If there was little progress in foreign affairs to be reported in the first year of the Kiesinger-Brandt administration (AJYB 1968 [Vol. 69], p. 477), there was even less in 1968. This was not mainly attributable to Bonn's attitude or an unwillingness to act. Rather the Federal Republic, like many Western countries, was victim of a stalemate in international politics that was sharpened by the Soviet bloc's intervention in Czechoslovakia on August 21 (p. 401). The feeling of frustration was openly expressed in a letter of Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger to Foreign Minister Willy Brandt on the occasion of the latter's 55th birthday, December 18, 1968:

This year, political and military tensions in Europe and all over the globe again have risen. Therefore, it is particularly difficult for you to pursue a foreign policy based on a constant striving for lessening the existing political and ideological conflicts.

He added the hope that Brandt's policy directed toward world peace would be successful.

A major dispute in the coalition government over the signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was not resolved by year's end. Brandt and his Social Democratic party, who were for signing the document, were strongly opposed by Finance Minister Franz Josef Strauss and the majority of the Christian Social Union. Public opinion seemed in favor of signing the treaty, but CSU feared that such a step would hinder Germany's nonmilitary use of atomic energy.

While the persistent efforts of the Federal Republic for better relations with East European countries were frustrated by international developments, Bonn's situation was made even more difficult, both by the Soviet bloc's aggressive line toward it, and the reluctant or skeptical support it received from the Western allies. Relations with the United States were certainly most cordial during Konrad Adenauer's chancellorship, when Dwight David
Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles determined U.S. policy. The cooling-off during John F. Kennedy's presidency carried over to Lyndon B. Johnson's administration. Relations with Great Britain as well as with France were never too close, though President Charles de Gaulle was probably more strongly impressed by Adenauer than by the succeeding chancellors.

Soviet agitation against the allegedly nationalist and revanchist Federal Republic was never as strong as in 1968. And regardless of whether it expressed real conviction or was politically motivated, this campaign was fed by the ultra-nationalist National Democratic party's (NPD) undeniable success in local and diet elections since 1966 (AJYB 1967 [Vol. 68], p. 352; 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 481-2; p. 365). Even if one failed, or hesitated, to consider NPD as fascist and neo-Nazi, as the Soviets and the German Democratic Republic (DDR) called it, it caused much concern and discomfort also in the countries of the free world. Therefore, like the question of the extension of that statute of limitations beyond 1969 (AJYB 1966 [Vol. 67], pp. 350-51), the problem of this rightist group could no longer be considered merely a domestic one.

At various times de Gaulle and Kiesinger exchanged visits whose unproductiveness could hardly be concealed by the official communiques. There was no change in de Gaulle's adamant refusal to revise his opposition to Great Britain's affiliation with the European Economic Community (EEC; Common Market).

President Heinrich Lübke, Kiesinger, and Brandt paid visits to various countries. Kiesinger was criticized for his October trip to Portugal and Spain which, except for Greece, were the least democratic states in Europe. He also went to Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. In February Brandt traveled to South America, Morocco, and several European countries, to the latter mainly in connection with NATO or Common Market matters.

Germany's hope that other Arab states would follow the example of Jordan (AJYB 1968 [Vol. 69], p. 477) and reestablish diplomatic relations with it was not fulfilled in 1968.

**DOMESTIC AFFAIRS**

Efforts to improve West Germany's economy, after a short recession late in 1966 and early in 1967 (AJYB 1967 [Vol. 68], p. 354; 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 477-8), were apparently successful, even in isolated West Berlin. West Berlin Mayor Klaus Schütz told the press on December 20 that the city's economic situation was better than at any time since 1945. In October the unemployed in the Federal Republic and West Berlin numbered 180,200, less than 50 per cent of the comparable 1967 figure. There were 580,000 job vacancies, or 88 per cent more than the year before. The number of foreign workers in West Germany exceeded one million, an increase of at
least 10 per cent over 1967. (The number of workers who came to West Berlin from West Germany increased by 20 per cent since 1967.)

Imports and exports also showed a marked upswing in the first five months of 1968, rising to DM 32.4 billion ($8.1 billion) from DM 27.8 billion in the comparable period of 1967; exports increased to DM 39.1 billion (almost $10 billion) from DM 35.1 (less than $9 billion) in 1967. Total 1968 exports were estimated at DM 100 billion (DM 87 billion in 1967).

When, late in November, a currency crisis shook France, above all, but also Great Britain and, to a lesser degree, the United States, foreign currency valued at a total of $4.5 billion was exchanged for German marks within a period of four weeks. This was convincing proof of the world's confidence in West Germany's economy. When the “Club of Ten” (Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, France, Canada, the United States, and the Federal Republic) assembled in Bonn, November 21, under the chairmanship of Federal Minister of Economics Karl Schiller to save France's currency and economy, and granted it a loan of $2 billion (DM 8 billion), West Germany contributed a larger share (DM 2.4 billion—DM 400 million more than the United States) than any of the other nations represented. The almost miraculous increase of German exports endangered the economies of other Western countries; France, in particular, sought the upward valuation of the mark to relieve pressure on the franc. However, Germany was unwilling to revalue the mark, as it had done in March 1961. It preferred to impose an export tax of four per cent, a measure that tended to help foreign producers and hamper domestic ones.

**Presidential Nominations**

The Federal Republic was troubled by a number of political events relating in part to Germany's Nazi past, in part to its delicate relations with its neighbors (East Germany possibly being the most annoying), and in part to its uncertain future.

It was announced on October 14 that Federal President Heinrich Lübke would resign on June 30, 1969, slightly before the expiration of his term in September. In recent years, demands for the resignation of the 74-year-old head of state were frequently voiced, since he had become a source of ever increasing discomfort and criticism for political (AJYB 1967 [Vol. 68], p. 351) and other reasons.

The way to the nomination of a successor having been cleared, the Social Democrats were first to announce their candidate for the presidency. On November 1 they unanimously nominated Minister of Justice Dr. Gustav Heinemann, 69, an eminent churchman and jurist, who had left his post as minister of the interior in the Adenauer cabinet in protest against the rearmament of West Germany.
CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich Soziale Union), * on November 15, nominated for the presidency West German Minister of Defense Gerhard Schröder, who also had held the posts of minister of the interior and of foreign affairs. Kiesinger, apparently distrustful of the allegedly ambitious and conservative Schröder who never was a friend of the present Grand Coalition but favored one between the two major "bourgeois" CDU/CSU and FDP (Free Democratic party), failed in his attempt to secure the nomination for the fairly unknown head of the German Protestant church, Professor Richard von Weizsäcker. Ex-chancellor Ludwig Erhard, the choice of Franz Josef Strauss's CSU, also was defeated.

As Bundestag (federal parliament) President Eugen Gerstenmaier announced, December 18, the new president was to be elected by the Bundesversammlung (federal assembly) in Berlin on March 5, 1969. For a long time, date and place were matters of dispute. There were unverified rumors that one Western power had voiced misgivings about the choice of West Berlin as the location for the ceremony. The decision was promptly characterized by Soviet news agency Tass, December 19, as "an escalation of the unrealistic and dangerous actions of the ruling circles of the Federal Republic toward West Berlin." Tass reaffirmed the Soviet view that West Berlin was "an independent political entity," while Bonn and the Western allies regarded it as closely linked to the Federal Republic.

The Federal Assembly, a body created for the sole purpose of electing the president, consisted of 1,036 delegates, half of them members of the Bundestag and the rest representatives of the Landtage (state diets), who were chosen on the basis of party affiliation. Neither CDU/CSU nor SPD (Social Democratic party), the major opposition party, had an absolute majority in the assembly and therefore both needed the support of the two small parties (FDP with 84 votes and the National Democratic party, NPD, with 22) to elect their candidate. NPD officially stated in December that its delegates would not vote for the SPD candidate. The alternatives were either to vote for Schröder, or to abstain if he rejected the party's support. The FDP delegates supposedly held the deciding votes if they all supported one candidate, and both parties wooed them. (Since the balloting was secret, no delegate could be forced to follow his party's decision.) The liberals in FDP clearly favored the dedicated liberal Heinemann; others tended toward Schröder, an open advocate of a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. Both men were political figures with rich experience, good minds, strong principles, and the ability to write and speak well. However, the constitution of West Germany gives little real power to the president. He is not head of the administration, as is the president of the United States, but merely head of the state, which he represents at home and, above all, abroad.

* CDU existed everywhere in the Federal Republic, except in Bavaria, which had the CSU, the sister party of CDU. Chancellor Kiesinger was chairman of CDU; Finance Minister Franz Josef Strauss of CSU. There were no major differences in program and policies between the two parties, but CSU had a smaller liberal faction, and is more conservative-nationalistic.
Elections

The year 1968 saw the beginning of public interest in the fall 1969 Bundestag elections. The focus was on a number of important questions:

1. Would the electorate approve the experiment of the “Grand Coalition” (CDU/CSU and SPD) by strengthening both parties, or would one of these major parties—CDU/CSU more likely than SPD—win an absolute majority, thus doing away with the need for a government coalition? Or was a new coalition in the offing, either CDU/CSU and FDP, or SPD and FDP? (Theoretically, there was also the possibility of a CDU/CSU and NPD coalition, if the NPD were to win 50 or more seats in the 1969 elections. Practically, no member of any party would even consider the likelihood of such a “bourgeois-rightist” alliance.)

2. How would FDP, at present the only opposition party with less than 10 per cent of the Bundestag seats, do in 1969?

3. Above all, how would the National Democratic party (NPD) develop?

Admittedly or not, the last question actually overruled all other considerations. NPD was formally founded on November 28, 1964, and soon proved to be more successful than most of its predecessors, the most important of them the Deutsche Reichs-Partei. Ten months later, it participated in the federal elections, gained no seats in the Bundestag (this required a minimum five per cent of the national vote), but scored 2.1 per cent which, at the time, probably should not have been taken as lightly as it was. Since then, NPD gained seats in the parliaments of all states where it participated in elections, with the exception of Hamburg, the city-state, where it obtained only 3.9 per cent of the votes in the March 1966 elections. In this and subsequent elections, the NPD vote was as follows: In 1966, in Hesse 7.9 per cent and in Bavaria 7.4 per cent; in 1967, in the Rhineland-Palatinate, 6.9 per cent, Schleswig-Holstein 5.8 per cent, Lower Saxony 7 per cent, Bremen 8.8 per cent; on April 28, 1968, in Baden-Württemberg 9.8 per cent.

After these elections, the authorities, though unable to point to significant losses by NPD, were eager to emphasize that this party—which some called neo-Nazi and others just ultra-nationalist—still was opposed by more than 90 per cent of the electorate who had voted for established democratic parties. Even if one accepted this contention (not necessarily true, e.g. in Württemberg an additional 2.6 per cent voted for the Deutsche Friedens-Union [DFU; German Peace Union], the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Unabhängiger Deutscher [AUD; Working Community of Independent Germans] and the Demokratische Linke [DL Democratic Left], all left-wing splinter groups whose “democratic” character some may have doubted), the fact remained that between 6 and 10 per cent supported Adolf von Thadden’s party, which obviously was not shaken by the multitude of domestic crises and the massive government, trade union, and party propaganda against it. True, in local (city council) elections in some states, such as the Saarland on October 20 (5.2 per cent), NPD did not do so well. However, comments on this develop-
ment that the decline of the party had just begun and its collapse was just around the corner appeared to be wishful thinking. In many local elections so-called Wählergemeinschaften (nonpolitical associations of voters), which did not exist in state or federal elections, played a major role, attracting a considerable number of votes, at least from non-Socialist circles but probably also NPD supporters.

At this writing, no one dared make a definite prediction about the outcome of the 1969 federal elections. A continuation of the diet elections trend would mean some losses for SPD and some gains for the Union (CDU/CSU) but since neither was expected to come close to 50 per cent, some coalition would be necessary for a new administration. If the Union remained the strongest party, Kiesinger was expected to continue as chancellor.

NPD leader Adolf von Thadden predicted that his party would win about 10 per cent, or 50 or more, of the Bundestag seats. Some thought him over-optimistic; some hoped that the persistent campaign that his party was unconstitutional and would be outlawed in the foreseeable future might frighten away some supporters. Yet, realists admitted that NPD and its ideology (as expressed in the Deutsche National-Zeitung (which was not its official organ) were holding their own, if not gaining ground.

An analysis of the followers of NPD and other parties, prepared by public opinion experts and published in the December 23, 1968 issue of Der Spiegel, seemed to indicate that the reason for the strong showing of NPD was its appeal to certain authoritarian traditions and nationalist tendencies that were neglected by other groups (and suppressed by the occupation powers after 1945). Therefore most other parties at times attempted "to overtake on the right" (rechts überholen)—an undertaking as unethical as it was futile, since no party could have expected to hold its Christian conservative, liberal, or more or less Socialist followers, while trying to outdo the openly extremist right.

Emergency Legislation

The crisis and turmoil, preceding and accompanying the passage of the emergency legislation (Notstandsgesetze) in May and June were the most stirring and significant in the two decades of the Federal Republic's existence. This review can only deal with some of the basic facts concerning the laws. First, the constitution of the Federal Republic can be revised much more easily than that of other countries, such as the United States. It requires ratification by two-thirds of the Bundestag, and only consent by the Bundesrat (the representative body of the States, comparable to the U.S. Senate). Of course, such a vote was not too difficult to obtain in the Kiesinger-Brandt government, with more than 90 per cent of the Bundestag supporting the administration.

Second, the emergency legislation had been the subject of debate and controversy for about a decade. Those who demanded such legislation argued
that, according to the provisions of the Germany Treaty of 1952 and 1954, signed by the three Western Powers, its adoption was essential for the transfer to the German government of a number of privileges, such as mail censorship and wire-tapping, which until then had been reserved for the Allied Powers. The proponents further stated that every democracy had the obligation to insure the proper functioning of its processes so that it could deal with what they called "external emergencies" (hostilities requiring a state of defense) as well as "internal" ones (civic disorders, catastrophes like earthquakes and floods).

The opponents of this legislation, including large sectors of SPD as the opposition party, practically all trade unions, a majority of the academic community, intellectuals, clergymen, and others, pointed out that similar legislation, i.e., the Enabling Act of March 24, 1933, gave Hitler powers that unleashed terror and war.

Two-thirds of the Bundestag, or 332 votes, were required for the passage of the emergency legislation; on May 30 it was adopted by a vote of 384. This meant not only that the 49 FDP delegates voted against it, but that an equally strong SPD group and some scattered CDU representatives did not follow their parties' recommendations. Approval in the Bundesrat came on June 14.

The new laws, amending articles 9, 10, 11, 12, 20, 35, 53, 80, 87, 91, 115 of the federal constitution, provided for the possible limitation of the secrecy of mail and telephone communications; the right to move freely; compulsory service in national emergencies; the right to resist illegal and unconstitutional measures; the use of federal and police forces in emergencies; the creation of a Joint Committee (Gemeinsamer Ausschuss) to deal with possible military attack, tensions, and situations requiring action involving international agreements.

After the adoption of the laws, public discussion, which had been particularly intense in the spring, subsided. Demonstrations by students, workers, and others, that preceded and coincided with those in France, showed the involvement of broad masses and the distrust engendered by the laws. SPD, in a letter of May 17 signed by its chairman Willy Brandt, tried to allay the misgivings expressed by tens of thousands of its members. Brandt emphasized that the party had been able to modify considerably the government's drafts, and that the text of the law was in keeping with the ideas expressed at six party congresses held between 1960 and 1968. In a Bundestag debate, Helmut Schmidt, delegate from Hamburg and leader of SPD, called the emergency law "the most parliamentary-based I know in Europe." His opponents replied that no comparable legislation existed in many European countries, and that no provision of this kind was contained in the U.S. Constitution. They further maintained that an undemocratic administration could abuse the laws and their emergency powers; on the other hand, a simple majority in the Bundestag could abrogate these powers.
"Extra-parliamentary" Opposition and New Leftist Groups

Mainly students, but also trade unionists and other concerned citizens, joined forces to form the so-called Ausserparlamentarische Opposition (APO) because they felt that FDP, the only opposition party in parliament—an allegedly liberal group which in fact was always hampered by progressive and nationalist factions in its ranks—was not the proper instrument for expressing their views. APO planned to accomplish this through demonstrations and other direct action. Among its most vocal groups was the SDS (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund), whose leader, 28-year-old Rudi Dutschke, was seriously wounded in an assassination attempt shortly before Easter. His assailant, Josef Bachmann, a 23-year-old man with nationalist leanings, had not as yet been tried by year's end. Intellectually, APO was strongly influenced by Marxist philosopher and University of California professor Herbert Marcuse and French student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit.

For years, a major target of the rebellious students had been the press empire of Axel Caesar Springer which published the dailies Die Welt and Bild-Zeitung (circulation over four million) in Hamburg, and a large number of other dailies and periodicals in Berlin and other cities. Springer was attacked for monopolizing public opinion and for the reactionary, ultra-nationalist character of his publications. The other pillar of the "establishment" was and continued to be the university and other institutions of higher learning. Demands for reform of basic ideology and administration included a major change in curricula and a one-third student participation in running university affairs. While not all students took part in these debates and demonstrations, the majority of those who did represented all shades of the Left. APO continued its activities after the spring rioting, but its strength was greatly reduced.

In opposition to existing parties, leftist groups also organized to gain representation in the state parliaments. In Wurttemberg-Baden, the Demokratische Linke with the participation of some old Communists, tried to get into the Landtag (state diet), but received only 2.3 per cent of the popular vote, not the required 5 per cent minimum. (At the same time, NPD reached 9.8 per cent!)

The Deutsche Kommunistische Partei, a new Communist party, was founded on September 25 at Frankfurt. It declared its intention to work within the framework of the federal constitution, hoping that it would not be banned like the old Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD), (AJYB 1958 [Vol. 57], p. 288). It was likely that the Communists and possibly some other leftist groups would put up candidates in the 1969 federal elections. The likelihood was that none of these groups would get enough votes for parliamentary representation, but that they would increase the strength of the more conservative CDU/CSU by drawing voters mainly from SPD.
Trials of Nazi Crimes

Several important trials of Nazi war criminals ended in 1968:

**Hamburg, February 10**: Three former members of the "special command 1005," SS-Hauptsturmführer Max Kraher (63), Otto Goldapp (70), and Otto Drews (57) were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Russian and Polish workers.

**Wuppertal, March 12**: Three former policemen who killed more than 700 Jews in the synagogue of Bialystock were sentenced to life imprisonment.

**Kiel, March 19**: Former SS-Scharführer Franz Müller (55) and Herman Heinrich (53) were sentenced to life and six years' imprisonment, respectively, for the murder of an undetermined number of Jews in Krakau (Poland).

**Nuremberg, April 5**: Two former Nazi judges, Karl Ferber (67) and Heinz Hoffmann (61) were sentenced to two years' imprisonment each, for condemning Leo Katzenberger, head of the Nuremberg Jewish community, to death for alleged race defilement.

**Stuttgart, April 29**: In the so-called Lemberg trial, which lasted 144 days, former SS-Scharführer Ernst Epple (60) was sentenced to life imprisonment and former Hauptsturmführer Röder (65) to 10 years in prison; eight other defendants were acquitted and one was found guilty but not sentenced.

**Bamberg, May 2**: Former Legationsrat (councilor in the Foreign Office) Franz Rademacher, who had escaped to Syria after a first trial in 1952 but returned to Germany in 1965, was sentenced to five years in prison for the murder of 1,300 Serbian Jews and the deportation of 2,000 Jews from France to Auschwitz.

**Münster, May 3**: The longest trial in post-war Germany, the so-called Stanislau trial, lasted for more than two years and cost about DM 1 million ($250,000). Of the 15 defendants, accused of the murder of more than 30,000 Polish Jews, Hans Krüger (58), Heinrich Schott (67), and Ernst Varchmin (60) were sentenced to life imprisonment; eight others received four-and-a-half to nine year terms, one was acquitted.

**Hildesheim, May 3**: More than 80 witnesses were heard in the trial against Johann Demant (76) and three others accused of killing more than 9,000 Jews in the district of Lublin. Demant was sentenced to life imprisonment, the others to terms of three to ten years.

**Munich, May 10**: The Schwurgericht (assize court) suspended the trial against Dr. Fritz Kühnle (56) who had participated in the Nazi "children euthanasia program." The court found that it could not refute his argument that he had acted out of pity.

**Frankfurt, June 16**: The third Auschwitz trial, which opened on August 30, 1967, ended; the two defendants Bernhard Bonitz (60) and Josef Windeck (63) were sentenced to life imprisonment.

**Osnabrück, July 5**: Three former members of the SS Leibstandarte Adolf
Hitler, Hans Röhwer (56), Hans Krüger (57), and Herbert Schnelle (54) were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of 22 Jews.

In late July Wilhelm Harster, former chief of the German security police in Holland who had been sentenced to 15 years in prison 18 months earlier (AJYB 1968 [Vol. 69], p. 379), was released. He had spent eight years in a Dutch prison and additional time, while charges were investigated. The German penal code permits the release of prisoners who had already served two-thirds of their term under certain circumstances, such as ill health. Harster fell into this category.

Frankfurt, August 9: The trial of Fritz Gebhard von Hahn (57) attracted particular interest because Chancellor Kiesinger was heard as witness. Von Hahn had been a member of the Foreign Ministry's Department for Jewish Affairs that planned and organized the extirpation of Jews. Found guilty of complicity in the deportation and murder of about 30,000 Jews, Hahn was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

Many trials were still being conducted. Also, as noted in a publication of the Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen (Central Office for Prosecution of Nazi Crimes) in Ludwigsburg, German prosecutors were investigating 15,000 other cases of persons suspected of war crimes.

Not since the International Military Tribunal sat at Nuremberg in 1948 has a judgment caused as much excitement as the one handed down on December 6 by Presiding Justice Ernst-Jürgen Oske of a West Berlin assize court. In a trial, in July 1967, Hans-Joachim Rehse (67) a former judge of the Nazi Volksgerichtshof ("German People's Court," the highest Nazi tribunal) and the first Nazi justice official to face a West German court, was sentenced to five years at hard labor for complicity in murder. But the German Supreme Court later annulled the verdict because the lower court dealt with an associate justice as though he had been only an assistant. Instead of making the earlier sentence harsher, Judge Oske of the new Schwurgericht (grand jury) acquitted Rehse on the ground that he had been "blinded" by Nazi ideology and had performed his office "within the framework of what was then legally representable." The judge ruled that no intention of "deliberate miscarriage of justice" (Rechtsbeugung) had been proved in three cases of murder and four cases of attempted murder, for which Rehse had been indicted. (Incidentally, none of the victims were Jews; in the Third Reich, most Jews were put to death without even the pretense of a court trial.)

The press, other news media, and large segments of the public expressed consternation and horror over the acquittal as well as the reasoning behind it, which was that every state (including that of Hitler) was entitled to take drastic measures for its protection. However, the defendants in the Volksgericht trials had not been charged with grave crimes, such as treason or serious attempts to attack the Nazi state, but with such minor offenses as spreading rumors about the Hitler regime, and others. The protesters
against Rehse's acquittal, for which there was no parallel, pointed out that it was illogical to reject the defense of former Nazi guards and officials that they merely carried out orders, and to free judges who, in cold blood, had sentenced anti-Nazis to death. The decision was under appeal, and Federal Attorney General Ludwig Martin announced that he would personally take charge of the retrial proceedings. Judge Oske, against whom huge demonstrations took place in Berlin, was reported to have suffered a nervous breakdown a week later.

At the end of 1968 the Ludwigsburg Central Office for Prosecution of Nazi Crimes, created by the states ministers of justice on December 1, 1958, had 170,000 names of Nazi criminals on file. Its staff of 120 legal experts and assistants tried desperately to open proceedings in as many cases as possible before the expiration of the federal statute of limitations on prosecution of Nazi crimes, on December 31, 1969. While Minister of Justice Gustav Heinemann and his party (SPD) were anxious to extend the statute, no action was taken. Kiesinger took no definite stand, and made contradictory, non-committal statements, apparently shrinking from taking a strong position on the issue shortly before the election campaign.* Yet, in October 1968, when Dr. Adalbert Rückerl, chief prosecutor of the Ludwigsburg agency, and some of his assistants went to Moscow, they found a wealth of new documentary evidence which was not known in West Germany.

Nationalism

As in previous years, the Deutsche National-Zeitung (the words "und Soldaten" were dropped from its title) was the main organ of the nationalist movement. Actually, it published five other weekly papers with similar contents under different names. NPD, the center of all nationalist activities, had its own, though less successful, organs: the Deutsche Nachrichten and the almost identical Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung, both of Hanover. While most foreign and many domestic observers called NPD "neo-Nazi," its leaders disclaimed practically all ideological links with the past.

The question of whether or not the party should be banned became very acute in 1968, and this for two reasons: Both the USSR and large groups in the United States expressed concern over NPD successes, and Kiesinger was worried lest a sizable NPD return in the 1969 Bundestag election (p. 365), as had occurred in practically all state diets (with the exception of Berlin, Hamburg, and North Rhine-Westphalia), would have repercussions in these countries. The West German government delayed a decision so long that even the most well-meaning critics became annoyed with its dilatory attitude, which was comparable to its attitude toward the extension of the statute of limitations.

* In the spring of 1965 as many as 63 per cent of all men and 76 per cent of all women pleaded for an end to the prosecution of Nazi criminals. Since then the percentage has probably risen.
In September rumors began to spread that the ministry of the interior, in an effort to uphold the constitution, was collecting material in support of an application to the constitutional court in Karlsruhe to ban NPD. Article 21, paragraph 2, of the federal constitution provided for the prohibition of political parties infringing on, or aiming at abolishing, the democratic order. Earlier this law led to the outlawing of a small rightist and the old Communist parties. In mid-November reports from Bonn indicated that Minister of Interior Ernst Benda thought he had sufficient evidence, and on December 18 he was said to have recommended appropriate action to the cabinet. According to the Stuttgarter Zeitung, he based his recommendation on four findings: (1) NPD was opposed to the idea of international understanding; (2) it stressed state power more than civil rights; (3) it demanded almost dictatorial powers for the federal president; (4) it advocated racist ideas.

No decision was reached by the cabinet, and Benda was asked to rearrange and resubmit the pertinent data and documents. The December 22 Frankfurter Rundschau stated that two SPD ministers supported Benda's recommendations, while two CDU/CSU ministers opposed it. But whether or not the government submitted the application to Karlsruhe, past experience indicated that it would take the court two or three years to reach a decision, certainly not before the federal elections. (Organizations such as the new liberal and leftist Demokratische Aktion, formed in Munich in January, have maintained that it was not necessary to resort to a protracted court action; they considered NPD an illegal organization that violated Law No. 2 of the Allied Control Council Laws as well as Article 139 of the federal constitution.) At any rate, experts doubted that any decisive action would be taken in the foreseeable future, and the election of NPD representatives to the federal parliament in September 1969 appeared almost a certainty.

In 1968 NPD frequently appeared in the news. Demonstrations against NPD meetings were held in May in Berlin, Bonn, Fürstenfeldbruck, and Offenbach, and in November in Munich. On October 7 Jochen Kotzias, Upper Bavarian district leader of NPD, resigned from the party. He followed the example of former Bavarian leader Florian Winter who resigned in October 1966 because, he said, NPD was a group of "godless fanatics." In December 1968 Winter published a 128-page book, Ich glaubte an die NPD ("I believed in the NPD") which revealed a number of damaging facts. Although a court order forbade him to state that the party had connections with South African Nazis or with the German Democratic Republic, he was permitted to say that NPD leaders "manipulated" their "elections," that "latent antisemitism was widespread in NPD circles," that the "leaders" never accounted for their finances, that two-thirds of DM 12,000, collected at a Munich election rally, disappeared. Nevertheless, he found the private and political attitude of NPD president Adolf von Thadden to be above reproach. The publisher of the book, Volker Hansen of Von Hase & Koehler at Mainz, was beaten, allegedly by NPD followers.
On advice of von Thadden, the West Berlin NPD, which had fewer than 500 members, dissolved on October 17 to prevent being banned by the Allied Powers upon Lord Mayor Klaus Schütz's request. Some members obtained a court order against that action, and the matter was pending at year's end.

**Indemnification and Restitution**

There were no major developments, neither legislation nor court decisions, in indemnification or restitution which for years have been in the process of completion. In February Albert Leicht, government expert in the ministry dealing with victims of Nazi persecution, estimated that another 1.4 billion mark ($350 million) would have to be paid out for claims.

The Federal Supreme Court at Karlsruhe decided, January 30, that a child born abroad of Jewish parents could claim restitution if there was proof that the mother suffered under Nazi persecution while pregnant, and that ailments of the child could be traced back to such illegal acts.

On April 1 the supreme court also ruled that Germans expatriated by the Nazis must be considered as never having lost their German citizenship, unless they later indicated that they did not wish to be considered as Germans. In particular, a November 25, 1941 Nazi decree depriving German Jews of their citizenship was declared illegal as of the date of issuance.

**Intergroup Relations**

The agencies of the Coordinating Council for Christian-Jewish Understanding in more than 40 cities carried on their usual programs of activities, mainly during Brotherhood Week, March 23–30. They included lectures, expositions, film presentations, and musical events. While the public joined in the observances, there was criticism from various quarters. Thinking Christians and Jews wondered whether the type of programs, that had been novel and adequate in the first post-war years, had not become empty routine. Rebellious students considered Brotherhood Week a typically hypocritical manifestation of the “establishment”; others, of the extreme right, used it as an occasion for voicing their anti-Jewish feelings in the guise of anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel.

It became more and more apparent that the brotherhood endeavors were in crisis, and that a solution could not be postponed indefinitely. The over-all Coordinating Council, located at Frankfurt, attempted to meet new needs by following a decidedly anticonservative and antinationalist line, thus extending the purely interfaith approach to one that was actively political and social. It was hoped that the routine activities of most societies could be improved by the influx of new members and new ideas.

On March 17 the Coordinating Council for the first time awarded the Buber-Rosenzweig medal to Professor Friedrich Heer of Vienna, Austria, author of the book *Gottes erste Liebe* ("God's First Love: Two Thousand
Years Judaism and Christianity”) and to Dr. Friedrich-Wilhelm Marquardt of Berlin for his book Die Entdeckung des Judentums für die christliche Theologie: Israel im Denken Karl Barth’s (“The Discovery of Judaism for Christian Theology: Israel in Karl Barth’s Thinking”).

Relations with Israel

Official relations between the Federal Republic and Israel did not undergo any significant changes. Although Foreign Minister Willy Brandt’s hope that diplomatic relations with the Arab states, which were broken off when the Federal Republic exchanged ambassadors with Israel (AJYB 1966 [Vol. 67], pp. 358-60), could be resumed, came to naught.

Many cultural events and economic developments showed the closeness of relations with Israel, but the attitudes of the Germans toward Israel appeared to be less favorable than in May and June 1967.

On May 15 German Ambassador Rolf Pauls presented a large collection of German books to the Ramat Gan municipal library, one of his last official acts before being replaced (August 10) by Karl Hermann Knoke, who had been ambassador in The Hague. It was acknowledged that Pauls had represented Germany for three years with tact and success. Knoke did not have to face the hostile demonstrations by rightist and leftist extremists that greeted Pauls in 1965.

On January 15 Frankfurt university opened an Israel week for which it invited eight professors of the Hebrew University. The city of Essen observed an Israel Week, April 30 to May 7. Plans were under discussion for a similar observance in Stuttgart, as well as for an exposition “3,000 Years Eternal Jerusalem” to be held in various cities.

On July 18 Bonn concluded a new agreement with Israel for financial aid in the construction of roads and other public works; in 1968 such aid was in the amount of 140 million mark ($35 million). The total credited by Bonn to Israel since 1963 (when the indemnification agreements expired) was DM 1 billion; DM 535 million, since 1966.

On November 3 the German airline Deutsche Lufthansa opened direct flights from Munich and Frankfurt to Lod in Israel. In the official party on the maiden flight from Frankfurt were Minister of Communications Georg Leber, Minister President of Hesse Georg August Zinn and Minister of Justice of North Rhine-Westphalia Josef Neuberger, representing the three leading political parties; other party representatives; delegates of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, as well as the Israel Ambassador to Germany Asher Ben Natan. The guests were welcomed in Israel by Transport and Communication Minister Moshe Carmel.

West Germany exports to Israel increased by about 80 per cent, from $104 million in the first half of 1967 to almost $213 million in the same period in 1968. An exposition “The New German Book,” with 4,000 titles,
was shown in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa, October 8-December 1. Some 25,000 copies of an attractive catalogue were distributed.

Two Germans selected for special honors by Israel's press and public were Rudolf Küstermeier, for 12 years the German Press Agency representative in Tel Aviv, and the head of the Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft (the trade unions' bank) Walter Hesselbach of Frankfurt, who received honorary fellowships from the Hebrew university and Tel Aviv university.

Among the many Germans who visited Israel, the most prominent was Dr. Gustav Heinemann, then Minister of Justice and SPD presidential candidate. He conferred with Israeli Minister of Justice Simeon Shapiro on the problems of the statute of limitations on Nazi crimes.

Germany strongly supported a new suggestion, in November, for some kind of association of Israel with the European Economic Community (EEC; Common Market). No results were expected in the near future in view of President Charles de Gaulle's opposition.

JEWISH COMMUNITY

The Jewish population of West Germany remained fairly constant: 26,114 Jews were registered with the Jewish communities on October 1, a slight decrease from 26,226 in 1967. The strongest decline was recorded in West Berlin: 5,771 in 1968 as compared with 5,885 in 1967.

During that 12-month period 80 Jewish children were born; 494 persons died. The return of Jews to Germany continued to be stronger than emigration, 937 compared to 463.

Between August 15 and November 30, the Jewish communities in the Federal Republic registered 825 refugees from Czechoslovakia.

Aid to Israel

Jewish giving for Israel through the Keren Ha-yesod, Keren Kayymet, Children and Youth Aliyah, and other funds continued on an impressive level, though individual contributions from both Jews and Gentiles were lower than in 1967.

Relations between the Jewish community in Germany and Israel, maintained through many channels, remained cordial and strong. It seemed to many that these were the strongest, all-embracing ties among German Jews. The reception given by the community to the Israel ambassador on the occasion of Israel's 20th anniversary was attended by 2,000 persons.

Communal and Social Welfare Activities

At the Zentralrat's (Central Council of Jews in Germany) 1968 conference, its general secretary, H. G. van Dam, said that a remark by Israel Ambassador Asher Ben Natan "Wir bestehen darauf, zu bestehen" ("We
insist on our existence”), applied to Israel and the Jewish community in Germany.

The Berlin Jewish community posthumously awarded its annual Heinrich Stahl prize to a German corporal by the name of Anton Schmid, who had helped many Jews in the East European ghettos and who was shot together with five Jews in April 1943.

In September the Jewish Hospital at Hamburg celebrated its 125th anniversary. Its new building, constructed in 1961, had a capacity of 220 beds.

The Zentralrat continued publication of its monthly *Jewish Press Service* ("Jüdischer Pressedienst").

During the year Jewish communities of Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, and Nuremberg began publishing their own papers, which they distributed to their members and to their former members now living abroad.

The Berlin Jewish Community arranged an exposition of “The Jewish Press in the 19th Century,” and held a memorial meeting for its former president, Heinrich Stahl, who died in Theresienstadt concentration camp.

*Cultural Events and New Books*

*Fiddler on the Roof*, the musical which was a great hit in New York and London, premiered as *Anatevka* in Hamburg on February 1, and had an attendance of 300,000 at its 274 performances. It then moved to Düsseldorf and Berlin. Tevya, the leading role, was played by the well-known Israeli actor Shmuel Rodensky. Public and press reaction was most enthusiastic.

The Munich Youth Theatre performed the Max Frisch drama *Andorra*, and radio and television stations continued to present topics of Jewish interest.

The death of Max Brod on December 18 in Israel, at the age of 84, was widely discussed by the German news media. The Prague-born writer had settled in Palestine in 1939, but continued to write his many books in German and visited post-war Germany almost every year. His editions of Franz Kafka’s works were published in Germany first.

Ambitious projects announced by German publishing concerns attracted international attention. The Berlin Propyläen-Verlag planned to print a facsimile of the famous Darmstadt Haggadah dating back to the 14th century, and the Munich Süddeutsche Verlag a facsimile edition of the only complete Talmud manuscript that has been preserved. This version of the Babylonian Talmud had been written down in France in 1343 by the scribe Salomon ben Shimson, found its way to Munich in 1803, and has been in the new Bavarian State Library ever since. The editions will cost about $500 each.

Rolf Vogel, editor of the *Deutschland-Berichte*, published in its second October issue a bibliography of 270 new books relating to Judaism, Jews, Israel, and related contemporary subjects. Among them were John Toland’s *Die letzten hundert Tage* ("The Finale: The Last Hundred Days") dealing with Hitler’s Germany in the final period of World War II; Robert W. Kempner, *Edith Stein and Anne Frank, Lebenszeichen aus Piaski* ("Letters
Personalia

Dr. Alfred Schüler, leading attorney of the United Restitution Organization, celebrated his 80th birthday on February 8. Fritz Kortner, famous actor, received the Ernst Reuter medal of the City of Berlin in February. Dr. Ernst Katzenstein, director of the Claims Conference at Frankfurt, was 70 years old on February 11. Rabbi Fritz Bloch, chairman of the Rabbinerkonferenz, the highest rabbinical body of West Germany, was honored on his 65th birthday on March 21. Ida Bär, a former inmate of Theresienstadt concentration camp and now the oldest Jewish woman in Frankfurt and probably in all of Germany, was widely honored on her 100th birthday on April 19.

At a ceremony in Düsseldorf at the end of May, Josef Neuberger, Justice Minister of Northrhine-Westphalia, was honored with one of the highest medals (Grosses Verdienstkreuz mit Stern des Bundesverdienstordens) by the president of the Federal Republic. In making the presentation, Prime Minister Heinz Kühn praised Neuberger's meritorious service. Before his appointment as minister, Neuberger had been active in the Zentralrat.

Jeanette Wolff, member of the West Berlin City Council, former SPD member of the Bundestag, and co-president of the League of Jewish Women as well as of the Berlin Jewish community, celebrated her 80th birthday in June. Ludwig Rosenberg, chairman of the German trade unions movement (Deutscher Gewerkschaft-Bund, DGB) was highly acclaimed on his 65th birthday on June 29. Emil Samuel, for many years president of the Minden Jewish community, was 75 years old on August 7. Richard Katz, well known author, was honored on his 80th birthday late in October. Fritz Goldstein, president of the Paderborn Jewish community, was 65 years old on December 30.

Paul Rosenthal, 65, president of the Wuppertal Jewish community, died on December 30, 1967. Peter Janiv, board member of the Frankfurt Jewish community died in Frankfurt on January 29. Max L. Oppenheimer, for many decades a highly honored Jewish communal worker, died at Heidelberg in February, at the age of 93. Salomon Lifsches, president of the
Mühlheim (Ruhr-Duisburg) Jewish community, died on February 17, at the age of 75. Werner Bockelmann, former Lord Mayor of Frankfurt, and a frequent visitor to Israel since 1958, died in a motorcar accident, in March at the age of 60. Leo Auerbach, a Frankfurt attorney who for years had served in the Zentralrat, the Jewish community and other communal agencies, died at the age 68. Fritz Bauer, the highest state attorney of Hesse and widely respected as a militant liberal, died on June 30 at the age of 65. Ruth Drost of Düsseldorf, a founder and board member of the League of Jewish Women, died on July 17, at the age of 59. Adolf Olkowitz, former board member and executive director of the Frankfurt Jewish community, died on September 24, at the age of 68.

Eleonore Sterling, professor of political science at the Pedagogic Academy in Osnabrück and author of many works on Jewish history died on December 27, at the age of 43. Among her writings were Er ist wie Du (“He Is Like Thou”), the history of German Antisemitism 1815–1850; Dokumente zur Geschichte der Frankfurter Juden, 1933–1945 (“Documents of the History of the Jews in Frankfurt, 1933–1945”); Der unvollkommene Staat (“The Imperfect State”). She also edited Ismar Elbogen’s Die Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland (“History of the Jews in Germany”). Dr. Sterling, who returned to Germany from the United States in 1949 and was the correspondent of the American Jewish Committee in Germany since 1958, was one of the leading scholars of the community, equally mourned by Jews and Christians.

HANS LAMM
East Germany

**POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Both domestically and in foreign policy, the East German regime sought to consolidate its power in 1968. Internally, it put into effect a new constitution which drastically reduced the rights its subjects supposedly—though never in fact—had had under the old one. Many observers felt that one of the important motives impelling the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia was the fear that the Czech example of democratization might undermine the position of Walter Ulbricht. The East Germans also feared that Czechoslovakia, next to the Soviet Union their most important trading partner, would shift much of that trade to the West. Certainly, the Ulbricht regime was in the forefront of the campaign against Czech "revisionism" and was one of the earliest and most consistent proponents of intervention. The East German attacks, delivered through the columns of the party organ *Neues Deutschland* and speeches by officials as well as through party and government channels, were in full swing as early as March. They recurred at frequent intervals thereafter.

**Relations with USSR**

East Germany's importance to the Soviet Union lay in the fact that, industrially, it was the most advanced member of the Soviet bloc. On a per capita basis its industrial production substantially exceeded that of the Soviet Union itself, and much of it was concentrated in fields requiring a high degree of technical sophistication. What now was the German Democratic Republic (DDR), had been before the war the center of the German optical and chemical industries and, despite Soviet removal of machinery in the early postwar period and the flight of many technicians and skilled workers to the West, the DDR's production in these fields was sufficiently important to play a major role in Soviet economic planning. Indeed, about one-sixth of the Soviet Union's foreign trade was with DDR; anything that might interfere with this trade, or substitute for the Ulbricht regime one which might insist on trade terms more favorable to East Germany, was a direct threat to the Soviet economy.

**Provisions of New Constitution**

A new constitution for the DDR was adopted by a plebiscite on April 6, with the approval of 94.54 per cent of the voters according to the official
count. A dispatch to the New York Times noted that "Opposition was almost impossible in smaller places, where entire factory groups and communities went to cast their votes in public." Among the rights "guaranteed" by the 1949 constitution, but not by the new one, were the right to strike, to emigrate, and to travel freely. The first in fact had never existed, and, since the construction of the Berlin Wall, the exercise of the second and third had been possible for most East Germans only at the risk of being shot by a border guard.

A number of changes were made in the constitution between the announcement of the first draft in January and the plebiscite in April. One of these, introduced at the request of the East German churches, was a statement that "Every citizen of the German Democratic Republic is guaranteed the same rights and duties irrespective of his nationality, race, ideology, or religious profession and faith." The government announced that this change was secured by Evangelical Bishop Moritz Mitzenheim of Thuringia, a long-time friend of Walter Ulbricht and the only Evangelical bishop who did not sign a request for changes in the original draft, which he called a perfect charter of humanity. Also, a statement that church-state relations "may be regulated through agreements" was added to a clause requiring the activities of the churches to be in harmony with the provisions of the law. This provided a framework within which the state, if it so desired, could give the churches some measure of autonomy, although it certainly offered no guarantee that this would be done. In fact, East German delegates were denied government permission to attend the July meeting of the World Council of Churches in Sweden.

Relations with Czechoslovakia

The contrast between developments in Czechoslovakia and the new East German constitution could not have been lost on either the Ulbricht regime or the East Germans. It doubtless was one of the factors responsible for the violence of the DDR regime's denunciations of Czechoslovaks. In March, when the new East German Constitution was awaiting ratification, these attacks became especially strong. Thus on March 12, the official organ Neues Deutschland printed an address by Czech conservative Drahomir Kolder, denouncing "spontaneous democratization" and speaking of the "pogrom mood" of the liberalizers. To this Neues Deutschland added an editorial charging certain circles in Prague with using the affair of General Jan Sejna (a Novotny supporter who had fled to the United States) "to raise demands for social-political changes." The next day it warned that "imperialist opponents are strengthening their efforts to influence activation of forces desiring to pull Czechoslovakia back to early capitalism."

On March 25, Kurt Hager, a member of the Politburo and the party's leading theoretician, denounced those who wanted to "regenerate" Communism, for forgetting dialectical materialism, the class struggle, and the key role of
the working class. He charged them with slandering the party organization by calling it a “conservative bureaucratic apparatus” and with exalting the role of the intelligentsia at the expense of the working class. There was no doubt that his targets were the Czechs. In a second speech a day later, he specifically denounced the Czech liberal Josef Smrkovsky. He noted that “West German propaganda centers zealously quote the remarks of Forestry Minister Smrkovsky. They report at great length the attacks of journalists and writers upon the leading role of the party, the Central Committee and its apparatus, and leading members of the government.” He offered the Czechs the guidance of the East German party in their “days of storm and stress.” Far from accepting this generous offer, the Czechs delivered an unprecedented protest to the East German Ambassador to Prague. A polemic between the press and sometimes the officials of the two countries continued until and even after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August. The East German regime also sought Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia; Ulbricht visited Moscow for this purpose at the end of May.

The presence of East German troops in the invasion force pointed up for many the parallel with the time of the Munich pact. Of the new invaders the Soviet Union alone had not been among the old. And the invasion was preceded by a meeting between Ulbricht and Alexander Dubček on August 12 in which Ulbricht reportedly issued an ultimatum. A belated recognition of the meaning for world public opinion of a new incursion by German troops into Czechoslovakia reportedly led the Soviet command to limit sharply the East German role in the occupation. However, this did not impose a brake on the East German propaganda effort. One particularly interesting aspect of this was the charge in Ulbricht’s Socialist Unity Party (SED) organ *Neues Deutschland* on August 25 that “The workers have lost control of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia” and “Zionist forces have taken over the leadership.” Other articles specifically singled out for attack those Jews and part-Jews who had played a role in the Czechoslovak liberalization movement.

**Anti-Jewish Propaganda**

The attack on Jews and “Zionism” was, of course, paralleled in other countries of the Soviet bloc. But according to Simon Wiesenthal, director of the Vienna Documentation Center of the Association of Jewish Nazi Victims, the East German denunciations had a special style that was not duplicated elsewhere in Eastern Europe. This he ascribed to the fact that many key figures in the East German propaganda machine had held similar positions under the Nazis. He noted that, except for a few verbal alterations, e.g. “Israeli” instead of “Jew” and “progressive forces” instead of “National Socialism,” articles in *Neues Deutschland* were indistinguishable from some in the *Völkische Beobachter*. At a press conference on September 6 he explained that this discovery in 1967 led him to begin an investigation into
the backgrounds of East German propagandists. He pointed out that since the conditions of dictatorship in East Germany made it difficult to find out exactly who did what job, his list only scratched the surface. Nevertheless, the 39 names presented gave some extremely interesting insights. Thus Kurt Blecha, head of the Prime Minister's press office, was a former member of the National Socialist party. Hans Walter Aust, editor-in-chief of the official foreign policy organ *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, had worked for the Gestapo and *Sicherheitsdienst* (security police) as supervisor of the National Federation of German Writers. He had also written for the official organ of the SS, Hitler's élite guard. A number of other East German officials had been almost as important in the Nazi hierarchy.

**Opposition to Invasion of Czechoslovakia**

Despite the mobilization of the official propaganda machine, and its completely unscrupulous distortions, there was widespread opposition to the invasion in East Germany. Protest demonstrations were reported in a number of cities, and the Czech embassy in East Berlin was deluged with expressions of sympathy such as flowers and visitors braving the security police. A number of young people, some members of prominent East German families, were given prison sentences for participating in these demonstrations. Among them were Franck and Florian Havemann, sons of the scientist Robert Havemann who, a few years before was removed as professor of chemistry at the Humboldt university for criticizing the regime. Not all came from oppositional backgrounds. Thomas Brasch, son of Deputy Minister of Cultural Affairs Horst Brasch, was sentenced to a term of two years and three months. His father reported him to the authorities. And Inge Berthold, daughter of the head of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism, was given a 27-month suspended sentence and ordered to leave school and work in a factory for its duration.

**The Middle East**

Like the other countries of the Soviet bloc, East Germany gave political and economic support to the Arab states and denounced Israel in violent terms. In connection with the tenth anniversary of the East German-Arab Society, its president, Paul Scholz, wrote in *Neues Deutschland* (October 22, 1968) that one of its purposes was "enlightenment on the background to Israel's wanton aggression and more especially unmasking the West German imperialists as the abettors of it." In a similar spirit, *Neues Deutschland* (December 4, 1968) accused the "Dayan mercenaries" of "never-ending terror actions."

A number of cultural and economic agreements were reached during the year between East Germany and various Arab states, notably the United Arab Republic and Iraq. There were also visits to the Arab states by East
German technical and cultural delegations; similar groups from Arab states visited East Germany.

MAURICE J. GOLDBLOOM

JEWISH COMMUNITY

News of the life of the remnants of the East German Jewish community could be obtained mainly in East Berlin, which West Germans, except West Berliners, and citizens of other nations could visit freely. More difficult and therefore exceedingly infrequent were visits to other Jewish communities in the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR).

Leon Brandt, an Israeli journalist who spent considerable time in the DDR, reported that at least 92 per cent of the 1,210 Jews were over 60 years old. In 1967 there were, according to his report, 60 deaths, as compared with only two births. Some 2,000 persons of Jewish descent but with no ties to the Jewish community allegedly lived in the DDR, among them Alfred Norden, the chief propagandist of the regime.

No restitution of any sort was made for the property of the East Berlin Jewish community, valued at 13 million Ostmark.

The Jewish cemetery at Berlin-Weissensee, the largest in all of Germany with 114,000 graves, appeared rather neglected despite a 200,000 mark maintenance expenditure by the DDR government. A former Jewish children's home from which 150 children and 70 infants had been deported, was converted into a home for the aged, housing 34 Jews, most of them women.

Another source of information was the Nachrichtenblatt der Jüdischen Gemeinde von Gross-Berlin und des Verbandes der Jüdischen Gemeinde in der DDR, issued quarterly in Dresden and Berlin. From October 1967 to October 1968, it reported 48 deaths in East Berlin, and ten in six other communities (Halle, Dresden, Karl-Marx-Stadt, Magdeburg, Thuringia, and Mecklenburg; none for Leipzig). No births were recorded in this quarterly. It contained little other information: Matzot and Passover wine were imported from Hungary and Bulgaria; Passover services in the Ryke Strasse synagogue in East Berlin were attended by 25 to 45 persons. Helmut Aris, the president of the DDR communities, was given a Hanukkah menorah on the occasion of his 60th birthday in May. Dr. Ödön Singer of Budapest, Hungary, was the only rabbi in the DDR. The Nachrichtenblatt never mentioned the State of Israel.

Novelist Arnold Zweig died in East Berlin on November 27, at the age of 81. Upon his return from Haifa shortly after the end of World War II, he severed most ties with Zionism, which he had advocated for decades. While Zweig professed strong loyalty to Marxism, he never signed an anti-Israel document. Yet, he had received the highest honors from the DDR regime, and the authorities honored his memory at a meeting in the Deutsche Theater.
and at his grave in the (non-Jewish) Dorotheenstädtischer Friedhof. The author of Der Streit um den Sergeanten Grischa ("The Case of Sergeant Grischa") never denied his Jewishness.

Alfred Behrendt, a board member of the East Berlin Jewish community, died on June 1, at the age of 70.

HANS LAMM