, Nixon said that the balance of power in the Middle East “must be tipped in Israel’s favor.” Speaking at a B’nai B’rith convention several days before, Nixon declared his “firm and unwavering commitment to the national existence of Israel.” Vice-President Humphrey took an equally strong stand on Israel, stating his support for the U.S. sale of supersonic Phantom jets to Israel. However, his position was somewhat weakened by President Johnson’s unwillingness to permit delivery at that time. Some observers regarded Nixon’s strongly pro-Israel stand as an attempt to gain the support of traditionally Democratic Jewish voters, who might have been vulnerable because of the law and order issue.\textsuperscript{12}

The electorate’s group orientation and sensitivity also were noted when Republican vice-presidential candidate Spiro Agnew used derisive ethnic terms while campaigning. In September he referred to Polish-Americans as “Polack,” and called an American newspaperman covering his campaign a “fat Jap.” The news media reports of these references stirred some criticism, and Agnew offered a public apology to anyone who interpreted what he called the humorous use of these “racial appellations” as racial or ethnic slurs.

Wallace Movement

The third-party presidential candidacy of George Wallace was a significant development in American national politics. Wallace’s name was on the ballot in all 50 states; his American Independent party was the first third party in a century to constitute a major movement on the right, rather than on the left.

The movement, more than the man himself, was the focus of considerable interest. The Anti-Defamation League reported in October that, “under the cover of a political campaign,” Wallace had become “the standard-bearer of the Radical Right in America, the front man in a mass movement of

\textsuperscript{10} Harris poll release, September 9, 1968.
\textsuperscript{11} Harris poll release, September 16, 1968.
extremism, dissension, and ill-concealed racism." Based on a study of state and local Wallace campaign headquarters, their organizers, petition gatherers, precinct and state chairmen, delegates, and electors, the ADL report asserted that the movement attracted, along with ordinary frightened or prejudiced Americans, "the legions of the far Right, and the dangerous hate fringe—John Birchers, Ku Kluxers, White Citizens’ Councilors, Liberty Lobbyites, Minutemen and many far-flung extremists who peddle race hatred and antisemitism.”

The report contended that Wallace had become the spokesman for "the fears and suspicions," and the "bizarre fantasies" typical of the extremist and white-backlash "demi-world." By using "hypocritical" calls for "states' rights" or "strident cries for 'law and order,'" he has pandered to the violent emotions of those advocating physical action as the solution of delicate human problems.” As a result, the report continued, the extremist legions, who contributed their influence and numbers to the Wallace campaign, have often used it to "fill their own ranks and their own coffers."

However, contrary to expectations, the 1968 presidential campaign was "significantly free of antisemitism, more so in fact than any Presidential election [in] the past two decades," Milton Ellerin found in an American Jewish Committee study of the Wallace movement. The report, released in December 1968, held that local and state Wallace headquarters used no material even faintly suggesting bigotry; nor was there any national distribution of antisemitic or anti-Negro material.

Analyzing the development of the Wallace movement during the campaign, Ellerin noted a steady decrease in the expected percentage of the total vote. He cited the September-October Harris and Gallup polls showing as high as a 20 per cent support for Wallace, and the election results giving him 13.6 per cent of the popular vote. According to Harris, the Wallace voter appeal stemmed "basically from the cleavage over race and the deep feelings and fears about the breakdown of 'law and order.'"

Ellerin suggested the drop in Wallace support by election day could have been a result of his greater national exposure. The mass media stepped up coverage of Wallace, as it became increasingly possible that he might receive enough votes to prevent a Nixon or Humphrey victory in the electoral college and thereby throw the election into the House of Representatives. However, since the support dwindled mainly in the working-class districts of the northern cities, the educational work of the labor unions appeared to have been directly responsible. Despite the steady loss of support, the Wallace candidacy tapped an undeniable vein of discontent among Americans throughout the nation. Ellerin concluded that the final weakening of the Wallace support in 1968 did not eliminate the elements for a mass-base third party, and the attendant danger from the right, as a political possibility in the future.

In another study of the Wallace movement, *Radicalism—Southern Style: A Commentary on Regional Extremism*, Reese Cleghorn, the associate editor of *The Atlanta Journal*, presented Wallace as an example of the Southern politics of "irrationalism," that early in the last century "had to begin reconciling its devotion to democracy with its denial of democracy to Negroes." This irrational attitude syndrome, Cleghorn said, provided a fertile ground for the Wallace appeal. In a state-by-state analysis of the Wallace vote, Cleghorn asserted that it "almost perfectly reflects the Southern nature of his candidacy and the unwillingness of those outside the South to follow him."

**Voting Patterns and Electoral Outcomes**

The narrow margin of the Richard Nixon victory and the support of George Wallace by northern urban voters raised questions about certain traditional patterns of electoral behavior. In the course of the campaign, pollsters were recording an apparent shift to the right by many urban whites who were considered part of the liberal Democratic coalition. Because of growing racial tensions, lower middle-class whites were expected to be especially receptive to the Wallace appeal. There also was conjecture that the Jewish voters might break their overwhelming Democratic voting habit and shift to Nixon, in response to his campaign appeals to them and the salient ring of "law and order" in their own urban communities. There also was discussion of the possibility of a Jewish backlash in response to overt black antisemitism.

However, the election returns revealed a pattern of mixed responses. Nixon's slim percentage margin over Humphrey prompted one observer to describe the election as an "abortive landslide," more a Democratic defeat than a Republican victory. The Wallace vote was 6.4 per cent less than earlier polls had indicated. Also, the regional base of his support was revealed by the fact that 57 per cent of his national total came from the South. His share of the total vote in the rest of the country was 7.5 per cent, still a significant figure, particularly in view of the close outcome.

Various trends were noted in the ethnic voting patterns. The Gallup poll reported a discernible shift among Catholics to Nixon, with Jewish and Negro voters maintaining their traditional support of the Democratic candidate. The sample indicated that 62 per cent of Catholics voted for Humphrey, 28 for Nixon, and 10 for Wallace. (By contrast, the Catholic vote in 1964 was 76 per cent for Johnson and 24 per cent for Goldwater.) According to Gallup, Jewish and Negro voters in sampled areas maintained

14 Published by the American Jewish Committee and the Southern Regional Council, December 1968.
16 Gallup poll release, November 7, 1968.
an 80-90 per cent support level for the Democratic presidential ticket. Based on sample precinct data, NBC News reported a significant vote for Wallace in certain ethnic communities: 10 per cent in Italian-American areas and 11 per cent in Slavic-American areas. According to the final and corrected national per cent sampling of returns compiled by NBC News, the Jewish vote was 81 per cent for Humphrey, 17 per cent for Nixon, and 2 per cent for Wallace.\(^{17}\) Several other post-election analyses \(^{18}\) emphasized the tenacity of liberal Jewish voting patterns and the Jewish repudiation of Wallace.

**Liberal-Conservative Trends**

The congressional and state elections showed an over-all drift to the right. Three leading Democrats and active liberals, Senators Joseph S. Clark (Pa.), A. S. Mike Monroney (Okla.), and Wayne Morse (Ore.), lost their bids for reelection. Senate conservative ranks were strengthened by the return of former Senator Barry Goldwater (Ariz.). On the other hand, Max Rafterty, who had defeated liberal Republican Senate minority whip Thomas H. Kuchel in a bitter and acrimonious primary race, in turn was defeated by liberal Democrat Alan Cranston.

The Republicans gained four seats in the House of Representatives. One of the surprising Democratic victories was won by Allard K. Lowenstein, a peace candidate and supporter of Eugene McCarthy, who defeated Mason L. Hampton, a conservative endorsed by Republicans, for a congressional seat in Nassau county, N.Y. Another Democratic victory was the election of Mrs. Shirley Chisholm, the first black woman to be sent to Congress. She defeated Republican-Liberal candidate James Farmer, former head of CORE, in the newly created 12th Congressional District (Brooklyn, N.Y.), which included the Bedford-Stuyvesant area.

State and local tax, and economic issues dominated the gubernatorial elections in which Republicans won 13 of 21 contests. The racial issue was a factor in North Carolina, where Lt. Gov. Robert W. Scott (Dem.) beat back a challenge from Rep. James C. Gardner (Rep.). Each candidate charged that the other did not do enough to prevent action by the federal government on racial segregation in the schools. Gardner made an open bid for Wallace support.

Locally, in Newark, N.J., Anthony Imperiale, head of the militantly white North Ward Citizens Committee, and Anthony Giuliano, former president of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, easily defeated two Negro candidates for the city council.

**Edward T. Rogowsky**

\(^{17}\) *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 29, 1968. An earlier NBC News estimate had put the Jewish vote for Wallace at 13 per cent, stirring a strong Jewish protest.

The United States, Israel, and the Middle East

By the end of 1968, little appreciable progress had been made toward a peace settlement in the Middle East. The growth of the Soviet presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the increasing influence and power of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations were new factors of potential danger. Intermittent violations of the cease-fire along the borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors produced an atmosphere of tension and hostility. Perhaps the most promising development toward an eventual settlement was the growing realization by the United States and the Soviet Union that the constantly escalating pattern of attack and retaliation must be broken, that another war must be averted if the states in the Middle East are to survive.

American Policy

Since 1968 was a presidential election year, more attention than usual was given to American foreign policy, and particularly to American policy in the Middle East. Major party candidates issued a number of statements regarding the proper orientation of American policy, and both Hubert H. Humphrey and Richard M. Nixon made strong pronouncements in favor of United States support for Israel. Nixon went further than Humphrey when, speaking to B'nai B'rith on September 8, he urged that the United States give Israel . . . sufficient military power to deter an attack. As long as the threat of Arab attack remains direct and imminent, sufficient power means the balance must be tipped in Israel's favor. An exact balance of power, which in any case is purely theoretical and not realistic, would run the risk that potential aggressors might miscalculate and would offer them too much of a temptation.

If giving Israel an edge required the sale of Phantom jets, Nixon said, then the United States would supply them. Here, for the first time, the idea of giving Israel a decided military advantage was mooted, United States policy having traditionally been to maintain a balance of arms between Israel and the Arab countries.

Two days later, on September 10, President Lyndon B. Johnson addressed himself to the question of peace in the Middle East. However, contrary to the expectations of many observers, he did not announce a decision on the proposed sale of Phantom F-4s to Israel; he rather emphasized again the urgent need for Soviet agreement to arms limitations for the Middle East. At the same time, he repeated that the United States had "no intention of allowing the balance of forces in the area to become an incentive for war." Johnson called for secure and recognized boundaries "as part of the transition
from armistice to peace,” which now must be “a real peace of justice and reconciliation—not a cease-fire, not a temporary truce, not a renewal of the fragile armistice.” He cautioned that the United Nations resolution of November 22, 1967 was not self-executing, that the parties involved therefore must make the major effort to initiate progress toward peace. This statement reflected no real change in United States policy; it was largely a reaffirmation of earlier pronouncements. The State Department continued to oppose the sale of the Phantoms, claiming they were not essential for Israel’s security and would only accelerate the flow of Soviet arms to the Arab countries. There was also some speculation that Israel’s refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as the United States wished it to do, may have been a factor in State Department opposition.

Acting on the basis of a Foreign Aid Authorization Act amendment that expressed congressional approval of the sale of the Phantoms, President Johnson announced, on October 9, that negotiations with Israel would begin shortly. This announcement came just after unproductive discussions between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko on the possibility of reducing arms shipments to the Middle East. However, the President’s statement did not eliminate opposition within the State Department, and some officials claimed it did not necessarily mean a definite commitment to supply the jets.

Despite this opposition, the State Department initiated negotiations with Israel. In November these were transferred to the Pentagon, indicating that agreement was near. On December 27 it was announced that the United States had agreed to sell Israel 50 Phantoms at an estimated total cost of over $200 million. Delivery was to begin late in 1969. Informed sources said at least 10, and probably 16, of the planes would be delivered by the end of the year. The Phantoms have a maximum speed of over 1,200 miles an hour, a range of over 1,000 miles, and serve as both bombers and fighter-interceptors. They have been in extensive use in Vietnam, where they proved superior to the Russian MIG-21, the aircraft supplied by the Soviet Union to the Arab states. Israeli crews were scheduled to come to the United States for a six-month training period. The decision to sell the jets to Israel, coming almost one year after the subject was first discussed between President Johnson and Israel Premier Levi Eshkol, reflected the administration’s reluctance to step up the arms race. This was overcome only by its greater concern over the growing Soviet buildup of Arab military strength and its determination not to put Israel in a militarily vulnerable position vis-a-vis the Arabs.

That President-elect Nixon regarded the Middle East situation as a high-priority issue was demonstrated early in December, when he sent William S. Scranton on a fact-finding tour of the region’s capitals. Scranton talked with Arab and Israeli leaders, and came away cheered about the prospects of peace. His comments regarding the need for a more “even-handed” United States policy in the Middle East caused some fear that he was advocating some concessions to the Arab states at the expense of Israel. In any event,
his precise recommendations remained unclear, and a complete report of his findings was not made public. Scranton's remarks, on returning to the United States, caused Nixon some embarrassment; he disassociated himself from them when his press representative Ronald Ziegler said they were "Scranton remarks, not Nixon remarks." Other than that, there was no indication before Nixon's inauguration as to what his position would be. Both Israel and the Arab states waited for the new administration to take over, in the hope that it would pursue a policy favorable to their respective interests.

**Soviet Presence in the Middle East**

The buildup of the Soviet fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean was intensified in the latter part of 1968 to perhaps 50 ships, but it was reported that 20 of these were withdrawn at the end of the year. According to *New Middle East* (London), October 1968, the fleet included nuclear submarines, some carrying nuclear missiles, several long-range missile-carrying destroyers, and at least one helicopter carrier. The Soviet Union stationed ships at Alexandria and Port Said in the United Arab Republic, and at Latakia in Syria. The Soviet determination to maintain a substantial position in the Mediterranean was affirmed by the official newspapers *Izvestia* (November 12) and *Pravda* (quoted in the *New York Times*, November 28), which called for the withdrawal of the American military and political presence from the Mediterranean and alleged that the United States was supporting the "expansionist" policies of Israel in order to maintain American supremacy in the region.

On November 27 *Pravda* said that the Soviet Union was now a Mediterranean power and, as such, had an interest in all problems involving the interests of that area. It further stated that the Soviet fleet was there "with the approval and in accordance with the interests" of the Arab states.

The United States responded to the Soviet challenge on November 21 by setting up, as part of a new NATO air command, a system of intelligence on Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean. This intensive surveillance may have accounted, at least in part, for the reduction of the Soviet fleet at the end of the year. Having given a show of naval strength, the Soviets also may have thought it wiser to withdraw part of its fleet, lest its presence encourage the Arab states to provoke another war, in the expectation of full Soviet support. The act doubtless reflected Soviet reluctance to risk the outbreak of such a war or an incidental confrontation with the United States.

Yet, the Soviets continued to provide the Arab countries with arms and technical and military advisers. About $2.5 billion worth of arms were delivered to the Arab states, bringing their arms levels up to, if not beyond, those before June 1967. It was estimated that there were 2,000-3,000 such advisers in the United Arab Republic, compared with 500-700 before the June war; some estimates rose as high as 5,000. At the same time, their presence in the United Arab Republic was causing friction between them and
the Egyptians who, while welcoming the assistance, were wary of Russian control.

An editorial in the December 3 issue of Pravda declared that the Middle East question could and must be settled by “political” means and that the Soviet Union would take the necessary steps to facilitate such a settlement. Pravda declared that the Soviet Union would not permit a new war to break out. In line with these statements, the Soviet Union, at year's end, appeared to be making an all-out effort to reach agreement with the United States on possible peace terms to be suggested to—or perhaps imposed on—the Arab states and Israel.

On the initiative of the Soviet Union, talks were held in New York early in December between Yosef Tekoah, the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir S. Semyonov. The meeting was shrouded in secrecy, but there can be little doubt that it represented a Soviet attempt to gain insight into Israel's position regarding a settlement. Gromyko went to Cairo for discussions with President Gamal Abdel Nasser on December 22, amidst rumors that the Soviets were worried lest the constant escalation of Arab-Israeli hostilities might lead to an American-Soviet confrontation.

On December 19, and again on December 30, the Soviet Union submitted to the United States Middle East peace proposals. According to a report in the Beirut newspaper Al-Anwar, the plan called for a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories over a period of three months. At the same time, each side was to declare the end of the state of belligerency. Also, United Nations troops were to be posted in Gaza, on the Sinai frontier, and at the entrance to the Strait of Tiran. The Soviets apparently intended that this plan be conveyed to the Arabs and Israel through Dr. Gunnar V. Jarring, Swedish Ambassador to the Soviet Union and United Nations mediator, upon the resumption of his mission late in January. However, the Johnson administration was reluctant to begin in the last weeks of its tenure what would necessarily be a long process of negotiation. Discussion of the proposed plan therefore awaited the incoming Nixon administration. Israel indicated that it was opposed to the Russian plan.

The Soviet Union also appeared to be considering expanding American-Soviet talks on the Middle East, to include France and Great Britain. Soviet officials met with British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart in London and with President Charles de Gaulle in Paris to discuss ways of easing tensions. The French strongly favored four-power talks, having called for them on several occasions. In view of the Soviet overtures to the Western powers, there were some grounds for hope that the Soviets were coming to the conviction that a settlement was in their own interest, and that they were prepared to work toward this end.
**United Nations Peace Efforts**

Throughout 1968 United Nations efforts to find a solution to the Middle East conflict had little result. Jarring held several sets of meetings with Arab and Israeli representatives in an attempt to find some basis for negotiations. In December and January he conveyed Israeli proposals for an agenda for peace discussions to the United Arab Republic, but there was no reply or counterproposal to either. In March a proposal that Israel, the United Arab Republic, and Jordan meet under Jarring's auspices was accepted by Israel, but not by the two Arab states. On May 1 Ambassador Tekoah conveyed Israel's acceptance of the United Nations resolution of November 22, 1967, declaring his government's willingness to seek agreement with each Arab state on the issues in the resolution. At the end of August Israel gave to UAR Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad an explanation of its understanding of the term "a just and final peace." His reply simply made a general reference to the United Nations resolution, but gave no details on its implementation. The interpretation of the resolution continued to be a source of disagreement between Israel and the Arab states: The Arabs regarded it as a formula for settlement, to begin with Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories; Israel said the resolution was not self-executing, that it was merely a guideline for a settlement and not an exact formula for it.

Hopes for a solution were raised slightly with the opening of the new session of the United Nations General Assembly. On October 8 Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban presented a nine-point program for peace, dealing specifically with all issues involved. Its first point was the establishment of a just and lasting peace, duly negotiated and contractually expressed. Such a peace, Eban said, would not be the mere absence of fighting, but rather "a positive and clearly defined relationship with far-reaching political, practical and juridical consequences." It would lay down the exact terms of Arab-Israeli coexistence, including a map of secure and recognized boundaries. These boundaries, Eban said, would replace the cease-fire lines, and "the disposition of forces will be carried out in full accordance with the boundaries under the final peace." This point was interpreted as indicating a measure of flexibility in Israel's position—a willingness to withdraw from occupied territories.

Eban also called for security arrangements to prevent the kind of situation which led to hostilities in 1967; the establishment of an open frontier, especially on the Jordanian border, and freedom of navigation in the region's international waterways. As for the refugees, Eban suggested that the interested states meet, even before the beginning of peace negotiations, to work out a five-year plan for a solution of the problem. Under a settlement, he continued, joint refugee integration and rehabilitation commissions would be set up to devise projects with regional and international assistance. With regard to Jerusalem, Eban expressed Israel's willingness to have the Christian and Moslem Holy Places become the responsibility of the respective religious
authorities. Perhaps the most important principle enunciated by Eban was the recognition of Israel's sovereignty, integrity, and right to national life, a point on which the Arabs have been notably reluctant. In conclusion, Eban called for programs of regional cooperation and development in the Middle East. Israel also indicated a willingness to give up, at least temporarily, its insistence on direct negotiations with the Arabs, and to exchange ideas on "certain matters of substance" through Ambassador Jarring. This, too, represented a softening of Israel's previous position.

The initial Arab response to these proposals was disappointing. There was some exchange of positions through Jarring, but it was apparent that the two parties had not come much closer on the essential points of a settlement. While the foreign ministers of Israel, Jordan, and the United Arab Republic were in New York for the meeting of the UN General Assembly, Jarring had intensive discussions with them in an attempt to define the position of each country. Through him, Israel and the United Arab Republic exchanged a series of questions about the definition of such terms as peace and secure, recognized boundaries. A similar outline of Israel's position was given to Jordan.

After the foreign ministers had left for their respective capitals, Jarring undertook another tour of the Middle East for further conversations with the governments concerned. Nothing substantive emerged from this new round of talks, but the parties appeared to favor that Jarring continue his mission at the end of the year. He agreed to carry on consultations with Israel and the Arab states late in January, after a brief return to his post in Moscow. There was speculation that he might take a more active role than in the past, either by presenting his own proposals for a settlement or conveying those put forward by the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Arab World

In the Arab world, 1968 was a year of considerable ferment. Judging by manifestations of discontent within the United Arab Republic, President Nasser's position may have been weakened in the course of the year. These appeared first in February over what were thought to be overly lenient sentences given to officers, accused of dereliction of duty during the June war. A series of violent protests by students and workers closed the universities on February 26. On March 3 Nasser called the sentences shocking, and promised a retrial. On March 30 he called for changes in the Arab Socialist Union, the only political party in the country, in order to make it more responsive to the wishes of the country. Although a referendum, held on May 2, gave Nasser a resounding show of support, with 99.98 per cent of the votes cast, the feelings of discontent against the regime did not subside completely. Another wave of unrest occurred in November, again centered in the universities, which were closed on November 24 and remained shut at the end of the year. Although these riots were not as serious as those of
February, they reflected continuing opposition to the government and its policies.

It is difficult to say what effect internal weakness had on Nasser's policy toward Israel, but it may, in the long run, limit his options. He may be forced to adhere to an inflexibly belligerent stance in order to divert attention from these weaknesses and to maintain his position. However, despite the uncertainties of his position, he remained the key to any peace settlement in the Middle East.

King Hussein of Jordan was in an even more tenuous position, as demonstrated in his dealings with the Arab commandos operating from his territory. Early in November Jordan was torn by several days of riots following a clash between Hussein's troops and Kateb al-Nasr, a splinter guerrilla group linked to the Syrian Ba'athist regime. Although this confrontation ended in a victory for Hussein, it brought his difficulties with the commandos into sharp focus. In mid-November he came to an agreement with the largest groups, al-Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The terms were that the commandos promised not to interfere with Jordan, in return for virtual carte blanche in their terrorist operations against Israeli territory.

Hussein's pact with the guerrillas, which was never publicly acknowledged, reflected their emergence during the year as an important factor in the Middle East. Claiming to represent the people of Palestine, they continuously operated against Israeli territory; but, in the long run, their impact may be less on Israel than on the Arab governments themselves. The commandos opposed any agreement whatsoever, calling for the liberation of Palestine by force. And, as with Nasser, Hussein's declining power may limit his alternatives for a settlement with Israel. Characteristically, King Hussein was reported to have said he would consider having the West Bank made into an independent Arab state, if this would help chances for peace. Although a denial of the report was issued almost at once, the proposal may have been intended as a trial balloon to test the reaction of the parties concerned.

In Iraq a coup d'état, on July 17, brought to power an extremist Ba'athist regime, followed by a purge and the arrest of a number of officials of the former government, including its premier and defense minister. Iraq announced its intention to keep some 12,000 troops in Jordan, despite the apparent desire of King Hussein to see them withdrawn. On December 4 these troops were involved in exchanges with Israeli soldiers, injecting a new and dangerous element into the conflict there.

Arab Refugees

The Arab refugee problem, too, continued to be a source of conflict and concern. Extended debate in the United Nations Special Political Committee took place on the question of extending the mandate of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), which was to expire in June 1969. On November 11, in an unprecedented appearance before the
committee, UN Secretary General U Thant said it was imperative that the mandate be renewed, that not to do so was "unthinkable." He urged all governments to be as generous as possible in view of an expected deficit of $5 million in 1969. The flight of refugees for camps on the West Bank of the Jordan to the East Bank (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 124–126) where UNRWA had no facilities, placed an additional burden on it. The refugees objected to the construction of concrete shelters because these would have an air of permanence. In January the refugees at Karameh threatened to destroy equipment and building material for the construction of such shelters. UNRWA finally managed to obtain agreement to build 10,000 galvanized steel, aluminum, and asbestos shelters, with floors of packed earth, edged with concrete, rather than with concrete bases. The funds for these new shelters came largely from the Near East Emergency Donations (NEED), a private American relief organization which came into existence after the June 1967 war.

On December 11 an American-sponsored resolution to extend UNRWA's mandate for three years, until June 1972, was passed unanimously, with Israel abstaining. On the same day the committee adopted another resolution, calling on Israel to take action for the return of Arabs displaced by the six-day war. In an attempt to ease the situation of the 1967 refugees, the Israel government announced in October that it would make available to refugees 7,000 permits to return to the occupied territories, which had not been used after the June war. However, by year's end, only a tiny handful of refugees had taken advantage of these permits.

On a related question, the UN Special Political Committee voted to establish a three-man committee to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Arabs in occupied territories. On Arab insistence, the proposal for a second humanitarian mission, similar to one conducted by Nils Goran-Gussing under United Nations auspices in summer 1967, was interpreted as including only the territory occupied by Israel; Gussing's mission had also examined the situation of Jews living in Arab countries which fought in the June war. The Israelis, opposing the resolution because it did not include the Arab states, made it clear that they would not permit the investigative committee to operate within the occupied areas. In any event, both the implementation of the resolution and the solution of the Arab refugee problem were dependent on the general political situation in the Middle East. The fate of the refugees continued to await a peace settlement in which it will play a prominent role.

Athens and Beirut Incidents

As the year drew to a close, a series of serious incidents occurred that were potentially more dangerous than any since the June war. On December 26 two Arab terrorists, operating from Lebanon, attempted to blow up an El Al airliner in the Athens airport. They were members of the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, with bases also in Lebanon, near Beirut. The attack stirred memories of the hijacking, on July 23, of an El Al plane en route from Rome to Israel. (The plane had been diverted to Algeria, and the crew and male Israeli passengers held there and released only on August 30, after extensive international efforts and the mediation of Italy. In exchange for their release, Israel returned sixteen captured Arab guerrillas.)

The plane at Athens, with 50 passengers and crew aboard, was ready for takeoff. One Israeli passenger was shot and killed, and a stewardess was injured. Only prompt action by the Greek airport personnel averted death for all on board. The terrorists were immediately apprehended to be tried by the Greek courts, and, although the relationship of the terrorists to the Lebanese government was somewhat unclear, Israel said it would hold the government responsible for the act. The Lebanese government, in a statement issued after the attack, called guerrilla activity "legal and sacred."

Israel's reprisal was swift and massive. On December 28 an Israeli force landed by helicopter on the Beirut airport, and destroyed 13 commercial planes belonging to several airlines. The Israelis were careful to evacuate everyone from the area before setting off the explosives, and there was no loss of life. According to the Israelis, the attack was to demonstrate to the Arab states that the price of terrorist activity could be very high, and to force them to curb the terrorists. Surrounded by hostile Arab states, the Israelis heavily depended on air lanes for transport and communication with the world. Any threat to this vital means of communication was therefore regarded as a grave danger.

World reaction to Israel's raid on the Beirut airport was violently condemnatory, both on the part of governments and public opinion. The United States, especially angered because the action came only a day after the announcement of its agreement to sell Phantom jets to Israel, protested to Israel in what was called "the strongest possible terms." By choosing as its target a state which had been moderate in attitude toward it, Israel had, according to some American officials, further weakened the possibilities for peace. In the wake of the raid, the Lebanese government was severely criticized by its own people. A strike was called by 25,000 university students demanding punishment of those responsible for the lack of defense at the airport, as well as the removal of restrictions on the operations of the guerrillas in Lebanon.

The United Nations Security Council was called into session on December 29 to consider complaints by Lebanon and Israel, regarding the incidents at Beirut and Athens. Speaking in defense of the raid on the Beirut airport, Tekoah said that Israel was entitled to take action against states that allowed terrorist activity to be launched from their territory. Maintaining that there could not be one law for Israel and one for the Arab states, he said that this state of affairs had contributed to "Arab intransigence and fanaticism," and that "It has encouraged the continuation of Arab aggression. There is no
doubt," Tekoah continued, "that, in the Security Council, it has given succor to Arab terror warfare. This must no longer be if the cause of peace is to be strengthened and advanced." The Lebanese representative Edward Ghorra called for sanctions against Israel under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The Security Council's unanimous adoption, on December 31, of a resolution condemning Israel, demonstrated Israel's isolation, even from usually friendly countries, such as the United Kingdom. Under the resolution, Israel was condemned "for her premeditated military action in violation of its obligations under the Charter and the cease-fire resolutions." It warned that a repetition of such an incident might lead to further steps, and stated that Lebanon was "entitled to appropriate redress." Both the United States and the USSR voted for the resolution, but the Soviets thought it too weak because it called neither for compensation for Lebanon, nor sanctions against Israel. Soviet delegate Yakov A. Malik accused certain members of the Security Council of "arm twisting" which, he said, "was used for the purpose of watering down the draft resolution and blunting its edge."

United States Ambassador J. Russell Wiggins said that, while his government voted for the resolution, it wished to dissociate itself from the attacks on Israel during the debate. "Israel," he maintained, "is not on trial here for its life. Israel is not being asked here to defend its right to exist." Nevertheless, Israel and friends of Israel in the United States were disappointed at the reaction of the American government and its less than "even-handed" treatment of the Beirut and Athens events. Israel's complaint regarding the Athens incident was not taken up, although it was on the agenda.

Protests to the State Department about the United States' condemnation of Israel and failure to say anything about the Athens incident, produced a belated statement of regret regarding the latter, and a slight softening of the American position. In his last press conference, on January 3, Secretary of State Dean Rusk called on the Arab governments to do their utmost to curb terrorist activity against Israel, adding that it was time to "reverse the cycle of violence and replace it with a new impetus" toward peace.

If the attacks at Athens and Beirut seems to diminish hope for peace in the Middle East, there was a ray of light in the reports that informal talks were taking place between Israeli and Lebanese officials at a point on their common border, and that these talks were not halted by the latest outbreak of violence between the two countries.
American Response to Soviet Antisemitism

Since 1964 activities among American Jews in behalf of the Jews in the USSR continued to be spearheaded by the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry. Originally created as a coordinating agency for 25 major Jewish organizations, the Conference increasingly initiated activities, especially since 1966. No other issue in Jewish community relations received such a steady focus in the last two years, except the Middle East crisis.

Following its original mandate (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66] pp. 312 ff), the Conference drew upon the resources of each of the national organizations. The National Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC), itself a coordinator for community relations groups, was asked to integrate Conference activities. In order to insure continuity, NCRAC in 1966 assumed temporary responsibility for professional guidance, which originally had been a rotated task. This arrangement was renewed and, at the end of 1968, NCRAC was the staff headquarters for the Conference. Albert Chernin (NCRAC) served as national coordinator, Rabbi Israel Miller (Rabbinical Council of America) as chairman. In spring 1968 these duties were rotated respectively to Abraham J. Bayer (NCRAC) and Lewis H. Weinstein, a prominent Boston attorney and community leader. An estimated 10 per cent of NCRAC budget was devoted to Conference work; an equal amount was derived from agency assessments and receipts. At the end of the year, NCRAC's portion rose sharply.

Individual agencies continued to develop activities for their memberships and the general community, thus expanding Conference work or performing tasks the Conference could not undertake.

By the last quarter of 1966 a regular and sustained program had developed. Community action guides, hundreds of thousands of basic fact sheets, general educational materials, travel exhibits, special reports, and news flashes for the mass media were distributed.

In periodic, closed discussions, U.S. government officials were asked by leaders of the Conference to press their demands on the Soviet Union, to share information, and to seek ways to keep the issue on an international agenda crowded with other vital issues. Among the officials were then Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg, and Walt W. Rostow, special assistant to President Lyndon B. Johnson. Similar meetings were held with such other ranking officials as American Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewelyn Thompson; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern European Affairs Walter Stoessel; Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs and former Ambassador to the
Soviet Union Foy D. Kohler, and Undersecretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach.

The Conference felt that keeping its appeal before the public would help sensitize Soviet officials, and create a climate that would make them receptive to initiating changes. The use of selective public activities carried the plight of Soviet Jews beyond the confines of Jewish interest. Thus, a "Declaration of Rights for Soviet Jewry," originally adopted at an April 1966 leadership conference in Philadelphia, became the vehicle for ceremonies and activities across the country. The following September national attention was focused on a rally in Washington's Lafayette Park, attended by some Senators, and 3,000 facsimiles of the declaration were placed in institutions across the country. Early in December a call for cultural and religious freedom for Soviet Jews, signed by 90 U.S. Senators, was printed as an ad in the New York Times and in local newspapers. That same week, the text of the declaration was released simultaneously by Jewish communal bodies in 18 nations, in the first coordinated international expression on the plight of Soviet Jews.

Similarly, in May 1967, newspapers throughout the United States carried a Conference plea for Soviet Jews, endorsed by 315 members of the House of Representatives. Seven months later, on the anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a statement by 357 members of the House was published in the New York Times as a Conference project. In January 1967 the Conference urged the Soviet Union to keep a promise made by Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin in Paris a month earlier that Soviet Jews, who had relatives abroad and wished to join them, would receive permission to do so. (AJYB, 1967 [Vol. 68], pp. 311, 360). United HIAS Service and the Conference jointly alerted Jewish communities throughout the country to facilitate exit visas for relatives in the USSR. (A trickle, which began early that year, was shut off following the June 1967 war in the Middle East.)

**Tactics Shift**

After more than four years of campaigning, and only some slight improvement in the plight of Soviet Jews, Jewish organizations feared that the American people, especially Jews, would no longer respond to the continuing need for public involvement. In an effort to extend its impact on Jews and non-Jews, the Conference leadership and local Jewish communities encouraged the use of significant target dates for staging dramatic public events. The plan was initiated with a single program in New York City: Simhat Torah became an opportunity to express solidarity with Soviet Jewish youth. On that day (October 28) in 1967, over 3,000 persons were massed near the Soviet Mission to the United Nations; the New York Board of Rabbis and the New York Coordinating Committee for Soviet Jewry, helped to
stage the event. The following year, simultaneous demonstrations were held in at least 30 cities in the United States and Canada.

Although some Orthodox groups felt uneasy about using religious holidays for seemingly secular activities, Passover and Hanukkah, too, were increasingly exploited. During Passover 1966, a "Geulah (Redemption) March" of 15,000 moved through the heart of New York to the United Nations. The week before, nearly 300 college-age students held an all-night vigil under Conference auspices, with the special aid of the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry. A year later, a broadscaled 24-hour vigil, involving 38 local Jewish groups and nearly 10,000 persons, was held near the United Nations, as similar events took place in 17 other cities.

The Passover "Matzoh of Hope," a brief statement added to the traditional family seder, also became widely accepted. Since its adoption in 1966, an estimated million or more copies had been duplicated, including reprints in synagogue bulletins, Jewish cookbooks, and Anglo-Jewish newspapers.

As a holiday which celebrates the struggle of the ancient Israelites to regain their right to worship, Hanukkah became a natural focus for activities. More than 50,000 persons in 37 cities took part in rallies and other public ceremonies on Sunday, December 11, 1966, which also marked the anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., addressed 12 of the rallies via telephone hookup. In 1967 observances, including a candlelight parade in midtown Manhattan and an all-night vigil at Philadelphia's Independence Hall, were held in 18 cities, with over 25,000 participants.

Realizing the great appeal of the theme of guaranteed human rights, Conference planners launched a major petition campaign in 1968, the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On Human Rights Day, December 10, a petition citing Soviet violations of the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, with a record quarter million signatures, Jewish and non-Jewish, were presented to J. Russell Wiggins, the then United States Representative to the UN, for transmission to Secretary General U Thant. Names continued to pour in for many more weeks.

Leadership Confers

The national leadership of the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry regularly met in New York City to plan strategies and keep abreast of changes in the Soviet Union. The Soviet involvement in the 1967 six-day war in the Middle East, and the concomitant anti-Jewish and anti-Israel propaganda offensive unleashed in Moscow, had a direct bearing on the work of the agencies. Initially, the crisis caused a suspension of public activities but, as the atmosphere in the USSR became increasingly anti-Jewish, the Conference vigorously resumed work.

Over 400 community leaders from across the country met at New York's
Waldorf Astoria hotel on April 7 and 8, 1968. The gathering analyzed the status of Soviet Jewry, explored possible future developments with several leading academicians, and heard portions of a taped 1966 address by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., as a memorial to the slain civil-rights leader. The delegates restated their petition for the Jews of the Soviet Union who, while judged to be increasingly self-assertive, still were being forced into silence. At the conclusion of the meeting, a delegation of presidents of the participating organizations brought a White Paper on Soviet Jewry to the Soviet Mission to the UN, for delivery to Ambassador Yakov Malik. The document also was sent to the White House.

Synagogues and schools continued to sponsor their own activities and, in consultation with the Conference, the Jewish Education Committee of New York initiated an eight-month educational program among the more than 100,000 students in local institutions. This culminated, at the end of 1967, in three newspaper ads sponsored by Jewish students, stressing the lack of educational facilities for young Soviet Jews. Several cities, including Boston, Detroit, and Washington, duplicated the project.

The American Association for Jewish Education, the national Jewish education service agency for religious and educational bodies, adopted similar tactics. An open letter of October 14, 1968, addressed to Menashe Mikhailovich, president of Moscow's Great Choral synagogue, and printed in the New York Times on that day, received wide attention. It linked the holiday of Simhat Torah with the eliminations of Jewish education in the USSR. In 1967 the National Jewish Welfare Board (JWB) introduced for affiliated community centers across the country, a project dedicated to Russian Jewish music. During National Jewish Music Month, it provided material to educate American Jews about the musical contributions of Russian Jews. The JWB project helped focus attention on contemporary Jewish culture in the Soviet Union, especially forced deprivations, such as the closing of the successful Riga ensemble and other dramatic or choral groups.

It was difficult to gauge the effectiveness of the Conference, or of Conference-related activities, but there were signs of Soviet sensitivity to them. In a long article, on May 29, 1968, Literaturnaya Gazeta, the weekly organ of the Union of Soviet Writers, denounced Conference chairman, Rabbi Israel Miller, and, through him, the Conference. The authors of the article, poet Abram Gontar and writer Mikhail Lev, were considered politically “safe” writers; their Jewish origin was considered a good credential. Using spurious arguments and selected data, the authors insisted that the Jewish issue had been artificially inflated and was “nonexistent in the USSR,” and that the Conference represented “hostile” elements.

While the major Jewish organizations in the Conference recognized that there had been some hopeful changes in the situation of the Soviet Jews, including the increased production of matzot and the printing of prayer books, they remained committed to achieving more fundamental advances.
They were determined to maintain their public information activities, to continue representations to their government and the United Nations, and to expand a campaign of exposure, as long as such protestations were necessary.

Dissident Groups Expand

New groups sprang up to demand even greater efforts on behalf of Soviet Jews, while older splinter groups pressed for more commitment. Some viewed the phenomenon as an expression of grassroots anger at the Conference's failure to effect great changes in the Soviet Union; others realized that the Conference had merely stimulated increased concern.

The groups were as varied as a Denver-based Committee of Concern for World Jewry and a student-created ad hoc Emergency Committee for Soviet Jewry in New York City. The American League for Russian Jews, formed in 1964 to secure "the right of the Soviet Jews to emigrate to the State of Israel, if they so desire," continued a small-scale, limited program. Many of its leaders agreed, at the end of 1968, to participate in an International League for the Repatriation of Russian Jews, in Geneva.

Since 1964 the most successful of the small, specialized groups, the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ) was spearheaded by Jacob Birnbaum. SSSJ's main goal was "to arouse the Jewish community to action for Soviet Jewry," including more education and "dramatic public demonstrations." It became known for its somewhat sensationalist displays, as well as highly visible student public-relations materials, much of which found its way across the country. The organization remained centered in New York City, and drew heavily from students in existing organizations rooted in traditional Judaism. While never a mass movement, SSSJ was enterprising and, in the last two years, increasingly responsive to cooperation with the older, established Jewish agencies.

One of the rather active local groups continued to be the Cleveland Council on Soviet Anti-Semitism (CCSAS). Although the council worked with some Jewish agencies, and received financial support from the local Jewish Community Relations Council, it remained critical of the "Jewish establishment" for its "inadequate response." The dynamic activists, who constitute its leadership, maintained contacts with similar local groups, including the Upstate Council of Youth for Soviet Jewry in Syracuse, N.Y., and the Bay Area Council on Soviet Jewry in Berkeley-San Francisco.

Rabbi Levin Visits

A visit from Moscow's Rabbi Yehuda Leib Levin, and the Leningrad cantor, David Stiskin, threatened to rupture the work of the Jewish organizations. Some analysts suggested it was this possibility that prompted the Soviet Union to permit him to come, after repeated refusals.

In April 1968 the major Jewish organizations reacted cautiously to reports
that a Soviet Jewish delegation would visit the United States. The first announcement came from the Soviet embassy which, however, denied any official connection. On April 16 the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry commented that “responsible American Jewish bodies have repeatedly petitioned the Soviet government to permit appropriate Russian leadership to visit the United States and establish contact with the American Jewish Community,” despite the fact that no representative group of any kind existed in the Soviet Union. (Judaism in the Soviet Union has lacked a central coordinating structure since 1926, when a rabbinic conference met for the last time. Some form of centralized institutions existed for congregations and clergy of all other recognized denominations and sects.)

It was noted that, in December 1967, the Synagogue Council of America had sent an invitation, one of several by other groups, to Rabbi Levin. There was no response from the rabbi, the Soviet embassy in Washington, or the Ministry of Cults in Moscow, where copies were sent. The Soviet Union chose to accept the sponsorship of the militantly anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism of such a visit. The anti-Israel Friends of Jerusalem, supporters of the extremist Neturei Karta sect, became involved in the negotiations as well as the tour. The Conference condemned the sponsorship of the Council which “repeatedly parrotted the Soviet propaganda line and has been an apologist for the USSR’s policy of depriving Soviet Jews of the same rights which are granted to all other recognized religious and nationality groups.”

A hoped-for “genuine communication between the Jews of Russia and the Jews of this country” did not take place. Invitations to Rabbi Levin to meet with the Synagogue Council of America, the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, and the National Community Relations Advisory Council were never answered. Telephone conversations between some leaders of these agencies and Rabbi Levin were cordial, and the aged rabbi guardedly suggested that such meetings might take place. However, in the end, the Moscow rabbi did not officially meet with the heads of any of these groups; he did meet with some important individual Jews.

The highlight of Rabbi Levin’s visit was an address at New York City’s Hunter College. He was enthusiastically applauded when he talked of peace and the desire to build bridges between the USSR and this country. He also described the present status of Soviet Jews in terms which contradicted most of the data gathered by non-Soviet sources in the last few years. He spoke of an active institutional life for religious Soviet Jews, and insisted that “there is no antisemitism in the Soviet Union.” Synagogue were closed, he said, because “Jews prefer to worship in private.” In response, a few persons in the audience, survivors of the Nazi holocaust and Orthodox Jews from Eastern Europe, interrupted the meeting by shouting pointed questions. The ensuing tumult ended the meeting, and the rabbi never concluded his re-
marks. The Soviet press, in reporting this event, noted that Levin’s tour of the United States was disrupted by “Zionist hooligans.”

Some observers feared the claims by Rabbi Levin and the Council for Judaism, and the counterclaims by Jewish and non-Jewish groups, might give rise to confusion that could undermine the will to sustain public protests, so carefully nurtured in the last few years.

**Academic and Intellectual Response**

The Conference on the Status of Soviet Jews, a national organization sponsored by prominent Jews and non-Jews, continued providing information to writers, educators, religious leaders, and civil rights leaders, concerned with Soviet Jews. Early in 1966 it convened an Ad Hoc Commission on Soviet Jews as a public tribunal on Jewish life in the Soviet Union. Among the members were Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas; Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; Bishop James A. Pike; Walter Reuther, president of the United Automobile Workers; Dr. Eugene Rabinowitch, editor of the *Bulletin of the Atom Scientists*, and Norman Thomas. In December the Commission’s chairman, Bayard Rustin, submitted an 11-page report of the findings to the Soviet embassy. Embassy First Secretary Igor D. Bubnov, replying for Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, characterized the findings as a “deliberate smear.” Rustin, who released an exchange of letters to the press in March 1967, refuted the charge by saying that the Commission was “concerned for only two things: the truth and the establishment of full cultural, religious and communal rights to Soviet Jews.”

On May 18 Robert Penn Warren, noted author and a sponsor of the Conference on the Status of Soviet Jews, addressed a letter to the Fourth All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers, with a copy to the Union of Soviet Writers, appealing to them to help save the cultural life of Soviet Jews, as a matter of human dignity. The directors of the Conference also circulated a petition, signed by nearly 200 leading public personalities, which appeared in the press on December 21, 1967.

In an effort to enlist educators, a group of academicians from 86 American universities came to New York to create a nationwide “Academic Committee on Soviet Jewry.” At a national academic conference in May 1968, nearly 200 delegates agreed that the “moral internationalization” of the problem was the most effective way to protect Soviet Jewry. The conference approved a 17-point action program for “systematic efforts to bring the weight of the American academic community to bear in lifting cultural and religious discrimination against the Jews of the USSR.” It also approved the text of a national academic appeal from university faculty which was to be sent to Moscow. The appeal, signed by 2,000 professors from 115 universities and colleges, appeared as a full-page ad in the New York *Times* of January 31. Initially delayed by events in Czechoslovakia and the Middle East, the ad was timed to appear 21 years after Solomon Mikhoels, chairman
of the wartime Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and a prominent figure in Jewish cultural life, was found in Moscow, allegedly murdered by Stalin's secret police. The academic committee also released a study by Moshe Decter, a specialist on Soviet and Communist affairs, on the use of anti-semitism as an instrument of Soviet policy since June 1967.

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