

Review
of
the
Year

UNITED STATES

Civic and Political

Intergroup Relations and Tensions in the United States

ELECTIONS • ERADICATION OF PREJUDICE • EXTREMISM AND VIOLENCE •
RADICALISM AND JEWISH YOUTH • PUBLIC OPINION AND MIDDLE EAST • BLACK
COMMUNITY • CIVIL RIGHTS • URBAN CRIME • NEGRO-JEWISH RELATIONS •
INTERRELIGIOUS RELATIONS

IN 1970 changes and developments in intergroup relations were viewed with mixed feelings by the various segments of the population. The Jewish community reacted to them with uncertainty, guarded optimism—and, at times, pained reappraisal. The elections saw more Jews running for office, in a climate of less antisemitism, than ever before. Progress was being made in areas in which there was discrimination against Jews, such as private clubs and executive suites of industry, largely because of pressure of legislation and public opinion.

Jews were calm or relatively unconcerned about radical right extremism; but they were much concerned over left extremist groups, black and white, young and adult, which were strongly anti-Israel and anti-Jewish. American public opinion generally remained overwhelmingly for Israel, but support had declined from a high point in 1967.

Christian-Jewish relations continued their upward movement, though with some frustrations and disappointments. While Catholic-Jewish understanding was encouraged by Catholic leaders, Protestant-Jewish relations showed little progress and, in some cases, even declined. Differences over church-state issues, notably federal aid to parochial schools, created tensions even among Jewish groups, with Orthodox leaders publicly siding with Catholic exponents of federal aid.

Negro-Jewish relations received less national attention, both in public discussion and research, than in preceding years. Though both groups were

found to be generally less prejudiced against each other, problems continued to arise in geographically and socially more localized areas, largely over antisemitic utterances by black extremist groups, crime and disorder involving Jewish victims, as well as the growing militancy of inner-city poor Jews determined to receive more attention by city administrators.

These occurrences, as well as other local, national, and international developments, among them Georges Pompidou's visit to the United States, discrimination by the Soviet Union against its Jewish citizens,¹ the militancy of Black Panthers, demonstrations by black and Puerto Rican activists in New York City's hospitals, the tactics of the Jewish Defense League, all reflected differing aspects or degrees of potential and actual antisemitism. They rekindled suspicion, anxiety, and fear in Jews about their own security, resulting in public demonstrations and protests and in initial discussions of "Jewish power," which expressed concern that Jews, by advocating everyone else's rights, would have no rights of their own unless they clearly politicized their identity.

Black status and power increased, particularly with the election of hundreds of black candidates throughout the country. A dramatic shift in public opinion, at least in the South, was the change in attitudes by Southerners toward sending their children to school with Negroes. Some black groups nevertheless hardened their attitudes towards whites, notably CORE, which officially rejected integration as an approach to achieving equal opportunity. There was also a rise in income, mostly for younger black families with children. But deep poverty continued to characterize most blacks.

Developments in the area of civil rights and civil liberties brought both satisfaction and disappointment. If the extension and expansion of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was welcomed, the Nixon administration and Congress were criticized respectively for failure to enforce existing legislation and for passing what was considered anti-civil libertarian bills.

Campus unrest, particularly on the high-school level, increased, creating a widespread and volatile situation traceable to such factors as civil-rights protests, effects of slum life, impact of minority group pressures, influence of college and university disruptions, as well as dissatisfaction over dress and grooming codes.

The year also witnessed the beginning of bombings and snipings triggered by various revolutionary groups, white and black, of the left and right. The cry for safety in the streets and law and order intensified as serious crime more than doubled during the decade of the 1960's. Nationally and locally, new citizens groups formed and became concerned with drugs, prisons and courts, police, and new approaches to reform of the country's criminal justice system.

¹ For the reaction of American Jews see "American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry: Summary Report of Activity During 1970," in this volume, pp. 265-270.

1970 Elections

JEWISH CANDIDATES AND JEWISH VOTE

An analysis of the November 1970 elections² indicated that American public opinion normally preferred candidates who had a centrist rather than a leftist or rightist platform. It also found that Jews as a group, though high on the socioeconomic ladder, voted very liberal, least racist, and least anti-Negro, despite pre-election claims that the Jewish vote was moving to the right. There was only some slight movement to the right among the elderly. In all, the voting pattern of the Jews resembled that of the blacks more than that of any other white ethnic group.

Antisemitism was an almost negligible factor in the success or failure of the unprecedented number of Jewish candidates for high office. Nine Jews, eight of them Democrats, ran for senator or governor. Three of the Jewish gubernatorial candidates, Milton Shapp of Pennsylvania, Marvin Mandel of Maryland (incumbent), and Frank Licht of Rhode Island (incumbent) won; Arthur Goldberg of New York, and Sander Levin of Michigan lost. Senators Jacob Javits (Rep., N.Y.) and Abraham Ribicoff (Dem., Conn.) were reelected. Four senatorial candidates—Sam Grossman, Arizona; Richard Ottinger, New York; Howard Metzenbaum, Ohio, and Nelson Gross, New Jersey—lost by two or three percentage points.

The almost total absence of antisemitism as a tactic in a campaign with an unprecedented number of Jewish candidates for high political office was very important, as was support for Israel at a time when the Middle East crisis was becoming more complex and heated.

There were some isolated manifestations of overt and covert antisemitism: in Cleveland, an American Nazi party attack on Democratic senatorial candidate Howard Metzenbaum, and in New York, slurs on the Democratic ticket headed by four Jews and one Negro. However, the *Baltimore Sun* noted after the elections, "the notable thing . . . was that anti-Semitism was proven to be dead as a factor of importance in American politics."

ANTISEMITIC CANDIDATES

Candidates who were overtly hostile to Jews fared poorly:³ J. B. Stoner, gubernatorial candidate in Georgia and an arch-antisemite, ran fourth in a nine-man race, obtaining 2.21 per cent of the total votes cast. Dan W. Salamone, who lost the Maryland Democratic gubernatorial primary, pub-

² Amy Malzberg and Geraldine Rosenfield, *American Votes, 1970: The Center Holds* (American Jewish Committee: December 1970), 20 pp. (mimeo).

³ Milton Ellerin, *The 1970 Elections—An Analysis* (American Jewish Committee: December 1970), 26 pp. (mimeo).

licly stated there was "too much concentration of power in the Jewish and Negro minority groups." Gerda Koch, who was defeated in a Minnesota congressional district Republican primary, said that "studies show that Zionists were instrumental in starting World War I and World War II." In Nebraska, American party gubernatorial candidate Albert C. Walsh, whose declared goal was to recapture the "Holy Land of the United States in the name of Christ" by a Constitutional amendment recognizing Christianity as the national religion, received 2.3 per cent of the vote. Retired Rear Admiral John Crommelin, an outspoken antisemite who ran for lieutenant-governor in Alabama, polled less than 1.5 per cent of the vote. The one successful candidate of this type was John J. Rarick (Dem., La.), an arch-segregationist, member of the White Citizens Councils, Wallace supporter, and choice of known antisemites, ran unopposed for the House of Representatives.

ISSUE OF ISRAEL

The only major candidate opposing American support for Israel was Alabama Democrat John C. Schmarkey, who failed in his bid for Congress; incumbent Republican Congressman John Buchanan, who was strongly pro-Israel, was reelected. George Wallace supporters running on a variety of American Independent party tickets took anti-Israel positions in areas where opponents were pro-Israel. Some 84 of them ran for Congress and the governorship in 22 states. They also were against racial integration in the schools, forced busing, and civil-rights legislation. Most of them polled fewer than 3 per cent of the votes.

Advocacy of support for Israel was nonpartisan and geographically diverse. In New York, 30 congressional candidates, Democrats and Republicans, urged continued U.S. economic and military support. In Ohio, Connecticut, California, and Massachusetts all senatorial candidates were strongly pro-Israel. At times, candidates debating the issue of Israel were obviously making a bid for the "Jewish vote."

EXTREME RIGHT-WING CANDIDATES

The reaction of the electorate to the extreme right was mixed. It had some solid victories in the House elections. Two John Birch Society leaders, John G. Schmitz and John H. Rousselot, were reelected in California, as were the right-wing favorites P.M. Crane in Illinois, John Rarick in Louisiana, John Ashbrook in Ohio, and John Dowdy in Texas. Candidates of its choice lost in Wisconsin and New Mexico. Tom Foley of Washington was reelected over a John Birch leader. Equally important was the defeat of Phyllis Schlafly, an Illinois arch-conservative.

In the state legislatures, the extreme right won at least two seats, one each in Maryland and Michigan. In other elections, one of its favorites, Dr. Max Rafferty, California's superintendent of public construction, lost, as

did Congressman Albert Watson, who sought the governorship in South Carolina.

BLACK CANDIDATES AND BLACK VOTERS

Blacks scored impressive victories in the elections. Almost half of an estimated 650 black candidates for various offices throughout the country were successful, with the greatest gains on state and municipal levels. Thirty-six ran for 23 seats in the House and one seat in the Senate, which was held by John Stennis of Mississippi. Four of the congressional candidates—Roger V. Dellums, Calif.; George Collins and Ralph Metcalfe, Ill., and Parren J. Mitchell, Md.—were elected, making a total of 12 black congressmen and one black senator, Edward W. Brooke (Rep., Mass.), in the 92nd Congress. Three of the newly elected black congressmen represented predominantly white districts; Parren J. Mitchell became the first Negro ever elected to Congress in Maryland.

Significant breakthroughs occurred in the South: two blacks in Alabama and all four black candidates in South Carolina were elected to the nearly century-long all-white legislatures in those states.

Despite the record number of blacks running for political office, registered black voters failed to vote in significant numbers. The most noticeable example was Atlanta's Fifth Congressional District, where Rev. Andrew Young, a close associate of the late Martin Luther King, Jr., lost by some 8,000 votes; only some 40,000 of 72,000 registered blacks voted. In the gubernatorial races, Dr. John Cashin, Jr., the black Democratic candidate in Alabama, and Thompson D. Broadwater, the black candidate running on the U.S. Citizens party ticket in South Carolina, were defeated.

Some analysts suggested that the failure of blacks to vote was responsible also for the defeat of liberals Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio and Albert T. Gore in Tennessee, and for the election of Independent Harry T. Byrd, Jr., in Virginia, who was not favorably regarded in the black community. Explanations for the poor turnout varied: some thought blacks were so disenchanted with "the system," that they simply refused to vote even for black candidates; others felt that the failure of candidates of both major political parties to make a distinct effort to get black voter support was to blame.

KEY ISSUES

Almost as significant as the results of the elections were the manner and style in which they took place: 1) The Republican efforts to make "law and order" a key election issue generally failed; in many contests Democrats also campaigned against rioting, bombings, and campus disruptions. 2) With the exception of New England where issues of social concern appeared to be dominant, most of the electorate was concerned with economic issues.

- 3) Neither civil rights nor withdrawal from Vietnam was a campaign issue.
- 4) College youth's participation in the elections was disappointingly small.
- 5) With the exception of South Carolina's gubernatorial race, in which Republican Congressman Albert Watson continually stressed the dangers of a black bloc vote and the high incidence of Negro riots, race was not a factor in Southern elections. In fact, "candidates in the South who seemed closest to George Wallace in style and attitudes on race, did poorly."⁴

Eradication of Prejudice

PRIVATE CLUB DISCRIMINATION

Much progress was made in eliminating private club exclusionary practices based on race or religion. In January the Minneapolis City Council Committee adopted a resolution prohibiting the issuance of liquor licenses to "any club or organization . . . which denies membership . . . on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, ancestry or national origin unless the organization limits membership exclusively to one national origin or one religion."

Two other rulings recognized the obligation of a state not to abet discriminatory practices through its licensing power. In August the Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission ruled, in the case of alleged discriminatory membership practices of the Marblehead Eastern Yacht Club, that it would, where discrimination was proved, "withhold the granting or consider suspending or revoking an existing license." And, in *Irvis v. Scott*, in October, the Federal Court in Pennsylvania unanimously held that where the state totally controls and regulates the sale of liquor, granting a liquor license to a racially discriminatory private club constituted discriminatory state action in violation of the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

By year's end, several other suits were pending. Plaintiffs of diverse backgrounds, Jewish, Negro, Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, American Indian, claimed in *Gerber v. Hood*, in the United States District Court, Seattle, that the granting of liquor licenses by the state to discriminatory private clubs constituted state action in aid of discrimination and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. In *Pitts vs. Wisconsin*, the American Civil Liberties Union sponsored a challenge to the tax-exempt status granted to the racially exclusionary Fraternal Order of Eagles. In November the American Civil Liberties Union, acting on behalf of 21 persons, filed suit in New Jersey, asking for the revocation of both the tax-exempt status and the liquor licenses of Elks lodges in the state.

Litigation was accompanied by increased educational activities on the part of local and national groups and organizations. In Seattle, Wash., some

⁴ *Ibid.*

15 racial, religious, and ethnic groups joined together in an organization called Asian Coalition for Equality, which urged Seattle businesses and organizations not to utilize the facilities of discriminatory clubs. Nationally, the American Jewish Committee, in July, wrote to some 600 college and university presidents and chancellors, asking that the use of exclusionary clubs for fund-raising events be avoided. Over 200 responded affirmatively; many issued directives to their personnel departments and alumni leaders not to use such clubs for meetings and affairs.

EXECUTIVE SUITE DISCRIMINATION

Limited progress continued to be made toward the removal of executive suite discrimination barring minority group members from reaching the top echelons in big business, high finance, heavy industry, and even academia. Government and organizational efforts brought changes in the recruiting, hiring, and promotional practices of a number of companies in 1970. Early in the year John L. Wilks, U.S. Department of Labor deputy assistant secretary for compliance, announced that the Office of Federal Contract Compliances would investigate anti-Jewish practices on the executive level by oil companies, as well as in managerial employment by the automotive and electronic industries. In announcing the investigation, he cited an Anti-Defamation League study which revealed that only about "1.5 per cent of corporate executives employed by the oil industry in New York" were Jewish.

Business Week of January 24, 1970, reported that "the status of the Jew in United States business is a paradox. . . . In some areas of the South and Midwest, Roman Catholics seem to suffer the same disability—they do not climb the corporate ladder so fast or so high as, say, Baptists or Methodists."

Private human-relations organizations, notably the American Jewish Committee, the Jewish Vocational Service, and the Anti-Defamation League, discussed the problem with scores of top corporate executives in the insurance, banking, airline, food, petroleum, petrochemical, automotive, and aerospace industries. In some instances, local action was taken, i.e., in Cleveland, where the Jewish Community Federation, together with a number of private foundations, funded a three-year executive advisory program for the elimination of barriers based on religion, race, ethnic origin, and sex in large Cleveland based firms.

Regarding discrimination in the top administration of colleges and universities, impressive progress was made; the number of Jewish college and university presidents increased from six in 1966 to at least twelve at the end of 1970.

Image of Minorities

Protests, pressures, and programs to eliminate prejudice from textbooks and the mass media continued, chiefly by minority-group members themselves. At the same time, demands escalated for minority-group courses and curricula in colleges and universities.

In California, in July, the American Indian Historical Society complained to the State Board of Education that fourth grade textbooks failed to depict the plight of contemporary Indians and that their presentation of early California Indians was "degrading" and "inaccurate." The National Mexican American Anti-Defamation Committee complained in December that telecasts projected negative stereotypes of Mexican Americans, casting them "as sneaky, untrustworthy thieves, who did not work, who are lazy, irresponsible, and who should and could be arrested by the superior white man." Protests by Italian-Americans led Attorney General John N. Mitchell, in late July, to issue a confidential memorandum to all government division and agency heads to stop using the term "Mafia" and "Cosa Nostra" because Italian-Americans "feel that the use of these Italian terms reflect adversely on Italian-Americans generally, and there is no doubt that their concern is genuine and sincere."

Demands for minority-group studies became so general and insistent, *Civil Rights Digest* of February 1970 reported, that "literally hundreds of colleges and universities have set up Afro-American studies programs," a practice spilling over into elementary and secondary schools. Similarly, more than 80 institutions of higher learning introduced Mexican-American study programs or departments.

Two 1970 research studies investigated the treatment of minorities in social-studies textbooks: *Minorities in Textbooks*, by Michael B. Kane, sponsored by the Anti-Defamation League, analyzed 45 leading junior and senior high-school textbooks. It found that material on the Jews suffered from an overemphasis on their ancient past; that their persecution under the Nazis was inadequately treated; that the black man's struggle for equality was treated more with complacent generalizations than with hard facts; that the contemporary role of other minority groups, such as Mexicans, American Indians, Chinese Americans, Japanese Americans, Spanish-speaking people, was largely ignored.

A preliminary report in June of an American Jewish Committee study of 24 world history and 19 American history texts indicated lack of historical accuracy and adequate coverage of Jews and Judaism. In most instances, there was no discussion of the post-biblical period, and where it was included, the presentation usually was inadequate. Students were unlikely to learn from the texts about the origin of the Jewish people and their influence on Western civilization, or even the history of the Jewish community in the United States.

The need to provide understanding of one's own and other ethnic groups was recognized in a bill introduced by Congressman Roman C. Pucinski (D., Ill.) for the establishment of an ethnic heritage studies center for the preparation of materials on the contributions to America of all minority groups, which would be used in schools and the training of teachers.

Extremism and Violence

Though serious urban civil disorders declined for the second consecutive year, scattered disturbances in smaller communities and the increase in bombings kept domestic violence at a high level. The Justice Department, in September, reported that 15 riots, 38 serious disturbances, and 63 minor disorders occurred between January and the end of July. In the period from January 1969 to April 1970, the *Christian Science Monitor* of September 21, 1970, stated, there took place 4,330 bombings and 5,794 attempted bombings resulting in 43 deaths, 384 injuries, and property damage totaling \$21.8 million. Assistant FBI director William C. Sullivan cited, for the January to October 1970 period, 190 reported instances of radically-motivated attacks against policemen, including 17 ambushes, resulting in the death of 21 police officers and injuries to 159 others.

However, violence was traced also to those on the right, such as white protests against war protesters and black activists, labor disputes, and personal revenge. In October two members of the Raiders, an antiblack underground group, were found guilty of blowing up 36 school buses in Longview, Texas, in July. Police in Houston were still hunting those responsible for twice bombing the liberal radio station KPFT.

A survey by the Urban Institute in Washington, D.C., released in November, revealed that while between September 1967 and the end of April 1970 the percentage of all colleges experiencing some incidents rose from 6 to 14, it rose to 32 between May and August 1970 after American troops had been sent into Cambodia. Of 805 incidents, 36 were described as "most serious," involving personal injury or property damage.

The two most deplorable incidents occurred at Kent State University, where members of the Ohio State National Guard, on May 3, fatally shot four students and wounded eight others, and ten days later, at Jackson State College, Mississippi, where state police fired into black student groups and dormitories, killing one student and a local high-school senior. On August 24 campus militants bombed the Army Mathematics Center on the Wisconsin University campus, killing one graduate student and injuring four others in the building.

In its report on the Kent State tragedy, released in October, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, chaired by former Governor William W. Scranton, stated that student demonstrators responsible for vandalizing the town of Kent, burning the campus ROTC building, and stoning National Guardsmen who tried to disperse the rally—shared responsibility for the

deaths and injuries. The report assailed the Ohio Guard for issuing loaded combat weapons to its men and condemned the "indiscriminate firing of rifles into a crowd of students and the deaths that followed" as "unnecessary, unwarranted, and inexcusable."

On the other hand, a special Ohio state grand jury investigating the shooting exonerated the National Guard. It found that "major responsibility" rested "clearly" with the university administration which fostered "an attitude of laxity, overindulgence, and permissiveness." This attitude permitted "overemphasis on the right to dissent" by some faculty members which was responsible for the students' behavior and "obscene" language.

In connection with the Jackson State killings, the President's Commission report condemned as "unreasonable, unjustified overreaction" the state police's use of shotguns and other arms. It found no substantiation of police reports of sniper fire directed at them; accused them of having lied to their superiors and to the FBI about the shooting, and said their action was in part motivated by confidence that they would not be punished.

In its over-all report, in September, the commission held that government, students, and universities shared responsibility for preventing campus disorders, and pleaded with all sides "to draw back from the brink" of a dangerous division. It condemned fanatical student terrorists, complacent campus officials, brutal law-enforcement officers, and the inflammatory speech of politicians. It urged President Nixon to exercise the moral leadership of his office to bring the nation back from the brink of ominous divisions over social problems. In a December 12 letter to Scranton, President Nixon strongly rejected this imputation of responsibility for disruption. Responsibility, he said, "rests squarely on the shoulders" of some members of the academic community. Earlier, in September, Vice President Spiro Agnew called the commission's reference to the president "'scapegoating' of the most irresponsible sort," adding that the report was "sure to be taken as more pabulum for the permissivists."

As 1970 was coming to a close, extremist left groups were not only having internal organizational problems, but they also ceased to attract a large following, particularly among students. The killings at Kent State and Jackson State universities, as well as the number of bombings, appeared to have a sobering effect on many. Also by year's end, Vietnam seemed to be a dormant campus issue, as were collegiate administrative and curriculum reforms.

A late December 1970 Gallup poll of some 1,063 students representing 61 colleges and universities revealed that extremist groups had as little appeal to them as to the adult population as a whole, though students were slightly more left than the rest of the nation. Less than 10 per cent of both students and adults gave a "highly favorable" rating to the leftist Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Black Panthers; reaction to the Weathermen was overwhelmingly negative. Analysis of the socioeconomic background of the students polled revealed that college seniors and college

graduates of private institutions in the East and from upper-income homes were most likely to regard favorably radical leftist groups. Less than 5 per cent of both students and adults gave a "highly favorable" rating to the rightist John Birch Society and the Ku Klux Klan.

One of the disturbing findings was that for many leftist and rightist radicals on the campus extremism appeared to have appeal for its own sake. Thus a significant proportion of students, who described their political philosophy as "far left," gave a highly favorable rating to the John Birch Society and the Ku Klux Klan; a similarly significant proportion of "far right" students gave a highly favorable rating to SDS, the Weathermen, and the Black Panthers.

By year's end, the Weathermen, whose leaders had gone underground, seemed to have renounced violence, but not their revolutionary cause. Bernardine Dohrn, one of the leaders, wrote in a December communiqué that "the future of our revolution has been changed decisively. . . . Our belief that armed struggle is the only revolutionary struggle is destroyed forever." She added that the "tendency to consider only bombings or picking up the gun as revolutionary, with the glorification of the heavier the better, we've called the military error." Some observers interpreted this change in Weathermen action as tactical rather than philosophical. Violence had not brought about the predicted repression which, the Weathermen expected, would elicit mass sympathy and support.

Responsibility for violence in ghetto disorders was examined in a study of arrest patterns in the riots of the 1960's, conducted by the Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research and released in early January 1970. It found that it was whites, not blacks, who were more likely to be arrested for shooting and sniping during ghetto disorders; that whites were more likely to be "outside trouble-makers" than blacks arrested in riots; that whites arrested appeared to come disproportionately from the lower socio-economic strata, and that they were just as likely as the arrested blacks to be unemployed and to have previous arrest records.

Radicalism and Jewish Youth

There was concern in the Jewish community over the political, social, and religious attitudes and behavior of Jewish youth, particularly over the participation of the militant in peace demonstrations, in New Left organizations, and antiestablishment petitions and protests. Jewish organizations, publications, and writers discussed, studied, and analyzed the causes of such involvement.

An analysis of publications dealing with young American Jews⁵ pointed

⁵ Geraldine Rosenfield, *What We Know About Young American Jews: An Annotated Bibliography* (American Jewish Committee: April 1970), 19 pp. (mimeo).

out that Jews attended college in greater proportion than the youth of any other ethnic or religious group; that, as a result of studying more, "they were inclined to ask more questions, be more mobile, cut loose from family and community ties, be more open in attitudes toward friendship, sex, and intermarriage, be more left wing politically." They were also apt to have "less ambivalence about identifying as Jews and have less reluctance to cast off Judaism altogether."

At a National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council executive committee meeting in October, Rabbi Oscar Groner, assistant national director of B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundations, described the emergence of "a new breed" of Jewish students, whose sense of identity with Judaism was awakened by the six-day war in the Middle East, and who adopted the tactics of "the Black activist ethnic movement." Defining them more precisely, he said:

These are not Jewish radicals but radical Jews, ethnic Jews. . . . [who] are radical in and about their Jewishness. They have developed a whole series of organizations and structures, some of them duplicative, but it is, nonetheless, a very exciting development. They call themselves radical Zionists, Students for Israel, Naaseh, Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry, Union of Jewish Students, National Jewish Organizing Project, and many other names.

Jack Porter theorized⁶ that when the Black-Power movement made them feel unwelcome and when black and white radicals began developing an anti-Zionist philosophy, these students felt impelled to break with them. But they also rejected the "Jewish establishment" as irrelevant and unresponsive to the needs of Judaism and Jewry, as they saw them. They therefore established their own groups reflecting their radical style and philosophy, as well as their reawakened sense of Jewishness.

The newly-formed groups made themselves heard through their own newspapers published from various campuses across the country. In Spring 1969 there had been but a handful of such Jewish student newspapers; by the end of 1970, there were an estimated 40 expressing a wide range of opinion: radical Zionist, Jewish nationalist, and religious Orthodox.

Further insight into this phenomenon was given by Nathan Glazer in a discussion of what he called "a crisis of identity and self-conception" in the Jewish community in which Jewish youth was a major factor.⁷ While the American Jewish community moved toward Jewish ethnicity and liberalism, radical Jewish youth movements were rejecting both. Glazer's solution: "new validity to ethnic attachment and to liberalism . . . by association with an old religion," and convincing youth "that we hold these commitments . . . because they do indeed provide the best pattern to organize our lives."

⁶ Jack Nusan Porter, "Jewish Student Activism," *Jewish Currents*, May 1970.

⁷ Nathan Glazer, "The Crisis in American Jewry," *Midstream*, November, 1970.

Public Opinion and the Middle East

Two major public-opinion polls conducted in 1970 indicated that while American public opinion continued heavily to favor Israel over the Arabs, it did so to a lesser degree. A Gallup poll taken between February 27 and March 2 showed 44 per cent of the sample favoring Israel, 3 per cent favoring the Arabs, and 32 per cent taking a neutral position. In August, before the wave of Palestinian guerrilla airplane hijackings (p. 431), a Harris poll indicated that 46 per cent of the sample expressed basic sympathies for Israel and 6 per cent for the Arabs; 25 per cent took a neutral position and 23 per cent had no opinion. Support for Israel was strongest among the college-educated and those in the highest income brackets. Pro-Arab sympathy was strongest among blacks. The Harris poll also found that 41 per cent of the respondents thought the United States should not send troops to defend Israel if its independence were threatened; 38 per cent disagreed.

The greatest support for the use of American troops in defense of Israel was found in rural and small-town America, particularly in the South.

Pro-Israel sentiment in rural America was also reflected in an August survey of Southern Baptist pastors and Sunday-school teachers. It found 77 per cent of the pastors and 73 per cent of the teachers sympathetic toward Israel, and only 2.6 and 1.1 per cent, respectively, expressed support of the Arab states. A March 1969 survey had shown 71 per cent of the pastors and 69.3 per cent of the teachers in sympathy with Israel.

POMPIDOU VISIT

Unhappiness among American Jews over France's anti-Israel policy and the French sale of 100 Mirage jets to Libya created a public storm during French President Georges Pompidou's official visit to the United States in February. An Ad Hoc Committee on International Affairs, representing every major American Jewish organization, held a demonstration in Chicago where Pompidou and his wife were being honored at a formal dinner reception tendered by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Alliance Française. The demonstration emphasized the protest of individual Americans, not of Jewish organizations, against French policy.

According to all reports, the predominantly Jewish gathering of some 10,000 persons was orderly, though the demonstrators crowded in when President and Mrs. Pompidou arrived. The guests entered the building less than a minute later, and the demonstration broke up immediately thereafter. The next day's Chicago press reported no violence whatsoever.

Upon returning to New York City, Pompidou abruptly cancelled a projected meeting with Jewish leaders, and angrily called the Chicago protest "a stain on the forehead of America." He charged, March 2, that the Chicago police had acted in complicity with the demonstrators by letting them

come too close to him. The furor triggered a hurried visit to New York by President Nixon, who apologized to Pompidou for any discourtesy experienced.

Black Community

In an evaluation of the 1970 status of blacks, the January-February 1970 *Crisis*, official journal of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, (NAACP), prepared a balance sheet. On the negative side were such items as President Nixon's Southern strategy; the shooting of black students at Jackson State College; continued unemployment; attacks on black children attending an integrated school in South Carolina; thwarted school desegregation; black and white racism; racial hostility in the armed services; and the death of several important black leaders.

Among the positive developments were the success of black candidates in the election; the defeat of Judge G. Harrold Carswell's nomination to the Supreme Court; the exoneration of five Texas Southern university students charged with the murder of a Houston policeman; the abandonment of Jim Crow facilities and programs at Antioch College; the extension of the voting rights act of 1965; the growth of minority construction contractors.

Of positive significance was a nation-wide March-April 1970 Gallup poll which found a drop in the percentage of white parents in the South who would object to sending their children to schools with black children. Decreasing from 61 per cent in 1963, to 16 per cent in 1970, the change was considered "one of the most dramatic in the history of opinion sampling." In the North, the percentage also declined from 10 in 1963 to 6 in 1970. Nevertheless, the Congress of Racial Equality, at its September 1970 national convention in Mobile, Ala., officially rejected integration as the approach to achieve equal opportunity, a policy stated in its endorsement of a Mobile public school plan premised on "desegregation without integration."

Census reports on the status of the blacks, which began to appear at year's end, revealed significant developments, particularly in relation to poverty among blacks, continuing migration to the North, and the problems of black families. Significant gains were reported in the North for 532,000 young black families with husband and wife under age 35; their average annual income was \$8,900, or 91 per cent that of their white counterparts, as compared to 62 per cent in 1960. But these, Census Population Studies director Herman P. Miller pointed out, were "the most stable and promising of black families."

Other categories of black families showed either modest gains, or none at all. For 1.5 million black households headed by women, there was no income gain at all, as compared to whites. Of these, 53 per cent had incomes under the officially recognized poverty line of about \$3,800. Outside the South, the number of such households rose from 400,000 in 1960 to about 800,000 in

1970, with more than 53 per cent having incomes below the poverty line. Older black families in the North and West either gained slightly or by statistically insignificant amounts. Black income in the North and West was 75 per cent of white income; in the South, it gained only slightly, averaging 57 per cent; for the nation as a whole, it was 61 per cent as compared to less than 54 per cent in 1960.

The figures, Miller said, suggested that "younger, better-educated blacks in the North have been able to get jobs, maintain stable marriages, and vastly narrow the income gap." At the same time, black female-headed households, increased sharply in the 1960's, to three times those among whites, indicating continued social deterioration and deep poverty among many black families. Successful black families were moving out of the depressed areas, leaving "a concentration of misery in the hearts of our largest cities."

On migration, the Census Bureau reported, Southern black movement to the North during the 1960's continued at almost the same rate as in the two decades before. Of the 1.4 million Southern blacks, 396,000 migrated to New York, 272,000 to California, and some 120,000 each to New Jersey, Illinois, and Michigan. The census report further indicated that as Southern blacks moved to the North and West, whites in those areas moved to the South. The result, according to a New York *Times* report, "is a clear continuation of a long-term trend toward depression of the black population throughout the country."

Civil Rights

An important gain in civil rights was extension in August 1970 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for five more years, and its amendments to make it applicable to Northern cities requiring literacy tests; to prohibit literacy and other tests and devices as qualification for voting; to establish uniform residency requirements of 30 days in all federal elections, and to lower the voting age from 21 to 18 in federal, state, and local elections. In a five to four decision late in the year, the United States Supreme Court upheld all provisions except the one lowering the voting age in state and local elections.

A second important gain was G. Harrold Carswell's failure to win confirmation as Supreme Court justice to replace Abe Fortas. Civil-rights leaders and organizations considered Carswell a Conservative of pro-segregation leanings, as well as an unhappy example of President Nixon's "Southern strategy," and launched a vigorous congressional and senatorial campaign against him. He was defeated by a Senate vote of 51 to 45.

Congress advanced the civil-rights cause by removing a restrictive appropriation ceiling on the budget of the United States Civil Rights Commission. Two bills for improving the Equal Employment Opportunities Act and advancing school desegregation were blocked.

Civil-rights leaders and supporters accused the Nixon administration of failure to advance civil rights, particularly to enforce existing legislation. In a widely publicized criticism, Bishop Stephen G. Spottswood, chairman of the NAACP board of directors, charged the administration with having a calculated anti-Negro policy, and the President with displaying "a massive indifference to the polarization which is crippling the entire nation. He is against busing to achieve racial balance in schools, and against 'forced integration' in the suburbs. He remains mute about forced residential segregation or busing to maintain Jim Crow Schools."

Urban School Unrest

A Syracuse University study of some 700 urban high schools, prepared for the United States Office of Education and released in October 1970, revealed "a widespread and volatile situation." Racially integrated schools, it found, were more likely to be disrupted than all-white or all-black schools. However, integrated schools with high percentages of black students were less likely to be disrupted if they had high percentages of black staff members. Where the percentage of black students was higher than that of black staff members, disruptions were more numerous and more racial in tone.

Among causes contributing to unrest, the report said, were the success of civil-rights protests; effects of slum life; impact of minority-group pressures on traditionally middle-class-oriented public schools; influence of college and university disruptions; "black revenge," as well as dissatisfaction over dress and grooming codes and school policies governing participation in extra-curricular activities. The study also found that the traditional punishment for disruptions by students—suspension, expulsion, police arrest, in-school detention, and referral to parental discipline—often produced "perverse and countra-productive results."

The report's conclusion that "disruption is positively related to integration" disagreed with an earlier 1970 study conducted by Columbia University for the United States Office of Education. The latter, a survey of some 7,000 students in urban and suburban junior and senior high schools in Greater New York and Philadelphia, suggested that tensions and conflicts arose over issues of school governance and individual rights.

Urban Crime

Criminal offenses in 1970, the FBI reported, were 11 per cent higher than in 1969; serious crimes, except for rape, continued to increase faster than the nation's population, and were moving to the suburbs along with the population. The incidence of crimes committed by Jews in New York City was "startlingly low," reported the Jewish Family Service in New York, in January 1970. The approximately 300 Jewish men and women annually

convicted of crime in New York City and sent to state prisons for rehabilitation represented 3.2 per cent of all New York City convictions.

Particularly hard hit were those living or conducting business in predominantly black sections of many cities. *Fortune* magazine, July 1970, reported that crime was seriously victimizing the black middle class which, it had been thought, would play a major role in rebuilding the cities:

Commercial establishments in some transitional and black neighborhoods, many of them operated by fledgling "black capitalists," are hurting. A report by the Small Business Administration last year showed that 35 per cent of the business in ghetto areas had insurance problems because of mounting vandalism, burglary and robbery—high premiums, abrupt cancellations, or inability to get any insurance at all. For a black man or woman in a big city, the chances of being robbed are about 2-and-a-half times as great as for a white, and blacks fare even worse in the case of burglaries.

Jewish merchants' fears that they were special targets of crime because they were both white and Jewish led to their steady exodus and a percentage increase of black businessmen in predominantly black sections of many cities. For example, in Philadelphia in 1970, half of the Jewish businessmen still remaining said they wanted to sell, primarily because of physical insecurity and fear of violence. A quarter of the Jewish businessmen said they had been held up at least once; one man reported 11 holdups. Fifty-two per cent said their businesses had been vandalized and 52 per cent that they had been burglarized; 54 per cent claimed shoplifting was increasing. Black businessmen, too, recognized the problem and demanded more police protection.

A special problem, the New York Federation of Jewish Philanthropies reported, were the city's 100,000 poor Jewish aged, who lived in or near ghetto areas, too poor or too old to move, and afraid to leave their apartments. Many Jews living in changing neighborhoods, it was noted, also felt isolated, frustrated, and abandoned by major Jewish institutions.

In 1970 Congress passed three major anticrime bills sought by President Nixon. The District of Columbia Crime Bill, passed in July, had three controversial provisions: preventive detention for up to 60 days before trial for defendants considered "dangerous" to the community; "no-knock" searches that would permit a policeman with a warrant to force his way into a home without announcing his presence or identifying himself, if there was reason to believe evidence inside would otherwise be destroyed; and wiretapping and bugging by police with court approval in certain cases. A bill extending for three years the 1968 Crime Control and Safe Streets Act authorized \$3.15 billion to help cities and states fight crime. It provided for up to \$650 million in block grant aid to states and cities during the 1971 fiscal year, \$1 billion in 1972, and \$1.5 billion in 1973.

The Organized Crime Control Act was signed October 15. The growing use and abuse of drugs were major contributing factors in the rise in crime. In 1970 it was estimated that there were some 200,000 heroin

addicts in the United States, half of them in New York City, most of whom had to steal to support a habit costing \$30 to \$50 a day. According to a February report by a committee on drug abuse of the New York Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, there was widespread and growing use of drugs also by Jewish youth in the cities, of whom some 12,000 between the ages of 12 to 21 were known addicts.

In October Congress passed the Controlled Dangerous Substances Act having a "no-knock" raid provision, which was aimed at controlling the flow of narcotics and dangerous drugs and at capturing and punishing pushers. While it reduced penalties for simple possession or use of narcotics for first offenders, it increased them for pushers and suppliers.

REFORM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The upsurge in crime underscored the need to reform court procedures and prisons. Complaints from inmates and disorders in prisons across the country in 1970 brought awareness of overcrowded jails, vermin-ridden cells, and poor food. Inmate disruptions at The Tombs, in New York City, brought to light that low-income *suspects* had to wait as long as two years for trial, and that the many prisoners serving terms for such nonvictim crimes as gambling, possession of marijuana, or loitering were a substantial cause of the overcrowding, which led to violence. United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren E. Burger led a drive to end court delay by requiring trial within 60 days of arraignment. He also urged courts to institute modern management techniques.

A massive new effort at reform began in May 1970 with the formation of the National Alliance on Shaping Safer Cities, which insisted the present criminal justice "system" was a "nonsystem" that did not deter, detect, convict, correct and would not improve without substantial public understanding and activity. It urged that nonvictim crimes be transferred to social-welfare and health agencies, which could better deal with them, so that law enforcement agencies would have more time to cope with violent crime.

The Alliance, consisting of 46 member agencies and groups, aimed at involving all types of citizens in determining how the streets were to be policed and justice meted out in humane, constructive ways.

POLICE AND CRIME

Another effort at a more enlightened approach to law enforcement was the creation in late 1970 of the Police Foundation, a private agency to help reform the operations and training of police departments, particularly in urban areas. It received \$30 million from the Ford Foundation. Headed by a board of directors of high city and police officials and academic experts in the fields of law and administration of justice, it was to fund

projects concentrating on freeing police from clerical jobs for criminal investigation; devising guidelines for making arrests in nonemergency situations; developing skilled management personnel, and promoting better relations with the community.

Negro-Jewish Relations

In 1970 Americans became increasingly aware of Black Panther activities through the highly publicized trials of their leaders, conflicts between Black Panthers and police, their demonstrations and speeches, and their alliances with various revolutionary groups, including Arab guerrillas. Testifying before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, J. Edgar Hoover said in November: "Arab guerrillas reputedly are heavily subsidizing the Panthers." Some 11 months earlier, Eldridge Cleaver had claimed the Panthers "fully supported Arab guerrillas in the Middle East."

The philosophy and attitude of the Black Panthers regarding American Jews, Israel, and the Middle East conflict were well reported. They equated Zionism with imperialism, and accused Zionists of representing American imperialism in the Middle East. In Black Panther literature, antisemitism and anti-Zionism became indistinguishable. The terms Zionist and Zionism, which were always used in a derogatory manner, were substituted for the word Jew, regardless of applicability. Illustrative of this equation was a New York *Post* January interview with Panther leader Eldridge Cleaver in Algeria. In it he criticized a "Commission of Inquiry" headed jointly by former Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg and NAACP director Roy Wilkins, which was to study clashes between the Black Panthers and police:

The power structure is trying to take control of the situation by using a well known Zionist and appointing Uncle Tom Congressmen like [Charles] Diggs and [John] Conyers and two well known discredited Uncle Toms like Roy Wilkins and Whitney Young to erect the facade of concern and official responsibility. Here comes Goldberg investigating a group that is a threat to both Uncle Toms and Zionists.

And in the official organ *Black Panther*, April 25, 1970, the party's international coordinator Connie Matthews wrote: "It was a Zionist judge, Judge Hoffman, who allowed the other Zionist to go free but has kept Bobby Seale in jail and sentenced him to four years for contempt charges." As proof of her contention that Zionists were racists, she continued:

The white-left in the U.S.A. is comprised of a large percentage of the Jewish population. Before the Black Panther party took its stand on the Palestinian People's struggle, there were problems, but the support of the white-left of the Black Panthers was concrete. However, since our stand, the white-left started floundering and it has become undecided. This leaves us with no alternative then to believe that a large portion of these people are Zionists and are therefore racists.

Reiterating opposition to "Israeli imperialism and Zionism aided and abetted by United States imperialism," she urged that "the one-eyed bandit of Tel Aviv, Moyshe Dyan [sic] must be hunted down and killed."

However, despite their vitriolic accusations, Black Panther leaders denied being antisemitic. The May 19 issue of the *Black Panther* stated:

It must be pointed out that the Black Panther Party is not anti-Semitic. In fact we are in total support of Palestine's righteous struggle against Zionist imperialism, that works hand in glove with U.S. imperialism. We must remember the Arab people are Semitic people also and the only right that the Zionist clique, headed by Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan have to the land that they call Israel is a robber's right.

Some months later, in September, Black Panther minister of defense Huey Newton, obviously referring to Connie Matthews' earlier statement, said:

We've been charged with being anti-Semitic. As a matter of fact some statements could be cited where some member of the party has made some statement in anger in order to hurt some of our white radical friends, because we believe they did not live up to the friendship agreement, but these were internal fights. . . . But as far as our official position, we are not anti-Semitic.

But nowhere did he, or any Black Panther leader, repudiate or condemn the "some statements."

By year's end it was clear that the Black Panther party represented only a tiny part of the black community, though it evoked in the community a certain admiration and sympathy for its bold and even illegal confrontations, particularly with the police. However, trials, police searches and investigations, shoot-outs, and internal differences over philosophy, tactics, and strategy made the future of the Black Panthers appear shaky, if not bleak.

The most recent analyses of Negro-Jewish relations, published at the end of 1969, were the opinion survey by Louis Harris Associates (AJYB, 1970 [Vol. 71], p. 224), and a revised edition of Gary T. Marx's *Protest and Prejudice: A Study of Belief in the Black Community*,⁷ based on a 1964

⁷ An appraisal of studies of prejudice, including the Marx book and Gertrude J. Selznik and Stephen Steinberg, *The Tenacity of Prejudice* (AJYB, 1970 [Vol. 71], p. 205), was made by Lucy S. Dawidowicz in "Can Anti-Semitism be Measured?" *Commentary*, July 1970. She found fault with those who fully relied on survey analyses to measure antisemitism. Though useful for "periodic pulse-taking," she says, such analyses serve ultimately "to limit our understanding of antisemitism, which is a phenomenon marked by a high degree of multiformity and contradictoriness." In particular she charged that Marx's primary concern was not antisemitism, but the views of blacks concerning the civil rights movement and that his study actually was "an uncritical apology for black militancy."

Marx took issue with the Dawidowicz critique in a letter to the editor of *Commentary* (November 1970, which published also comments from other readers). Referring particularly to the last charge, he stated that his study applied to black militancy of 1964, not of 1970: "the most likely to be militant over civil-rights issues in 1964, rather than being the frustrated, alienated, hate-filled *lumpen* misfits. . . . tended to be instead an elite group in the black community."

study which was first published in 1967 (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 45–46, 50).

Mention should also be made here of David Drew's *A Profile of Jewish Freshmen*, an American Council on Education 1970 research report, which found that a high percentage of Jewish freshmen believed the disadvantaged should have preferential treatment in college admissions.

Jewish Defense League

The Jewish Defense League (JDL; AJYB, 1970 [Vol. 71], pp. 206, 225–28) used a variety of tactics to achieve its major aims which, according to its chairman Rabbi Meir Kahane, were to teach Jewish pride and self-defense, and to achieve political power. Administrative director Allen Mallenbaum elaborated to the *Christian Science Monitor*, January 16, 1970: "We do whatever is necessary to protect the life and property of little Jews. Whatever is necessary may mean a speech on a troubled college campus, or a court injunction. It also may mean a raw show of force—including the use of arms."

Militantly, and sometimes illegally, JDL impressed itself on the public's mind. In January it clashed with police at a demonstration outside the Soviet Mission to the United Nations and 27 members were arrested. It mailed letters to synagogues throughout Greater Philadelphia informing rabbis that, "If Muhammed Kenyatta [leader of the Philadelphia Black Economic Development Conference] or . . . his followers attempts . . . to disrupt your services, the Jewish Defense League expects to show courage in upholding the laws of our state by calling the police." In the latter part of the month and early in February, it protested the Soviet Union's treatment of Jews by disrupting concerts by Soviet musicians and conducting a "sit-in" at impresario Sol Hurok's office.

In May JDL attacked three Arabs in their offices near the United Nations and left a flyer explaining that the attack was in retribution for the killing of Israeli school children by Arab guerrillas. JDL members occupied the Park East Synagogue opposite the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in defiance of the rabbi's request that they leave, and shouted demands and played martial music directed at the mission.

In June, during an altercation between a group of blacks and Jews after a Negro girl was killed by a truck driven by a hassidic Jew, Kahane was arrested in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn for allegedly assaulting a police officer and resisting arrest. The Jewish community of Williamsburg asked JDL to stay away because its presence heightened existing tensions.

In July JDL invaded the New York offices of the Soviet-American trading company Amtorg, to protest the arrest of 50 Jews in the USSR.

In September, after the Arab guerrilla hijackings, two JDL members carrying firearms and explosives were arrested for allegedly planning to hijack an Arab plane.

In October JDL conducted a sit-in at the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies in New York, demanded \$6 million for Jewish education, to which the agency responded by securing a Supreme Court restraining order against JDL.

The reaction of the major Jewish organizations, particularly in New York City, was most critical. In November American Jewish Committee president Philip E. Hoffman declared JDL activities "clearly violate the laws of the city, state, and nation, . . . endanger the lives of innocent citizens and . . . serve to harm those very causes which JDL purports to advance." In November Rabbi Joseph Karasick, president of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, called JDL "destructive" and "irresponsible," and its bombings of Soviet agencies in New York the "undisciplined and unjustified action of a small group that does not represent any Jewish consensus nor any major responsible American Jewish organization." In a December interview with *Panim el Panim* Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, dean of the rabbinical seminary Mesivtah Tifereth Jerusalem in New York, discussed JDL: "Not one Jew has been saved or helped because of these demonstrations. On the contrary, they are harming very much. Hundreds and thousands in the Soviet Union have been jailed or exiled as a result of such activities."

These and many other condemnations by prominent Jewish leaders and groups had little effect on JDL. The group claimed some 9,000 members at year's end, with the largest chapter in New York City and others in Philadelphia, Cleveland, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, San Francisco, Miami, Los Angeles, and "other small cities." Judging from the size of their demonstrations, however, its membership seemed to be much smaller; or perhaps consisted of many passive supporters who refused to participate in its activities. Although JDL activists appeared to be predominantly Orthodox, the group claimed Conservative, Reform Jews, as well as non-Jewish members, including blacks.

It appeared at year's end that not all chapters were in total agreement with the national leadership. In Boston at a meeting of the Jewish Community Council, a local JDL leader stated he did not favor some activities of the New York group and that he would resign if they were carried on in the Boston area.

No doubt, JDL's slogan, "Never Again," touched a raw nerve in many Jews, particularly those who believed extremist groups like the Irgun and Stern Gang played a necessary role in Israel's fight for independence. Young JDL'ers pointed to the alleged achievements of black militants and claimed that the "Jewish establishment" was too conservative or too removed from the problems of the Jewish poor in the cities and the Jewish oppressed in the Soviet Union. At the same time, JDL had appeal for many elderly, poor and, lower-middle-class Jews, who lived in changing neighborhoods and feared lawlessness and disorder, particularly by blacks.

Some observers thought JDL sparked a sense of urgency to respond to

threats to Jews here and abroad, which, they felt, older, established organizations could not or refused to do. After attending a lecture by Rabbi Kahane, staff columnist Beryl Segal wrote in the December 18 issue of the Jewish weekly *Rhode Island Herald*:

The Jewish Defense League is far from being a bunch of Hippies or a band of Vigilants. They are concerned Jews. They are mostly students of Yeshivos and their leaders are modern Jews who refuse to bend their heads and turn the other cheek. They do not initiate violence. But they do not run away from it. They are against destruction, but they will destroy those who rise up and destroy them.

In the same general vein, but without endorsing the tactics used, were comments by this writer in the March 27, 1970, issue of *The Reconstructionist*. While JDL actions were outrageous by all traditions of organized American Jewry, he said, they were "understandable and necessary, if not commendable"; for

Jews in our urban city know the dangers . . . feel them, and live them. . . . It is they who should be listened to and responded to—and it is here where the opponents of community defense are at their most irrelevant, for their public condemnations are barren of hope, promise and remedy, and thereby certain to intensify the helplessness and desperation and militancy of the poor.

Lincoln Hospital

In New York City, Lincoln Hospital and Einstein College of Medicine were participants in a confrontation involving a year-long series of conferences, demonstrations, and sit-ins, at which charges and countercharges of racism, religious prejudice, medical incompetence, and criminal practices escalated. Similar, but less extended, activities took place in other city hospitals, such as the Metropolitan Hospital, Gouveneur Health Services Clinic, Prospect Hospital, Brookdale Hospital Center, and Harlem Hospital.

A preliminary Anti-Defamation League report in December identified three militant community groups which were threatening New York City hospitals with turmoil, disruption, instability, and lower professional standards: 1) the Health Revolutionary Unity movement claiming to have city-wide representation in hospitals; 2) the Young Lords, a Puerto Rican group espousing revolution and armed struggle to "liberate" Puerto Ricans in the United States and Puerto Rico; 3) Young Doctors and Health Care Workers, an activist, New-Left group.

Lincoln Hospital, the only hospital in the South Bronx, a dense poverty area 65 per cent Puerto Rican and 35 per cent black, has been administrated and staffed by Yeshiva University Albert Einstein College of Medicine. In March 1969 the hospital's community mental health center was "taken over" by nonprofessional workers who charged white administrators with

"racist neglect of the needs of the community."⁸ After months of intense activity, 21 Puerto Rican members of a community group, in February, occupied the hospital administrator's office for several hours protesting the refusal of the Superintendent of Hospitals to appoint as administrator, a Puerto Rican, Dr. Antero Lacot, whom he considered unqualified. Three weeks later the mayor's office announced Lacot's appointment.

A series of protest actions against the hospital began in June: a demonstration against overcrowding and filth; setting up of a patient complaint desk by the Young Lords; a strike, in July, for higher pay and improved working conditions by some 350 technicians and para-professionals; a Young Lords sit-in for improved medical facilities at the hospital, which it called a "butcher shop that kills patients and frustrates workers from serving these patients," because "Lincoln exists under a capitalist system that only looks for profits."

Two weeks later, 12 doctors (11 Filipino and 1 Korean) in the pediatrics clinic asked to be relieved of their jobs because of "harassment and intimidation" by the Young Lords and other groups, and director of pediatrics Dr. Arnold Einhorn said he could not continue to operate "under these conditions." Dr. Lacot denied these charges and promised there would be no interference with patient care by militant groups. However, in August, director of obstetrics and gynecology Dr. Joseph J. Smith was held hostage for six hours by militants who demanded his resignation for refusing to renew a contract of a black physician, and for what they claimed a "genocidal abortion program."⁹ On August 26, a court restraining order barred community groups from "interfering with patient care and medical services at the Lincoln Hospital." Continued political activities in the hospital were reported in the press a month later.

In November Einstein Medical College Dean Label C. Scheinberg, giving in to demands by Dr. Einhorn's staff physicians, removed him from the post, which he had held for 12 years, and replaced him with his Puerto Rican assistant, Dr. Helen Rodriguez. According to the *New York Post*, a November 14 "confidential memorandum" signed by Scheinberg, praised Dr. Einhorn for having been "a superb director of the pediatrics service" but that "the pediatrics department finds it essential at this time to have a director of a different ethnic background."

This resulted in such actions as a recommendation by Mayor John V. Lindsay for a compromise proposal; a City Commission on Human Rights investigation into allegations of racism in Dr. Einhorn's ouster; occupation by the Jewish Defense League of the offices of Dean Scheinberg and President Samuel Belkin of Einstein and Yeshiva University, demanding Einhorn's reinstatement. On November 22 Einstein College announced Dr.

⁸ Geraldine Rosenfield, *Lincoln and Einstein: Medicine, Ideology and Ethnicity* (American Jewish Committee, January 1971), 23 pp. (mimeo.).

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Einhorn's reinstatement, to start December 1 and to last until December 15, when he was scheduled to go on vacation.

A new issue arose when an ad hoc meeting of Lincoln's professional and nonprofessional psychiatric staff voted no confidence in their department chief Gabriel Koz. Action was based on the principle that workers should select bosses and that workers, together with the community, control the program. This action was firmly rejected, on December 7, by hospital administrators who stated, "Neither the community nor the staff controls the Department of Psychiatry nor any other department in this hospital."

By year's end the *New York Times* had traced the source of the conflict at Lincoln Hospital to an administrative decision to recruit interns who were "socially conscious and politically aware," and friction between Dr. Einhorn and his interns over their support of community activists.

The reaction to these events in the general and Jewish communities was strong: The Jewish Defense League, as a *Jewish Press* editorial of March 27, 1970 indicated, felt that "The school's purpose was to bring more black and Puerto Rican doctors into being. Now we see the thanks." One of many letters in the *New York Times*, articulating the growing anxiety of Jews in the social services profession, deplored "the nefarious trend toward ethnic tests for positions where expertise and dedication transcend skin color." The President of the Queens Jewish Community Council, on December 14, wrote to the Dean of Einstein Medical College:

As a hospital and medical school run under Jewish auspices and with widespread Jewish financial support, the thought that you would not stand up and strongly defend a Jewish staff member against an unfair demand to remove him, not because of his lack of capabilities but because he was not Puerto Rican, is one which strikes us with horror.

Professor Seymour Siegel of the Jewish Theological Seminary, in an interview on December 4, quoted doctors affiliated with Einstein as saying, "If it can happen to Jews by Jewish supported institutions such as Einstein, which is Yeshiva University's baby, what can be expected of the non-Jewish world and its dealing with Jewish personnel?"

The Yiddish daily press echoed these sentiments: the *Day—Jewish Journal*, on November 27, declared that "the main reason for Dr. Einhorn's dismissal is an anti-Semitic one" and expressed fear that he was being offered as the sacrifice to the "anti-Semitic passions of Jew-hating Puerto Ricans." The *Jewish Daily Forward*, on December 25, decried the use of ethnicity as a criterion and warned that it was "extremely important to tell the whole truth—if the truth is that Dr. Einhorn was persecuted because he is a Jew."

A minority Jewish view was expressed by Henry Schwartzchild, a member of the Commission on Social Justice of the Synagogue Council of America, who felt that, under certain conditions, it was "proper for a community to assert its prerogative."

Interreligious Relations

CHRISTIAN-JEWISH UNDERSTANDING

A major breakthrough in Catholic efforts to improve relations with Jews was the November 1970 report of the Secretariat for Catholic-Jewish Relations to the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in Washington, D.C. The Secretariat not only encouraged the establishment in each diocese of an office or process to improve such understanding, but also provided materials for this purpose. It also held regular meetings with major rabbinical and Jewish communal organizations. Some 35 dioceses now had such programs.

However, the report pointed out, some problems still existed:

1) Antisemitism, though mostly low-toned and unconscious, was still widespread and required constant effort to detect and unmask its many disguises.

2) Catholic scholars have not yet sufficiently pursued research into the renewal of theology regarding the place of Judaism in the divine plan, though the Vatican Council's statement on the Jews showed the way.

3) The State of Israel has become a serious stumbling block in Jewish-Christian relations. Since "Jews have in the vast majority identified with that State" and "see Zionism as central to Judaism itself and essential not only to Israeli but also Jewish survival," they consider it "as an ecumenical and a religious consideration which should be included in the dialogue." They have judged Christian coolness or silence regarding Israel's danger, especially during the six-day war, "as indifference toward what they considered the possibility of another genocide." Dialogue on this point has taught Christians more about the bond uniting Jews to Israel, and Jews some of the questions Christians have had on the subject.

Catholics also showed concern regarding teaching about Jews and Judaism in Catholic seminaries, colleges, universities, and high schools. One study, released in 1970 by Sister Rose Albert Thering, O.P., indicated that 40 per cent of Catholic seminaries and colleges provided courses in Jewish studies; 41.3 per cent of the seminaries and 75 per cent of the colleges treated Judaism in comparative religion courses; and 82.7 per cent of the seminaries and 68.9 per cent of the colleges offered Scripture courses which specifically dealt with the relationship of Christianity to Judaism.

It was found that not all these institutions of higher learning dealt with the theology of the Nazi holocaust, or the history or theological significance of the State of Israel. These subjects appeared to have fuller treatment in Catholic high schools; almost 70 per cent of those responding to the questionnaire reported that local rabbis were invited into the classrooms when Judaism was being discussed.

No similar structural reforms took place among the mainstream Protestant denominations.

Still, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews continued to hold a large number of conferences, institutes, lectures, scholarly exchanges, and dialogues, all designed in one way or another to improve interfaith understanding among scholars, theologians, teachers, and laymen.

Of particular significance was the new and increasing number of programs and discussions by Jews with "conservative" or Evangelical Protestant groups, which, before the six-day war, had little contact with the Jewish community. Their readiness to meet and work with Jews stemmed from their support of Israel, whose victory and growth they viewed as a fulfillment of biblical prophecy, and from opposition to the Soviet Union, especially among Baptists whose sect was persecuted behind the Iron Curtain. For example, in May 1970, the Lutheran Council in the U.S.A. and the American Jewish Committee cosponsored a major colloquium on "The Meaning of Israel for Jews and Christians." Jewish organizations helped promote Billy Graham's film, "His Land," which, though intended for Christian audiences, was considered strongly pro-Israel.

CHURCH-STATE ISSUES

Disagreement on church-state relations among Jewish organizations most clearly manifested themselves in the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC), to which practically all major national, local, state, and county agencies across the country belong. In 1970 NCRAC, except for the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations in America (UOJC), reaffirmed complete separation of church and state, and opposition to the direct or indirect use of public funds for the support of religiously controlled schools, including transportation and textbooks. UOJC strongly dissented, stating that the majority position was "detrimental to the Jewish interest" and "a product of a misreading of the First Amendment." It distinguished between basically religious and basically secular courses in parochial schools and considered government support of the secular programs no more a breach of the principle of separation of church and state than government exemption of houses of worship from realty taxes.

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court decision in *Walz v. The Tax Commission of New York*, in May, was that real estate tax exemption was not aimed at establishing, sponsoring or supporting a religion, and that the effect was not an excessive governmental entanglement with religion.

However, several decisions by lower courts strictly adhered to church-state separation: In January and June, the state supreme courts of Maine and Massachusetts declared pending parochial bills unconstitutional. In July the Montana Supreme Court unanimously invalidated a tax levy which was to be used to pay teachers in a parochial high school.

A U.S. District Court rejected the claim of a group of California parents of children in nonpublic schools that they were constitutionally entitled to state aid. A similar suit by parents claiming aid under the Federal Elemen-

tary and Secondary Education Act was dismissed in August on procedural grounds by a U.S. District Court in Missouri. A three-judge Federal Court unanimously held in October that a Connecticut statute providing aid to parochial schools was unconstitutional. A New York judge, in November, upheld the action of a state commissioner barring aid to a sectarian college. In October the Louisiana State Supreme court declared a July 1970 state act aiding sectarian and private schools in violation of the state constitution. A Federal Circuit Court in December reversed a decision upholding Ohio's granting of textbooks and other materials under Title II of the Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and remanded the case for trial.

On the other hand, free busing for parochial school students was upheld in Minnesota and West Virginia courts. And the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously upheld the use of state credit to assist the financing of the construction of buildings for sectarian schools.

Of some 70 cases reported by the American Jewish Congress Commission on Law and Social Action,¹⁰ 30 dealt with public aid to sectarian schools and colleges, and 24 with other instances of government support of religion, such as religious practices in public facilities, prayers and Bible reading and distribution in the public schools, compulsory chapel services in service academies, tax exemptions for religious bodies, and state abortion laws.

According to the American Jewish Congress, one of the "conspicuous" features of church-state cases before the Supreme Court was the attempt to use the courts to obtain financial aid for parochial and other nonpublic schools as a matter of right. In such cases it was urged that the state had an obligation to provide aid in order to bring about "parity" in financing out of public tax funds secular aspects of instruction in both public and nonpublic schools.

The issue was widely discussed as financially troubled private and church-supported schools continued to close down across the country. President Nixon, in April, established a special panel to study federal aid to private schools.

The 1970 record of state legislatures on public aid to religiously affiliated schools included the adoption in Louisiana, Michigan, and New Jersey of "teachers' salary supplement" acts providing for state payment of at least a part of the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in some or all nonpublic schools, and the appropriation by the New York State legislature of \$28 million, to be used specifically to help nonpublic schools keep attendance and other records. Pennsylvania, which had adopted a salary supplement statute in 1968, increased its appropriation in 1970; at the same time, it

¹⁰ *Litigation Docket of Pending Cases Affecting Freedom of Religion and Separation of Church and State* (American Jewish Congress, January 1, 1971), 93 pp. (mimeo.).

limited aid under the statute to 25 per cent of the average instructional cost in public schools.

Indirect and narrower forms of aid for church-affiliated schools were adopted in several states. Georgia voters adopted a constitutional amendment authorizing the General Assembly to provide grants to students at colleges which were not part of the state university system. New Hampshire passed a measure providing financial assistance to school districts, giving certain limited services to nonpublic schools and those with a dual enrollment program. The New York State legislature voted to repeal the Blaine Amendment prohibiting direct or indirect aid to church-affiliated schools; to become effective, the repeal required a second vote by the legislature in 1971 or 1972, as well as approval by referendum.

Parochial-school aid advocates suffered some reversals in Michigan where a popular referendum approved a state constitutional amendment barring all state support for private schools, except the provision of buses, and in Nebraska, where voters rejected a proposed state constitutional amendment permitting tuition reimbursement for nonpublic school parents.

Also, tuition grant bills in California, Florida, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin were defeated, as were proposals in several states for teachers' salary supplements, busing, auxiliary services, and income tax credit.

Ever since the Supreme Court, in 1963, outlawed prayer in public schools, attempts have been made by school committees, state legislatures, and individual educators to return to the practice. In November the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously ruled unconstitutional a Netcong City High School plan to read a prayer taken from the *Congressional Record* to a voluntary audience of students before school officially opened each day. In a lower court ruling, New Jersey's Judge Joseph A. Stamler called "This type of subterfuge . . . degrading to all religions."

The issue of reforming state abortion laws, too, often became the subject of intense public debate. The *Religious News Service* pointed out in a review of the year 1970 in religion, that "the inability of New York Catholics to stop enactment of what was called the nation's most liberal abortion law, suggested a waning of the Church's power to make its views prevail."

PHILIP PERLMUTTER

The United States, Israel and the Middle East

THE YEAR 1970 marked a period of significant transition for the Middle East. During the first half of the year the continued intensification of the Egyptian-Israeli war of attrition brought death and devastation that became increasingly intolerable for both sides. At the same time, the deepening, direct Soviet involvement in the United Arab Republic's military establishment raised the spectre of an inevitable collision of the two nuclear superpowers if the escalating violence along the Suez Canal was not quickly brought to a halt. This prompted United States Secretary of State William P. Rogers to undertake a new initiative in mid-June to get the parties "to stop shooting and start talking." After the United States succeeded in extracting the formal acceptance of Egypt and Israel, and apparent Soviet acquiescence, the guns along the Suez Canal fell silent on August 7 and diplomatic talks began.

The fragile cease-fire continued despite denunciations by Syria and Iraq of any peaceful settlement with Israel and efforts of the Palestinian commando groups to wreck the talks and renew the conflict. A more serious challenge to the American initiative was immediately posed by massive Egyptian deployment of advanced Soviet surface-to-air missiles close to the Suez Canal, in violation of the military standstill agreement. Jerusalem denounced the build-up and said Israel would not return to the indirect discussions, begun at United Nations headquarters on August 25, until the military balance along the Canal had been restored. After lengthy, and at times heated, exchanges between Washington and Jerusalem, the Nixon administration acknowledged that Cairo and Moscow had unfairly exploited American restraint in arms shipments to Israel, and agreed to sell Israel additional planes, tanks and sophisticated electronic equipment.

The firmer American posture also moved the Russians to discourage any new Egyptian military adventure. A Soviet-Egyptian diplomatic campaign at the United Nations resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly, on November 4, of a resolution urging the parties to extend the cease-fire for three months to get UN-sponsored peace talks under way. Since the resolution also deplored "the continued occupation of the Arab territories," it provided Cairo with the needed face-saving formula to justify its agreement to extend the cease-fire. At the end of December, Israel resumed indirect talks with Egypt, while continuing contacts with Jordan under UN special envoy Gunnar Jarring's auspices.

This revived hopes for a Middle East settlement, but one that was by no means certain, because Egypt and Israel remained far apart in their demands and suspicious of each other's intentions. Would the cease-fire be only a

temporary hiatus in the established pattern of intermittent and ever more intense hostilities, or would it be the first step toward a just and lasting peace? The answer would depend in large measure on what lessons the parties had learned and what conclusions Russia and the United States drew from the developments in 1970.

Nasser's Death and Legacy

Within the Arab world an era came to an end with the death in September of UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser. He had been Egypt's undisputed ruler for more than a decade and a half, a charismatic leader for the Arab masses, and a force to be reckoned with by the nations of the world. Since there was no single Arab leader of his stature to assume Arab leadership, Nasser's death encouraged greater independence of action by the other members of the Arab League.

Within Egypt itself, the transition was remarkably smooth, at least on the surface. Anwar el-Sadat, a long-time army colleague and fellow member of the revolutionary "Free Officers," who had earlier been selected by Nasser as his vice president, was quickly nominated by the ruling Arab Socialist Union to succeed Nasser as president. He was endorsed by the Egyptian National Assembly and elected in a popular plebiscite, on October 15, by 90 per cent of the votes cast. Since Nasser had in his time received over 99.9 per cent of the vote, the fact that more than 700,000 did not vote for Sadat was taken by some observers as an indication that there existed potential sources of discontent and that the new regime would have to prove itself. Sadat pledged greater emphasis on improving life for the Egyptian people. The selection of Abdel-Mohsen Abu-el-Nur to succeed Nasser as secretary-general of the Arab Socialist Union was in keeping with this promise. Abu-el-Nur was an agronomist and former minister of agrarian reform and land reclamation, deputy premier for agriculture and irrigation, and minister for local administration. Time would tell whether Sadat was only mollifying the discontented until he could consolidate his power or whether he seriously intended to shift national priorities from an active pan-Arab policy to a concentration on Egyptian domestic reforms.

Nasser's post as prime minister went to Mahmoud Fawzi, a 70-year-old career diplomat, who had served six years at the United Nations and spoke seven languages, but neither Russian nor Chinese. He was Egypt's first non-military prime minister since September 1952. His broad experience and noncontroversial background made him an apt choice for leading Cairo's new diplomatic offensive for international support, especially in the West.

The new regime pledged to continue the foreign policies of Nasser, but his legacy was ambiguous. In the last months of his life, Nasser apparently became concerned about Egypt's heavy dependence on the Soviet Union and, in an attempt to regain his earlier advantageous position of having the two superpowers compete for Egypt's favor, he began to drop private hints

to Western visitors that he would welcome improved Egyptian-American relations if Washington would stop supporting Israeli "imperialism and racism." In a televised May Day address to the Egyptian people Nasser made this appeal public. He justified the massive Soviet military aid as necessary to withstand Israeli "aggression by American-made Phantoms," and insisted that "all this aid, brothers, has been without strings." He declared that Soviet help was not given "to commit aggression or to expand, [but] to liberate our territories and to strengthen our independence," which was Egypt's right and "indeed . . . our duty."

At the same time, Nasser declared, Egypt was prepared to "work for peace" and "to abide by all peace arrangements" provided in the November 1967 Security Council resolution. But, he added, there could be "no peace with Israeli expansionism"; Israel would have to withdraw from the occupied territory, as well as "implement the UN resolutions on the Palestinian people's rights."

Nasser then turned to Arab-American relations, declaring that "a decisive moment" had been reached: ". . . either we will be estranged forever or there will be a new, serious and definite start." Noting reports of United States discussion of a new shipment of arms to Israel, he appealed to Nixon not to give fresh support to Israel, either military, political or economic, as long as it occupied Arab territories. He was making this "final appeal," he said, "for the sake of peace in the Middle East." Israel interpreted Nasser's speech as an attempt to put it on the defensive before world public opinion and to drive a wedge between it and the United States. As for Sadat, he was left with a choice of interpreting Nasser's declaration as Jerusalem did, or as a mandate to seek peace with a nonexpansionist Israel.

Attempts at Arab Unity

Within the Arab world, Sadat could cite Nasser to justify greater emphasis on Egyptian rather than pan-Arab politics. True, Nasser had preached Arab unity and had at various times tried to subvert what he called the "reactionary" regimes in other Arab states to bring them under Cairo's "progressive" hegemony. Yet, after the bitter experience of the union with Syria, which broke up in 1961 after only three years, and the long, costly, and inconclusive Egyptian intervention in the civil war in Yemen, Nasser became wary of grandiose schemes of pan-Arab unity. Thus, while Nasser encouraged closer economic and political cooperation with Libya and the Sudan where leftist army officers had seized power in 1969, he advised proceeding cautiously on plans for formal federation at a conference with General Gaafar Numeiry of the Sudan and Colonel Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, in Khartoum in May 1970.

The question of how far and how fast to proceed with unification continued to be seriously debated in Egypt after Nasser's death. Sadat and the Sudanese and Libyan leaders meeting in Cairo in November announced their

decision to form a unified leadership committee to improve coordination and advance the integration of their three states. But by year's end, the three had not yet progressed beyond an "agreement to agree" in principle to an eventual federal union.

The concept had more to recommend it than the abortive Egyptian-Syrian union. The three states were contiguous, and they could complement each other's needs: Libya had surplus oil, the Sudan had fertile land, and Egypt could provide teachers, technicians, and surplus farm labor to its less developed neighbors. Union would increase their relative weight within the Arab world and their prestige internationally. On the other hand, in Sudan, union was regarded as "premature" by its influential Communist party. There was also no doubt that it would spur the secessionist movement among blacks in the south, who were revolting against domination by the northern Muslim Arabs. Some Libyans, too, were likely to oppose giving up a major share of their oil wealth to their much larger neighbors.

The union's long-range effect on the Arab-Israel conflict aroused some concern in Jerusalem, especially after the new Syrian regime of General Hafez al-Assad in November began to express interest in joining. The projected union, if it actually came into being, would enhance Egypt's economic resources and military potential, and the more fanatical Libyans and Syrians might push Egypt into resuming hostilities. On the other hand, a union would mean at least the theoretical possibility that Cairo would have a restraining influence on Tripoli and Damascus, and that Egypt's leaders would find economic cooperation with their Arab neighbors more productive than conflict with Israel.

Among the factors prompting Egypt to seek rapprochement with Libya and the Sudan was dissatisfaction with the eastern Arab states, which had failed to give effective military aid against Israel and were constantly bickering among themselves. In August, Iraq accused Egypt of betraying the Arab cause by accepting the Rogers proposal for a cease-fire and indirect talks with Israel. Egypt's reply was that it had borne the entire brunt of the battle at great cost, while Iraq had allowed the eastern front to disintegrate and sought cheap propaganda victories through bellicose pronouncements from the safe distance of Baghdad. War Minister General Fawzi told the Iraqis that his country suffered "20,000 military and civilian martyrs since June 5, 1967." In addition, more than 500,000 Egyptian civilians had been evacuated from the cities along the Suez Canal as part of the war of attrition.

Palestinian Extremism

The recklessness and divisiveness of the Palestinians, whose cause Nasser had been championing over the years, led Cairo to have some serious second thoughts about unqualifiedly backing their commando groups. In a June broadcast from Damascus, Dr. George Habash, leader of the radical leftist

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), demanded that Egypt and Jordan renounce their acceptance of the November 1967 UN Security Council resolution, and "cooperate unconditionally" in "fighting Israel and erasing it from the Middle East map." He warned that if any Arab leaders continued to seek a peaceful settlement with Israel, "the forces of the Palestine Revolution will have no option but to fight them and eliminate them and their regimes." Indeed, the commandos soon proved to be a more immediate threat to the Arab governments than to Israel.

When Yasir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), denounced the cease-fire, Nasser clamped down on the Palestinians in Egypt and prohibited the use of its powerful transmitters for PLO propaganda broadcasts. The commandos then turned to Jordan, where they gradually became a law unto themselves. Intermittent skirmishes between the Palestinian guerrillas and the regular Jordanian army erupted into several days of bloody fighting in June, and a full-scale civil war in mid-September, when King Hussein finally decided that he would lose the loyalty of his army and what remained of his kingdom, unless he decisively reasserted his authority.

Meanwhile, early in September, the PFLP carried out the most spectacular of its series of hijackings of civilian aircraft, holding more than 300 men, women, and children hostage for days in the broiling Jordanian desert and blowing up four Western-owned jet airliners worth some \$50 million. The PFLP acts aroused nearly universal condemnation, with Egypt and some other Arab states denouncing them as harmful to the Arab and Palestinian cause. They were considered an attempt by the Popular Front hijackers to wreck the possibility of a peaceful agreement with Israel by setting off a chain of escalating violence in the region. Some observers saw Red Chinese influence behind all this. Lending some credence was the fact that Dr. Habash was just completing a tour of Asian Communist countries (China, North Vietnam, and North Korea) and that he had declared earlier in an interview with *Life*, published on June 12, that the People's Republic of China was the PFLP's "best friend" and that "China sees eye to eye with us on this issue." When he was asked whether the prospect of triggering a third World War did not bother him, he replied, "To be frank, it doesn't."

Whatever their intentions, these events in summer 1970 may have marked a critical turning point in the fortunes and appeal of the Palestinian commandos. Moscow, Cairo and Amman were finally convinced that unless the commandos were curbed and progress was made toward a peaceful settlement, the situation might rapidly get out of control. Nasser's last act was to sponsor a summit conference in Cairo to hammer out an agreement between the Jordanian government and the Palestinian commandos to end the civil war. Nasser died the day after the conference ended, and the agreement turned out to be only a temporary truce. Although scattered incidents continued to erupt and each side accused the other of violations, by year's end King Hussein seemed to have regained firm control and the Palestinians

were decimated, discouraged, and disorganized. But a new outbreak by embittered Palestinian fanatics remained an ever present danger.

Fear of Great Power Confrontation

If George Habash was not concerned about triggering a third World War, President Nixon certainly was. In his "State of the World" message on February 18 he elaborated on his first post-election statement on the Middle East, in which he had expressed concern lest renewed conflict in the area lead to a Soviet-American nuclear confrontation (AJYB, 1970 [Vol. 71], p. 229). Alluding to the irrational and emotional elements in the area, Nixon pointed out that the Middle East "combines intense local conflict with great-power involvement," a combination "all the more dangerous because the outside powers' interests are greater than their control." Noting that increased Soviet activity in the Middle East and the Mediterranean in recent years had consequences going far beyond the Arab-Israel conflict and affected long-standing United States obligations to enhance the "integrity and freedom" of nations in the region, Nixon warned that "the United States would view any effort by the Soviet Union to seek *predominance* in the Middle East as a matter of grave concern" (author's emphasis).

However, Nixon weakened his warning by emphasizing throughout the message that the United States was ready to work together with the Soviet Union within the Middle East and elsewhere—a significant departure from the Eisenhower-Dulles policy of trying to keep Russia out of the Middle East. Indeed, the "State of the World" message announced a shift in America's foreign policy goal from that of policeman of the world to "a more realistic assessment" of United States interests aimed at more limited commitments and "a sharing of responsibility" for peace. Although the President acknowledged that the Middle East presented one of the sternest tests of his policy of "peace through partnership and accommodation of interests," he presumed that the Soviet Union would agree to some cooperation out of a common interest in avoiding a direct confrontation.

Nixon reiterated the American proposal for a Great Power limitation on arms shipments to the Middle East as a stabilizing step and, at the same time, reaffirmed the United States intention "to maintain careful watch on the balance of military forces and to provide arms to friendly states as the need arises." Almost immediately, however, unnamed "administration officials emphasized," according to a front-page Washington dispatch by Peter Grose in the *New York Times*, February 19, "that Mr. Nixon's warning referred to any broad efforts toward staking out a position of strategic strength in the Middle East." The dispatch further said that "the sending of MIG-23 aircraft"—which Nasser requested and which were more advanced than the MIG-21's he had previously received—"or even an unanticipated dispatching of Soviet pilots to the United Arab Republic, would be viewed in the context of the Arab-Israeli dispute and not the broader strategic problems of the

area." This presumably accurate interpretative article doubtless weakened the general impact of Nixon's warning to the Russians; more ominously, it could have been interpreted by the Russians as a green light for escalating their military involvement in the Arab-Israel conflict.

Soviet-Egyptian Military Coordination

After Israel's deep penetration raids into Egypt, Nasser secretly flew to Russia in January 1970. Within weeks of the visit, the Soviet Union began to introduce its most sophisticated ground-to-air missiles, first around the major Egyptian cities and the Aswan Dam and then ever closer to the Suez Canal front. Russian missile crews and increasing numbers of Soviet advisers with the Egyptian forces were supplemented by Russian pilots, who in mid-April, began to fly operational missions.

The Russians moved step by step, pausing each time to gauge the American reaction. A key development occurred in March 1970. Since Mrs. Meir's visit to the United States in September 1969, Israel had been pressing the United States for the delivery of additional Phantom and Skyhawk jets. In January 1970, President Nixon reassured an emergency gathering in Washington of Jewish leaders that the United States "stands by" Israel and was "prepared to supply military equipment necessary to support the efforts of friendly governments, like Israel's, to defend the safety of their people." On March 23 Secretary of State Rogers announced that the President would "hold in abeyance for now" the decision on Israel's request, but that he ordered a close watch on the military balance in the area. Two days earlier Nixon had referred to recent "disturbing reports" that the Soviet Union, by deliveries of new SA-3 missiles to the UAR and "through the insertion of military personnel, may be taking actions which could change the balance." If this should occur, "then the United States would take action to deal with that situation."

The Israelis were troubled by this response, for they were convinced that the latest Russian actions had already affected the balance of power. Israeli military planners stated that Israel could not wait until the shift of balance against it became decisive for the United States to provide assistance. By then it might be too late. Secretary Rogers tried to reassure Jerusalem on this point when he added to his announcement on holding off the sale of the planes that the United States would be able "to provide additional as well as replacement aircraft promptly if the situation requires it."

The decision on the planes was deferred for a number of reasons. President Nasser privately and publicly warned the United States of serious consequences to American interests in the Arab world if the planes were sent, and American oil company executives added their voices of concern. State Department officials feared that additional arms shipments to Israel would jeopardize the American image of "even-handedness" as well as the fragile hope of Arab acceptance of the Rogers proposals for a political settlement.

Finally, it was hoped that if Washington limited arms shipments to the area, Moscow might be induced to do likewise. Warnings by the Israelis and some American political scientists that Moscow would interpret Washington's action not as an expression of restraint but merely of indecision and weakness went unheeded.

In any case, less than a month after the Nixon-Rogers announcements, Soviet pilots began to fly operational missions in Egypt. Secretary Rogers acknowledged before the House Foreign Relations Committee, on June 9, a further deterioration in the Middle East situation "largely as a result of increased Soviet involvement in the air defense" of the UAR. He noted that this was the first time since World War II that Soviet missilemen and pilots were stationed in a country outside the Warsaw Pact, but tried to minimize the significance of this event by pointing out that so far the Russians had avoided a direct clash with Israeli pilots.

Washington became alarmed when it learned a few days later that, in one week in June, Israel lost three Phantoms to the new Russian-manned missiles and that the Israelis in turn downed four MIG-21's—reliably reported to have been manned by Soviet pilots. Fears mounted that the escalating fighting along the Suez Canal would lead to a new all-out round in the Arab-Israel conflict and that the direct involvement of Soviet personnel could lead to a United States collision with the Soviet Union.

Reaction to New U.S. Peace Initiative

The main points of the new peace initiative launched by Secretary Rogers on June 19 were restoration of an Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire along the Suez Canal for at least 90 days and agreement by the parties to begin indirect talks with UN Special Envoy Gunnar Jarring on moving forward to a peace settlement based on implementation of all parts of the November 1967 Security Council resolution.

Israel at first flatly rejected this initiative, but, at United States urging, agreed to wait until the others had responded. After the Egyptians, Russians, and Jordanians all replied affirmatively, Israel found itself in the publicly untenable position of seeming to be the obstacle to peace. Washington also applied intensive pressure on Jerusalem to accept, intimating that if it did not, its pending arms and economic requests might be indefinitely delayed.

It was thought in Washington that the USSR urged Egypt to agree to the American initiative because the Russians were concerned that the situation along the Suez Canal might get out of hand; that the White House was reasserting its authority in the Middle East crisis, and that Nixon might revert to his traditionally tougher anti-Communist stance. In a television discussion with three commentators on July 1, President Nixon explained the strategic and economic importance of the Middle East to the United States and its NATO allies, and said Soviet military aid to Egypt and other Russian moves into the eastern Mediterranean affected these American in-

terests. Charging that Israel's "aggressive neighbors—the U.A.R. and Syria" wanted to "drive Israel into the sea," and that a shift in the balance of power against Israel would therefore mean war, Nixon made it clear that the United States would give Israel aid to counter the Soviet support of the UAR because "it is in United States interests to maintain the balance of power." He again urged the Soviet Union to join with the United States "to work together to bring this particular danger spot under control."

The President's hand had been strengthened by developments in Congress. On May 23, seven senators, all notable critics of the American Vietnam policy, wrote a letter to Nixon, warning that use of Soviet pilots and men in Egypt threatened not only Israel but world peace; urging the sale of needed aircraft to Israel and calling for a new attempt by the United States and its NATO allies to restore the cease-fire as the first step toward peace. This was followed, on May 27, by a letter from a bipartisan group of senators to Secretary Rogers, warning that recent Soviet actions represented "a challenge to American strategic interests and a growing threat to world peace," and also urging that the United States announce its intention to provide aircraft to Israel. By June 24 this letter had been endorsed by 79 senators, or far more than the two-thirds majority needed for treaty approval. A majority of the House of Representatives similarly endorsed arms for Israel.

Among other factors reportedly influencing the Soviet position were resentment in some quarters at home at the economic drain of aid to Egypt, and perhaps more importantly, eagerness for a political settlement which would permit the reopening of the Suez Canal, a vital artery linking Russia's industrial heartland with its Far Eastern provinces in case of a conflict with China.

The Egyptians, it was argued, also had good reason for assuming a more moderate stand. There was considerable resentment in the army over growing Soviet domination of the country, and as already noted, Nasser, too, was unhappy about it. Besides, the war was inflicting heavy economic and physical losses; in the month of June alone, Nasser publicly admitted, his army suffered some 2,000 casualties along the Suez Canal front. There were widespread reports, fostered by Cairo, that the Egyptians were weary of war and genuinely sought a lasting political settlement.

Many Israelis were skeptical; they saw Nasser's response as merely tactical, not as a basic policy shift. They cited his speech to the Arab Socialist Union, wherein he said that failure by Egypt to agree to the Rogers initiative would give Israel "the excuse to obtain more arms from the U.S." The Israelis feared that Nasser would use the 90-day cease-fire to legitimize his resumption of fighting when it expired. More important, a cease-fire might enable the Egyptians and Russians to carry out their plan to install missiles along the canal itself, which had thus far been frustrated by Israel only through more than two months of intensive around-the-clock shelling.

The Israel government accepted the Rogers initiative only when American officials explained that they regarded the 1967 unlimited cease-fire still bind-

ing and were only reestablishing Egyptian compliance with it, and when Nixon informed Prime Minister Meir of a promise by the Egyptians, with alleged Russian endorsement, that they would observe a military standstill forbidding installation or redeployment of missiles and other new equipment within a 50-kilometer radius from the canal. At the end of July, Nixon declared that the United States considered the military standstill "an integral part" of the cease-fire; reiterated the American commitment to Israel's security and maintenance of the military balance, and expressed his belief that Israel could agree to the cease-fire and the negotiations through Dr. Jarring "without fear" that its "position may be compromised or jeopardized in that period."

"Crisis of Confidence" in Israel-U.S. Relations

The already strained American-Israel relations escalated into a major crisis of confidence when several incidents made Israel suspicious that at least some high American officials were more concerned with the success of the Rogers initiative than with Israel's legitimate security needs. Despite Mrs. Meir's insistence that Israel agreed to withdrawal "to secure, recognized and agreed boundaries," State Department officials allowed Dr. Jarring to announce that Israel had agreed to "withdrawal." Israel produced evidence of continuing major Egyptian violations of the standstill through installation of new missile sites and heavy artillery near the canal. However, American leaks to the press, including a comment by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, minimized the military significance of the violations, questioned the accuracy and conclusiveness of the evidence, and even impugned Israel's motives for bringing the charges. They created the impression that Israel was reluctant to enter into serious peace negotiations and was using the violations as an excuse to scuttle the talks.

The Israel government had in fact made several concessions by agreeing to indirect talks, a limited cease-fire, and the principle of "withdrawal." But these moves were based on the pledge of continued United States support, which had now been placed in doubt.

The American government finally acknowledged that violations of the cease-fire had occurred on the Egyptian side, and warned Moscow and Cairo that these acts endangered the peace effort. It also quietly began to make military assistance available to Israel to help neutralize the effect of the missiles. State Department officials privately acknowledged the need to "mend fences" and to restore Israel's confidence in the United States. The Israel government also was anxious that the misunderstandings be removed. Accordingly, a private visit by Mrs. Meir to open the American United Jewish Appeal and Israel Bond campaigns was made the occasion for a day of intensive meetings with the President and Secretary Rogers in Washington on September 18. In the discussions, Mrs. Meir made three points:

1. Israel would not rejoin peace discussions until the situation on the west

bank of the Suez Canal was restored to what it was before the cease-fire began. President Nixon reportedly agreed to personally take up with the Russians this demand, but did not guarantee success.

2. The Israel government would continue to reject the Rogers proposals of October and December 1969, essentially because Israel's ideas of secure and defensible borders and a just solution of the refugee problem were at considerable variance with the Rogers formulations.

3. Mrs. Meir requested large-scale economic and military assistance, but sought reassurance that action on these requests would not be made contingent on Israel's position on details of a peace settlement. The President reportedly instructed senior American officials in her presence to give these requests prompt and sympathetic consideration.

Crisis in Jordan

Mrs. Meir's visit helped clear the air and remove some of the acrimony in American-Israel relations. Whatever the outstanding differences between the United States and Israel regarding the political settlement and negotiation tactics, the chaotic events in Jordan during September resulted in an unprecedented degree of collaboration. When the PFLP hijackers took over a desert airstrip and kept the Jordanian army at bay, King Hussein launched an all-out campaign against the commando groups. For nearly ten days bitter fighting raged in the streets of Amman, in the Palestinian refugee camps, and in several northern towns which had become commando strongholds. The number of killed and wounded was in the thousands; some estimated tens of thousands. The commandos charged that the Jordanian army had inflicted more casualties on them than the Palestinians had suffered in two decades of hostilities against Israel.

At the height of the fighting, the radical pro-Soviet regime in Syria—which backed the guerrillas and long desired to remove the conservative, pro-Western Hussein—moved nearly 300 Russian-supplied tanks into Jordan. What had been an internal conflict now became a major international crisis. Secretary Rogers on September 20 denounced the Syrian move as an “irresponsible and imprudent intervention.” President Nixon later said it had created “the gravest threat to world peace since this Administration came into office.”

However, the Syrians withdrew, King Hussein reestablished his authority, and the war was contained. The United States managed to avoid a dreaded confrontation by alerting the 82nd airborne division and other American military units in the United States and West Germany, preparing military transport planes, ostensibly to evacuate endangered American civilians, and dispatching ships of the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean. These well publicized moves were reinforced by President Nixon's dramatic visit to the flagship of the Sixth Fleet to underscore the continuing United States interest in the security of the Mediterranean. The determination to maintain

the necessary military strength to preserve the peace against any threat in the Mediterranean was, he declared, "one of the primary indispensable principles of American foreign policy."

Israel played a most useful role in maintaining the credibility of the firm American posture. It was later revealed that the American units were greatly below normal strength, since many of their men had been transferred to service in Vietnam, and that America's NATO allies in the area were reluctant to provide support facilities. But the Israelis had an air force ready to destroy the Syrian tanks if they did not withdraw from Jordan. A partial mobilization of Israeli armed forces left no doubt that Israel was prepared within hours to intervene if necessary to prevent a pro-Soviet and militantly anti-Israel takeover in Jordan.

Knowing that it was no match for Israel, the Syrian air force kept its planes grounded. Damascus ordered the tanks to withdraw from Jordan. The approximately 12,000 Iraqi troops stationed in Jordan, which Baghdad radio had long proclaimed would be in the vanguard of the Palestinian guerrilla struggle, remained in their barracks and took no part in the fighting.

Soviet propaganda tried to make it sound as if it had been Moscow's moderating influence on its Syrian and Iraqi allies that stopped the attack. Most independent observers gave Moscow little credit for Syria's belated moderation. On the contrary, they suspected that the Russians initially gave at least tacit approval, if not outright encouragement, to the Syrian adventure. Clearly, the Syrians could not have moved nearly 300 Russian-supplied and Soviet-advised tanks without the knowledge of Soviet officials in Syria. If Moscow recommended moderation, it was only after the United States and Israel had demonstrated that they would under no circumstances permit the Russians to enter Jordan through the Syrian back door. When the United States reinforced its Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean, the Soviet Union temporarily reduced the number of its ships near the area of conflict as a sign to Washington that Moscow wished to avoid any confrontation.

U.S. Military Aid

In the aftermath of the Syrian-Soviet challenge in Jordan and the Egyptian-Soviet missile violations along the Suez Canal, the United States provided additional military aid to Jordan and Israel. Within several days, in December, King Hussein and Israel Defense Minister Moshe Dayan visited Washington. Hussein reportedly requested \$125 million in military aid over the next five years, including M-60 Super-Patton tanks and F-104 Starfighter jets, in addition to the \$30 million the Nixon administration had already granted to Jordan to replace the equipment lost in the civil war. Hussein also urged the United States to prod Israel to agree to withdrawal from occupied territory, except for possibly minor rectifications on a reciprocal basis. Asked by reporters about his promise to grant self-determination to the Palestinians after Israeli withdrawal, Hussein said he was confident the Palestinians would

always vote to remain in "the Jordanian family." The King was reported to have urged the United States not to speak of a Palestinian entity or otherwise seem to encourage Palestinian separatism. Hussein described his meetings with President Nixon and Secretaries Rogers and Laird as "extremely satisfactory."

Dayan reportedly discussed details of the equipment Israel was purchasing under the long-term, low-interest \$500 million military credit approved by the administration and authorized by Congress. Dayan was unusually reticent about his meetings with Nixon, Rogers and Laird. He denied that he had either made any specific request or received any new promises. However, he was believed to have suggested a mutual thinning out of forces along the Suez Canal as a first step in easing tensions, reopening the canal, and laying the groundwork of confidence for a full agreement in the future.

Speaking in New York to leaders of the United Jewish Appeal upon his return from Washington, Dayan praised President Nixon for having "kept every word he told us since he came to power, and he said a number of important words." Dayan apparently was alluding not only to a promise by Nixon to maintain the military balance of power in Israel's favor, but also to his formal assurances that the United States would not require Israel to withdraw any of its forces before a contractual peace settlement was concluded. These two points were implicit in the official Israeli statement, on December 28, that "the present political and military conditions" enabled and justified Israel's decision to resume participation in the Jarring talks.

Clarification of U.S. Policy

Secretary of State Rogers helped clarify American policy and allay some Israeli misgivings in his press conference of December 23. He emphasized that when speaking of a peaceful settlement, the United States did not mean "a temporary arrangement which will permit belligerency in the area," but "a permanent contractual peace that is agreed to by all those involved, and which will have as much assurance as it is possible to give in international life." When pressed about the precise role of the United States in working out or guaranteeing a settlement, he refused either to repeat or disavow what he said in a speech in December 1969 about limiting Israel to "insubstantial" alterations in the boundaries that existed before the 1967 war (AJYB, 1970 [Vol. 71], p. 239). He declined comment, he said, because he did not want to jeopardize prospects for a beginning of negotiations. However, he stressed that

. . . we have said consistently that we think the responsibility for working out a peaceful settlement for an agreement rests among the parties—the UAR, Jordan and Israel. We do not have any blueprint as such. We do not have any plan that provides security as such. We think those matters should be negotiated among the parties. They have to live with each other, and they

have to have sufficient assurance among themselves that they can protect their own countries. . . .

He went on to say that in accordance with the terms of the November 1967 Security Council Resolution, the United States was prepared "to play a role in providing guarantees," but not as "a substitute for an agreement among the parties, but as supplementary and complementary." The form of the guarantees would depend on "what the parties would want and what other nations involved would want." While the United States as yet had formed no definite conclusion on participation in a multilateral international peace-keeping force, he totally rejected press speculation that it might consider a joint, bilateral Soviet-American peace-keeping force: "We have never given any thought to that concept," he explained, because "I think that concept, with just the two of us involved, would be totally impractical." Rogers thought the climate for peace "very good" because the continuation of the cease-fire made the people in the area realize the importance of peace and might put them "in a more flexible frame of mind."

Whether the decision in Cairo, Moscow, Amman, and Jerusalem would be for resumption of hostilities or further progress toward peace would depend in no small measure on what the United States did or failed to do in the months ahead. This became clear from a review of the record of American actions in 1970. They demonstrated that Washington's vacillation and indecision during the first half of the year encouraged a spirit of adventurism in Moscow that increased the danger of confrontation between the superpowers. Conversely, the firmness displayed by the United States government during the second half of the year acted as a restraining and sobering influence on the Russians and thereby lessened the risk of confrontation.

UN and Palestinians

While the Palestinian nationalists had serious setbacks in Jordan and in Lebanon, where stringent measures were adopted against the commandos, the Palestinians scored new successes at the United Nations. A record number of nine resolutions dealt with various aspects of the question.

The November 4 General Assembly resolution calling for continuation of the cease-fire and resumption of Arab-Israel talks included a clause recognizing that "respect for the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East." This was a watered-down version of the original draft proposed by 19 pro-Arab African and Asian states and Yugoslavia, which would have recognized that "full respect for the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine, as affirmed in the General Assembly resolutions, is a prerequisite to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East." This would have meant pushing Israel back at least to the 1947 partition plan borders, if not its complete dissolution and replacement by a Palestinian Arab state. The amended ver-

sion was relatively mild; several delegations explained that they understood it as not intended to undermine Israel's existence but merely as reaffirming the UN's concern for the individual Palestinian refugees contained in previous resolutions.

Far more controversial was an anticolonial General Assembly resolution adopted on November 30, which condemned "Governments that deny the rights to self-determination of peoples recognized as being entitled to it, especially of the peoples of southern Africa and Palestine." The phrase "and Palestine" was approved by a vote of 48 to 27, with 35 abstentions. The Arabs thus succeeded in their campaign to link Israel with racist South Africa. Once the phrase had been approved, few states wanted to go on record as opposing the principle of self-determination, and the resolution as a whole was adopted by a vote of 71 to 12, with 28 abstentions.

There was some irony in the outcome, since Israel voted earlier that day, together with the Arab states, in favor of some other resolutions explicitly condemning South Africa's *apartheid* and calling for measures against racial discrimination. Israel, Iran, and Turkey were the only Middle East states to vote for a Western sponsored resolution which condemned *apartheid*, as well as all other forms of racial discrimination; called upon all countries to become parties to the 1966 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and reaffirmed the intention to combat racism and promote social justice based on respect for the dignity of the individual. Most of the Arab states and the Soviet bloc voted against this resolution, presumably because it was too moderate in language or too universal in application to suit their taste.

The Arab tactic of building step by step upon previous resolutions to expand the legal basis of their case reached its culmination in a December 8 Assembly resolution. This, for the first time, explicitly "recognized" that the Palestinian refugee problem "has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." The resolution recognized further that "the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations," and declared that "full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine" was an indispensable element in the establishment of Middle East peace.

In opposing this resolution, the United States representative said that it was the antithesis of earlier Assembly and Security Council resolutions calling for a peaceful solution between the Arab states and Israel, and that it distorted the Charter principle of self-determination by applying it not to a colony or other non-self-governing territory, but to one or more sovereign members of the United Nations (Israel and possibly Jordan). He pointed out that this was in contravention of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, which forbids the UN from intervening in matters which are essentially within a state's domestic jurisdiction. The representative of Gabon opposed the resolution on the ground that it dealt only with the rights of a single Arab

people of Palestine and discriminated against other peoples of the region, who were directly interested parties.

Not only was the resolution one-sided and of dubious constitutionality, but it was adopted by a questionable parliamentary procedure. Before the vote, pro-Arab Somalia proposed waiving the principle that all important questions required a two-thirds majority and that, instead, this resolution be decided by a simple majority. This proposal was approved by the slim majority of 49 to 44, with 27 abstentions. The resolution itself was adopted by a vote of 47 to 22, with 50 abstentions. Although "legally" adopted, the resolution was backed by less than even a simple majority of the UN's total membership, drawing its support almost exclusively from Arab, Islamic, and Soviet bloc states.

The other resolutions on the Arab refugees were essentially carbon copies of those adopted in previous years, concentrating on the humanitarian aspects of the problem and particularly on the increasing financial difficulties facing the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in the Near East. During the debate in the Special Political Committee, the Turkish representative, with the support of several other European delegates, urged that the political aspects of the question be held in abeyance and that the committee consider practical measures to improve UNRWA's finances. This had a generally salutary effect, although some Arab states and spokesmen for "the Palestine Arab delegation" and "the Palestine Liberation Organization" could not resist using this forum to deliver their usual lengthy anti-Israel diatribes.

UNRWA Commissioner-General Laurence Michelmore told the committee that the agency had gone through the most difficult year in its history. Inflation and the growing number of school-age children had raised UNRWA's budget to an estimated \$47.5 million for 1971, of which 46 per cent was earmarked for education, 40 per cent for relief services, and 14 per cent for health and sanitation. He estimated a deficit of \$5.5 million to \$6 million, unless additional contributions were obtained. While the agency had already reduced some relief and health expenditures, he said, any additional reductions, especially in education, were likely to have an "explosive" effect among the refugees. The representatives of Lebanon and Jordan also expressed concern that reducing or terminating UNRWA's services would undermine stability in their countries.

UN Secretary General U Thant, in a December 2 statement, endorsed the appeal for additional funds, noting that to deprive the refugees of needed services would constitute a "shameful failure by the United Nations to live up to its moral obligations." He also pointed out that any large reduction in UNRWA's services would inevitably add to resentment and tension at a time when an improvement in the atmosphere was desperately needed for progress toward a real solution. The Assembly adopted resolutions urging increased contributions from governments and other sources, and also appointed a nine-member working group to assist in fundraising and to

prepare a comprehensive report on all aspects of the agency's financing for the Assembly's next (fall 1971) session.

In his annual report for the year ending June 30, 1970, Dr. Michelmore also acknowledged that the deterioration of the political climate in which the agency operated hampered its operations. The agency's difficulties in Jordan and Lebanon, he wrote, had their source in "the considerable growth in numbers, firepower and influence of the Palestine politico-military organizations, in the enhanced political consciousness of the Palestine refugee community, which raised basic questions of authority and identification, and in the reflection of these developments in the attitude of the Agency's locally recruited staff."

In practice, this meant that some local UNRWA officials in Gaza and the West Bank were implicated in terrorist activities, according to the Israeli authorities who arrested them. The most flagrant abuses occurred in Lebanon, where for several weeks the guerrilla groups took over the refugee camps, and in Jordan, where refugee camps were openly being used as headquarters and training centers for terrorist operations.

The tragic events in Jordan in September increased the hardships for the refugees and compounded the agency's financial difficulties. Not only was UNRWA's property destroyed in the fighting, but the clear evidence of its inability to screen out terrorists from the other refugees, or even to prevent the guerrilla groups from operating in its camps, aroused criticism in the United States and made it increasingly difficult to obtain congressional support for additional relief contributions. In an editorial, "Subsidizing Subversion," the *New York Times* on November 6 characterized UNRWA as a "noble humanitarian effort" that "has been prolonged and perverted until it has become an instrument for sabotaging the work of the world organization." The writer concluded that, in light of the year's experience, "it would be folly to carry on UNRWA's program as before." Similar criticism was voiced by Senator Jacob K. Javits (R., N.Y.) and Gaylord Nelson (D., Wis.), who called for overhauling UNRWA's operations to prevent their abuse for political and military purposes.

Opposition was also expressed to UNRWA's toleration of the guerrilla groups and what appeared to be an inclination to think of legitimizing their role, as evidenced in its readiness even to consider a proposal submitted by the Arab host government in June that "representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization should take part in future meetings on education" for the refugees. The apparent purpose of such PLO involvement was to restore the anti-Israel indoctrination that had been removed from the textbooks after Israel's protest to UNRWA and UNESCO in 1967 about texts used in UNRWA schools in Gaza and the West Bank. The American delegate emphasized in the UN committee discussion that the United States believed that UNRWA should deal only with governmental authorities on questions of order and security in the camps. He "welcomed assurances" that UNRWA supplies had not been diverted to improper uses, except during

periods of actual fighting. In the course of the UN discussion, he noted that the United States had contributed over the years some \$500 million—a preponderant share of UNRWA's income.

There was general agreement that UNRWA's work would have to be continued until an over-all solution was reached. Senators Mark O. Hatfield (R., Ore.), Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.) and George D. Aiken (R., Vt.) introduced an amendment to the foreign aid appropriation bill to provide an additional \$1.5 million to UNRWA for education and vocational training. This, Hatfield explained, would help more refugees acquire marketable skills so that they could leave the camps. The squalor, idleness, and frustration of camp life, he said, were major causes of refugee attraction to the *fedayeen*.

Palestinians and Peace

However, even this additional aid was no adequate solution. During the UN committee debate, the Israel representative spoke of Foreign Minister Abba Eban's 1968 proposal to the UN for an international conference of the countries contributing to UNRWA, the Arab states, and Israel to work out a five-year plan for solving the refugee problem, a proposal that was rejected by the Arab states. In the meantime, he continued, Israel undertook some modest measures of its own: Under its family reunion scheme, 18,628 Arab inhabitants, who had left the West Bank and Gaza in the wake of the 1967 war, returned by the end of August 1970. Israel also aimed at making the refugees under its administration self-supporting, and employment exchanges made no distinction between refugee and non-refugee. When Eban addressed the General Assembly, on September 28, 1970, he spoke of other programs. Israel's "open bridges" policy permitted some 55,000 Arabs from Jordan and other Arab countries to visit their relatives west of the Jordan during the summer, and thousands of Arabs from Israel and the West Bank crossed the river to Jordan and other Arab countries. And there was a growing volume of trade over the bridges, interrupted only briefly by the Jordanian civil war. Israel also sent trucks with medical supplies to Jordan for the victims of the civil war as an example of "how humane solidarities should prevail over political and military tensions."

There was growing recognition in Israel that peace required not only formal documents, but the development of personal contacts among the peoples to overcome deepseated hatred and mistrust. Reports spoke of the traumatic effect of the Jordanian civil war on the moderate Palestinians and of the disillusionment with the guerrillas of a large but silent majority of them on both sides of the Jordan, who would welcome a peaceful settlement. However, they were divided among themselves, and unwilling or unable to challenge effectively the militant commandos.

The establishment of a separate Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank remained only a theoretical possibility, though Hussein's severe meas-

ures increased the traditional resentment of many West Bank Palestinians against Jordanian rule. The idea was stalled by disagreement among the Palestinians on who was to be their leader, and by Hussein's opposition. Israelis and Americans were divided on the merits and viability of a separate Palestinian state in addition to Jordan. However, most believed that as long as Hussein was in control and willing to consider a peace agreement with Israel, one should attempt to negotiate with him and his government, rather than encourage dissident Palestinian elements. But even this was not an immediate prospect since Hussein did not dare to make peace with Israel until the Egyptians had reached an agreement with Israel.

Moreover, the relationship between the Palestinians and the Jordanians was regarded as an internal matter in which neither Israel nor the United States should interfere. Commenting on the events in Jordan, Eban formally acknowledged in his September UN address that "it is for the Arab Governments to determine their regimes and institutional structure. Israel will never move its forces in any cause except its own legitimate security." He pointed out that the "structure, name and regime" of the kingdom of Jordan "were determined not by Israel but by its Arab citizens."

Eban also acknowledged that the Palestinian question was not simply a matter of refugees. He stressed, however, that "it is in peace, not in violence, that the Palestinian Arabs will find their true destiny." Elaborating on this point, he said:

In conditions of peace, Israel's eastern neighbor would be an Arab State, a majority of whose population would be composed of Palestinian Arabs, and a majority of all the Palestinian Arabs would be citizens of that State. . . . Wherever the boundary is determined in the peace agreement, the Palestinian Arabs on both sides of the Jordan will find a better future than that which Arafat and Habash and the hijackers can offer them. . . . The original former Palestine area on both sides of the Jordan will accommodate two States, Israel and an Arab State—while the area regains its natural economic unity and advances towards new forms of economic integration.

The events in Jordan in 1970 and the discussions at the United Nations thus underscored a basic dilemma that continued to face those who sought to achieve peace in the Middle East. It was not yet possible to make peace directly with the Palestinians but there could be no lasting peace without the Palestinians.

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