

Review
of
the
Year

UNITED STATES
OTHER COUNTRIES

Civic and Political

Intergroup Relations and Tensions in the United States

ALTHOUGH it may not have seemed so from day to day, 1969 turned out to be the "Year of the Pause." The black "revolution" hesitated. The white "counter-revolution" surfaced officially, but less assertively than had been expected. The student "revolution" slowed down. Compared with the previous few years, the blood pressure of the nation seemed to drop. Yet the social problems in question were not demonstrably alleviated; intergroup hostility was at as high a conscious level as ever; there were no new serious expressions of reconciliation or optimism in any quarter. The segments of the population seemed to be circling each other warily, waiting, as though a little frightened by their own passions. It was impossible to tell by year's end whether this was a calm period in the same old storm, or the beginning of some new, uncharted turbulence. The Jewish community shared in this uneasiness, developing some insecurities of its own. There was a growing sense of the minority status of the Jews in America, as a new administration took office and the Middle East crisis became chronic.

BLACK AMERICA

As the 1960's came to a close, there was more than the usual amount of stocktaking. How much progress was actually made in the last decade and in the period of the black revolution? During the year certain statistical indexes were released, which pointed to relative as well as absolute advancement.

Employment

A key Bureau of Labor Statistics document¹ analyzed 1962-1967, the most recent five-year period for which comprehensive statistics were avail-

¹Clare C. Hodges, "The Negro Job Situation: Has It Improved?" *Monthly Labor Review* (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Office of Manpower and Employment), January, 1969.

able, and reported substantial improvement in the Negro job situation. During that period, over a million Negroes moved into jobs offering higher pay and status. In 1962 about 17 per cent of the nonwhite labor force were in white-collar occupations: professional, managerial, clerical, sales. In 1967 the percentage was about 23. For the white labor force the comparative figures were 47 and 49 per cent. In five years, almost three quarters of a million Negroes moved into these middle-class occupations. The black rate of new entry into these categories of occupation was about three times that of the white working force. In other terms, during 1962-1967 the percentage of Negroes in white-collar jobs rose from 4 to 5.4 per cent, representing about one-fifth of the progress needed for blacks to grow—and the whites to shrink—to proportions which paralleled their respective representation in the total working force.

Also during that period, the number of blacks in skilled craftsmen occupations rose from about 6 per cent to about 8 per cent, while the proportions of whites remained the same, at some 14 per cent. Almost a quarter of a million Negroes entered this category, at approximately four times the rate of the white population. They made about one-quarter of the progress needed for them to grow—and the whites to shrink—to the proportions paralleling their proportions in the total working force.

Another encouraging note was the expansion of Negro employment in fields that were considered to offer the best jobs in terms of pay, advancement, security, and status. Negro employment grew especially rapidly in education, public administration, and durable goods manufacturing. The number of Negroes in these jobs rose by nearly 60 per cent, as compared to some 25 per cent for white workers.

One index of the growing economic stability among Negro workers was the decline in long-term unemployment. In 1962 about one-third of the Negro unemployed were out of a job for 15 weeks or more. By 1967 only about one-sixth were so chronically unemployed, about the same proportion as among white workers. One statistical aspect of the educational picture also improved substantially. At the beginning of that five-year period, non-white young men averaged two years less schooling than white young men. At the end, the gap was only six months. The dropout rate also dropped considerably; the percentage of Negroes in central cities who completed high school rose from 43 in 1960, to 61 by the end of 1967; but their group level of academic achievement remained much lower.

Of course, the meaning of these statistics depended in part on interpretation. There still was a substantial gap between the economic status of Negroes and whites. Since the beginning of the decade, the Negro median family income increased from 61 to 68 per cent of the white median family income in the central cities; but it still was only 68 per cent. Most significantly, increasing numbers of Negroes "trickled upwards" into better working- and middle-class occupations, leaving large pools of even more

concentrated ghetto poverty behind. In a *Washington Post* analysis of the 1969 report on Negro status, Herman Miller, director of the Census Bureau's population division and author of the report, wrote:

The figures that we have for the very poorest areas in Cleveland and Los Angeles, places like Hough and Watts, show that poverty in these places has increased, average family income has not risen, and unemployment rates have remained very high. This deterioration may reflect the migration of the more successful families from the slums, leaving behind widows, deserted wives and children, the aged and the uneducated—those least able to cope with their social and economic problems.²

At the point when the poverty programs of the past eight years were being reexamined, it was clear that the ghetto areas were continuing to deteriorate; their hard-core poverty was stubbornly resisting any mass remedy. The welfare rolls were rising, and the percentage of Negro families headed by women increased from 23 per cent in 1960, to 30 per cent at the beginning of 1969.

General Mood

Thus while, by usual historical standards for emerging groups, there was continuing and substantial economic advancement, the mood of bitterness and frustration on the part of Negroes did not abate. The corporate sense of poverty and oppression still stamped black America, and was reflected by corporate black spokesmen.

When CORE director Roy Innis was asked by Urban America to comment on the 1969 government report, he said: "I haven't seen it, but any kind of report presenting a pleasant picture of blacks in the city is almost a vicious lie." John Morsell of NAACP said: "The dilemma in commenting on a report of this kind is that one must rely on the census figures to reach his conclusion. You can't really get a feel of the way things are except by walking through the streets."³

The *Newsweek* poll of June 1969 indicated that the corporate anger of black America remained high. It is not that Negroes were unmindful of the progress that was being made: 7 out of 10 said that the blacks made progress during the past five years, and 6 out of 10 felt that they personally made progress on the job and in getting their children educated. On the other hand, about 6 out of 10 thought the pace of progress too slow, as against some 4 out of 10, three years earlier. And about one-half of black America felt that local police violated Negro rights, as against about one-third three years earlier. In statistical sum, the blacks recognized that they were making economic progress, but were still angry at the whites. The anger was especially visible among those under 30, and in the ghettos. According to the

² Reported in *Chronicle*, monthly report of Urban America, Inc., March 1969, p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

Newsweek poll, over one-half of the Northern black youth believed that the white population was actively involved in keeping blacks down, and another third believed the whites were indifferent, at best. Over one-third said that Negroes could get what they wanted only by violent means.

Decline of Separatism

This all pointed up the mixed quality of the end-of-the-decade feelings in the black community. The organizational life of the black community in 1969 was similarly unstrung. Most strikingly, black separatism visibly lost some of its forward drive. For one thing, the separatist groups were pulling in somewhat different directions. CORE proposed black capitalism, and introduced a Self-Determination Act in Congress, which would make massive credit available to the black man for his own business enterprises. The National Black Power Conference in Detroit talked about going the same route, but by way of cooperatives rather than black capitalism. The cultural nationalists, such as US, emphasized the central need of black cultural unity. SNCC emphasized the importance of black political power.

The Black Panthers made the transition from a black nationalist group to a universalistic revolutionary movement. This was the one most important symbolic development which signaled, at least temporarily, an end to the virgin thrust of black nationalism. The Black Panthers had been a fiercely nationalist and separatist movement. During the 1968 elections, some of their leadership became involved in California with the Peace and Freedom Party, and they began to become politicized in the traditional radical sense. This tendency came to climax in a three-day conference held under Black Panther auspices in Oakland, Cal., July 18–20, which was billed as the birth of a "United Front Against Communism."

The call for united political action by all radical groups displaced the black nationalist theme. Most of the several thousand participants in the conference were white. The keynote speaker was Herbert Aptheker, white Communist party theoretician. Observers noted a number of apparent ties between that section of the old Left and the Black Panthers. Progressive Labor party representatives were barred from the conference, and pro-Maoist material began to disappear from the Black Panther newspaper. David Hilliard, one of the top leaders of the Black Panthers, said in the August 3 issue of the *Black Panther* that the Communist party "actually came out and did some degree of work to put the conference over." In the August 16 issue of *The Guardian*, he said: "We are aligned with factions within the CP who want to move forward to a better society." As this trend developed, Stokely Carmichael, who had been a high functionary of the Black Panthers, attacked them publicly for breaking faith with black nationalism.

For the time being at least, the separatist thrust seemed to be petering out, partly perhaps because it never had massive black support. The 1969 *News-*

week poll found that only 9 per cent of black America wanted segregated schools, and only 13 per cent thought that "Negroes will make more progress by running their own schools, businesses and living in their own neighborhoods rather than by integrating." According to *Newsweek*, even among the under-30 Negroes, "the cause for perhaps three-quarters of their generation is still the old set of goals: no more and no less than an equal chance at decent jobs, housing and education—within an integrated America."

Black Business

As the more symbolic goals seemed to recede, "old-fashioned" economic goals became more important. The most dramatic theme was "black business," which gained prominence in the latter part of 1968 through the vocal support of the Nixon administration and the increased activities of the Small Business Administration (SBA). In every fairly large community a number of business development corporations, and other private coalitions and agencies were involved in stimulating black business. In Philadelphia, the Business Development Corporation, owned by 3,000 Negro shareholders at \$2 a share, helped arrange SBA-guaranteed loans for black businessmen through a consortium of banks. In Chicago, Reverend Jesse Jackson's "Operation Breadbasket" helped obtain contracts for service-oriented black business. The Rochester Business Opportunities Corporation, a mixture of community groups and banks, provided loans directly, or helped secure loans through SBA.

For obvious reasons, this in fact was the kind of activity in which organized sections of the Jewish community felt they could effectively participate. For example, an American Jewish Committee end-of-the-year report recorded that a number of its chapters helped with both financing and business counseling: In San Diego, American Jewish Committee members formed a development company to provide seed money and expertise to help Negro businessmen. In Chicago, Negroes wishing to buy neighborhood businesses from nonresident whites received management counsel and financial aid from the American Jewish Committee, in cooperation with the Economic Development Corporation. Working through the Los Angeles Chapter, a paint manufacturer arranged to establish a paint store which was to be owned and controlled by a black organization.

Certainly, 1969 was the year in which more national conferences on black business were held than ever before. But around these activities and these conferences developed some discussion and dissent about the nature and value of black business, especially in the ghetto. Reverend Jesse Jackson said:

Black people control nothing in the ghetto. The island has to exist in a capitalistic system without any capital. Any area in capitalism without a circular flow of capital is a slum, whether it's Appalachian, white or Southside black.⁴

⁴ *Business Lawyer*, September 1969, p. 12.

Roy Innis put it more ideologically:

Separation is a more equitable way of organizing the society. The important distinction is that in such a society the control of goods and services flowing through a distinct geographical area inhabited by a distinct population group would be in the hands of those indigenous to the area.⁵

Others, like Bayard Rustin, had doubts:

Most of the experiments in black capitalism thus far have been total failures, as, given the odds, they should continue to be. For one thing, small businesses owned and run by blacks will, exactly like their white counterparts, suffer a high rate of failure. In fact, they will face even greater problems than white small businesses because they will be operating in predominantly low-income areas. . . On the other hand to create large-scale black industry in the ghetto is unthinkable. The capital is not available and even if it were there is no vacant land.⁶

A side issue in the controversy over black business arose out of the aversion of some to perpetuate institutions of capitalism, when they felt that only a change of the economic system would benefit the Negro population. Thus, some black business efforts emphasized cooperatives. In April, while the prestigious and "capitalistic" American Assembly was holding a conference on black economic development in New York, the National Black Economic Development Conference in Detroit, through James Forman, issued a *Black Manifesto* demanding a half billion dollars from American churches and synagogues. Although it was not altogether clear how the money was to be used, the emphasis was on land and cooperatives rather than on capitalistic ventures.

However, the chief lines of controversy crossing the issue of black business had to do with separatism, on the one hand, and workability, on the other. James Gibson ended an article on ghetto economic development, titled "New Ways of Giving Non-Whites the Business?" with these words: "if we cannot make ours one society and one market place, we will not be able to erect two."⁷

In an era of economic domination by massive corporate structures, for some the useful black business thrust would be one that skirted ghetto business altogether, and concentrated on developing black service and manufacturing enterprises that would be satellite to the corporations; or, even more difficult but probably more important, placing black executives within that corporate structure.

Employment

Meanwhile, for most of the black population, the central problem remained that of getting more and better jobs. The end of the traditional civil

⁵ *Civil Rights Digest*, Spring 1969, p. 12.

⁶ *Harper's Magazine*, January 1970, p. 28.

⁷ *Civil Rights Digest*, Spring 1969, p. 4.

rights period was signaled, early in the 1960s, by a series of direct-action assaults by the black groups on job sites, especially in the construction industry. This arena and form of action came to the fore again in 1969. In Pittsburgh, in August, black demonstrators took to the streets in protest against the low number of Negroes in the construction unions, managing to shut down 15 construction projects.

The black interest in moving into the skilled construction trades was reflected by the Nixon administration's revitalization of the so-called Philadelphia Plan. A Philadelphia Pre-Award Plan, instituted by the Department of Labor in 1967, required low bidders on each federally-assisted contract to submit an affirmative action program for increasing minority group representation in the skilled construction trades. At the end of 1968 the U.S. comptroller general ruled the plan illegal, unless some minimal standards for "affirmative action" were set. In July 1969 a Labor Department-revised Philadelphia plan required employers to make "good faith efforts" to meet goals of minority hiring levels, ranging from 4 per cent in 1969, to 26 per cent in 1973. The comptroller general still opposed the plan as one violating the Civil Rights Act because it called for racial quotas. Under pressure from the administration, Congress refused to outlaw the plan. Black groups approved, although sometimes lukewarmly; organized labor objected; and the Contractors Association went to court in opposition, losing in the first round.

Meanwhile the black pressures—and the threat of Philadelphia plans being imposed around the country—led to different confrontations and plans in cities like Boston, Chicago, New York, and San Francisco. The Chicago plan, approved by unions, employers, and minority community groups, provided that the minority communities help recruit 1,000 skilled workers to be accepted immediately as full journeymen, and another 3,000 whom the unions and employers were to place immediately in a skill-training program. The Boston plan provided for at least one trainee for every four journeymen on public construction.

Hanging over all of these plans was the shadow of economic recession. In August the Commerce Department reported a 9 per cent decline in housing starts in July, the sixth consecutive monthly decline. And the Nixon administration called for an extensive cutback in construction as part of its fight against inflation. The problem in the construction industry highlighted the perilous dilemma facing the entire society: at a time when economic goals again were coming to the fore, and when there were clear indications of substantial economic progress by the black community, the entire economy was slipping badly. As unemployment rates rose, presumably as a deliberate function of the fight against inflation, the economic advancement of blacks, who were still the first to be laid off, began to be eroded. And the uneasiness of the white working-class population grew.

WHITE AMERICA

While the focus of the "black revolution" began to blur a bit in 1969, despite the continued level of generalized anger, it was the year for the full public emergence of the body of discontented white Americans. The mass media discovered "Middle America," and the "Other Other Americans." It was significant that the term white backlash was not used as freely as in previous years. The legitimacy of the seed discontent among the white American working and lower-middle classes was being acknowledged. Pete Hamill wrote:

The working-class white man is actually in revolt against taxes, joyless work, the double standards and joint memories of professional politicians, hypocrisy and what he considers the debasement of the American dream . . . any politician who leaves that white man out of the political equation does so at very large risk.⁸

Congressman Hugh Carey of New York said:

The average working stiff is not asking for very much. He wants a decent apartment, he wants a few beers on the weekend, he wants his kids to have decent clothes, he wants to go to a ballgame once in a while, and he would like to put a little money away so that his kids can have the education that he could never afford. That's not asking a hell of a lot. But he's not getting that. He thinks society has failed him and, in a way, if he is white, he is often more alienated than the black man. At least the black man has his own organizations, and can submerge himself in the struggle for justice and equality, or elevate himself, whatever the case may be. The black man has hope, because no matter what some of the militants say, his life is slowly getting better in a number of ways. The white man who makes \$7,000 a year, who is 40, knows that he is never going to earn much more than that for the rest of his life, and he sees things getting worse, more hopeless.⁹

In the Spring 1969 issue of *New Generation*, in an article entitled "The Other Other America: The White Working Class," sociologists William Simon, John H. Gagnon, and Donald Carns wrote about the disaffection of the working-class youth:

Part of the problem has been the failure of the society's cultural middle men, its intellectuals, even to begin to recognize this population. . . [T]hese anti-establishment intellectuals may be hard to distinguish from the establishment itself. For working-class populations, particularly the young, these anti-establishment groups have become the establishment, at least to the degree that they set the tone of the surface imagery of our times. And, for example, much is said of the crisis of the colleges and the ghetto schools, both apparently requiring growing investments of society's resources. Does anyone for a moment think that the quality of education in the working-class schools in this country—both public and parochial—is any better? That the slaughter of human poten-

⁸ Pete Hamill, "The Revolt of the White Lower Middle Class," *New York*, April 14, 1969, p. 29.

⁹ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 28.

tial and sensibility is any less severe? Or that a crisis of identity equal in magnitude to that of the children of the affluent middle class or those of the ghetto is not going on among the youth of the working class? . . . For him [the working class youth] racial integration (and the disruption of community life that he feels, not without justification, must follow) is part of an organized effort within which agents of government, the mass media and even the church are co-conspirators. Thus he too becomes anti-establishment, but for him it is a liberal establishment, and before it he feels increasingly powerless.

Gus Tyler commented on the legitimacy of these disaffections in the July 7 issue of the *New Leader*, warning those who would simply dismiss them as racist:

To ask people to be fearless when they have every reason to be afraid is to ask normal folk to act abnormally. . . . They will seek safety—no matter what political ribbon is wrapped around the prized package of survival. Castigating these people as stupid (some are) or racist (others are) does not solve the problem. They will in the end simply conclude that the lofty lecturer who thus looks down on them is himself either stupid or a racist, or both.

Basic Discontents

There was no question that the emergence and thrust of the black population became connected to these disaffections; but more and more observers were pointing out in 1969 that the bigotry was being attached as a tail to basic discontents, rather than the other way around. A Pennsylvania steel town clergyman, Gabriel Fackre, in the May 7 issue of the *Christian Century* pointed out that "prejudice had always existed in 'seed form' among the workingmen," but something else had been added to bring that prejudice into full bloom:

. . . alienation—as severe, disorienting and thingifying as that felt by the black, the young and the poor. . . . In the mind of the blue collar worker, the black citizens had "gotten to" the effective centers of cultural change. In fact, as far as he could see from changes in his own existence, "they" were in cahoots with the blacks. As he saw it, strings were pulled that took Negroes off sweeper jobs, and put them on the line next to him, or, miracle of miracles, in foreman and executive jobs above him. He even heard rumors of preferential hiring which, according to bar room talk, would put him out on the street in favor of the black man. And when he came home from the frustrations of work what did he find? "They" were pushing black faces at him through the TV screen which was supposed to be his escape hatch from the harsh realities of daily life. Furthermore, "they" were rearranging his neighborhood so that these "outsiders" could move in, and "they" were conducting social experiments with his kids, moving things around in the schools so that the blacks could "take over" there too. In all these cultural shifts, it seemed clear to the white worker, "they" were at it again. And, of all things, "they" were giving the Negro the decision-making power and personal recognition he so desperately craved.

Newsweek's special report, "The Troubled American,"¹⁰ said, in summary, that

... the average American is more deeply troubled about his country's future than at any time since the Great Depression. The surface concerns are easy to catalogue: a futile war abroad and a malignant racial attitude at home; unnering inflation and scarifying crime rates, the implacable hostility of much of the young. But the middle American malaise cuts much deeper—right to those fundamental questions of the sanctity of work and the stability of the family, of whether a rewarding middle class life is still possible in modern America.

The poll of white Americans with incomes between \$5,000 and \$15,000, conducted by the Gallup organization for this *Newsweek* report, confirmed the nature of the discontents: Half believed that the United States had changed for the worse over the past decade, and more than half that it was likely to get worse; two-thirds thought the police should have more power, and about 85 per cent that both black militants and college demonstrators were treated too leniently. Forty-four per cent believed "Negroes have a better chance than people like yourself to get well-paying jobs"; only 21 per cent thought Negroes had a worse chance.

This mood of apparent white anger, combined with the mood of black anger, would seem to have provided the elements of a disastrous explosion. And, indeed, there was some explosive language. "They think they've heard from black power," *Newsweek* quoted one community worker in a Slavic neighborhood in Milwaukee, "wait till they hear from white power—the little slob. . . Boy, he's getting sick and tired of all this mess. One day he'll get fed up and when he does, look out."

Black-White Tension

But the explosion never took place. There were some ugly scenes, especially at points of direct confrontation. Notably when Pittsburgh black demonstrators took to the streets in August in protest against the low number of Negroes in the construction unions, Mayor Joseph M. Barr arranged a two day shut-down of 15 major construction projects, while negotiations took place. Over 4,000 construction workers marched in counter-demonstration, denounced the mayor, and invaded his offices. Most of the signs they carried had to do with lost wages, but others said: "We build the city, not burn it down," "White police and union unity," and "We are the majority." Confetti rained down on the demonstrators from white-collar workers in office buildings nearby. Negroes on a passing city garbage truck were booed.

The construction industry was a notorious tinderbox: Some of the craft unions were almost all white; entry was rigidly structured through apprenticeship, a long and arduous route; construction would be hit early by a reces-

¹⁰ "The Troubled American: A Special Report on the White Majority," *Newsweek*, October 6, 1969, p. 28.

sion; the unions attacked the Philadelphia Plan fiercely as a deliberate device to pit labor and blacks against each other. But 1969 passed without the serious direct confrontations that this impasse seemed to make inevitable.

But while, for the most part, massive confrontations were avoided, expressions of interracial anger were, if anything, on the increase—and the anger was indeed being acted out in smaller group settings. Federal officials reported an increase in 1969 in the number of firebombings. Also, in November, an official of the Department of Defense admitted what had already become apparent: that racial tension was “a pervasive problem throughout the armed forces.” There were scattered reports of sustained violence between black and white servicemen at various bases. At Camp Lejeune, N.C., in July, fighting between Negro and white Marines left one killed and 44 injured. The Marine Corps subsequently bent its rules to permit the use of the clenched-fist black-power salute and the Afro hair style. These conflicts also existed in Vietnam. L. Howard Bennett, deputy assistant secretary of defense for civil rights, said of Vietnam: “In World War II and Korea we had racial problems after the war came to an end, after the confrontation with the enemy. Here sometimes we’re faced with a problem at the height of enemy hostilities.”¹¹ He indicated the Army would shortly follow the Marine Corps lead in relaxing certain regulations.

However, in 1969 the “riot watch” division of the U.S. Department of Justice recorded only five incidents of civil disorder, characterized as “riots,” in Hartford, Conn.; Harrisburg, Pa.; Youngstown, Ohio; York, Pa., and Omaha, Nebr. Seven such “riots” were recorded in 1968 and 11 in 1967, and these had greater intensity than the later disorders. The *Civil Disorder Digest* of September commented that “For whatever reasons, the summer months of 1969 were definitely ‘cooler’.”

During the year there were other warnings that the now explicitly two-way tensions would explode in the political arena, with Middle America decisively asserting its power. In the spring, municipal elections took place in New York, Minneapolis, and Los Angeles, which seemed to embody the revolt of the discontented whites. In all three cases, the “law-and-order” candidates pointedly won over the liberal candidates. In Minneapolis, Charles Stenvig, a policeman, won over both Democratic and Republican candidates. Stenvig said:

People felt that nobody was representing them and nobody was listening. They felt alienated from the political system, and they had it up to their Adams apples on just about everything. So they took a guy like me—four kids, an average home, working man, they could associate themselves with. They just said: “Lookit, we’re sick of you politicians.”¹²

In the New York City spring primary (p. 217), Mario Procaccino, with a strong law-and-order image, won the Democratic candidacy; and John

¹¹ New York Times, November 29, 1969.

¹² Newsweek, October 6, 1969, p. 60.

Marchi won the Republican candidacy against the less conservative candidate, incumbent Mayor John V. Lindsay. In Los Angeles, "tough" Mayor Sam Yorty won a May run-off against Negro candidate Thomas Bradley.

These elections were generally acknowledged to be expressive of a mood of discontent in Middle America: about taxes, inflation, violence, and crime on the streets, which continued to soar. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's annual *Uniform Crime Reports* indicated in 1969 that the national rate of criminal homicide increased by 36 per cent since the beginning of the decade, forcible rape by 65 per cent, aggravated assault by 67 per cent, and robbery by 119 per cent. In Baltimore it was pointed out that a citizen had 1 chance in 49 of being the victim of a violent crime during the year.

The mayoralty elections reflected these concerns behind which certainly lurked racial tensions. However, all three electoral battles fizzled out as Armageddons of black-white tensions. By and large, the political campaigns carefully avoided direct confrontations. And, characteristic of the year, the elections were blurred in their specific mandates, though they expressed a general mood direction. Thomas Bradley did get 47 per cent of the vote in Los Angeles, although the blacks comprised only about 15 per cent of the population, and Maurice J. Goldbloom pointed out in *Commentary*¹³ that "no other liberal has come that close to election in Los Angeles in the past half century." Goldbloom also suggested that the New York primary vote did not show a significant shift to the right, as much as it demonstrated fragmentation in the Democratic party. Procaccino, the clearest "hard-line" candidate, running against four liberal opponents, won with only one third of the Democratic vote. And Mayor John Lindsay won the run-off in November against both Procaccino and Marchi. In Milwaukee, Stenvig steered clear of any kind of racist line, and indeed split the Negro vote against his Republican opponent. He carried one of the two identifiable Negro precincts in the city. And, although Negroes made up less than five per cent of the Minneapolis population, the black director of the active local urban coalition won the spring city-wide election to one of the three vacancies on the Minneapolis board of education.

Perhaps it is part of the understanding of the confused mood of 1969 to recognize that a concern with crime was not just a white concern. John Morsell of the NAACP said in March:

There is a terrible feeling of fear in Harlem. The streets appear deserted after 7 P.M. Residents are more afraid of the criminals today than of the police. We must have more police protection and sterner measures to control crime and narcotics.¹⁴

¹³ Maurice J. Goldbloom, "Is There a Backlash Vote?", *Commentary*, August 1969, pp. 18-26.

¹⁴ *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

Civil Rights Legislation

In short, this was the "Year of the Pause" rather than the "Year of the Reaction," which was constantly being anticipated. Certainly there had been no wholesale breakdown of American democratic institutions. The commission on law and social action of the American Jewish Congress issued a report which said that "by virtue of the decisions of the Supreme Court during the last 15 years, Americans now enjoy a degree of constitutionally guaranteed freedom without parallel in our history."¹⁵ This judgment included the decisions of the 1968–1969 term. In three decisions, the Court interpreted the provisions of the Voting Rights Act in a manner designed to eliminate indirect, as well as direct, barriers to Negro voting in the South. The Court also struck down residency requirements for welfare recipients, unanimously invalidated the Ohio criminal syndicalism act, and ruled out punitive drafting of young men who attacked the military and the draft. The American Jewish Congress report did not see the immediate changes in the Supreme Court as presaging any serious changes in its voting pattern on such matters.

On the legislative and administrative front, the motif was characteristically mixed. During 1969, 29 laws improving protection of civil rights were adopted by state legislatures. Most of these related to fair housing. Five states—Delaware, Idaho, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Washington—enacted fair housing laws, bringing the number of states with such laws to 26. The Anti-Defamation League reported in December that 37 states had fair employment laws, and 38 laws against discrimination in places of public accommodation, and suggested that "most of the states in which one can realistically expect the enactment of such laws have already taken such action."¹⁶ In 1969 New York adopted a pioneer state law which called for "affirmative action," reminiscent of the Philadelphia Plan, to increase the employment of any minority group having a disproportionately high unemployment rate. The State of Washington passed a law requiring admission of minority group members to state-supported apprenticeship programs in a ratio equal to their proportion in the general population. Maine became the first state to pass legislation prohibiting private clubs with liquor licenses from discriminating against membership applicants on racial, religious, or national grounds. One negative note: New York state passed a law prohibiting appointed boards of education to bus school children for purposes of racial balance.

¹⁵ Commission on Law and Social Action of the American Jewish Congress, *The Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Decisions of the United States Supreme Court for the 1968–1969 Term: A Summary and Analysis* (October 1969), 102 pp.

¹⁶ "State Civil Rights Legislation—1969," *Law*, December 1969, p. 1.

Administration Policy and Civil Rights

On the national front, Richard Nixon went into office under a cloud of suspicion from the black community. The *Newsweek* poll reported in June (June 30, 1969 issue) that 25 per cent of black America felt "the federal government is helpful to Negro rights," as against 74 per cent in 1966 under the Johnson administration. The mass media developed the image of Nixon's "Southern strategy," which was variously reported as an attempt to cool down the national temperature, and as an attempt to secure the South for the Republicans—indeed to wrest the South away from George Wallace. The Nixon administration appointed an apparently conservative Southern judge, Clement Haynsworth of South Carolina, to the Supreme Court; he was rejected by the Senate in November after a bitter fight. In August the administration went to the courts, asking for a delay of school desegregation in a number of deep Southern districts. In October the U.S. Supreme Court refused this request. As a result, many school districts in Mississippi and elsewhere were forced into integrated plans for the first time. In some cases, a reported mass departure of whites from the public school system was reported, but, significantly, there was not the violent physical resistance that followed earlier desegregation in the South, eliciting the use of U.S. troops by President Eisenhower.

With administration support, Congress also amended the Voting Rights Law to apply to all states, rather than to a few Southern states, bringing the charge that it was made more difficult to enforce.

On the other hand, in December, the Nixon administration successfully opposed a legislative amendment which would have prevented withholding federal funds from school districts that did not follow integration plans. As far as the black population was concerned, the Nixon administration also had on the positive side of its ledger the Philadelphia Plan, as well as its successful fight against having the anti-poverty program dismantled by congressional action and turned over to the states.

The administration's most significant positive proposal probably was the introduction of legislation substituting for the traditional welfare program a family assistance plan placing a minimal floor under all family income in America. The plan was attacked in some quarters as having too low a floor; but the basic policy recommendation was generally regarded as a progressive landmark in welfare reform. All these developments were taking place against the dark background of a promised man-made recession, which was designed to fight inflation but added a final measure of uncertainty. If America was relatively quiet in 1969, it was an uneasy quiet.

THE JEWS

State of Antisemitism

The Jews were at least as uneasy about the urban scene as other Americans. They were being told by their "experts" that they had less to fear from traditional antisemitism than from the developing general temper of extremism and violence. *The Tenacity of Prejudice*,¹⁷ a most thorough analysis of a survey of antisemitic attitudes among Americans by Gertrude Selznick and Steven Steinberg, was published as part of the University of California, ADL-funded series on antisemitism. The authors found that over one-third of the American sample rated "high" on antisemitic beliefs, and noted that while "conventional antisemitism beliefs in Jewish clannishness and unethical business practices have undoubtedly declined since the 1930's and 1940's, [they] have not declined radically and are still far from vanishing" (p. 16).

These results were not startling, and some criticism suggested that the authors placed unwarranted emphasis on the ability of education to eradicate antisemitism. But perhaps the aspect of the book most pertinent to the climate of 1969 had little to do with antisemitic prejudice per se. The authors found what they considered a more important syndrome among Americans: a pervasive lack of commitment *against* antisemitism. For example, they found that almost one-third of those Americans who were unprejudiced and ranked low on the antisemitic scale said it would "make no difference" to them in their voting if a Congressional candidate was running on an anti-Jewish platform. Selznick and Steinberg commented (p. 56):

Few antisemites now feel that a candidate's antisemitism is, by itself, an adequate reason for supporting him. However at least some non-antisemites do not feel that antisemitism in a political candidate is sufficient reason to vote *against* him. In effect, both are saying that they might buy political antisemitism as part of a package deal, provided the package as a whole was attractive to them. . . . So long as Americans fail to take a principled stand against political antisemitism, its occurrence in the future cannot be ruled out nor can other forms of anti-democratic politics.

Report on Violence

And this was a year in which there continued to be much public attention to the potential of violence, to extremism, and to the imminent fall of our civil society. After a series of preliminary reports which made front pages across the nation, the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence in December published its final report entitled, *To Establish*

¹⁷ Gertrude J. Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, *The Tenacity of Prejudice: Anti-Semitism in Contemporary America* (New York, 1969), 248 pp.

Justice and to Insure Tranquillity. Like a number of earlier government commission reports, it was doom-ridden in tone. "While serious external dangers remain," it said, "the graver threats today are internal: haphazard urbanization, racial discrimination, disfiguring of the environment, unprecedented interdependence, the dislocation of human identity and motivation created by an affluent society—all resulting in a rising tide of individual and group violence" (p. xxxii).

Although the Commission had some specific measures to suggest for the alleviation of violence, such as the regulation of firearms and mass media, its basic recommendation was a familiar one: "The way in which we can make the greatest progress toward reducing violence in America is by taking the actions necessary to improve the conditions of family and community life for all who live in our cities, and especially for the poor who are concentrated in the ghetto slums" (p. xxi).

The special Jewish concern with antidemocratic behavior and violence, however, was not academic, and was chiefly attached to two phenomena: black-Jewish relationships and campus disorders.

Black-Jewish Relations

The past year's concern about black-Jewish relations seemed to subside somewhat in 1969. That is, it received somewhat less mass media attention, partly because the dramatic focus of the New York City school conflict had diminished. However, the definable areas of special black-Jewish friction persisted. Abraham Duker described one of those areas in *Patterns of Prejudice*, referring to:

"the prevailing mood in the Yiddish-speaking and Orthodox sectors of the Jewish community. Many Jews of this type live in or near racially mixed neighborhoods, where they face attacks, robberies, chicanery, sometimes even death. They feel neglected and disregarded by the city's authorities. Their pleas for protection are in vain. Their synagogues and educational institutions are vandalized and even set on fire. Sometimes worshippers were attacked on their way to and from place of worship. Their children are molested and held up on the way to and from school. Swastikas are painted or chalked in Negro areas.¹⁸

One atypical, but nonetheless symptomatic, reaction of the Jewish community to this kind of friction came to national attention in 1969 through a militant fringe group, the Jewish Defense League (JDL; p. 225). The mainline Jewish organizations uniformly and strongly disassociated themselves from what they called JDL's "vigilantism" and "irresponsible talk," and accused it of violating the tradition of Judaism and exacerbating racial

¹⁸ Abraham G. Duker, "Negroes Versus Jews: Antisemitism Is Asserted," *Patterns of Prejudice*, March-April 1969, p. 9.

conflict. But there were some scattered vibrations of support around the country.

ISSUE OF MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

While direct confrontation between proximate black and Jewish groups occurred in certain limited sections of the large cities, another source of friction between blacks and Jews, less direct but highly charged, persisted: the Middle East crisis. Certain limited sections of black leadership continued to attack Israel and defend the Arab cause. For example, the *Black Panther* throughout the year published articles praising al-Fatah and condemning "fascist Zionist pigs," as the one in its August issue entitled, "Zionism (Kosher Nationalism) Plus Imperialism Equal Fascism." The Black Panther party did not have a mass following by any count, but it was the most publicity-worthy Negro group in America in 1969. This status was enhanced by a continual series of gun battles between police and Black Panthers across the country. Black Panthers who were killed in these battles garnered for their organization a certain amount of emotional support in both the black and white communities. Eldridge Cleaver, the Black Panther leader-in-exile, was the most newsworthy American black man in 1969; his anti-Israel statements, issued from Algeria, received wide attention in the American press.

One explicit attempt to play on these frictions, as they were felt by Jews, occurred during the heated Bradley-Yorty mayoralty race in Los Angeles. In the two-month interval between the primary and the runoff, there was a concerted attempt to stir a Jewish backlash against the black candidate. For example, "A Message of Conscience," specifically playing on Jewish concerns over black militancy, was distributed in Jewish neighborhoods with a covering letter from 21 rabbis. It featured a statement made by James Forman in Detroit in April, which called for "the use of force and the power of guns," and said that "we sit back and watch the Jews in this country make Israel a powerful conservative state in the Middle East." The message called for the election of Sam Yorty in light of the Forman statement, although Thomas Bradley, a former police officer, had no association with Forman, and explicitly spoke out against both violence and antisemitism.

Organized segments of the Los Angeles Jewish community dropped their nonpartisanship long enough to respond angrily to this piece of literature. By all precinct estimates, the Los Angeles Jewish voters were the only group of nonblacks, including the Mexican Americans, who gave clear majority support to Bradley. But it fell short of expectations. In the Fairfax area, a heavily Jewish, largely lower-middle-class district bordered by an increasingly black population, the Bradley-Yorty vote in the 14-candidate April primary split about 75-25. In the runoff, the Bradley-Yorty vote split about 55-45. Of course there were many differential factors in the runoff, such as the reduced number of candidates and larger number of voters, so there was no

sure way of determining the effect of the interim appeal to black-Jewish friction. One thing is certain: an open appeal of this kind would not have been possible several years ago.

Campus Disorders

The student revolution on the campus also was a matter of continuously expressed concern for the Jewish community. To some extent, it was part of the special Jewish concern over violence and antidemocratic behavior. But there were indications towards the end of 1969 that the movement may have lost some of its force, at least for a time. In December the *Civil Disorder Digest* reported:

In September, university administrators and students prepared for the well-advertised "Fall Offensive" by campus radical groups. But the protests never got off the ground in most places: the "Offense" never really materialized in not anything remotely resembling what the predictions had threatened.

Of course, spring rather than fall always was the peak of student activism. And, earlier in the year, there were a number of serious campus disorders. Students captured buildings, and in some cases also administrators, at colleges like Harvard, Brandeis, and Cornell. A photograph of black Cornell students brandishing rifles as they emerged from a building made front pages in the nation's press. At San Francisco State College, pitched battles took place between police and students, partly immobilizing the college for a long period. However, several developments took place during the year which suggested that the failure of the "fall offensive" was more than a seasonal phenomenon.

First of all, in keeping with the spirit of the year, a kind of counter-offensive seemed to have developed. S. I. Hayakawa, president of San Francisco State College, received national recognition of sorts as the tough man who had "won" on his campus. He banned disruptive activities, moved the police against violations, and kept the campus officially open against both a student and faculty strike; there was an almost bland return to normalcy in the fall. In November Morris B. Abram, president of Brandeis University, said that he would not allow a repetition of the January ten-day takeover of a campus building. He declared that, instead of waiting for the students to tire and then granting amnesty, as he had done, he would henceforth suspend the students immediately and call police if no other methods for eviction could be found. He said: "I do not believe we are any longer in a stage in which university rights can be violated without penalties being attached." Injunctions against student groups were obtained at MIT, Boston University, New York University, Fordham, and Tufts.

At the same time, the student movements, themselves, showed certain signs of attenuation. The heart of the white radical student movement, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) broke into three separate and

bitterly competing groups at their annual convention in Chicago during the summer. The Worker Student Alliance, representing the doctrinal "old Left" element of the former SDS and relating to the Communist and the Progressive Labor parties, organized around renewed attention to student-worker relationships and comprehensive revolutionary activity. The Revolutionary Youth Movement retained the old SDS image, and the more eclectic New Left approach to campus protest on specific issues, such as war. The Weatherman Collective was a New Left split-off dedicated to bringing down society by urban guerrilla warfare. The Black Panther leader in Illinois accused them of "ousterism."

Black student groups became even less inclined to mingle their issues with those of other campus groups, and, by year's end, already achieved one of their major objectives: at least the initial creation of black studies programs and departments in most of the major colleges and universities around the country. It was suggested that student radicalism was coming to some kind of a pause of its own, partly because of the counteroffensive, partly because the issue of the Vietnam war was losing its potency as a specific radical issue. It seemed that the anti-Vietnam issue had been coopted by a large mass of "Middle-Americans."

But whether or not student radicalism was in fact subsiding for a time, the Jewish community's concern was heightened by the heightened relationship of that radicalism to the critical Middle East issue. There were indications that, as the Vietnam issue diminished in importance, the Middle East issue might take its place on the radical agenda. Al-Fatah could take the place of the Vietcong as the darling of American student radicals. This stance of the radical campus youth was an especial affront to the Jewish community because so many of them were its own children. As Seymour Martin Lipset put it in *Encounter*:

The task for analyzing the impact of the New Left on Israel's position is complicated by the fact that Jews play a very great role in the student-based New Left, considerably disproportionate to the number of Jewish students on the campus. Many of these Jewish Leftists exhibit familiar forms of Jewish self-hatred, of so-called "Jewish antisemitism" of the sort which were widespread within the Left before the Nazi Holocaust and the creation of the State of Israel.¹⁹

Moratorium

The proposition that the anti-Vietnam issue had forever broken student-radical bounds was signaled by the massive Moratorium day rallies on November 15. It clearly was the largest public protest of the Vietnam war and, according to historians in the Library of Congress, the largest nationally coordinated anti-war demonstration in American history. A quarter of a

¹⁹ Seymour M. Lipset, "The Socialism of Fools': The Left, the Jews, and Israel," *Encounter*, December 1969, p. 32.

million marched in Washington. There were a hundred thousand in the Boston Commons, and demonstrations in every city of size. In addition, numbers of children stayed away from school and workers away from work, and churches and synagogues held prayer meetings all over the country. What had started as a national protest by college students was now a more general protest in which labor unions, religious institutions, and city and state officials joined. Governor Francis Sargent of Massachusetts said at one rally, "This war is costing America its soul,"²⁰ and this sentiment seemed to be the sober common denominator that brought together so many from the student body, the middle class, the working class on Moratorium day. The demonstrations were, for the most part, sober, peaceful, and awesome in proportions. The issue clearly no longer belonged just to the students, nor to Left-leaning adults. Some student radical groups were dismayed by this development, seeing themselves once again coopted.

However, the events of the Moratorium day also crystallized another truth: for all those who marched and prayed in protest there were as many, and probably more, in America who wished to disassociate themselves from this protest. President Nixon made a speech defending his policies, and the response was so overwhelmingly in his favor that the entire episode was generally conceded to be a Nixon "victory." Thus, the uneasy split in the American population was again dramatically revealed.

Many felt that Vice President Spiro T. Agnew was widening, and capitalizing on, the split in America when he attacked the Moratorium supporters as "effete snobs," drawing on an anti-elitist, anti-intellectual strain which had characterized the George Wallace campaign. And, indeed, some observers felt that Agnew's approach was part and parcel of the administration's Southern strategy. In December Agnew created an even greater furor with his attack on what he felt was the bias of the mass media, and especially the national television networks. He referred to "this little group of men who wield a free hand in selecting, presenting and interpreting the great issues." He complained that television commentators "live and work in the geographical and intellectual confines of Washington, D.C., or New York City." Even some of those who were in agreement with Agnew's basic assumption of bias in the mass media were alarmed by his language which, among other things, touched an old nerve of conspiracyphobia. Gerald L. K. Smith, America's dean of professional antisemites, called Agnew's speech "a courageous address" against the "mindwashing establishment operating tyrannically by controlling the source of news in New York City."²¹ The racist and antisemitic magazine, *Thunderbolt*, wrote: "Vice President Agnew has come to grips with the Jews."²²

Frank Mankiewicz and Tom Braden, syndicated columnists in the *Washing-*

²⁰ *New York Times*, October 16, 1969.

²¹ *Special Bulletin*, November 21, 1969.

²² *The Thunderbolt*, December 1969, p. 1.

ton Post, headed a column: "Agnew Unintentionally Triggers Renewed Round of Anti-Semitism," and reported:

It was noticeable at once in this city where local television stations were swamped for three days after Agnew's speech with obscene phone calls protesting "Jew-Commies on the air." But now, Norman B. Isaacs, executive editor of the *Louisville Courier Journal*, reports that he has been "literally buried under an avalanche of sick mail."²³

Jews again were reminded of the dogged line connecting polarization, extremism, and political antisemitism.

Civil Status of Jews

In addition to this generic uneasiness about the apparent rise of anti-democratic sentiment and violence in America, there was some uneasiness about the possibility of deteriorating civil status of Jews in America. There was an almost, but not quite, inaudible gasp in the American Jewish community when Abe Fortas was not replaced on the Supreme Court by another Jew. For over half a century, ever since Louis Brandeis became a Supreme Court justice in 1916, there had been a Jewish Supreme Court justice, always one of the most splendid evidences of Jewish "belongingness" in American society. Retiring Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg said publicly that there was no "Jewish seat" on the Court; but the very fact that he found it necessary to make such a statement was reflective of some of the feelings in the Jewish community. So was the fact that Mayor Lindsay found it necessary to say that he did not think "any ethnic or religious or national group has any claim on any seat on the Supreme Court," and, at the same time, to lament the break in the "tradition of Brandeis, Cardozo, Frankfurter and Goldberg," whose contribution to justice he described as "enormously sensitive and humanistic."²⁴ At a time when the black revolution dramatized the symbolic importance of such appointments in pluralistic America, and, indeed, shortly after the appointment of the first black Supreme Court justice was publicly hailed as having such symbolic importance, the break in this tradition necessarily carried some import for many Jews.

Nathan Lewin carried the matter further in an article in *Jewish Life*²⁵ by pointing out that there were not only no Jews in the Nixon cabinet, but that the number of Jews had been strikingly reduced in policy positions in those departments where they traditionally had been quite visible, e.g., the Departments of Justice, Treasury, Health, Education and Welfare. Wrote Lewin: "The President is an honorable man, and surely no one accuses him of overt antisemitism." Nevertheless, "the phenomenon which appears and

²³ *Washington Post*, December 30, 1969, p. A 15.

²⁴ Report on press conference in *New York Times*, August 15, 1969.

²⁵ Nathan Lewin, "The Vanishing Jew in the Federal Establishment," *Jewish Life*, September-October 1969, pp. 6-13.

reappears is that of a Jewish subcabinet official or a civil servant at the policy-making level leaving the government and being replaced by the stereotype Nixon Republican—a white, upper middle class Protestant who has been a politically active Republican in his State or local community.” Much of this might have been expected from the nature of the political condition. But Lewin’s point was this: “The very least that can be said with absolute confidence is that no effort is being made by Mr. Nixon or his associates to see to it that Jews—like Negroes or women—are represented at the visible policy-making level of the executive departments.” Whether or not this was properly a cause for uneasiness, it obviously was for a number of Jews. This seemed to be compounded at the end of the year when the administration’s statements of position appeared to many Jews to represent an alarming erosion of United States policy towards Israel.

Interreligious Affairs

There seemed to be continuing progress on the level of interreligious understanding and interreligious dialogue. For example, more than 70 Jewish and Baptist scholars and theologians met formally for the first time in August in a conference sponsored by the American Jewish Committee and the Southern Baptist Convention Home Missions Board. The “sense of the meeting,” drafted by conference participants, called for the establishment of a continuing interreligious committee to implement “a deep concern over the inversion of moral values in the establishment of our national priorities.”²⁶ Resolutions called for a joint defense of religious liberty for Baptists and Jews in the Soviet Union; for a greater involvement of churches and synagogues in the social problems of America; for joint efforts to end antisemitism.

But many Jews still saw a basic rift in Jewish-Christian dialogue and relations, dating from the apparent failure of the Christian religious movement during the six-day war to see the authentic relationship between the American Jew and Israel. Among the further expositions of this failure, seen also as a Jewish failure, was that of Manfred Vogel, then visiting lecturer at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, who wrote:

The justification for the Jewish partner’s expectation of the Christian response is based . . . on the Jewish partner’s fully and authentically disclosing his distinct, peculiar, religious reality, that is, his membership in a community of faith which is inextricably bound to be an ethnic nationhood. The crucial fact is, however, that, in reality, the Jewish partner did not so disclose himself. The Jewish partner in the dialogue, prior to the six-day war, was pursuing a humanitarian encounter. The Jew who was present in that dialogue was the Jew *qua* human being, the Jew who suffers the inequities of prejudice and persecu-

²⁶ *Religious News Service*, August 26, 1969.

tion. The Jew in his distinct, peculiar, religious-ethnic reality, the Jew *qua* Jew, was absent.²⁷

The same question was central to developments in Catholic-Jewish relations. Dr. Joseph Lichten, director of the Anti-Defamation League's department of intercultural affairs, wrote that "the year 1969 was full of promise for interfaith relations, the most constructive since 1965, when the Declaration on Non-Christian Religions was promulgated."²⁸ This sentiment was largely based on a "working paper" on Christian-Jewish relations, which was presumably destined to become a new Vatican document on Christian-Jewish relations. Lawrence Cardinal Sheehan of Baltimore reported on it at an interfaith conference in December. The import of the document was to remove any doubts that had been raised by earlier Vatican documents about mere "tolerance" of Jews, rather than their full acceptance as a legitimate religious group in their own right. This document insisted that the Jewish religion should *not* be seen just as a stepping stone to Christianity, and that the Old Testament should be recognized for its "proper validity." It went so far as to suggest the possibility of joint prayer. Especially gratifying to the Jewish community was the recommendation that Catholics should recognize the religious significance of the State of Israel for Jews and attempt to "understand and respect" the "link between the people and the land." But the Vatican immediately warned that the version reported by Cardinal Sheehan had not yet been approved, and the Synagogue Council of America, the congregational representative body of all branches of Judaism, withheld comment amidst intimations that there had been significant changes in the text. The changes presumably had to do with the references to Israel. In a typical after-reaction, the *Reconstructionist* wrote that finally

the Bishops had eliminated from that "working paper" every reference to the State of Israel. They did not wish to appear to be siding politically with Israel in her conflict with the Arab nations, nor were they prepared yet to speak truth to the Arab world, lest it arouse Arab ire. But there can be no peace in the Middle East until the integrity of the state of Israel is acknowledged, and the Church ought to lead the way. Certainly, acknowledgement of the importance of the State of Israel is a test of Christian understanding of Jews.²⁹

Thus, the ecumenical weakness perceived by the Jewish community in 1967 seemed to persist.

²⁷ Manfred Vogel, "Some Reflections on the Jewish-Christian Dialogue in the Light of the Six-Day War," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January 1970, p. 105.

²⁸ *ADL Bulletin*, January 1970.

²⁹ "The Politics of the Vatican Council Statement on the Jews," *Reconstructionist*, January 23, 1970.

Church-State Relations

Meanwhile, there was new concern on the interfaith front as a concentrated drive developed for state aid to the embattled Catholic schools. It was reported that Catholic enrollment had dropped by about half a million in two years.³⁰ Teacher salaries continued to rise while parochial-school funds continued to fall off. In Rhode Island, a law was passed authorizing payment of up to 15 per cent of the salaries of elementary school teachers in private schools, including religious schools where, however, these funds were to be applied only to the teaching of secular subjects. In Connecticut, the legislature authorized the payment of 20 per cent of the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in private and religious schools. Higher payment to teachers—up to 60 per cent—was authorized for teachers of secular subjects in religious schools with a preponderance of children from low-income families. Similar “purchase of services” bills, or bills providing voucher payments of tax credits to parents of children attending religious schools, were introduced around the country. The general understanding was that they would be reintroduced in 1970 in states where they had been defeated. In several cases, special legislative committees were set up to study the problem of aid to religious schools. Minnesota enacted a bill providing free transportation for religious- and other private-school students, and Indiana approved the rental of textbooks for use in such schools.

It seemed clear to church-state watchers that the question of direct governmental aid to religious schools—by way of the child—was building up to another judicial crisis. There were cases in the courts challenging the use of federal funds by Catholic colleges in Connecticut, Vermont, and New Jersey. These were expected to move up to the Supreme Court, as were cases involving governmental aid to lower-grade parochial schools. The principle of child welfare, which the Supreme Court found valid in the case of parochial school transportation, was the principle around which the current government aid bills were scrupulously built. One California legislator, defending his support of “parochiaid” legislation, said to a Jewish agency: “Separation of church and state is not as important as it used to be.” Partly, he was referring to what he considered the overriding considerations of a sick urban educational system. But he also was referring to the fact that, through the back door of welfare, the wall of church-state separation had already been pretty deeply penetrated.

George R. La Noue, Columbia University professor, summed up that penetration in December:

Since World War II there has been a radical transformation of church-state relations that has passed almost unnoticed. Church and state are linked today in a whole series of federal programs. Indeed, under current laws and operating

³⁰ *New Jersey Education Association Review*, January 1970.

practices, a church institution can obtain its land from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare via the General Services Administration; its mortgage insurance from the Housing and Home Finance Agency; its food from the Department of Agriculture; its wine from the Department of Treasury; and its prospective members from the Office of Economic Opportunity. Should it encounter an act of God, the church institution can turn to the Small Business Administration for a disaster loan. This is something less than separation of church and state. There is no need for a conspiracy theory to explain this departure from the separation tradition. It is simply that many men in many programs made pragmatic and political decisions until the principle was overwhelmed. Madison and Jefferson's separation of church and state is, after all, an 18th century concept of limited government that does not fit easily into the operation of a welfare state.³¹

Also stirring on the church-state front were questions relating to the tax-exempt status of churches. With the approval of major Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish religious bodies, Congress set about to pass a tax reform bill which would gradually eliminate the tax-exempt status of church-run secular business enterprises. And, in June, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case involving the constitutionality of exempting church property from real estate taxes. The suit was brought by Frederick Walz in the New York courts, and was denied by the highest New York state court, which held that such tax exemption was "firmly imbedded in the law of the state."³² Since the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear such cases on four different occasions since 1956, a number of lawyers were startled by its willingness to consider this case. Some momentum seemed to be developing in this direction during the year. Studies in church tax exemption were reported underway in Minnesota, Idaho, Vermont, and Pennsylvania, at least. Oregon's house of representatives voted to tax churches for fire and police protection, only to have the state senate kill the bill. The Kansas legislature repealed the state law granting tax exemption to ministers' dwellings.

Attempts in some states and localities to return some religious emphasis to the public schools were growing. There were reports of local efforts to circumvent the Supreme Court ruling on prayers in the public schools. The Illinois legislature authorized a period of silent prayer at the beginning of the public school day. In Indiana, the legislature did likewise, and also authorized voluntary Christmas and Easter religious services in the public schools.

In May the school committee of Leydon, Mass., approved prayer readings in the classrooms, an order which was rescinded at the insistence of the state commissioner of education. Three months later, the school committee voted to resume prayers, with participation entirely "voluntary," a measure which, committee member Gerald F. McCarthy held, "will stand the test of any court if we are challenged by some extremist."³³

³¹ George R. La Noue, "Church, State and the Courts, *The Nation*, December 15, 1969.

³² *Journal of Church and State*, Autumn 1969, p. 573.

³³ *Religious News Service*, August 29, 1969.

In Netcong, N.J., a nondenominational prayer was recited before the beginning of classes. The purpose of the service, according to the school superintendent, was to encourage "the love of one's neighbor, brotherhood and respect for the individual."³⁴ The schools used the prayers of congressional chaplains, as reprinted in the *Congressional Record*. Even after the state attorney general declared the Netcong procedure illegal, the local board of education, in December, voted 7 to 1 "to continue school prayer."³⁵

Congressman Richard Roudebush of Indiana applauded the Netcong procedure, and indicated he would insert daily into the *Congressional Record* children's prayers which could be read in public schools as "a legal remedy to the tragic Supreme Court decision" barring prayers. One verse inserted by the Congressman for reading in the nation's public schools read:

I, too, thanks would offer,
Jesus, Shepherd dear,
For Thy tender pasture
And Thy guiding care.³⁶

Four different school districts in Pennsylvania reportedly reinstated school prayers. The Albert Gallatin area school district in Southwestern Pennsylvania was enjoined in December by a federal court from continuing its prayers. But here, as elsewhere, the dispute was to be extended. The school district's solicitor said: "The original error in the school prayer matter was made by the Supreme Court, and it's going to have to be corrected by them."³⁷

In California, the state board of education held that science textbooks used in California schools should include, along with Darwin's theory of evolution, other "competing theories" about the origin of life, such as the story of Genesis. At the same time, the board produced a set of "morality guidelines" for use in the schools, which Jewish organizations and some Christians called "sectarian and fundamentalist" in nature. A more moderate set of guidelines was adopted, over the strong support of the original document, by a number of groups holding that, after all, this was a Christian country.

EARL RAAB

³⁴ *New York Times*, September 17, 1969.

³⁵ *Christian Science Monitor*, December 5, 1969.

³⁶ *Religious News Service*, October 15, 1969.

³⁷ *New York Times*, December 18, 1969.

Intergroup Relations and Tensions in New York City

THE INCREASING polarization across the nation along racial, political, and economic lines was keenly felt in New York City in 1969. The mayoralty election reflected these great divisions. Mayor John V. Lindsay, supported by urban upper-middle-class liberals along with Negroes and Puerto Ricans, scored an undecisive victory over Comptroller Mario A. Procaccino and State Senator John Marchi whose "law and order campaign" attracted the middle-class ethnic voters fearing the growing violence in the cities. The "Jewish vote," said to be the key to the election, was split evenly between Lindsay and Procaccino.

School decentralization again was a potent issue. But the question no longer was whether or not decentralization would take place, but how it would be done.

On the college campuses, the cause for unrest shifted from the kinds of demands made in 1968 by predominantly white middle-class students at Columbia University to the demands by Negro and Puerto Rican students seeking greater access to the City University system.

NEW YORK MAYORALTY ELECTION

Mayor John V. Lindsay, who practically was counted out after losing the June primary, made a remarkable comeback to win reelection against Democratic candidate Mario Procaccino and conservative Republican candidate John Marchi. Lindsay received 41.8 per cent of the vote, the lowest plurality since the Fiorello La Guardia election in 1933; Procaccino received 35 per cent of the vote; John Marchi, 23.2 per cent. The voting percentage by ethnic group, based on returns in sample election districts, was reported by CBS and NBC. Voting percentages reported by WCBS-TV were:

<i>Groups</i>	<i>Lindsay</i>	<i>Procaccino</i>	<i>Marchi</i>
Jews	44	44	12
Negroes	80	13	7
Italians	15	55	30
Puerto Ricans	64	27	9
Irish	26	26	48

WNBC-TV sampling was as follows:

<i>Groups</i>	<i>Lindsay</i>	<i>Procaccino</i>	<i>Marchi</i>
Jews	42	49	9
Negroes	85	11	4
Italians	24	63	13
Puerto Ricans	63	26	11

Lindsay's Comeback

After Lindsay's defeat in the primaries, prospects for his reelection were considered very slim by most political observers. Surveys taken at the time indicated that over 70 per cent of New Yorkers would not vote for Lindsay. In July Lindsay entered the mayoralty race as a candidate of the Independent party, carrying on a modern-style market-research and media campaign, marked by a voter-attitude survey and television advertising, rather than his old-style field organization campaign of 1965. A change of strategy and image was necessary for a comeback. He had to redress the old grievances and show that he was "repentant." Most of the campaign strategy was aimed at appeasing the resentment of the white middle-class, especially the lower-middle-class groups.

The Polls

The effect of preelectoral polls again was at issue in the campaign. Mario Procaccino was particularly disturbed about the influence of the *Daily News* straw poll on the election outcome. He felt that the overestimation of Lindsay's strength tended to discourage those who might otherwise have voted for him. The poll was 6 percentage points higher than the actual vote.

The results of five surveys conducted throughout the campaign showed Procaccino gradually giving ground to both Lindsay and Marchi. Procaccino's percentage of the polled vote slipped from 33 per cent to 27 per cent, while Lindsay and Marchi gained 4 and 3 percentage points, respectively. A comparison between the polls taken by Oliver Quayle for NBC in July and October revealed a 5 point gain for Lindsay (from 30 to 35) and a 2 point loss for Procaccino (from 35 to 33), with Marchi losing 7 points (from 19 to 12). The percentage of undecided voters increased from 16 to 20.

Independent polls taken by Procaccino (telephone poll in October) and Marchi (September) predicted a victory for the candidate conducting the survey.

The Jewish Vote

The attention given to Jewish voters in the election was unprecedented. Milton Himmelfarb, writing in *Commentary*, observed that "in no other American election has the 'Jewish vote' ever been so central to the strategy and the tactics of the candidates, or so prominent in the news, commentaries, polls, and analysis, as in New York in 1969."¹

Some Jewish organizations denounced appeals by candidates to specific racial, religious, or ethnic groups on the ground that the media's focus on alleged bloc votes would increase polarization, alienation, and distrust in the city. Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum of the American Jewish Committee said in

¹ Milton Himmelfarb, "Jewish Class Conflict?" *Commentary*, January 1970, p. 37.

a radio broadcast, on November 2, that "ethnic or religious identification is not a controlling element in an individual's choice; it may be one element, but it is rarely the controlling one. Jews are influenced primarily by positions that candidates and parties take that affect the welfare of all Americans." However, professional politicians felt quite sure that the "Jewish vote" would determine the election.

According to Arthur Klebanoff, the Lindsay campaign strategy was aimed directly at those who were unlikely to vote overwhelmingly for or against him:

The question for the campaign, therefore, was not simply the Jewish voter; it was rather a particular kind of Jewish voter, a voter who had preferred Robert Wagner to Procaccino in the Democratic primary; who had voted against the Civilian Review Board, but not with the intensity of its staunchest critics; a voter who had all along maintained a strong tie to the political magic of Jacob Javits.²

HOW DID JEWS VOTE?

CBS's post-election poll gave Lindsay and Procaccino each 44 per cent of the votes cast by Jews; NBC gave them 42 and 49 per cent, respectively. Obviously, there was no "Jewish vote," if by that one means a bloc vote. A more interesting question is how Jews actually voted, and along what lines the votes were split. On the whole, the split was along economic lines, with the upper-middle- to upper-class Jews voting for Lindsay (about 72 per cent) and lower-middle-class Jews for Procaccino. Lindsay's victory was ascribed to the support of the majority of the center. An analysis suggesting such a split broke down the results of ten assembly districts (all Jewish or mixed white) that cast at least 42 per cent of their vote in the Democratic primary for Robert F. Wagner and/or James Scheuer. In the higher income groups, [25th, 27th, 43rd, 44th, 73rd, and 76th assembly districts] 60 per cent voted for Lindsay. The four districts with lower-income populations [39th, 41st, 45th, and 46th] voted for Procaccino.³

CAMPUS TENSION

Campus tension in 1969 reflected the increasing militancy of Negroes and Puerto Ricans. The principal issue in most of the disturbances was open enrollment; subsidiary demands were better representation and relevance of curricula (black studies programs). In April a dual track admissions policy was the major plank in a series of five demands put forth by a group of Negro and Puerto Rican students to the City College administration. The

² Arthur M. Klebanoff, "Is There a Jewish Vote?", *Commentary*, January 1970, p. 45.

³ *New York Times*, November 6, 1969, quoting the findings of Harry C. Harris, consultant for Realtronics computer programmers.

object of this policy was to redress the racial imbalance of Negro and Puerto Rican students from their present representation of 15 per cent in City College to 40 per cent, their approximate ratio in the public high schools. The plan called for the enrollment of half the freshman class from disadvantaged neighborhoods without regard to grades, while the other half would be admitted by the usual standards.

The other demands, classified as "non-negotiable," called for a degree-granting school of black and Puerto Rican studies; a SEEK (Search for Education, Elevation of Knowledge) program offering remedial help to promising students in preparation for matriculation; proficiency in Spanish and in "black and Puerto Rican heritage" for all students in the School of Education planning to teach in the public schools.

According to Professor Lloyd P. Gartner,⁴ the crisis at City College "was in itself not linked with the political and cultural revolt which has swept the campus. It was a straightforward phenomenon of black militancy."

In May, after a series of shutdowns, Dr. Buell S. Gallagher resigned as president of City College, saying that political circumstances no longer made it possible for him to function effectively. Professor Joseph Copeland was named acting president. After each shutdown, court orders were issued to reopen the school. The injunctions were prompted by individual suits against the City University, initiated by Comptroller Procaccino and Representative John Biaggi at one time, and by the Jewish Defense League on another occasion. Court injunctions became an effective means of handling campus disorders throughout the city.

Other campuses seriously disrupted by student dissent over open enrollment were Queens College, Brooklyn College, Queensborough Community College, and Pratt Institute.

Open Admission Plan

In July the Board of Higher Education, pressured by the spring campus disorders, approved a resolution advancing the target date for open admission from 1975, as stated in its 1964 master plan, to September 1970. The plan included the following features:

- 1) Admission to some City University programs of all city high-school graduates who apply;
- 2) Remedial and other supportive services for all students requiring them;
- 3) Maintenance and enhancement of standards of academic excellence in University's colleges;
- 4) Ethnic integration of the colleges;
- 5) Student mobility between various programs and units of University;
- 6) Continued admission of all students who would have been admitted to specific community or senior colleges under past admissions criteria.

⁴Lloyd P. Gartner, "The Five Demands at New York City College, *Midstream*, October 1969, p. 35.

According to the board's policy statement of July 9, the action was based "on the most urgent considerations of public necessity and equity." Adoption of the plan would mean the admission of all New York City high school graduates applying to some program of higher education. Admission would be based on class rank or grade averages: to senior college, students in the top half of graduating classes, or having 80 per cent grade averages; all others to community colleges. Under this plan, 14,000 additional freshmen were expected to be admitted to the City University in September 1970.

Many groups, including Jewish groups for whom CUNY had been an important stepping-stone to a better life, had strong reservations about the new policy, or even opposed it, on the grounds that:

- 1) It would lower the standards and prestige of CUNY;
- 2) It would create a quota system by color and community, would bar a substantial number of minority-group high school graduates from senior colleges, and might even lead to *de facto* segregation;
- 3) It would create a problem of retaining some of the faculty;
- 4) It would create two conflicting, polarized bodies in the university, which in the end would destroy it;
- 5) There were not sufficient funds to implement such a program.

The plan was attacked by Mayor Lindsay and former Mayor Wagner, as well as by major Jewish organizations, as a "quota system" that would operate against the best interests of all concerned.

One of the problems of open admission was funding. The cost of the program for the first year was estimated at \$35.3 million. According to Dr. Albert Bowker, president of the Board of Higher Education, its implementation would require 1,000 more faculty members, new space, and facilities for remedial work.

The Board of Regents endorsed the city's request for CUNY open enrollment, and urged that the system be made statewide. In his 1970 message to the state legislature, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller set forth a "full-opportunity" program to provide access to higher education for all New York State high school graduates, and recommended expansion of all state and state-aided programs. Many believed that such a program would help distribute minority-group students, thus lessening the possibility of CUNY becoming *de facto* segregated.

Black Studies

On July 23 the Board of Higher Education approved plans for courses and departments of urban and ethnic studies at City, Hunter, Bronx Community, Richmond, and John Jay colleges. More than 100 courses in Afro-American and African studies were instituted throughout the City University. Hunter College was the first to establish a department offering majors toward degrees in black and Puerto Rican studies.

SCHOOL DECENTRALIZATION

In 1969 demands for integrated city schools (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 251-52; 1969 [Vol. 70], pp. 79-82) gave way to demands for community control and/or decentralization. Decentralization, essentially an administrative reform, means that local boards run the school, but the ultimate power of quality control remains with the central board. Community control implies political reform, with responsibility of supervising as well as running the schools resting with the community. Advocates of decentralization of school administration and parental control of school policy argued that it would enable them to demand a more equitable share of the resources for education, free them of total dependence on white generosity, and force the bureaucracy to be more responsive to local problems.

According to a Harris survey, released January 30, 1969, parents of children in New York City schools were evenly divided over the decentralization issue: 37 per cent were for more local control, 34 per cent for things as they were, 5 per cent for less control, and 24 per cent were undecided. The basic division varied sharply by area and by key groups. Brooklyn and Manhattan generally tended to favor decentralization; Queens, Richmond, and the Bronx to oppose it. Negroes were overwhelmingly in favor, while Catholics were against it. The division among Jewish parents showed a slight margin in favor (43 per cent in favor, 41 per cent for the status quo, and 16 per cent for less control).

Legislation

In the spring two major bills were proposed: the Regents bill tending toward community control, and the Marchi bill for decentralization. The Regents bill called for a five-man community board which would be appointed by the mayor to replace the central board, and would create 20 to 30 local school districts empowered to hire teachers, establish curricula, and manage fiscal affairs. The Marchi bill provided for an elected seven-man board with limited powers, and left the hiring of teachers and setting the performance standard in the hands of the central board. Among the supporters of the Regents bill were the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Urban League, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Rabbis for Community Control, and the Council of Churches of New York City. Proponents of the Marchi bill included the Union of the Federated Teachers, the New York City Board of Examiners, and the committees for the election of mayoral candidates Procaccino and Marchi.

After intense negotiations, the new decentralization bill was passed on May 1, 1969. Under the new system, local boards would appoint the school superintendent and, with his assistance, the school principals. And, while

present tenured teachers were protected, local boards were authorized to hire new teachers within existing state and city eligibility rules.

Opposite reactions to the law were clearly articulated by UFT president Albert Shanker, who thought "we have a good piece of legislation here," and by Rhody McCoy, Ocean Hill-Brownsville district administrator, who called the law "a prelude to the destruction of public education."

Redistricting

Redistricting was the final step of the new plan. It originally arose in response to a state legislative mandate that no school district have less than 20,000 pupils. (The definition of districts is an important prelude to the elections of school boards.) In November the central board voted to set up 32 largely autonomous community school districts, of which the three experimental districts—I.S. 201, Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and Two Bridges—would now be a part. Isaiah Robinson, the only Negro and a newly elected board member, strongly objected to the elimination of the experimental districts as separate units, which opened old wounds, and cast the only vote against this action. He asserted: "We've broken faith with the black and Puerto Rican community."

Backers of total community control, particularly blacks and Puerto Ricans, rejected the board's plan because they felt there was insufficient proof that the demonstration districts did not work, and because the plan left the power largely in the hands of the "establishment."

On December 4 the first public hearings on the proposed redistricting plan were held. Demands were made to continue the demonstration districts. The Reverend C. Herbert Oliver, chairman of the governing board of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, charged the plan "was the most blatant example of gerrymandering in recent history." Rhody McCoy urged the retention of his unit, at least until it could be evaluated, and suggested that the study, which should take two years, be conducted by the University of Massachusetts School of Education.

Reactions

In October, at an alumni meeting of the Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary of Yeshiva University, acting New York school superintendent Dr. Nathan Brown warned that the exodus of Jews from New York could turn the city into a "series of ghettos with the police protecting one group from another." He urged rabbis to help run the school system, rather than abandon the city and their responsibilities. He said rabbis had a great stake in school reorganization because the majority of Jewish children, some 500,000, attended public schools, and that the only way to successfully fight school-power politics was to involve parents in the educational process.

According to David K. Cohen writing in *Commentary*,⁵ "a good deal has been made of the various ways in which decentralization and community control will improve achievement, but a review of what we know turns up confused, contradictory or discouraging evidence. This does not mean that greater openness, and more accountability are not worth-while goals." Cohen concluded that "if one were guided solely by the research on achievement and attitudes, one would not employ community control or decentralization as the device most likely to reduce racial disparities in achievement."

Naomi Levine and Richard Cohen saw the basic issues in decentralization as the realignment of power—economic and political—and questioned the wisdom or propriety of encouraging its redistribution along racial lines, which did not concern education as such.

Will the realignment of power along lines of color operate in such a way as to socially stratify society and thus isolate the black community even more rigidly and deny it access and free exchange with white society?⁶

JEWISH-NEGRO TENSIONS

In late November, Louis Harris and Associates, in association with the Sarah Lawrence College Institute of Community Studies, issued *Sources of Racial and Religious Tensions in New York City*, a Ford Foundation-sponsored study of Negro-Jewish tensions. It found that Negroes agreed with negative statements about Jews in larger proportion than other segments of the population. However, their attitude was interpreted as not specifically anti-Jewish, but as a special instance of anti-white feeling. The study also found a polarization within the Jewish community: the wealthier, younger, better educated, and nonaffiliated Jews were generally more sympathetic to the Negroes and less concerned with antisemitism than the older, less educated, and Orthodox Jews. The authors found that, on the whole, "The traditional reputation of Jewish support of the underdog, no matter what his color, race or national origin, has been shaken to the core among segments of the community."

VANDALISM

June: Rocks were thrown through the windows of Rockaways Temple Young Israel. Earlier, swastikas had been painted on the walls of the building.

The West Bronx Center of Religious Zionists was destroyed by fire; arson was suspected.

⁵ David K. Cohen, "The Price of Community Control," *Commentary*, July 1969, p. 28.

⁶ Naomi Levine (with Richard Cohen), *Ocean Hill-Brownsville: Schools in Crisis*. (New York: Popular Library) p. 135.

October-November: Swastikas were painted on the doors of the Congregation B'nai Jacob in Flatbush and the Rego Park Jewish Center in Queens.

November: An estimated thousand books were destroyed in a fire at Yeshiva Marbeatze Torah. Among them was a 600-year-old edition of Moses Maimonides's *Mishneh Torah*, which the *yeshivah's* rabbi had brought with him from Poland when he fled the Nazis in 1939.

January 1970: A fire at Congregation Ahvath Torah in the Bronx destroyed five Torah scrolls valued at more than \$2,000 each. The city fire marshall confirmed the suspicion of arson.

At the Flatbush Yeshiva's Joel Braverman High School, vandals painted a Black Panther slogan on the wall and paint-sprayed "Al Fatah" across a valuable mural depicting the twelve tribes of Israel.

In February 1970, following the rash of synagogue arson and vandalism, Assemblyman Albert H. Blumenthal asked that a report be made by the special police department unit, established by the Mayor in 1968 to investigate crimes against churches and synagogues in the city. "Such a report," Mr. Blumenthal said, "would enable us to assess the seriousness of these incidents and to make a determination as to whether there is a wave of such crimes, as many believe there is."

JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE

The Jewish Defense League (JDL) headed by Rabbi Meir Kahane (formerly rabbi of the Traditional Synagogue in Rochdale Village, Queens) is a militant group that has taken upon itself the responsibility for the physical protection of Jews. It was organized in the summer of 1968 in response to what Kahane discerned as an upsurge of antisemitism resulting from the New York City school crisis, for which he blamed the black militants, radical Leftist groups like Students for a Democratic Society, and public officials whom he regards as too permissive toward both these groups. Kahane was editor of the *Jewish Press*, a weekly Orthodox-oriented Jewish newspaper, until October, when its publisher, Rabbi Sholom Klass, asked for his resignation. Klass said Kahane had made of JDL a "personal political club" which he used to wage a "campaign of vilification," especially against Mayor Lindsay, and that he was asked to resign as editor because he gave more time to JDL than to the newspaper.

The organization first began to attract attention toward the end of October, after JDL members thwarted a vandalism attempt at Montefiore cemetery. In February they picketed both the Metropolitan Museum of Art and Radio Station WBAI. The first was in protest against the "Harlem on My Mind" catalogue, the second against the reading of the poem "Antisemitism" by Leslie Campbell on the Julius Lester Show (AJYB, 1969 [Vol. 70], pp. 78, 84).

The character of the organization was most dramatically revealed in May

when James Forman, the black militant who had made the rounds of the city's churches demanding reparations for the "crimes against the black people," announced that Temple Emanu-El would be his next stop. Thereupon Kahane vowed that Forman would not set foot in the temple, and that he would provide it with protection, however unsolicited and unwanted. Forman did not make an appearance, but pictures of JDL members brandishing lead pipes in front of Emanu-El were featured on the TV news reports and in the daily press. Kahane later ran a full-page ad in the *New York Times*, June 24, featuring that photograph with the rhetorical caption: "Is this any way for nice Jewish boys to behave?" to which the answer was:

Maybe. Maybe there are times when there is no other way to get across to the extremist that the Jew is not quite the patsy some think he is.

Maybe there is only one way to get across a clear response to people who threaten seizure of synagogues and extortion of money. Maybe nice Jewish boys do not always get through to people who threaten to carry teachers out in pine boxes and to burn down merchants' stores.

Maybe some people and organizations are too nice. Maybe in time of crisis Jewish boys should not be that nice. Maybe—just maybe—nice people build their own road to Auschwitz.

Rabbi Maurice N. Eisendrath, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, commenting on the Forman incident, said:

Jews carrying baseball bats and chains, standing in phalanxes, like goon squads, in front of synagogues, led by rabbis, are no less offensive and, in essence, no different from whites carrying robes and hoods, led by self-styled ministers of the Gospel, standing in front of burning crosses. Neither Jews nor Christians nor America need such "protectors." This so called "Jewish" Defense League violates every ethic and tradition of Judaism and every concept of civil liberties and democratic process in American life.

Rabbi Kahane, in response, said the Defense League was a group "that believes Jewish defense is not a thing to be ashamed of. And men like James Forman (in New York, principal spokesman for the Black Manifesto) unfortunately understand the language of bats and chains far more clearly than sermons by Rabbi Eisendrath."

In the July 25 issue of *Reconstructionist*, Marnin Feinstein, a member of the faculty of City College of New York, reported that eight members of the Jewish Defense League appeared on the campus at the request of several City College groups, to attend a rally against the rumored capitulation on the part of the administration to all the black and Puerto Rican demands. Between 200-250 students attended the rally, and were quickly surrounded by a large group of black students, accompanied by non-student Black Panthers in African garb. Rabbi Kahane, who addressed the rally, was heckled and interrupted many times. Jewish students wearing yarmulkes were mocked, shouts of "Jewish Fascists," "Jew bastards" were heard from

various directions, while members of the JDL were threatened with death. "Were it not for the presence of police, a pitched battle would have been set off. The presence of so small a group of Jewish students at the rally once again suggested passivity and timidity in the face of potential violence, I believe, in keeping with *galut* mentalities," Feinstein wrote.

In September, after the JDL had staged demonstrations in front of the United Nations headquarters of the UAR, the League claimed that since Arab terrorists had tried to intimidate American Jews, they, the JDL, would hold the Arab diplomats "responsible for any actions of terror against Jews in this country."⁷ When asked on what basis the organization took it upon itself to defend world Jewry, Bertram Zweibon, general counsel for the JDL, said: "The people . . . Jews. We know what support we're getting from the people themselves."

In October, at a press conference called by a representative cross-section of the New York Jewish community, JDL was "resoundingly denounced" after the appearance of the full-page anti-Lindsay JDL ad: "WE REMEMBER DO YOU?—The Jews of New York Cannot Afford Four More Years of John Lindsay." Arthur J. Goldberg, then president of the American Jewish Committee, deplored the injection of racism into the campaign, and compared an appeal to racial antagonism in trying to win support for opposing a candidate to "crying fire in a crowded theater." American Jewish Congress's Howard Squadron denounced the ad as conducive to a "campaign of hatred and vilification." Dr. Bernard Mandelbaum, president of the Jewish Theological Seminary, criticized JDL for its "wicked, irresponsible talk." One voice raised in mild defense of JDL was that of Rabbi Louis Newman of Temple Rodeph Sholom in Manhattan, who said that, however mistaken the League was in its tactics, it "has sought to create a different image of Jews in the United States . . . we are not an acquiescent or supine people."

In November, the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, representing 82 local Jewish community agencies and nine national groups, summed up the views of the responsible and experienced Jewish leadership in the United States:

The National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council . . . is opposed to vigilantism, whatever its auspices, and firmly rejects the paramilitary operations of the Jewish Defense League as destructive of public order and contributory to divisiveness and terror.

Jewish security—indeed, the security of any ethnic or racial group—does not lie in taking the law into one's own hands. That kind of simplistic approach to the complicated problems of our time can only produce warring groups, not solutions.

⁷ Jewish Telegraphic Agency, September 21, 1969.

On November 20 JDL requested \$100,000 of the major Jewish organizations in order to help staff its widely criticized "citizen patrols," and was promptly turned down. Arnold Forster, general counsel of the Anti-Defamation League, called the request "chutzpah." Edward Moldover, president of the New York chapter of the American Jewish Committee, said:

We prefer to put our faith in Police Commissioner Leary and New York's Finest to provide protection for the residents of our city. If there are needs for additional police protection, the way to achieve that is through duly established legal authorities, not through vigilante groups.

In December JDL staged a series of demonstrations outside the Soviet mission to the United Nations in protest against the alleged Soviet persecution of Jews in the Soviet Union. The demonstrations were denounced in Moscow by Chief Rabbi Yahudi Leib Levin, who said: "You cannot talk to the Soviet Union in that way. It is too strong a country."

Efforts by JDL to enroll members in Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Boston, and Montreal have been denounced by local Jewish community organizations.

STEVEN E. FRIEDER

The United States, Israel, and the Middle East

THE CHANGE of administration in Washington in January 1969 was awaited in Israel and the Arab world with a mixture of hope and anxiety. The optimists in Jerusalem could point to the Republican campaign platform which recognized the "growing menace to Israel" from Soviet arms shipments to the Arabs, pledging United States provision of "countervailing help to Israel, such as supersonic fighters," to keep Israel's forces "at a commensurate strength" for its own protection, and to help keep peace in the region. Candidate Richard M. Nixon went even further in a campaign statement declaring that an exact balance was not enough to deter a potential aggressor, and that, therefore, "the balance must be tipped in Israel's favor." Moreover, President-elect Nixon, who was the first American chief executive to visit Israel, was impressed by Israel's security needs upon inspection of the Golan Heights shortly after the June 1967 war. In view of Nixon's record of militant anti-Communism, one could argue, he would naturally favor pro-Western Israel against Soviet-backed Arab states.

On the other hand, the pessimists in Jerusalem and the optimists in the Arab world could point to the fact that Nixon was not beholden to the "Jewish vote," since the overwhelming majority of Jewish electors supported his Democratic opponent, and Republican administrations traditionally favored business interests, including oil companies with heavy investments in the Arab world. The Arabs drew further encouragement from former Governor William W. Scranton's public recommendation for a "more even-handed" United States Middle East policy (AJYB, 1969 [Vol. 70], pp. 102-103). Although Scranton reaffirmed American concern for Israel's security, his implied criticism of the Johnson administration for allegedly undermining American influence in the Arab world by too close identification with Israel was reminiscent of similar charges against the Truman administration by the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1953, and the resultant active courtship of the Arab states by the Eisenhower administration, in which Nixon had served as vice president.

President Nixon made it clear at his first press conference, on January 27, that he believed "we need new initiatives and new leadership on the part of the United States in order to cool off the situation in the Mideast." He said his administration was giving top priority, possibly second only to Vietnam, to "the Mideast problem," and was open to suggestions for reducing the possibility of another explosion, which, he thought, "could involve, very well, a confrontation between the nuclear powers—which we want to avoid."

Four Power Talks

Among the suggestions on President Nixon's desk were a French proposal for Middle East talks among the United Nations representatives of the Big Four—Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union—and a new Soviet note of December 30, 1968 setting forth Moscow's position on a solution. Roger Vaurs, spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry, explained on January 17 that the objective of the Big Four discussions was to "open the door to a settlement" by an agreement among the permanent Security Council members having interests in the Middle East on the implementation of the November 22, 1967 Council resolution. This seemed necessary in view of the impasse in Dr. Gunnar V. Jarring's efforts toward agreement among the parties to the conflict. Paris also was said to be concerned that, in the wake of Israel's retaliatory raid on the Beirut airport and the increasing militancy of the Palestinian commando groups, the relatively moderate and pro-Western Lebanese regime would be shaken, and that, if Palestinian extremists overthrew King Hussein in Jordan, the prospects for a peaceful settlement with Israel would be lost. While Washington shared these concerns, some observers believed that the initiative also reflected France's uneasiness at being left out of the bilateral exchanges between the American and Russian superpowers, as well as the desire to reassert its role as a major power in the Mediterranean and Middle East.

The Soviet note was interpreted as designed to achieve several objectives. Seeking to maintain the dialogue on the Middle East initiated during the Johnson administration, Moscow sprinkled its note with some apparently conciliatory, though ambiguously worded, phrases to show that it welcomed Nixon's desire to move from an era of cold-war confrontation to one of negotiation with the Russians. At the same time, Moscow was deeply concerned lest the Egyptians, out of desperation and impatience, launch a premature attack against Israel forces in Sinai that would bring another humiliating defeat for Soviet arms and diplomacy. Thus, the Soviet note, which followed Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko's visit to Cairo, also was designed to convince Egypt to rely on Moscow diplomacy to produce Great Power pressure for achieving the Arab objective of a complete Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in the June 1967 war. To this end, the Soviet note explicitly stated that "the situation which existed in May 1967 shall be restored."

ISRAEL'S OBJECTIONS

The Israelis quickly and categorically denounced the proposals for both the Big Four and Big Two talks. Jerusalem raised objections of principle to great powers imposing their will on small states and to any settlement not negotiated by the parties to the conflict. Israel Foreign Minister Abba Eban called the Soviet proposal a plan for dismantling Israel, commenting that an

imposed settlement was "like a warm frost with the contradiction built in—if it's imposed it's not a settlement." In practical terms, Israel feared a repetition of the situation in 1957, after the Sinai Campaign, when combined Soviet and American pressure forced Israel to withdraw without the achievement of lasting peace. It regarded the Big Four forum as no better than the Big Two, for, while Washington and London tried to be "even-handed," Paris was tightening the embargo on arms shipments to Israel and moving ever closer to Moscow's pro-Arab position.

One of the last acts of the Johnson administration, on January 15, was to send a reply to Moscow, after consultation with Secretary of State-designate William P. Rogers. It welcomed the expressed Soviet desire to aid Jarring's mission and to continue the Soviet-American exchange of views, but was critical of the Soviet position on many key issues. According to the text, published in the January 19 issue of the Cairo *al-Ahram*, the note also declared that the United States considered it "a matter of highest priority" that the Soviet Union and other states join in using "all their influence to stop the grave increase of Arab terrorist operations in the area, since terrorist operations inevitably lead to retaliatory operations." The terrorist acts "supported or permitted by some governments, and the retaliatory acts raised by them constitute a serious violation" of the UN cease-fire resolutions and jeopardized the prospects of peace. The American note also expressed regret over Soviet refusal to reach an agreement on limiting arms shipments to the Middle East, a question that Washington said should be considered "an indispensable element in the peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis."

EGYPT'S OPPOSITION

Al-Ahram, which frequently reflects the views of UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser, denounced the American note and declared that President Johnson, "more hated than any other modern politician, has ended his rule in an anti-Arab stance, a stance that invites more than hatred." The paper highlighted reports of Rogers' stand that he merely took note of Johnson's reply to Moscow but did not go so far as to approve it. On its front page it also published a letter from Nixon reciprocating Nasser's New Year's wishes and promising to do his best to bring "justice, security and peace to all humanity."

On March 4 President Nixon indicated that he achieved "substantial progress" in his talks with French President Charles de Gaulle and other European leaders in bringing the British and French Middle East positions closer to that of the United States. He added that his talks with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin led him to be "cautiously hopeful" that the Soviet Union might "possibly play a peace-making role in the Mideast." He acknowledged that Moscow's policy was ambivalent; for without Soviet rearming of Israel's neighbors, "there would be no crisis there." Yet, while

Moscow was providing arms to potential belligerents, it also recognized that a conflict could easily get out of control. It was this fear of escalation that was giving the Russians second thoughts, since "the Soviet Union does not want a confrontation with the United States any more than we want one with them." He intended to do all he could to develop this understanding with Moscow, Nixon added, because "without the Soviet Union's cooperation, the Mideast is going to continue to be a terribly dangerous area if you continue to pour fuel on those fires of hatred that exist on the borders of Israel."

U.S. CLARIFICATION

Announcing that the United States had agreed to Four Power talks at the United Nations, Nixon emphasized that the powers "cannot dictate a settlement in the Middle East. The time has passed in which great nations can dictate to small nations their future, where their vital interests are involved." The role of the outside powers would be "to indicate those areas where they believe the parties directly involved in the Middle East could have profitable discussions" and to provide "a major-power guarantee of the settlement" reached.

When, in mid-March, Eban conveyed to Nixon Israel's concern at the prospect of a direct Soviet military role in the guise of guaranteeing a settlement, U.S. officials let it be known that the president did not necessarily mean a Four Power military guarantee, but some form of moral or political endorsement by the powers, or possibly the stationing of United Nations forces. However, Eban was unable to persuade the United States to forego the projected Four Power talks. On March 30 the Israel cabinet declared it "entirely opposes" the talks by outside powers and "any settlement and any procedure that is not agreed upon" by the parties. It noted that, only a few days earlier, Nasser reiterated Arab refusal to recognize Israel, to negotiate with it or to make peace with it, and that, consequently, the Four Power procedure "undermines" the responsibility of the Middle East states to attain peace among themselves.

The first formal session of the Big Four talks began on April 3 in New York, at the home of Armand Bérard, France's permanent representative to the UN. At his press conference on April 7, Secretary Rogers expressed regret that Israel was so strongly opposed to the idea of the Four Power talks and reiterated that the United States had made it "perfectly clear" to Israel's government that "we do not intend and will not seek to impose a settlement on Israel." He said that the United States would continue the talks in the hope of getting the parties to reconcile their differences. When a reporter asked how he expected to influence them without appearing to be imposing something on them, Rogers replied that he believed "the force of reasoning and the force of public opinion has a lot to do with influencing nations." He

thought that "if the world community should agree on a certain general formula" for a Middle East settlement, the governments in the area "would want to think long and hard before they turned it down." This answer seemed to confirm the fears of the Israelis, who saw it as a veiled hint of American pressure in the event they disagreed with whatever settlement the powers might devise. Rogers acknowledged that "somewhere down the road there will have to be some direct negotiations between the parties" to agree on the terms of the settlement; but the Israelis were far from reassured.

Hussein's U.S. Visit

It was considered by no means coincidental that Rogers gave his most explicit endorsement to the Four Power efforts at the same time that he reminded the press of the arrival of Jordan's King Hussein in Washington the following day. Calling the king "a close friend of the United States for many years," Rogers praised him for having "played a major and constructive role in the search for peace in the Middle East." On Hussein's arrival, President Nixon hailed him as a man of "courage, wisdom and moderation." Hussein replied by urging a move "within the very near future" toward a just and honorable peace, or "we might, indeed, lose the chance." In a speech before the National Press Club, on April 10, Hussein presented a six-point peace plan which, he claimed, had the support of Nasser. While his points closely followed those outlined in the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution, he explicitly advocated for the first time "guarantees for all of free navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba and Suez Canal." In return, the king said, "our sole demand upon Israel is the withdrawal of its armed forces from all territories occupied in the June, 1967 war and the implementation of all other provisions of the Security Council resolution." Nasser was more circumspect in an interview with Clifton Daniels of the *New York Times*. When asked to comment on Hussein's address, Nasser would only say that, once Israel agreed to implement fully all points of the resolution and after Israel granted all Palestinian Arab refugees the right to return, "well, so they will have free passage in the Suez Canal." Shortly before Hussein's statement, both Jordan and Egypt responded to a questionnaire from Ambassador Jarring on their peace terms by stating that the 1947 partition plan—which gave Israel one-third less land than even the 1949 armistice lines—provided the only internationally recognized formula for secure borders.

When Hussein was questioned by UN correspondents about the complete rejection by several Palestinian commando groups of the UN resolution and his peace efforts, he acknowledged that this was a problem, but he was confident that "if it is not too late, the overwhelming majority of our people will come along with us."

By emphasizing that time was running out, Hussein appealed to Washington's desire to strengthen his hand, and that of other "moderates" in the

Arab world, against the challenge of extremist elements at home and the appeal of radical, Soviet-supported states like Syria and Iraq, which refused to consider any peaceful accommodation with Israel. During his visit to Washington, Hussein also obtained American approval of his request for \$30 million in arms, including a second squadron of 18 F-104 jet interceptors, armored personnel carriers and communications equipment. Administration sources tried to minimize the military significance of the transaction by pointing out that the first squadron of planes, ordered in 1966, would only be delivered in the latter part of 1969; that Jordan was still short of pilots; that the 50 Phantom jets Israel was beginning to receive under the agreement concluded at the end of the Johnson administration were superior, and that, in deference to Israel objections, Washington declined to sell tanks to Jordan. The arms deal was regarded by both American and Jordanian officials primarily as a symbolic gesture of United States support for the king, designed to bolster his standing among his officer corps, which had been pressing for new weapons.

Foreign Minister Eban dismissed Hussein's plan as containing nothing new, and pointed out that the Security Council resolution was not self-implementing and that until direct Arab-Israel talks took place there would be only "polemics, propaganda and public relations," but no real progress toward peace. Hussein responded, in an interview in New York, that it was "now up to the Big Powers to convince the Israelis that their attitude must change."

Egypt's War of Attrition

President Nasser, too, sought to bring great power pressure to bear on Israel; but, while Hussein's tactic was to appear moderate and reasonable to the West, Nasser decided to play upon the superpowers' expressed fears of a new military explosion. Accordingly, in the beginning of April, the Egyptians began intensive daily shelling of Israel positions across the Suez Canal, using artillery, mortars, and tanks. Egyptian army commando units crossed the waterway to attack Israel positions in Sinai; Nasser announced that Egypt now felt strong enough to launch a "war of attrition" against the Israeli occupying forces, and reiterated that Egypt was determined to liberate eventually "every inch" of occupied territory; Egyptian government spokesman Dr. Mohammed Hassan al-Zayyat denounced the Suez Canal cease-fire line, explaining that the UN cease-fire decisions "cannot remain in force forever." UN Secretary-General U Thant warned the Security Council on April 21 that a virtual state of active war existed in the Canal area. Many press reports speculated on the imminence of a full-scale war. State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey voiced American "concern" over Egyptian rejection of the UN cease-fire resolution as a "retrogressive" step, and Washington appealed to Cairo through diplomatic channels to restore the cease-fire along the canal.

Israel Defense Minister Moshe Dayan dismissed the Egyptian attacks as "fireworks" which could not alter the basic military and political situation. Israel responded by calling in its "airborne artillery," and successive raids by its fighter-bombers knocked out many of the Egyptian artillery positions along the Canal, thereby greatly reducing Israel's casualty rates; crippled Egypt's radar network; and struck with impunity at military targets deep in Egypt. By the end of the year, Israel's command of the skies and occasional daring commando raids against a variety of Egyptian installations convinced the outside world, if not the Egyptians, that Nasser was incapable of launching anything but a purely suicidal raid in the near future, and that the war of attrition failed to dislodge the Israelis from the June 1967 cease-fire lines.

Congressional Support for Direct Negotiations

On the occasion of Israel's 21st anniversary, Senators Hugh Scott (R.-Pa.) and Abraham Ribicoff (D.-N.Y.) sponsored a Congressional Declaration for Peace in the Middle East. The bipartisan statement, endorsed by a majority of both houses of Congress, called upon the leaders of the Arab states to meet the Israelis "in face-to-face negotiations," and voiced opposition to "any attempt by outside powers to impose halfway measures not conducive to permanent peace." It advocated United States' opposition to "all pressures upon Israel to withdraw prematurely and unconditionally from any of the territories which Israel now administers," in the absence of direct negotiations and a contractual peace settlement.

While mindful of these criticisms, the administration was not prepared to abandon its efforts to reach agreement with the other powers on the main elements of a settlement. The discussions among the four UN ambassadors in New York were paralleled by talks in Washington between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Joseph J. Sisco, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs. On May 26, the United States submitted a set of basic principles to Moscow for acceptance by the Soviet Union and its Arab allies. They asked that peace be restored through a comprehensive agreement as a single package, not in separate phases; that the accord be "contractual" among the parties themselves, not imposed from outside; that the frontiers should not "reflect the weight of conquest," but that they must be agreed upon by the Arab states and Israel, not defined by the Great Powers. The Soviet reply received on June 17, after Gromyko consulted with Nasser, was a "disappointment" to American officials. While agreeing to maintain contacts, it emphasized Egyptian objection to any direct negotiations with Israel, any territorial concessions whatsoever, or any separate settlement not acceptable to the Palestinian refugees. The note's terms were considerably stiffer than expected after Dobrynin's alleged relative flexibility in oral discussions with Sisco. This led to speculation in Washington that either Soviet influence on the Egyptians had been overestimated and Cairo had in fact

exercised a veto over Moscow, or that the Russians were far less eager for a settlement than the optimists had anticipated. At his news conference on June 19, President Nixon conceded that "I would have to admit that I see very little defusing" of Middle East tensions.

Sisco went to Moscow in mid-July to pursue the discussions with Gromyko and other Soviet officials and to urge upon them the need to curb the supply of arms to the region, but he made little headway. The distance between the two superpowers was revealed at the UN. President Nixon told the UN General Assembly on September 18 that the United States was convinced peace in the Middle East required "a binding, irrevocable commitment by the parties," that peace, to be lasting, "must leave no seeds of a future war," and therefore "cannot be achieved on the basis of substantial alterations in the map of the Middle East." Turning to the role of the outside powers, Nixon suggested that "failing a settlement," an agreement to limit arms shipments to the area "might help to stabilize the situation," but that United States efforts to induce the Soviet Union to enter discussions on such limitations had been "without result." The following day, Gromyko rejected Nixon's suggestion, telling the Assembly that discussion of arms limitation "cannot serve any useful purpose so long as the Israeli troops occupy the territories of the Arab countries."

Rhodes Formula

Hopes for a negotiated settlement were raised briefly in mid-September, when Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad told the New York press that, if Israel renounced "expansionism," the United Arab Republic would be willing to utilize again "the procedures followed at Rhodes in 1949" that led to the Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement. The press immediately hailed the statement as heralding an important shift to flexibility in Egyptian policy from the intransigent Khartoum summit rejection of any negotiation with Israel. Riad's acceptance of the "Rhodes formula" was no spur-of-the-moment slip of the tongue, for he first volunteered the suggestion in a meeting with Secretary of State Rogers an hour earlier, and, finding favorable response, agreed to make it public. That evening the Rhodes formula was endorsed by Gromyko in talks with Rogers. Dobrynin and Sisco were instructed to put the understanding in writing, and they agreed to include the following clause in the draft treaty they would submit to Israel and Egypt: "Israel and the United Arab Republic agree that their representatives under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring will utilize the procedures followed at Rhodes in 1949."

Hopes for peace were shattered twenty-four hours later, when Cairo insisted that there had been no direct negotiations at Rhodes; that Jarring's shuttling back and forth between Cairo and Jerusalem was the same procedure as at Rhodes, and that this was all Riad had in mind. The Israelis responded that they would be perfectly willing to follow the Rhodes formula,

and proved by old UN documents that there had indeed been face-to-face Egyptian-Israeli talks at Rhodes. Cables from UN mediator Ralph Bunche to Secretary-General Trygve Lie revealed that Bunche had met with each delegation separately on January 12, 1949, and that the following day the first joint meeting was held, at which the head of each delegation "made a formal declaration of his government's desire for the establishment of an armistice and pledging his delegation to work persistently and in a spirit of conciliation." Bunche utilized three types of procedure: separate preliminary discussions with each delegation, informal meetings between heads of delegations and the UN representative, and joint formal meetings of the two delegations. Israel Ambassador to Washington Yitzhak Rabin, who had been a member of Israel's delegation at Rhodes, recalled that the three kinds of meetings took place concurrently, "the joint exchanges being held invariably around a single table."

To the American and Soviet diplomats the Rhodes formula seemed a good way of saving face for all: the Egyptians could say that negotiations with Israel were not direct because a UN official was present; the Israelis could point to the presence of Egyptian and Israeli negotiators in the same room and the subsequent Egyptian and Israeli signatures on any agreement reached as proof that it was negotiated by the parties directly involved. Of course, the condition for success was that both sides were in fact eager for a negotiated settlement and were held back only by the absence of an acceptable formula. On October 11 *al-Ahram* made it clear that Cairo completely backtracked from Riad's statement: Egypt would not accept "the Rhodes formula or any other formula involving direct or indirect negotiations with Israel." The paper contended that Jarring's mission merely was to set a timetable for Israel's withdrawal and the implementation of the others terms of the November 1967 resolution, and that no negotiations were necessary. Some Middle East observers questioned the sincerity of Riad's initial statement, noting that his seemingly conciliatory comment may have been intended only as a public-relations ploy to counteract the favorable American reaction to Prime Minister Golda Meir, who was due to arrive in Washington on that day on an official state visit.

Mrs. Meir's Visit

Mrs. Meir was received at the White House on September 25 with full honors, including a formal state dinner, and warm words of greeting from President Nixon. He expressed the hope that Mrs. Meir would succeed in bringing a lasting peace to the people of Israel, a "brave and courageous" people. Nixon spoke of the Israelis' "immense military burden," of "the tremendous budget they have to bear," and of their success in developing an arid land, despite all obstacles. He had personally seen Israel's technical assistance programs in other continents, he said, and "this kind of genius,

this kind of ability, is very rare in the world" and "desperately needed for the works of peace."

Mrs. Meir had two lengthy private meetings with President Nixon and a talk with Secretary Rogers. There was no official communiqué at the end of the two-day visit, and no announcement of any specific new American commitment. Mrs. Meir reportedly requested some 25 additional Phantom jets and 100 of the slower Skyhawks; long-term credit to ease the burden of paying for matériel already being delivered, and substantial new economic assistance. Mrs. Meir declared that she was going home "with a lighter heart than when I came," for she found friendship and reaffirmation that the United States "feels that the existence of Israel is important" and would help it overcome the many obstacles to peace. But she failed to convince the administration to abandon the Four Power talks. Mrs. Meir was later greeted with tumultuous welcome and enthusiastic outpouring of friendship in Philadelphia, New York, Los Angeles, and in her hometown, Milwaukee. In New York Mayor John V. Lindsay welcomed Mrs. Meir at the airport and at a City Hall reception, and hosted the most lavish dinner in the city's history for a visiting foreign guest.

Middle East and Vietnam

An attempt by Israel's prime minister to underscore the basic agreement between the United States and Israel on foreign policy principles was not completely successful. President Nixon had mentioned Middle East tensions in passing in his major speech, on November 3, justifying his Vietnam policy. "Precipitate withdrawal" of American troops from South Vietnam, he said, would set off violence "wherever our commitments help maintain peace—in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western hemisphere. A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends." On November 7 Mrs. Meir congratulated Nixon on his "meaningful speech," noting that it "contains much that encourages and strengthens freedom-loving small nations the world over, which are striving to maintain their independent existence looking to that great democracy, the United States of America." The White House released her message and Nixon's reply that he "deeply appreciated" her "thoughtful message."

Mrs. Meir's letter drew criticism from American Jews who were active in the peace movement. They noted that the Israel government had scrupulously resisted President Johnson's efforts to obtain endorsement for his Vietnam policy, and they contended that Mrs. Meir's statement was a gratuitous intrusion into a domestic controversy that would alienate possible supporters of Israel. Mrs. Meir's defenders pointed out that she did not deal with the merits of Nixon's policy, but only expressed "her hope that he will speedily succeed in bringing about peace in Vietnam." Israel also was legitimately concerned that the anti-Vietnam war sentiment in the United States might lead the administration to adopt a neo-isolationist policy of refusing to

honor its commitment to any distant small state, such as Israel. Mrs. Meir reacted to President Nixon's reassurances on this point, rather than to his statement on Vietnam. Some political commentators saw in the note a more concrete quid pro quo. Nick Thimmesch, Washington columnist for *Newsday*, said Mrs. Meir "developed a personal sympathy" for Nixon during her Washington visit, and that she also was "shrewd enough to know that her support of Nixon's Vietnam policy is a welcome tonic for the President," which could be repaid by a delivery of even more Phantom jets.

U.S. Peace Proposals

Meanwhile, the Israelis were becoming increasingly concerned over developments in the Great Power talks, as the feeling grew in Jerusalem that Israel no longer enjoyed Washington's full confidence as it did during the Johnson administration. On October 28 the United States submitted to the Soviet Union a working paper containing detailed proposals for a draft agreement between Israel and Egypt. Mrs. Meir complained that the proposals were handed to Israel only some six weeks later. Within the framework of the Big Four talks, the United States submitted similarly detailed proposals on October 18 for a settlement between Israel and Jordan. A copy was given Israel the same day. Foreign Minister Eban expressed surprise that the document was not shown to him before, since he met with Secretary Rogers only two days earlier. State Department officials contended the Israelis were unjustifiably upset, for the proposals allegedly contained nothing that had not already been discussed with Israel representatives.

The American-Israeli disagreement might have remained unpublicized but for the fact that Secretary Rogers, in a lengthy talk on American policy for achieving peace in the Middle East (December 9), spelled out in considerable detail the main points of the still confidential American proposals. Rogers explained that the danger of a new Middle East conflict and the belief that the parties to the Arab-Israel dispute "alone would not be able to overcome their legacy of suspicion" convinced the United States of its responsibility "to play a direct role in seeking a solution." He said that, therefore, the United States accepted the suggestion of both the French government and UN Secretary-General Thant for Four Power talks to aid Jarring's efforts, and also pursued bilateral talks with the Soviets. Rogers stressed that the United States had acted "in full recognition" of four basic factors:

First, Peace rests with the parties to the conflict. The efforts of major powers can help: they can provide a catalyst, they can stimulate the parties to talk, they can encourage, they can define a realistic framework for agreement, but an agreement among other powers cannot be a substitute for agreement among the parties themselves.

Second, a durable peace must meet the legitimate concerns of both sides.

Third, the only framework for a negotiated settlement was in accordance with the entire text of the [November 1967] UN Security Council resolution.

Fourth, . . . a protracted period of no war, no peace, recurrent violence, and spreading chaos would serve the interest of no nation, in or out of the Middle East.

Referring to the bilateral Soviet-American talks, Rogers said, "we are under no illusions; we are fully conscious of past difficulties and present realities." Despite a measure of mutual understanding achieved in the talks, he said, "very substantial differences remain." He expressed regret over the Soviet delay in responding to the "new formulations" submitted to them in the October 28 American note, and he reiterated Washington's intention to continue discussing Middle East problems with Moscow as long as there was "any realistic hope that such discussions might further the cause of peace."

Secretary Rogers denied that the United States was partisan to either side in the conflict, and insisted that its approach was "*balanced* and fair" (Rogers' emphasis). He added that the United States would "not shrink from advocating necessary compromises, even though they may and probably will be unpalatable to both sides."

The balanced American policy was to encourage the Arabs "to accept a permanent peace based on a binding agreement" and to urge the Israelis "to withdraw from occupied territory when their territorial integrity is assured." As Rogers predicted, his proposals were quickly attacked from both sides.

Arab and Israeli Reactions

The Arabs objected to: 1) Rogers' insistence on "a binding and specific commitment" by the Arab states and Israel "to peace with each other, with all the specific obligations spelled out, including the obligation to prevent hostile acts originating from their respective territories"—an allusion to the terrorist activities of the Palestinian commando groups; 2) his statement that the parties themselves would be required to negotiate the practical security arrangements on the ground, and that Ambassador Jarring's role was to "engage the parties in a negotiating process under the Rhodes formula"; 3) his recognition that Israel's navigation rights in the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran "should be spelled out"; 4) his reiteration that withdrawal of Israel forces would begin "only after complete agreement had been reached" on all aspects of the overall settlement.

Although the Arabs considered all these points as evidence of America's continued pro-Israel bias, the Israelis themselves were far from reassured. Mrs. Meir accused the United States of "moralizing" and unjustly balancing the intentions of the two sides, even though Israel sought peace and the Arabs were preparing for a new war. She objected to the detail in which Rogers spelled out the proposed terms of settlement, leaving the parties very little to negotiate and, in effect, undermining Israel's bargaining rights on matters vital to its security.

Jerusalem further contended there had been an "erosion" of the American position. On the key question of the location of the secure and recognized borders called for in the Security Council resolution, President Johnson had emphasized there could be no return to the June 4, 1967 situation, and only said the new lines "should not reflect the weight of conquest." In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 27, 1969, Rogers maintained that "rectifications from the pre-existing lines should be confined to those required for mutual security and should not reflect the weight of conquest." In September President Nixon told the UN that there should be no "substantial alterations in the map of the Middle East." On December 9 Rogers went out of his way to emphasize that "we do not support expansionism" and declared "any changes in the pre-existing lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security."

These mutually agreed "insubstantial" alterations were to apply only to the Jordan-Israel frontier. And while earlier diplomatic formulations of the U.S. position on the Egypt-Israel border stated that the old international frontier was not necessarily precluded from consideration, Rogers now explicitly declared that the U.S. proposed settlement "would require withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from UAR territory to the international border between Israel [or Mandated Palestine] and Egypt." Israel and Egypt would negotiate only such questions as demilitarized zones and security safeguards relating to Sharm al-Shaykh, which controls the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. The future of the Gaza Strip was to be agreed upon among Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. The only frontier to which Rogers made no reference was the Israel-occupied Golan Heights, presumably because Syria rejected the November 1967 Security Council resolution and refused even to talk with Dr. Jarring.

The Israelis pointed to the increasingly restrictive American interpretations of border revisions as proof of their fears that, in the process of Big Two and Big Four talks, the United States would make ever greater concessions at Israel's expense in the hope of winning Soviet agreement. This, the Israel Embassy in Washington declared, would encourage the Arabs to maintain their intransigent refusal to negotiate with Israel, since they would naturally view "the concessions as a gesture of appeasement and as a license for further diplomatic and military escalation." However, State Department officials denied any fundamental shift in American policy and claimed Rogers merely gave greater precision to long established American positions.

Jerusalem and Refugee Settlement

The Israelis were also unhappy about Rogers' explicit comments on Jerusalem and the refugee problem. While he indicated that Jerusalem should remain a unified city, as the Israelis wished, he also said that the final status of the city should be determined primarily "by the governments of Israel

and Jordan, taking into account the interests of other countries in the area and the international community." The Israel government had long declared its readiness to allow persons of all faiths free access to the holy places, with the respective religious authorities supervising their own sites. However, the Israel government expressed strong opposition to Rogers' proposal that there be "roles" for "Jordan in the civic, economic, and religious life of the city."

On the refugee question Rogers went beyond the Security Council resolution's general call for a "just settlement." He emphasized that the settlement "must take into account the desires and aspirations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the governments in the area." This was spelled out in the Jordan-Israel draft agreement submitted by the United States to the Big Four on December 18. Both parties would be asked to accept the principle that refugees of the 1948 war "would have the choice between repatriation to Israel and resettlement with compensation." In order to implement this settlement, the parties would agree on "mutually acceptable procedures" for repatriation and resettlement, including "the number to be repatriated and resettled annually in order to carry out the decisions of the United Nations with respect to the Palestinian refugees." The practical details were to be worked out by Jordan and Israel under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring, who also was authorized to ask the participation of such other states as Egypt, should he consider it "desirable and necessary." If the parties agreed, and Ambassador Jarring considered it "desirable," an international commission would be established "to ascertain the choice of the refugees." The first group of refugees was to arrive in Israel within three months of the implementation of the final accord between Israel and Jordan.

On December 29 Mrs. Meir told the Knesset that the adoption of American proposals on borders and refugees would constitute "a grave danger to our very existence." This "return to the geography of 1967 and the demography of 1947," she charged, would give the Arab terrorist organizations the choice of deciding whether to shell Israel from the other side of vulnerable borders, or to attack it from within after having returned as refugees.

American officials considered the Israeli fears exaggerated, arguing that the great majority of refugees would choose to be resettled and that no refugees would be returned without agreement by Israel, which could exercise veto power over security risks. Israel officials countered by questioning the possibility of ascertaining the free choice of the embittered refugees; they also feared that, despite Israel's theoretical veto power, the international commission to be established would generate tremendous pressure on Israel to yield.

Fears of Imposed Settlement

Going deeper than the disagreement between Jerusalem and Washington over the terms of a peace settlement was a growing concern in Israel and

among American Jews that the United States would be tempted to use the economic and military assistance Israel requested as a lever for forcing Israel to make concessions. There were recurrent press reports that American businessmen with oil and other interests in the Arab world were urging such a course upon the administration. Concern over this was voiced to Secretary Rogers on December 22 by a delegation of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations and the American Jewish Committee. Rogers sought to reassure the Jewish leaders that the United States did not intend to impose a settlement, a point he reaffirmed the next day at his press conference. He added that there "is no linkage" between Israel's requests for additional aid and Israel's attitude to the U.S. proposals, that the United States was considering Israel's aid request carefully "in full realization that we have an obligation, as do the other nations in the United Nations, to support the sovereignty of Israel and its future security."

But, while there may have been no formal linkage, the timing and content of the Rogers speech made it apparent that the United States was very much concerned about the general political climate in the Middle East as well as the broader Soviet-American relationship. Rogers explained at his press conference that the United States decided to make public the essentials of its private diplomatic efforts "because our position was being distorted in some parts of the world." In his speech Rogers specifically mentioned, and denounced as false, the allegations that the United States sought to divide the Arab states by urging the UAR to make a separate peace.

Arab Anti-American Propaganda

Washington also was angered by the intensified propaganda drive launched by Egypt in October against the United States and pro-Western Arab states, which charged, among other things, that United States military advisers were serving with the Israel armed forces and that the United States was encouraging Americans to fight for Israel. These charges were repeated even after the State Department issued several official denials explaining that, while a recent Supreme Court decision ruled that Americans did not automatically lose their United States citizenship if they voted in a foreign election or were drafted into a foreign army, the United States government actively discouraged service by Americans in any foreign army; that persons doing so might be subject to fine or imprisonment under existing American statutes. The United States embassy in Tel Aviv estimated that only about 100 American Jews, who settled in Israel but retained their United States citizenship, were serving in the Israel Army. Nevertheless, official Arab propaganda agencies asserted that "American soldiers" were establishing a settlement near Jerusalem and were responsible for a rocket attack on the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Beirut in October. Under the heading, "Will the Middle East Turn Into Another Vietnam?", the Arab Information Center, agent of the Arab League in the United States, pub-

lished an ad in the *New York Times* on November 7, charging the United States with giving "open encouragement" to Americans to fight in Israel, and warning that this growing involvement "will lead to another Vietnam in the Middle East." The ad concluded with a question set in large bold-face: "Do you want your American boys to perish on the battlefields of the Middle East?" Some Middle East specialists believed there was an even more ominous motive behind the Arab propaganda campaign, namely, to justify to the Arab masses and the world, Nasser's decision to request several thousand more Soviet military "advisers."

Anwar al-Sadat, a top aide of President Nasser, called the United States "our enemy No. 1," told a public rally of Egypt's ruling Arab Socialist Union in October that "thousands of Americans" served in the Israeli forces, and predicted "growing U.S. aggressiveness."

Despite Cairo's hostile propaganda, Rogers was conciliatory: In his December 9 speech he declared that "whenever and wherever Arab states which have broken off diplomatic relations with the United States are prepared to restore them, we shall respond in the same spirit." The speech also was intended to shore up the remaining pro-Western regimes in the Arab world by demonstrating that the United States was balanced in its Middle East policy, thereby enabling them to justify to their own people their continued friendly relations with Washington.

Libyan Coup

The overthrow of the conservative monarchy in Libya on September 1 by a group of radical young officers friendly to Egypt was followed by a series of acts weakening American and British influence in the country. The army officers called for accelerating plans to close down the Wheelus Air Force Base outside Tripoli, the last remaining American Strategic Air Command base in the Arab world, and denounced foreign economic domination of the country. However, while the new regime adopted a militantly anti-Israel posture and moved to coordinate Libya's economic and political policy with that of Egypt and the Sudan, at the end of the year Libya's rulers had second thoughts about expropriating the foreign oil concessions, and American companies were encouraged to maintain their operations.

The Libyans also concluded a large-scale arms agreement with France under which Paris was to supply 110 supersonic Mirage jets. Washington was concerned over this new escalation in the arms race, since the number of aircraft was considered far beyond Libya's own needs, and Egyptian military advisers accompanied the Libyan purchasing mission. After an unsuccessful attempt to conceal, and then to minimize, the size of the deal, the French argued that it was preferable for the Libyans to turn to Paris, rather than to Moscow, for its arms.

Lebanon's Dilemma

Meanwhile, the increasing militancy and open activity of Palestinian commando groups in Lebanon posed a harsh dilemma for the moderate pro-Western government in Beirut. If armed commandos, who were predominantly Muslim Palestinians, were permitted to operate freely within Lebanon, they would constitute both a threat to the tenuous Christian-Muslim balance within the country and an invitation to the Israelis to retaliate against Lebanon for harboring the marauding terrorist bands. But if the small and mainly Christian-officered Lebanese army was ordered to crush the Palestinians, Lebanon faced the danger of a new civil war in which Egypt and Syria would be tempted again to back the more radical Muslim and Palestinian elements, as they did in 1958. There had already been brief but bloody clashes between government forces and Palestinian commandos and refugees in April.

When Assistant Secretary of State Sisco was asked, after a speech to the Middle East Institute in Washington on October 10, about the Lebanese situation and the possibility of Israel retaliation against commando bases in southern Lebanon, he declared that the United States attached "great importance to Lebanese independence and integrity" and that "we would view with great concern any threat to that integrity from any source." He added that the United States had "very warm friendship" for Lebanon and highly valued that country's "open and democratic society." After the Sisco statement was widely disseminated by the U.S. Information Service in Beirut, it was welcomed by conservative, Christian elements in Lebanon, and denounced as unwarranted American intervention by the Left and by Moscow, Cairo, and Damascus propaganda organs.

When, in October, a series of increasingly bloody clashes between the Palestinian guerrillas and Lebanese government forces threatened to escalate into a full-scale war that neither side wanted, Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasir Arafat and the Lebanese Commander in Chief, General Emile Bustani, met in Cairo and, with Egyptian mediation, concluded a secret compromise agreement on November 3. Nasser praised the agreement as "preventing a catastrophe for the Arab world." However, as the year ended, the situation was one of a tense and tenuous truce, with dispute continuing over the rights and restrictions of Palestinian commando groups. In Jordan, too, the Palestinians were increasingly obtaining quasi-official autonomy for their activities and further restricting Hussein's freedom of action.

Arab Disunity at Rabat

If the pro-Western regimes were under attack, the radical regimes had their failures as well. Syria and Iraq continued to be torn by internal turmoil, and the mid-December Arab League summit conference in Rabat broke up in open disagreement without a final communiqué. Arafat was

unable to obtain the large financial aid he had requested for the Palestine Liberation Organization, and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia resisted Nasser's demand that he and other oil-rich conservative Arab states substantially increase their subsidy to Egypt and the unified military command. American policy in general, and Rogers' speech in particular, were credited with, and blamed for, the Rabat fiasco. Although the conference did not formally abandon the earlier Khartoum decision barring direct Arab negotiation with, or recognition of, Israel, it also failed to endorse the extremist call for a new war and an end to diplomatic efforts for a solution.

Soviet Intransigence

The Arabs thus left the door slightly open to a political settlement; but the formal Soviet reply on December 23 to the American proposals of October 28 were a disappointment to Washington. Moscow denounced the American plan as "one-sided" and "pro-Israeli." While the Soviet note grudgingly acknowledged that the various American concessions which had angered Israel reflected "certain progress," it made no concessions on its part, and only demanded further changes for the benefit of the Arab states. American officials were particularly disturbed over the apparent Soviet "retreat" even from positions on which there had earlier been firm Soviet-American agreement. For example, the Soviet note now said that "it would not be expedient" to move toward Arab-Israeli contacts through Dr. Jarring "in view of the sharp differences which have recently emerged in interpretation by the sides of the so-called 'Rhodes formula.'" Washington saw this as distressing evidence that Moscow was unwilling to use its influence to bring the Egyptians to moderation, and instead yielded to Egyptian intransigence. There was no sign at year's end that Russia was eager for a genuine Arab-Israeli peace.

INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

If the Great Powers failed to achieve a fundamental political settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict during 1969, the United Nations was equally ineffective in preventing violations of the 1967 cease-fire agreements, in safeguarding the fundamental human rights of the Jewish minorities in certain Arab countries, or in bringing the Arab refugee problem any closer to a solution.

In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the United Nations, issued in mid-September, Secretary-General U Thant grimly noted that, despite all UN efforts to restore the cease-fire, a virtual state of war existed in the Suez Canal region, and "the prospect of even a first step towards a peaceful settlement now seems still remote." This situation, he acknowledged, created a considerable "crisis of effectiveness for the United Nations." He warned that, unless there was rapid progress toward a settlement, "there is a very real danger that this great and historic region, . . . will recede steadily into a new dark age of violence, disruption and destruction."

Jewish Minorities in the Arab World

Nevertheless, Thant assumed only a cautious and limited personal role. On January 27 he issued a statement expressing "regret and concern" at the "sentencing and hanging in Iraq of 15 persons charged with espionage, nine of whom were Jews." He noted that on January 13, he had already conveyed to the Iraqi UN representative his deep concern over the trials, and particularly their impact on "public opinion both inside and outside Iraq," declaring, "mass trials and executions are always to be deplored and are particularly abhorrent and dangerous when they are carried out in such a way as to inflame the emotions of the populace." Adnan Raouf, Iraq's acting permanent representative, responded that the executions were "entirely an internal affair," and expressed surprise that Thant should have considered it proper to comment on them. In his statement Thant in fact conceded that he did not question Iraq's right to put its own citizens on trial and that he was exercising "his good offices on humanitarian grounds." The other motivating factor was his fear lest "the repercussions from this unhappy development" impede efforts for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. When Thant was asked at a press conference, the following day, whether he intended to bring the subject of the hangings before the Security Council, he reiterated these points and then made the further comment:

Of course, if similar actions had taken place in another area, outside the region, I might not have even thought of issuing any statement. I have recognized and I still recognize that this is purely an internal affair. . . . It is of course far from my intention to bring this matter before any deliberative organ of the United Nations.

In his annual report Thant noted briefly that there were "many innocent and helpless victims" of the Middle East crisis, and singled out for mention the persistent problem of the Palestine refugees, which urgently demanded solution, as well as "the plight of another, smaller group of helpless persons," namely, "the small Jewish minorities in certain Arab states." Thant concluded that "it is clear that, in some cases at least, these minorities would be better off elsewhere and that the countries in which they now live would also be better off, given the prevailing circumstances, if the departure of those who would wish to leave could be sanctioned and arranged." Again he noted that, since these Jewish persons were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the governments of the Arab countries, the problem could be approached only from a humanitarian standpoint and a desire to lessen internal and international tension. He expressed the hope that "it may soon be possible to find sensible ways of solving this largely humanitarian problem." Nevertheless, by year's end neither the Iraqi nor the Syrian authorities had permitted a single Jew to leave, although there had been many requests for emigration. They continued to subject the Jewish minorities to arbitrary arrest and harsh discriminatory measures.

Council Condemnation of Israeli Reprisals

During 1969 the Arab states continued to wage their anti-Israel campaign in every available UN forum. With the unwavering support of the Soviet bloc and of Muslim and radical members of the Third World, the Arabs managed to score some formal parliamentary and propaganda successes. However, the adoption of one-sided resolutions condemning only Israeli violations of the cease-fire was seen by some as further weakening the moral influence of the United Nations in dealing with the Arab-Israel conflict, since this merely reinforced the prevailing Jerusalem view of the UN as a biased court from which Israel could not hope to obtain justice.

For example, after an Israeli air attack against Jordan, on March 26, in the area south of es-Salt caused the death of 18 persons and the injury of 25 others, Jordan asked the Security Council to condemn Israel for having "brutally attacked Jordanian villages and civilian centers," and to consider sanctions to check future Israeli aggression. Israel filed a cross complaint charging the Jordanian government and armed forces with aiding and encouraging armed attacks, infiltration, and acts of murder and violence against civilians by terrorist groups operating from Jordan and "the wanton shelling of Israeli villages." Ambassador Yosef Tekoah contended Israel's retaliation was "active defense" directed at disabling terrorist bases in the area, from which more than 200 sabotage raids and other attacks across the frontier were launched since mid-January, he said, resulting in 69 Israeli casualties, eight of them deaths, in the previous month alone. He added that a UN observer was among those injured in a terrorist bombing of a Jerusalem supermarket.

After lengthy debate and behind-the-scenes discussion, the Security Council on April 1 adopted a resolution sponsored by Pakistan, Senegal and Zambia, condemning the "premeditated air attacks launched by Israel on Jordanian villages and populated areas in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions"; deploring "the loss of civilian life and damage to property"; and warning that if such attacks were repeated, the Council would "consider further more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter" to prevent their repetition. (The sponsors originally sought an explicit reference to possible economic, political, and military sanctions.) The vote was 11 to 0 in favor, with 4 abstentions (Columbia, Paraguay, United Kingdom, United States). Israeli sources pointed out that six of the 11 votes came from countries that either never recognized, or had broken off diplomatic relations with, Israel: Algeria, Nationalist China, Hungary, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and Spain. Of the other five, France, Senegal and Zambia generally adopted a pro-Arab stance; only Finland and Nepal could be regarded as more or less neutral.

Charles W. Yost, the United States representative, said he abstained even though his government condemned all violations of the cease-fire and,

especially, air attacks, which, by their very nature, were bound to be indiscriminate in effect. Moreover, such attacks were counterproductive in achieving Israel's proclaimed objective of negotiations, for the "inevitable slaughter of innocent people" only "aggravated the bitter and uncompromising attitude towards Israel in the countries that suffered the losses." On the other hand, Yost felt it was unjust and unrealistic to consider in isolation the Israeli air attacks, which were unquestionably provoked by indiscriminate attacks on innocent Israeli civilians in markets, schools, theaters, and commercial aircraft. He rejected the argument that these Arab terrorist acts were morally justified as resistance to occupation, or that acts by irregular forces were different in character from those of regular armed forces. To the innocent victims, it made no difference, Yost said, for "death is just as final and shocking if it comes from a bomb in a supermarket or from a bomb from the air." Because the operative part of the resolution concentrated exclusively on one kind of violence and ignored the one provoking it, he said, the United States regarded the resolution as "unbalanced, unrealistic and unlikely to move the parties towards seeking a peaceful solution." The British delegate gave similar reasons for his government's abstention.

Human Rights Commission Inquiry

On March 3 the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution establishing a special working group of experts to investigate allegations concerning violations by Israel of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the protection of civilian persons in time of war in the territories occupied during the 1967 war. The group was empowered to receive communications and hear witnesses, and was to report on them to the next session of the commission. The same resolution reaffirmed "the inalienable right of all the inhabitants who have left since the outbreak of hostilities to return," and called on Israel immediately to implement previous UN resolutions. It deplored "Israel's continued violations of human rights in the occupied territories" and called on Israel immediately to end such acts as destroying civilian Arab homes, deportation, and "resorting to violence against inhabitants expressing their resentment to occupation." The resolution was adopted by a vote of 13 to 1 (Israel), with 16 abstentions. Almost all favorable votes were cast by states that were either Arab, had large Muslim populations, or were members of the Soviet bloc. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and all West European and Latin American members of the commission abstained, their main objection being that the resolution prejudged the very issues for whose investigation it ostensibly was establishing a group of experts. The Israel government dismissed the "unbalanced and prejudicial resolution" as "a purely propaganda exercise lacking any moral validity." Israel further contended that any investigative committee also should look into "the vicious trampling on the human rights of the Jewish communities in certain Arab countries."

Israel maintained, too, that the resolution did not represent the views of "the responsible and impartial majority" of the 32-member Commission on Human Rights. The Arabs, for their part, argued that the 13 to 1 vote constituted "overwhelming" majority support by the commission for their charges, since abstentions did not count as negative votes. In June the group of six experts (four from pro-Arab Senegal, Yugoslavia, India, and Tanzania, and two from neutral Austria and Peru) began hearing complaints from Arab witnesses in New York and in the Arab capitals; the Israel government refused to admit or to have any dealings with the group. In September Israel adopted a similar posture toward a General Assembly investigative committee composed of representatives of Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Ceylon. Israeli officials stressed that their government had nothing to hide and that it had fully cooperated with neutral investigators, such as the Swedish diplomat Dr. Nils-Göran Gussing, who had visited Israel, the occupied territories, and the neighboring Arab states in the summer of 1967 as the special representative of the UN Secretary-General (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], p. 34).

U.S. Condemnation of Israel Raid

On August 26 the United States joined in the unanimous adoption of a Security Council resolution condemning "the premeditated air attack by Israel on villages in Southern Lebanon." It referred to a raid on August 11 by Israeli jet fighter-bombers, six miles inside Lebanese territory, on Mount Hermon sites, described by the Israelis as guerrilla encampments from which increasing terrorist forays against Israeli settlements had been launched. Israel Ambassador Tekoah denounced the resolution as another example of the UN's "double standard," for it yielded to Arab insistence and omitted a direct and explicit call to all the parties to observe the cease-fire.

The United States made a concession in accepting a text which, Ambassador Yost acknowledged, "does not deal in as balanced a fashion as we would have wished with the cycle of provocation and reprisal." Yet the United States supported the resolution, he explained, for its clear indication of Council disapproval of all violations. The text deplored "all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire," and declared that "such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated" and would prompt the Council to consider "more effective measures" to prevent their recurrence. Lebanese representative Edouard Ghorra said the Council action amounted to a rejection of Israel's countercomplaint against Lebanon. Some observers thought the American vote was motivated by a desire to counteract growing criticism of the United States by the moderate pro-Western Arab states with a demonstrative act showing Washington's opposition to Israeli reprisals.

Although the Suez Canal front saw the most intensive, and almost continuous, fighting during 1969, neither the United Arab Republic nor Israel requested a meeting of the Security Council.

STATUS OF JERUSALEM

On June 30 the Security Council began consideration of a Jordanian complaint that measures taken by Israel in Jerusalem were contrary to a Security Council resolution of May 21, 1968 and several General Assembly resolutions on Jerusalem (AJYB, 1969 [Vol. 70], pp. 182-83). On July 3, 1969 the Council unanimously approved a resolution, jointly submitted by Pakistan, Senegal and Zambia, deploring Israel's failure to show any regard for the earlier resolutions; censuring "in the strongest terms all measures taken to change the status of Jerusalem"; confirming that all Israeli legislative measures purporting to alter the city's status were invalid, and urgently calling on Israel "to rescind forthwith all measures taken by it which may tend to change" Jerusalem's status and to refrain from any such actions in the future. The United States abstained on this last section, calling it inconsistent and impractical, but then voted for the resolution as a whole.

Ambassador Yost said the United States always felt that Jerusalem enjoyed a unique international standing, and that no action should be taken without full regard to its special history and special place in the world community. He characterized as "detrimental to the common interests in the city" Israel's expropriation and confiscation of land, the demolition of buildings and construction of new housing on this land, and the application of Israeli law to East Jerusalem. The United States, he emphasized, regarded the part of Jerusalem taken over by Israel in the June 1967 war as legally no different from the other occupied territories. Consequently, Israel was bound under international law and the Geneva Convention to maintain the occupied area as intact and unaltered as possible, which meant no interference in its customary life and no changes except for those required by immediate occupation needs. Yost noted that the American government repeatedly expressed its displeasure to Israel on this matter.

But Yost also stressed that Jerusalem was not an isolated problem. It was an integral part of the whole complex of issues in the Arab-Israel conflict. The United States continued to believe that a package solution, as envisaged in the Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, was the basis for a just and lasting one. In the context of such a solution, Jerusalem "should not again become a bone of contention among religions and nations, but an example of unity."

Soviet delegate Aleksei Zakharov denounced Israel's "illegal, criminal and arbitrary actions" in Jerusalem, which, he said, confirmed Israel's policy of "aggression and expansion." The only peaceful solution, he held, was the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied territories, "including the Arab part of Jerusalem." Jordanian Ambassador Muhammad el-Farra declared that Israel's "contempt, arrogance, deceit and conceit" in defying the Council's resolution indicated sanctions as the only remaining alternative to

bring Israel's compliance with the established principle that "acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible."

Ambassador Tekoah accused the representatives of Jordan and other Arab states of turning the debate into a "bacchanalia of belligerence and abuse." The Arabs, he said, had neither the moral nor legal right to accuse Israel, since they had rejected the UN Charter requirement and numerous resolutions calling for peaceful coexistence with Israel. Jerusalem's "history, reality and destiny," he emphasized, could not be erased by Security Council votes. It was not only a religious center, but a living city—with a population of 200,000 Jews, 60,000 Arabs and 5,000 others—which always had been the capital of only one nation, "the Jewish people," and "irrevocably bound up" with its history. Tekoah then turned to Jordan's right to present a claim, describing its illegal invasion of the city, the "barbaric destruction of the Jewish quarter, of Jewish houses of worship, of ancient Jewish cemeteries," and its refusal to permit free access to the Holy Places. No state, he contended, legally recognized Jordan's right to Jerusalem. Israel found "unacceptable" the American view that the eastern part of the united city of Jerusalem constituted occupied territory, since "the expulsion of the Jordanian aggressor from Jerusalem could not have suddenly bestowed on Jordan rights which it had never possessed." Unity was Jerusalem's natural state; Israel was sovereign; Jerusalem was Israel's eternal capital, he concluded. But, Tekoah continued, Israel fully realized its international responsibility and would "ensure the universal religious interests in Jerusalem and make certain that all its inhabitants, Jewish and Arab alike, were protected in their rights, their property, their lives."

Arson at Al-Aqsa

The day after an arsonist damaged the historic Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on August 21, 25 states with Muslim populations urgently requested, in a joint telegram expressing their horror and grief at the outrage, that the Security Council meet to consider suitable action for an impartial investigation of the fire, the prevention of a recurrence of vandalism against, or profanation of, the Holy Places, and the assessment by Islamic countries of the damage and arrangements for the mosque's repair.

By the time the Council began to meet on September 9, an Australian Christian visitor with Messianic delusions, Michael Denis William Rohan, had confessed to setting the fire; the Israel government had expressed its sorrow over the fire and agreed to permit an Egyptian expert architect to inspect the mosque and a group of distinguished Moslems to supervise the repairs; a commission of inquiry composed of Arabs and Jews had been appointed by Israel's supreme court president to receive testimony (p. 501).

Disregarding these facts, the Arab states and the Soviet bloc proceeded to excoriate Israel. The UAR representative charged Israel with "original and vicarious, direct and indirect" responsibility for the mosque's destruction and

profanation. Soviet representative Yakov Malik declared the Council "must clearly state that Israel was politically and morally responsible for the arson" in the mosque, because the "atmosphere of repression, terror and arbitrariness" under Israeli occupation had led to the fire. Malik outdid Agha Shahi of Pakistan, sponsor of the resolution adopted by the Council, who stressed that it was not his intention "to prejudice responsibility for the act or to allege Israeli complicity." However, he considered the act "a by-product of the military occupation and annexation of Jerusalem," since it was "inconceivable" for such a crime to occur under normal conditions.

On September 15 the Council adopted a resolution stopping just short of explicitly blaming Israel for the fire. The resolution, adopted by a vote of 11 to 0, with the United States, Columbia, Paraguay, and Finland abstaining, said the Council "determines that the execrable act of desecration and profanation of the Holy Al-Aqsa Mosque emphasizes the immediate necessity of Israel's desisting from acting in violation of" the earlier Council and Assembly resolutions on Jerusalem and "rescinding forthwith all measures" to alter the status of the city.

Lord Caradon of the United Kingdom declared that his government did not consider Israel guilty or at fault in the fire, that it deplored the accusations made or implied, and "would never be associated with such baseless allegations or false insinuations." He said he voted for the resolution, even though he was not satisfied with its language, because it reaffirmed the Council's stand on Jerusalem and condemned "the contemptible act of arson." Ambassador Yost expressed the United States view that it saw no evidence of the suspected arson being anything but "an individual act, as demented as it was dastardly." He explained that the United States abstained because, in its view, the resolution went far afield of the ostensible purpose for which the Council had been called, and was contrary to the American objective of creating "an atmosphere of conciliation and goodwill," which was a necessary prelude to a peaceful settlement.

Recognition of Palestinian Refugees

The Special Political Committee of the General Assembly began its annual review of the work of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) on November 17. Laurence Michelmore, the agency's commissioner-general, noted that there now were more than 1,400,000 persons in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon asking for UNRWA assistance. These did not include the persons displaced by the 1967 war. About 1.25 million were eligible for some form of assistance; 840,000 of them received monthly food rations. Camps in East Jordan, established since June 1967, held some 92,000 displaced persons, both old and new refugees. Roads, schools, and health and other facilities had been provided. Improved medical care resulted in a dramatic decrease in eye diseases. UNRWA found a great increase in demand for education and

vocational training, which strained its facilities. Although some groups of refugees were better off, Michelmoresaid, the economic condition of the refugees, as a whole, had not improved. As a result of rising costs and increased needs, he anticipated a \$5 million deficit for UNRWA in 1970. He warned that stopping or reducing aid in the present atmosphere of tension in the area "could have extremely dangerous consequences," and urged that UNRWA's finances be put on a sounder basis than the current reliance on voluntary contributions by governments and individuals.

Michelmoresaid had this to say about press reports that Palestinian commandos had seized control of the UNRWA camps in Lebanon: The camps were like Arab villages, or areas of larger towns, which people normally could enter and leave as they pleased. Nonrelief functions, such as maintenance of law and order, administration of justice and issuance of building permits were the responsibility of the host government. He acknowledged that, for several weeks, armed men had come into some camps from which the regular Lebanese police were absent, and they "at times . . . had exercised control over entry to and departure from the camps." Thus six UNRWA buildings were occupied, and for several days UNRWA staff was barred from entering some of the camps. Michelmoresaid gave assurance that UNRWA continued to control distribution of its services to its intended beneficiaries and that he was satisfied "the integrity of these UNRWA operations had been maintained, and that its assistance was not diverted to other purposes." Some foreign observers noted, however, that UNRWA was overwhelmingly staffed with Palestinian refugees, and that, over the years, the agency had not succeeded in weeding out and depriving of rations and other benefits members of Palestinian liberation movements who engaged in terrorist training.

Three resolutions were approved in the political committee and then endorsed by the plenary of the General Assembly in December. The first, sponsored by the United States, and adopted by a vote of 101 to 1, with 4 abstentions, expressed regret that there had been no substantial progress toward a solution of the refugee problem through repatriation or resettlement with compensation, as provided in earlier resolutions; asked the commissioner-general to continue his efforts to rectify the rolls, and called on all governments "as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible" to meet UNRWA's financial needs. However, the Assembly failed to incorporate any part of UNRWA's costs into its regular budget, and gave Michelmoresaid no guidelines as to where to cut the program if necessary. Following the precedent of the last two years, the Assembly unanimously adopted an 18-power draft authorizing UNRWA to continue to provide as much assistance as was practicable, on an emergency and "temporary" basis, to needy persons displaced as a result of the 1967 war, and appealed for generous contributions to meet this need.

The most heated debate arose over a resolution introduced by Somalia

and 11 other pro-Arab states. It recognized that the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees resulted from "the denial of their inalienable rights"; expressed grave concern over "reported acts of collective punishment, arbitrary detention, curfews, destruction of property, deportation and other repressive acts" against refugees and others in the occupied territories; reaffirmed "the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine," and requested the Security Council to take effective measures to ensure implementation of the relevant UN resolutions.

Opponents of the resolution held that it would merely exacerbate tensions; that the Assembly was not the appropriate forum for this discussion since the major powers were now engaged in efforts to find a solution in accordance with the November 1967 Security Council resolution, and that the debate should be restricted to the humanitarian problems of refugee aid. The United States representative stressed that the requirement to respect the wishes of the refugees did not give them an unconditional right of free choice. That right was limited by a second requirement to safeguard the legitimate interests of states, and the original resolution of December 1948 therefore stipulated that returning refugees be "willing to live at peace with their neighbors." Thus, he said, the UN had a clear responsibility "not to countenance any proposals which threatened the existence of Israel or of any other Member State." The representatives of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of Canada, among others, said they could not support a text which implied the disappearance of Israel, or called into question its right to exist.

Apparently fearing that the resolution might not get the two-thirds majority required for formal approval of important questions by the plenary, Somalia moved that this resolution came within the category of "other questions" referred to in Article 18 of the UN Charter, which could be approved by a simple majority. Israel Foreign Minister Eban refused to comment on a resolution which, by definition of its sponsor, was unimportant. The substance of the resolution was approved by 48 votes in favor to 22 against, with 47 abstentions, and virtually all favorable votes coming from Arab, Islamic, or Communist states. Some of the states that voted for the Somali resolution or abstained, indicated that it did not weaken Israel's right to exist, but merely reaffirmed pre-existing "inalienable" rights of the Palestinians. Nonetheless, the vote represented a political victory of considerable propagandistic value for the Palestinian "liberation" movement. It was also an indication of the growing tendency to regard the Palestinian problem not primarily as a humanitarian one affecting individual Arab refugees, but as a political question affecting a nationalist movement.

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