Review of the Year

UNITED STATES

OTHER COUNTRIES
Politics and Intergroup Relations in the United States

Politics in this country, particularly in an election year, always has reflected ethnic, racial, and religious cleavages. However, it is unlikely that any national election in American history saw such blatant appeals by candidates to ethnic group interests and widespread public discussion of these interests as were used in 1972. As a result the election largely turned on ethnic issues, although these usually dealt with differences in morality and life styles rather than with more traditional income or class divisions.

The election returns revealed a major change in the way minorities and the less advantaged have responded politically for almost two generations. The coalition of Southern whites, Jews, white ethnics, blue-collar workers, and campus-oriented intellectuals, that had felt comfortable in the Democratic party since the advent of the New Deal, was shattered, at least nationally with the landslide reelection of the Nixon-Agnew ticket.

According to an extensive postelection survey conducted for CBS, Roman Catholic voters for the first time in the country’s history selected a Republican candidate, by a margin of 53 to 46 per cent. And, for the first time since reliable election survey data became available in the mid-1930s, 54 per cent of labor-union families voted the Republican ticket. Jewish voters gave the Nixon-Agnew slate an estimated 35 per cent, double the 1968 percentage. Even voters earning less than $7,000 annually—the traditional bulwark of

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3 Gallup Opinion Index, December 1972.
Democratic strength—gave Nixon 42 per cent of their votes, a jump of 18 per cent over 1968, an NBC survey showed.

The CBS survey also found that, contrary to earlier predictions, the President narrowly won the youth. He carried the rural areas, the suburbs, and even some of the cities, including Cleveland and very nearly New York City. Even among academics, who generally have been found on the liberal-left side of the political fence, there was only a slight lead by Senator McGovern of 51 to 48 per cent. Finally, President Nixon completed the process begun in 1948 by sweeping all 11 Southern states—in 1968 the Democrats had taken Texas—thereby completely reversing the role that had made these states a consistent source of Democratic majorities.

In the battle for the George C. Wallace vote, and the anger and alienation it represented after Wallace had been disabled in an assassination attempt, Nixon was the primary beneficiary. The President's 1972 percentage was the sum of his 1968 vote (43.4 per cent), Wallace's 13.5 per cent, and as he, himself, suggested "about five points" for the assorted misfortunes that befell the Democratic ticket. However, the Wallace vote probably was not crucial. Had Wallace run and gained 15 per cent of the vote, Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab estimate, Nixon would have ended up with 50 per cent and Senator McGovern 35 per cent of the ballots cast.

Blacks maintained their overwhelming support of the Democratic party. However, their vote for Nixon increased from about 10 per cent in 1968 to 13 per cent, according to a November 10 release by the Joint Center for Political Studies; other sources put it as high as 21 per cent. The Center indicated it may have underestimated his vote slightly, since it did not include information from suburban areas.

The apparent victory for conservatism and the Republican party, however, was somewhat less clear than the actual presidential vote indicated. The GOP failed to carry the House or Senate despite the Republicans' presidential 60.7 per cent of the votes. Republican governors declined in number from 31 in 1968 to 19. Liberal Republicans, such as Senator Edward W. Brooke (Mass.), Clifford P. Case (N.J.), Mark O. Hatfield (Oreg.) and Charles H. Percy (Ill.) were reelected. Conservative Senator Jack Miller of Iowa was replaced by a Democrat, and another conservative, Senator Gordon Allot of Colorado, was defeated by an ex-Republican who had abandoned his party over the unsuccessful attempt to nominate Judge Harold Carswell to the Supreme Court.

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Since the election was neither a personal endorsement of the President nor a clear-cut victory for conservatism, its meaning was fiercely debated. Some observers argued that the electorate appeared to be rejecting social change as projected by a coalition of "new class" intellectuals, an elitist youth culture, and an underclass led by militant blacks. In contrast to the ambiguities of Senator George McGovern's ideas, it was said, Nixon offered an escape into nostalgia and familiar values, such as the work ethic and strongest-nation doctrine. By doing so, he managed, as Governor Wallace earlier and Senator McGovern briefly in the primaries, to emerge as champion of the alienated, white underdog rebelling against the elitism of the "new politics." That the election outcome indicated no racial backlash was seen by some in the fact that a majority of 2 to 1 of both Nixon and McGovern supporters said they would be more likely to vote for a candidate who would improve opportunities for blacks.7

The American Jewish Committee's executive vice president, Bertram H. Gold, declared that the voters had opted for "a progressive centrism, built firmly on a foundation of positive social content," rather than reaction.8

However one interpreted the meaning of the election, it seemed to signal for the 1970s the access to power of a new alliance between low- and moderate-income white ethnics, mostly Roman Catholic, and a broader base of Evangelical Protestants and some Jews. The question was whether this alliance was a temporary phenomenon or the "new majority" President Nixon had boasted of having created. In any case, it was clear that this would have a profound impact on intergroup relations in this country.

Ethnic Consciousness and Middle America

The revived interest in ethnic identification continued as a major current in American life. When World Publishing Company issued an "Ethnic Prejudices in America" series, it explained that it did not include material on the blacks because there were enough publications on this group. Other books published included Michael Novak's *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics: Politics and Culture in the Seventies*9 and Mark R. Levy and Michael S. Kramer's *The Ethnic Factor: How America's Minorities Decide Elections*.10

*New York* magazine had a special issue on the Irish (March 13), and the *New York Times Magazine* (April 30) carried Richard Gambino's article,

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7 Ibid.

8 "Progressive Centrism, Mandate For the Seventies," address before the American Jewish Committee's National Executive Council Meeting, December 1, 1972, Hollywood, Fla.

9 New York, 1972.

"Twenty Million Italian-Americans Can’t Be Wrong." NBC featured a Polish private eye, Banacek; CBS did a one-hour documentary on Italian American culture; the film "The Godfather" played to packed houses. There were signs, too, that "the ethnics" were organizing politically. New figures like Barbara Mikulski and Stephen Adubato had been elected to city councils in Baltimore and Newark, respectively.

However, this growing affirmation of the value of ethnicity and the "new pluralism" (AJYB, 1972 [Vol.73], pp. 98-102) did not go unchallenged. Critical reviews appeared of Murray Friedman's *Overcoming Middle Class Rage* and Novak's, *Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics*. Colin Greer said the "new pluralism" was "soil as fertile for group hatred and violence as it might be for social strength." A revived ethnicity, Norman Podhoretz warned, could pose a threat to "the idea of a common culture."

Regardless of the intellectuals' debate, political parties and national candidates made strenuous efforts to harness the forces of ethnicity. The GOP had been moving aggressively into this field since 1968, when it established a Republican National Committee ethnic office. Its allocation to win ethnic voters in the 1972 election campaign was estimated at half of its $40-million budget; target states included New York, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Texas, and New Jersey, where ethnics constituted half of the population. In 1972 the ethnic press gave wide publicity to a constant stream of presidential appointees having ethnic names. The White House committed itself to sending a representative to 13 separate ethnic functions in Chicago alone. Mrs. Nixon attended a Lithuanian folk festival, while the President, himself, appeared at an Italian folk festival in place of his daughter Patricia Cox, who could not attend.

Italian-Americans were a special target. In 1972 they seemed to be the most angered white ethnic group seeking political recognition. In 1968 they had been crucial in bringing New Jersey into the Republican camp. Levy and Kramer also reported that Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller had been

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14 *Commentary*, June 1972.


17 Levy and Kramer, *op. cit.*
reelected in 1970 with 65 per cent of the Italian vote. Two years earlier, they said, Nixon's 49 per cent plurality among New York state's Italians had made him the first Republican presidential candidate to capture a major ethnic group. In the 1972 election Mayor Frank L. Rizzo of Philadelphia, who had been elected a year earlier on the Democratic ticket, announced his support for Nixon. With other Italian-American political figures, such as Representative Mario Biaggi of the Bronx, N.Y., and Mayor Joseph Alioto of San Francisco, on the rise, the vote of this group was in a state of flux.

The President carefully planned his efforts to appeal to the sensitivities and values of "the ethnics." He put a presidential ban on the use of the word "Mafia." On the eve of Columbus Day he paid tribute to the nation's Italian immigrants, noting that they came "not asking for something, asking only for the opportunity to work." When he visited the Soviet Union, Nixon publicly noted in Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, that many Ukrainians lived in Chicago, Pittsburgh, and other parts of the United States. He also went to Warsaw, and on his return to the White House met with some Polish-Americans who burst into appreciative song.

In the campaign for the "ethnics" Senator McGovern seemed strangely out of place, despite the traditional Democratic affinities of these groups. "The prairie personality," one observer wrote, has "a sense of justness and uprightness but not so much of family and community." During their national convention in Miami Beach, the Democrats planned a two-day ethnic fair, replete with organ-grinders, mazurka-dancers, lasagna, baklava, and kolaches; but this was ethnic politics of yesteryear. Reported James P. Gannon in the June 12 issue of the Wall Street Journal: "Planners of folk fairs do not seem to understand that there is a new ethnic politics developing that has little or nothing to do with tacking a -ski on the end of your anglicized name. It is an issue-oriented politics based on the real-life concerns of white ethnic voters rather than the sentimental massaging of homeland memories." And Michael Novak, who enlisted in the Shriver campaign, explained that the new ethnic politics means you have to "look at the world, the way they do," and not necessarily be a part of an ethnic group.

"The ethnics" seemed to be less attracted to the Republican national ticket than repelled by McGovern's mainstream liberalism mixed with evangelical Protestant style and the elitist, overly ideological forces that supported him. It was symptomatic of the McGovern forces' lack of identification with ethnic

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18 Wall Street Journal, June 1, 1972.
19 Philadelphia Inquirer, October 9, 1972.
groups that the ethnic division of the Democratic party was abolished in July, when Mrs. Jean Westwood, who had been supported by McGovern, became national chairman of the Democratic party. An urban ethnic office was opened in McGovern campaign headquarters only after Shriver became the vice-presidential candidate, whose major role was to try to woo back ethnic voters.

The Rise of Evangelical Protestant Movements

In 1972 there emerged into clearer focus an important parallel movement to the ethnic surge: the rise of 30 million Protestant fundamentalist evangelicals. The movement was described in a number of books published during the year, including Religion and the New Majority, by Lowell D. Streiker and Gerald S. Strober,23 and Why Conservative Churches Are Growing, by Dean M. Kelley.24 Kelley pointed out that in recent years most liberal Protestant denominations, like the United Methodist Church and the Episcopal Church, either lost members or barely maintained themselves. To the degree that the Roman Catholic Church moved to a less absolute posture, its membership, too, was leveling off, and 1970 saw the first decrease since the Church's founding in this country. Groups showing steady gains were the Mormons, Southern Baptists, and Jehovah's Witnesses who held on to old-time beliefs, shunned compromising contact with other churches or secular causes, and maintained that they alone possessed the truth. Churches which had diluted their traditional purpose of providing meaning in personal life in favor of "extraneous goals such as changing social structures," Kelley noted, were losing ground. There also was developing an "ecclesiastical fundamentalism" or "populism" among liberal and conservative Protestant groups. This prompted Presbyterians and others to emphasize and spend money on local rather than national programs.25

There were signs, mainly outside of the cosmopolitan centers but even within them, that the values and life-styles of Protestant fundamentalist groups were taking hold in reaction against the counter-culture. A bagpipe and military-band version of the 200-year-old hymn, "Amazing Grace," made it into Billboard's "Top Twenty." Cat Stevens's "Morning Has Broken," an old English school hymn, reached number eight.26 In addition, the Jesus People movement spawned an estimated 25 to 50 fairly stable monthly publications not unlike the underground press of the Left. Like the

latter, they were beginning to penetrate the college campus.\textsuperscript{27} Campus officials in various parts of the country also reported a sharp increase in the demand for religious studies.

During his four years in office President Nixon carefully cultivated these currents which perhaps embodied many of his own values and experiences. Under him, "evangelical Protestantism had gone about as far as it was possible to go toward achieving official establishment," religious columnist Louis Cassels suggested.\textsuperscript{28} The President's statements on patriotism and the work ethic moved Charles P. Henderson, Jr., to label him the "theologian" of the new American civil religion. Nixon had formed a close personal and political alliance with moderate evangelist Billy Graham whom Strober and Streiker described as "the quintessential Middle American." He was a frequent visitor to the White House, not just to lead Sunday prayer services. Leaders of the more liberal Protestant denominations publicly complained that they were unable to get an appointment with the President to present official policy statements adopted by their groups.

Republican leaders campaigning for Nixon sought to capitalize on these conservative or more traditional currents. Republican Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott called McGovern the "Triple A candidate—Acid, Amnesty and Abortion." Clearly, McGovern's cause came to be identified with social issues that set on edge the teeth of evangelical fundamentalists and ethnics. Symbolically, Mayor Frank Rizzo and Billy Graham emerged as the two most important political figures in 1972.

\textbf{Working-Class Alienation}

Another political target group in the campaign, overlapping the ethnics and fundamentalist Protestants, was labor, mainly the blue-collar and, to a lesser degree, the white-collar workers. Traditionally allied with the Democratic party, organized labor was courted by the Nixon administration during the turmoil surrounding the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in 1970, when thousands of "hard-hats" marched on Wall Street to demonstrate their support of the Vietnam war. Recognizing that Democratic workers normally viewed American life much as he did, Nixon began to woo them assiduously. Whether coincidentally or not, former Teamster president James R. Hoffa was let out of prison. The construction unions were the beneficiaries of special treatment by the administration under a separate wage-control board. These unions also were pleased with modifications of the Philadelphia Plan which had been designed to increase the number of minority workers in the building

\textsuperscript{27} New York \textit{Times}, November 5, 1972.

trades (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], p. 134). As a result of these efforts and the lack of confidence in McGovern among working-class whites, unions representing five million members, among them the Teamsters, endorsed the President in October.29 At the conclusion of the Democratic National Convention, the executive council of the AFL-CIO, following the lead of its president, George Meany, agreed to remain officially neutral in the campaign. Earlier Meany had said about McGovern, "This man's ideas aren't liberal. This man's ideas are crazy."30

In 1972 American workers, especially the young, were at a peak of dissatisfaction. While industrial America had recovered from a two-year recession and hard-hat cities like Detroit, Pittsburgh, and Buffalo were humming again, many workers seemed to become dissatisfied with their daily job experience and the quality of their lives. A number of social-science investigations in 1972, some of them government-sponsored, documented this development. Among them were HEW's massive study, Work in America; America's Young Workers, the American Jewish Committee's National Project on Ethnic America survey of attitudes of young workers of Polish, Irish, and Italian extraction in Chicago and Hartford; Irving Howe's The World of the Blue-Collar Worker; The Hidden Injuries of Class, by Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, and Where Have All the Robots Gone?, by Harold L. Sheppard and Neal Q. Herrick.

The feeling on the part of workers of being trapped and dehumanized by monotonous jobs offering little opportunity to use their skills, lowered their productivity, increased absenteeism, raised turnover rates, and gave rise to industrial sabotage and wildcat strikes. The "'Lordstown syndrome'"—as the strike by young workers against a General Motors plant in Lordstown, O. because of an alleged speed-up on the assembly line was called—received considerable public attention.31 Sheppard and Herrick reported that workers with bad jobs and little opportunity of change were less likely to vote, and when they did, they tended to support George Wallace.

As the political campaign progressed, it became increasingly evident that the McGovern forces, who had had high hopes of capturing a major proportion of the 25 million young first-time voters, were encountering the deep dissatisfaction of many young workers who represented two-thirds of the youth constituency. The other third was college students. In interviews of voters under 25 years of age, conducted between October 11 and 15 in 24 locations across the United States, Peter Hart Research Associates of

Washington, D.C., found that they preferred Nixon to McGovern by a margin of 52 to 36 per cent. However, McGovern led on college campuses.  

Nixon concentrated on the various elements that made up the Middle America of 1972. One Democratic worker described his technique: "Nixon gnawed around the edges of a worker's life. He hasn't touched the central trade union part. But he gnaws a little at the Catholic part, a little at the Polish part and a little at the anti-hippie part. After a while, he has an awful lot of workers." Underlying the specific tactics or strategies used by Nixon and McGovern was a profound difference of opinion on where the country was going, or wanted to go. Conservative columnist and former Nixon political advisor Kevin Phillips, summed it up on the eve of the campaign:

While it is oversimplistic to divide "alienation" into just two categories, there would seem to be a basic cultural difference between "new value"-oriented indignation—the elitist McGovern brand—and the "Middle American" anger of trod upon tradition and spurned Levittown societal beliefs and values. Perhaps the real pivot of the election is this: Just how much have people—or human nature—really changed? If there is an all-pervasive new morality-cum-alienation that cuts across previous ethnic and chronological lines, then McGovern, the clear beneficiary, could win. But if the real frustration is with the trampling of traditional values, and if major chunks of the old Democratic coalition are angry at the cultural upheaval represented by McGovern, then Richard Nixon will come out on top.

The results of the election seemed to bear out the latter alternative. According to a Gallup poll, 54 per cent of labor-union members and their families voted for Nixon. Four years earlier, 56 per cent of the labor vote went to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, 29 per cent to Nixon, and 15 per cent to George Wallace. Even in the 1956 Eisenhower sweep, 57 per cent of the voters in union families voted for Adlai E. Stevenson, the Democratic candidate. Angered by McGovern's stand on welfare, busing, and other civil-rights issues directly affecting their neighborhoods and jobs, as well as his position on abortion, drugs, proposed "surrender" to Communist Vietnam, and amnesty for draft dodgers, ethnic groups shunned the Democratic national ticket. In Cleveland's 23rd ward, which was 80 per cent Slovene and blue-collar, Nixon won a clear majority of 57 per cent over McGovern's 41. In 1968 Humphrey captured this ward with 53 per cent, to Nixon's 24 and Wallace's 23.

34 Kevin Phillips, op. cit.
After the election the "hard hats" and organized labor received their reward: Peter J. Brennan, president of the New York City and New York State Building and Construction Trades Council, who had led the famous "hard hat" parade in New York in 1970, was appointed Secretary of Labor. The President was reported to have offered to put a labor-union representative also in a high level post in every department of the federal government.37

However, there was no indication that any of the problems that gave rise to ethnic, working-class, and middle-class rage were being dealt with by either the administration or Congress.

Broader questions, such as improving the nature of work so that a worker can feel pride and satisfaction in the job, went unaddressed. General Motors moved to the offensive on the issue. Top executives dismissed boredom and unhappiness among workers as exaggerated and emphasized high salary scales and generous fringe benefits.38 The HEW study's findings and proposals seemed to conflict with administration thinking and policy, particularly with Nixon's view that the "work ethic" was giving way to a "welfare ethic." Outgoing Secretary of Labor James D. Hodgson, whose department would be responsible for carrying through the study's major recommendations, said that the issue of job dissatisfaction had been overblown; that it was largely a creation of "pop sociologists" and their media sisters-under-the-skin.39

At year's end, influential senators, including Edward M. Kennedy (Dem., Mass.), Birch Bayh (Dem., Ind.), and Charles H. Percy (Rep., Ill.), were beginning to address themselves to the issue. Kennedy indicated in an interview with the Los Angeles Times that alienation of blue-collar workers was a key issue for the Democratic party, which would have to "more effectively express concern for keeping elements that have been friendly in the past."40

Roman Catholics and Church-State Relations

A special target of the "ethnic" strategies of the Republican and Democratic candidates was the country's largest religious group, the 48 million Roman Catholics who were estimated to constitute one-fourth of the total electorate.41

38 Ibid., December 24, 1972.
40 Ibid., December 24, 1972.
41 24 per cent Italian-Americans; 16 per cent Irish-Americans; 16 per cent German-Americans; 12 per cent Polish-Americans; 32 per cent other Catholics.
Andrew M. Greeley and other social scientists were demonstrating that Catholics no longer fitted politicians' image of an unwelcome immigrant population that related closely only to their Church and unions. After a slow start, considerable numbers of Catholics had “made it” by the beginning of the 1970s. Those under 40 years of age were as likely to be college graduates and economically successful as comparable American Protestants. In 1970 one-third of the nation’s college students were Catholic, compared to one-fourth in 1960. Many were moving to the suburbs. Much of the sharp increase in the Long Island population in the last decade resulted from the exodus of Italians from New York City. Despite their socio-economic success, however, Catholics had not “made it” in terms of broader acceptance of their cultural values and traditions which continued to be ignored and resented by many leaders in American culture.

Contrary to the widespread belief that Vatican Council II inspired changes in the American Catholic Church in the 1960s, it was the social and economic changes of that decade that in fact heavily influenced both the Church and laity. The latter were somewhat to the “left” of comparable groups in the population on a number of political and social questions. In the first of a planned series of yearly reports on attitudes and behavior of United States Catholics, based on statistics gathered by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, Greeley and William C. McCreary indicated Catholics seemed to have become “virtually indistinguishable from Protestants” in their views on moral and religious issues. The report charted a rapidly shifting outlook on such matters as church attendance, sexual morality, and even abortion under certain circumstances, although official church teachings remained essentially unchanged. Tensions persisted on such matters between younger and older Catholics and between the younger and older clergy. Only 40 per cent of the priests in the United States still supported the Church’s official teaching on birth control, while 83 per cent of the bishops did.

Like generals who fight this year’s war with last year’s strategies, both Nixon and McGovern responded to Catholic voters in traditional political terms. The former entered the campaign riding a growing Republican tide among Catholic voters, which had been interrupted only by the Kennedy and Johnson elections, probably because of the increasingly suburban and “have” character of this group since the 1950s.

42 Andrew M. Greeley, “American Catholics—Making It or Losing It?”, The Public Interest, Summer 1972.
43 Newsday, August 2, 1972.
Estimates based on Gallup poll election surveys indicated that the Catholic vote for the Democratic presidential candidates was as follows: Stevenson received 56 per cent in 1952, but only 51 per cent in 1956; it rose to 78 per cent for John F. Kennedy in 1960, decreased slightly to 76 per cent for Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964, and dropped again to 59 per cent for Hubert H. Humphrey in 1968 (8 per cent of the vote went to Wallace).

Nixon courted the Catholics in a variety of ways. He jetted to Philadelphia in the spring to tell a cheering crowd of nuns, priests, and lay educators gathered at the annual meeting of the Catholic Education Association that he was “irrevocably committed” to proposing measures to preserve parochial schools. He praised these schools for offering “spiritual values” and a “moral code.” In a radio speech, on October 25, he promised to seek tax credits from Congress for parents of children attending parochial schools. In May he wrote a widely publicized letter to Terrence Cardinal Cooke of New York personally supporting a church-led drive to repeal the state’s liberal abortion law, which was later passed by the legislature and vetoed by Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller. In rejecting his own population commission’s recommendations for liberalized abortion, planning services, and contraceptives for minors, he appealed to family-centered, ethnic Catholics.

In return John Cardinal Krol, head of the National Conference of Bishops and, since the death of Cardinal Spellman, perhaps the leading Catholic prelate in the country, delivered the invocation at the Republican National Convention. The Cardinal also was photographed with the President on the eve of the election after his return from Poland where he commemorated the martyrdom of a priest who had died in Auschwitz. The photograph, which appeared in newspapers around the country, aroused criticism by liberal Catholics. To some Cardinal Krol seemed to be the religio-political Catholic counterpart to evangelist Billy Graham.

Besides economic issues including his stand on tax reform, McGovern heavily banked on traditional Catholic loyalties to the Democratic party to work in his favor. On September 19 in Chicago, as polls showed his strength among Catholic voters eroding, he endorsed a tax-credit system of providing federal aid to parochial and other nonpublic schools. In a statement issued later in the day he said he favored something along the lines of a bill before the House Ways and Means Committee, pushed by Wilbur D. Mills of Arkansas and other Democratic congressmen, calling for a $200 annual tax credit for each child attending a qualified nonpublic school. The bill was supported also by the Nixon administration. On September 23 the New York Times editorially attacked McGovern’s stand as “a threat to the principle of

the separation of church and state, no less real for being an indirect subsidy.‘’

Early in October the Ways and Means Committee reported the bill out, but Congress adjourned without acting on it.

Abortion, too, became a hot political issue during the campaign in a number of states. In contrast to Nixon’s clear-cut support of the campaign to repeal New York’s liberal abortion law, McGovern’s repeated assertions that the federal government should not get involved; that the matter should be left to the states, hurt him politically. In Michigan and North Dakota the issue of liberalizing abortion laws was on the ballot: it was turned down in both states by a margin of 2 to 1 and 3 to 1, respectively.48 The Pennsylvania legislature passed a strict anti-abortion bill, which was killed only because the lower house could not muster the necessary two-thirds vote to override Governor Milton Shapp’s veto. McGovern was contending against a Nixon-led national current against “permissiveness,” with the implicit view that child-bearing be made mandatory as penalty for sexual indulgence.

The election demonstrated that, at least on a national level, Nixon’s “Catholic strategy” had been successful: for the first time in American history slightly more than half of all Catholic voters supported the Republican presidential candidate. McGovern split the two most predominantly Catholic states, carrying Massachusetts and losing Rhode Island by a narrow margin.

Catholic sociologist Andrew M. Greeley stated that, insofar as Catholic voters were concerned, the message of the election was that the “New Politics” had lost it, not that the President had won it. He argued that by rewriting the rules of the Democratic National Convention and insisting Catholic ethnics were “racists” and “hawks,” the “reformers” lost a substantial number of Catholic votes for the top of the Democratic ticket. Greeley also felt that the “New Politicians” were eager to dump the Catholic ethnics and Middle Americans because “there is a strong—and frequently quietly explicit—strain of anti-Catholicism in the liberal-left wing of the Democratic Party.”49

This clearly was an exaggeration. However, there was little doubt that many Catholics, along with other voters, rejected the ideological, moralistic, and evangelical qualities of many McGovern supporters and the personality of the candidate, himself. On the eve of the election, Hart Research Associates reported that had Edward Kennedy been his party’s nominee, Catholic voters would have selected him over Nixon.50 It was not so much change they resisted and resented, Seymour M. Lipset and Earl Raab pointed out, but “extremism” and “change that takes place in a non-traditional manner”.51

49 “New Politics Drove Catholics From Democratic Party,” ibid.
50 Ibid., October 26, 1972.
51 Lipset and Raab, op. cit.
As in the case of the ethnics, there was no serious effort to deal with social, economic, and even moral issues on which Catholic voters were wooed. Despite Nixon’s explicit statements of support for aid to parochial schools, critics noted, he had introduced no legislation on this subject during his previous four years in office. His endorsement of tax credits for parents of nonpublic-school children was accompanied by off-stage warnings by his budget and Treasury Department advisors, who pointed out that the enactment of such legislation would mean a billion dollar loss in revenues. And this loss would have to be made up some other way, possibly by cutting other education expenditures. 52

As the year came to a close, the Catholic Church continued to find itself in serious difficulties. The decline in parochial-school enrollment continued, although at a slower rate than the year before. 53 A report by a committee of businessmen and community leaders in Philadelphia on the financial crisis in archdiocesan schools early in the year was presented personally to the President by John T. Gurash, the group’s chairman and head of the INA Corporation, and Cardinal Krol. It described an impending disaster for public as well as parochial schools unless government aid was forthcoming shortly, but made no specific recommendations. To relieve the situation statutes providing for tax credits or for monetary reimbursement to parents for tuition paid to nonpublic schools were enacted in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, and Ohio. 54

A number of Supreme Court and lower court decisions in 1972 added fresh difficulties to the serious defeats suffered by proponents of aid to parochial schools the year before (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], p. 105). On October 10 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down by a vote of 8 to 1 a 1971 Ohio law for direct tuition grants to parents of children in nonpublic schools. In doing so, it let stand the opinion of a three-judge federal court which held, “One may not do by indirection what is forbidden directly.” In the lower court’s view, the Ohio law violated the First Amendment’s prohibition of any public “establishment of religion” because the “effect of the scheme is to aid religious enterprises.” 55

This action endangered systems of tuition grants to parents of private-and parochial-school children which a number of states adopted when, in 1971, the court in Lemon v. Kurtzman and Earley v. DiCenso (AJYB, 1972 [Vol.

53 Catholic Standard and Times, November 2, 1972.
73], pp. 73-74, 105) ruled out direct grants to these schools. It also seemed to some that in their legal effects tuition grants more closely approximated tax credits now advocated by parochiaid proponents than did "purchase of services arrangements" barred by the Supreme Court a year earlier. In New York, a federal appeals court struck down two sections of a law enacted in May, providing for private-school tuition refunds to poor parents and state-supported maintenance allowances to inner-city private schools, but upheld an income-tax benefit plan for parents. In Ohio, however, a three-judge federal court invalidated that state's tax-credit statute during the last days of the year.56

Critics of proponents of government aid to private and parochial schools were irked by efforts to find some way around the 1971 Supreme Court decisions. Leo Pfeffer, who for many years had played a leading role in arguing against parochiaid before the Court, called the proposals "a chess game with the Constitution," comparable to efforts in the South to circumvent school-desegregation decisions.57

Nor was parochiaid supported by voters in several states in 1972. A ballot proposition to establish a $12.1 million fund for scholarships to nonpublic-school students was rejected in Maryland. Idaho voters defeated a measure allowing nonpublic-school students to use public-school buses to go to school, and in Oregon a proposal to amend the state's constitution, with possible benefit to proponents of aid to nonpublic schools, was turned down.58

The difficulty of liberals, most of whom opposed parochiaid, was that they had won a series of court decisions and several referenda and, as a result, failed in their attempt to get the political support of urban Catholic voters. Adam Walinsky was one of the few liberal voices endorsing some form of aid to parochial schools. (McGovern's support of tax-credits received little attention.) He recommended, in the October issue of the New Republic, tax deductions for all charitable contributions, including those to church and parochial school fund-raising drives. Efforts of this kind might have helped liberals regain some credibility with Church leadership and many of the laity. "To do otherwise," Walinsky concluded, "is to risk the worst political sin of all, which is not failure, but irrelevance to the concerns of our people; and as well to all of those children, black and white and Puerto Rican, Catholic and non-Catholic, for whom the parochial schools are one of the few bases of stability in the difficult and often menacing urban world."

56 American Jewish Congress, op. cit.
57 "Aid to Parochial Schools," Reform Judaism, October 1972.
The Jews

THE ELECTIONS

Although the Jews numbered just under three per cent of the total United States population, their concentration in six important states—New York, Florida, California, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Illinois—their proportionately large turnout at the polls, and their generosity in supporting causes they believed in have made them special targets for politicians in recent years. The 1972 election year, however, saw an unprecedented concentration on, and at times an almost obscene public discussion of, the alleged "Jewish vote." A sampling of articles and headlines in the news media included "Will Jews Dance to Nixon's Tune?" a special section in New York magazine (August 14); "Wooing the Jewish Vote," in Newsweek (August 21); "The Jewish Swing to Nixon," in Time (August 21); "Is There Really a Jewish Vote?", in The Philadelphia Inquirer (October 1); "Nixon Accused of Backing Israel to Woo Jewish Vote," in the New York Times (October 1); and "Nixon Stronger Among Jews," in the Detroit Free Press (October 23). It was widely assumed that Jews would vote as a group on such Jewish issues as Israel, Soviet Jewry, and racial quotas, rather than on a broad range of concerns, as would other Americans.

Both political parties organized "Jewish desks" to move in aggressively on Jewish voters. The Nixon forces believed the Jews offered an unusual opportunity for significant political gains over the approximately 17 per cent received in 1968. McGovern could only hope to maintain the high proportions of the Jewish Democratic vote in national elections since the New Deal era—according to Levy and Kramer, 90 per cent in 1940, 1944, and 1948; 64 per cent in 1952; 60 per cent in 1956; 82 per cent in 1960; 90 per cent in 1964 and 83 per cent in 1968.59

For more than a year before the election, presidential advisors had been suggesting that it would be a mistake to "write off" the Jews. They pointed out that the safety of Israel was a central Jewish concern, as was the safety of Soviet Jewry. They also argued that, as a relatively prosperous community, Jews should be turning more conservative and should support Nixon's economic views, his strong stand on law and order, and his opposition to quotas in affirmative-action programs.

In connection with the role of Israel in the campaign and Nixon's strategy to capitalize on this issue, a major controversy had developed even before the presidential nominating conventions over alleged intervention in American politics by the Israel government. In a speech over the Israeli state radio on the occasion of the anniversary of the six-day war, Israel's ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin, was quoted as saying, "We have to differentiate between aid in the form of action and aid in the form of words. While we appreciate support in the form of words, we are getting from one camp, we must prefer support in the form of deeds we are getting from the other camp." Rabin reportedly said on another occasion that no other American had made such a far-reaching statement committing the United States to support Israel's existence as President Nixon in his address to Congress upon his return from Moscow.60

The speech was seen in newspaper stories and editorial interpretations as expressing Israel's preference for Nixon. Among some of the strong condemnations it called forth was Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s assertion that no foreign envoy since British Ambassador to the United States Jackville-West (who publicly stated in 1888 that the election of Grover Cleveland to the presidency would be to the advantage of Britain) "has intervened so mindlessly in American politics" as Rabin; that "unless his Government recalls him, one must assume that he is executing a premeditated policy."61 Rabin said that he had been quoted out of context and that his remarks had been misinterpreted.62 Several days later Senator Ribicoff (D., Conn.), a key McGovern advisor, released a statement by Prime Minister Golda Meir asserting Israel's neutrality in the United States presidential campaign.63

From the very outset, McGovern was on the defensive with Jewish voters, a position that remained essentially unchanged during the campaign. He had won the nomination over Humphrey and Jackson, who, over the years, had built solid support in the Jewish community as a result of efforts on behalf of Israel and other issues important to Jewish voters. Arguments that McGovern was weak on the issue of Israel, which first surfaced in the California primary where McGovern defeated Humphrey, were given wide publicity. At the height of the California primary, Los Angeles Anglo-Jewish papers carried a

series of advertisements calling McGovern's support of Israel questionable. The ads, which bore no imprint of Humphrey sponsorship, contained excerpts from earlier McGovern speeches in support of reparations for Palestinian refugees, and pointed to his having voted against military credits for Israel and his inclination to support the internationalization of Jerusalem.

In addition, McGovern's campaign manager Gary Hart said in the question period following his address to students at George Washington University on September 9\textsuperscript{64} that McGovern "should have condemned Israel" for its attacks on Lebanon following the murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympiad (p. 451). Another aide, Richard Stearns, signed pro-Arab advertisements carried by the Washington Post and New York Times on June 23 and November 22, 1967, respectively. While McGovern disavowed these positions, the statements were widely reported in the press, and reprints turned up in Nixon campaign packets circulated in the Jewish community.

The McGovern-Shriver forces fought back as best they could on issues that were known to be of importance to Jewish voters; but they could not deal with the undercurrents. They struck hard at Nixon's credibility. In a speech on October 30 in a West Los Angeles synagogue, vice-presidential candidate Sargent Shriver pictured Nixon as historically cold to Israel and insensitive to the plight of Jews in the Soviet Union. He criticized the President for having "an insufficient number of Jews and ethnics on his personal staff." Said Shriver: "Nixon just became friendly [toward Israel] this year. Are you confident that on November 8th Nixon won't revert back?"

Earlier, on August 30, McGovern stressed in a talk to members of the New York Board of Rabbis his long-time commitment to Israel, asserting that the security of Israel was not a partisan issue. On September 21 he told leaders of 25 major national Jewish organizations that he would vote in favor of a plan to withhold "most-favored-nation" trading status from the Soviet Union until it abolished its "slave tax" on Soviet-Jewish emigrants and ceased its "arming of Arab terrorists."\textsuperscript{65}

Within the Jewish community the maneuvering for votes and statements by leaders identified with major Jewish organizations for or against national political candidates aroused concern. Newspaper reports late in August indicated that the formation of a Jewish committee backing the Nixon-Agnew ticket, co-chaired by William A. Wexler, the immediate past president of B'nai B'rith, and Samuel Rothberg, chairman of the Israel Bond organization, was to be announced after the Republican convention. Criticism came immediately from the board of governors of B'nai B'rith. This was followed by the release, on September 1, of a statement by eight major Jewish

\textsuperscript{64} Hatchet (George Washington University student publication), September 21, 1972.

\textsuperscript{65} New York Times, October 22, 1972.
organizations, including the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, and the United Synagogue of America, deplored appeals to Jews based on the single issue of United States support of Israel. It declared that it was an "error to assume that political endorsements by individuals identified as officers or members of an organization reflect the views of that organization or its membership," and it noted further that the record of both major parties was supportive of Israel. Simultaneously, the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council released guidelines on political campaigns, adopted in June 1971, to help its constituent organizations avoid even the appearance of partisanship.

These reactions seemed to have some effect. The announcement in October of the formation of Concerned Citizens for the Re-election of the President—the original Jews for Nixon organization—which contained the names of major Jewish organizational leaders like the Detroit philanthropist Max Fisher, omitted the names of their organizations and mentioned only their home cities.66

The campaign was remarkably free from antisemitism; but there was some discomfort among Jews about the emergence of a number of stereotypes. Newspaper stories referring to Jewish "fat cats," "Jewish financiers," and "Jewish money" began to appear during the early days of the Democratic primaries. For example, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak wrote in their column, "GOP's Belling of Fat Cats," in the July 27 Washington Post, that Nixon campaign workers had enlisted "every major contributor to Humphrey's 1968 and 1972 presidential campaigns," and described the contributors as "these Jewish businessmen." The syndicated columnist Nicholas von Hoffman commented on what he called the competition among politicians for the Jewish vote by their support of Israel "the valiant little country," which is also "a very truculent one, the Prussia of the Middle East," whose "combative desire for Lebensraum" could "drag us into disaster."67

ISSUE OF SOVIET JEWS

One of the most significant issues on which Jewish interests cut across the political campaign was the Senate debate over a bill to ratify President Nixon's opening of trade channels with the Soviet Union. Along with 74 other senators, Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) introduced an amendment to the bill which sought to block the trade agreement, scheduled to be voted on in 1973, unless the Soviet Union stopped harassing Soviet Jews wanting to emigrate and rescinded the education tax. The Christian Science Monitor, in an

66 Jewish Post and Opinion, October 20, 1972.
October 6 story, "U.S.-Soviet Trade and Jewish Issue," described Senate resistance as partly pre-election tactics. *Time* was even more critical, asking in an article, "Catering to the Jewish Vote," in the October 26 issue, "at what point the desire to bring justice to persecuted minorities in other lands should override the clear U.S. national interest." On this question, Nixon was politically on his weakest grounds with Jewish organizations. He urged them not to force a harsh confrontation with Russia in view of the administration’s policy of quiet diplomacy. Pressures in the United States appeared to have forced some relaxation of the emigration tax, which, however, was reportedly reinstated after the election.

The election bore out earlier predictions of a significant rise in Jewish votes for Nixon. An American Jewish Committee study of neighborhoods on the East and West coasts, and Florida indicated about 35 per cent of Jewish voters who actually voted for a presidential candidate, voted for Nixon. This figure was about 25 per cent of all registered Jewish voters.  

**VOTING PATTERN**

The heaviest volume of Jewish votes for the Nixon-Agnew ticket was in areas of racial tension. In Michigan, with busing for greater desegregation a key issue in Detroit, Flint, and Pontiac, the Jewish vote for Nixon increased markedly. In Brooklyn’s heavily Jewish Canarsie district, which also was in the throes of a busing controversy, the President received 54 per cent of the vote, compared to 23 per cent four years earlier. It was estimated that in Ohio McGovern won between 52 and 54 per cent of Jewish voters, down heavily from 81 per cent in 1968 (AJYB, 1969 [Vol. 70], p. 100).

As noted earlier in mayoralty elections in New York, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles, there were political divisions among Jewish voters along class lines. Wealthier, upper-class Jews tended to vote for the more liberal candidate regardless of party label, whereas a larger percentage of poorer, less-educated Jews voted for the conservative candidate. While there was a moderate decline in the Democratic vote among the more prosperous Jews between 1968 and 1972, the drop was sharp in the Democratic vote among the less prosperous.  

Even so, the election demonstrated how difficult it was for Jews to vote for a conservative political candidate, though many disliked McGovern, in the high rate of their abstention and boycott of the presidential-line on the ballot. In the Brighton Beach section of Brooklyn, a low income area of elderly...  

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68 Milton Himmelfarb, "The Jewish Vote (Again)," *Commentary*, June 1973, p. 81.

people, many of them foreign-born, the physical and presidential abstention rate was 24 per cent, compared to 8 per cent in 1968.\(^70\) Among Americans generally, according to the *Gallup Opinion Index*,\(^71\) 45.5 per cent did not cast ballots. This represented the lowest voter turnout since 1948. The high percentage of votes McGovern received among Jewish voters cast doubt on the "turn to the right" noted in so many discussions of Jewish voting patterns. Had the rest of the electorate voted as the Jews did, McGovern would have been sent to the White House in a landslide majority larger than Nixon's.

Nevertheless, the decline in Jewish votes for the top of the Democratic ticket was significant. In an important article, "Why Jews Turn Conservative," in the *Wall Street Journal* for September 14, Irving Kristol argued that the Left had moved further left, thereby "disinheriting Jews . . . of their traditional political loyalties. . . . Jews have not become 'reactionary' . . . he wrote, "as a result of affluence or [Israel's] military victory. But they are certainly reacting against the new politics of the Left." He concluded that Jews, both in the United States and Israel, were moving toward a concern for conserving the kind of liberal society that prevails in both lands.

The election demonstrated that much of the discussion of the "Jewish vote" and Jewish issues had been misleading. Jews voted on the whole range of issues affecting America.

Twelve Jews were elected in November to serve in the 93rd Congress, the same number as in the 92nd Congress, two less than in 1967, and six less than in 1966. "Jews have depleted their potential political strength almost for the next ten years," Representative Benjamin Rosenthal of Queens told an interviewer before the election. "There will not be an increase in major Jewish officeholders during this period of time."

**ANTISEMITISM**

While antisemitism was not an important factor in the election campaign, it was found to persist in a number of areas. In August the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the American Jewish Committee, and the American Jewish Congress filed a formal charge with New York City School Chancellor Harvey B. Scribner, seeking an investigation of the appointment of Luis Fuentes as community superintendent of School District No. 1, Manhattan. They asked for Fuentes's dismissal on the grounds that he allegedly made antisemitic remarks when he was acting principal in the Ocean Hill-Browns-


\(^{71}\) "'1972 Election Turnout Lowest Since 1948 Presidential Election,'" December 1972.
ville demonstration school district, and for the removal of the school board for having failed to investigate his conduct.

Late in the year, the Anti-Defamation League released a survey noting "a marked increase during the previous two years in the scope of American anti-Jewish activities, incidents, organizations and publications," accompanied by diminishing public concern. The dimensions of the threat were not negligible, the ADL said, and came from the far Left as well as the right, "from otherwise respectable sources and from extremist segments of other minority groups." 72

At the same time, ADL also released the preliminary findings of a study of teenagers in three integrated East Coast public school districts, conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of California, which showed a high incidence of anti-Jewish and anti-black prejudice. Blacks were held to be less antisemitic than whites.

An analysis of teaching material published by 12 denominational and independent Protestant groups, undertaken by Gerald Strober for the American Jewish Committee, 73 found that they continued to "perpetuate outdated stereotypes and prejudices [about Jews] in daily life," and thereby to "hamper the growth of mutual respect between Christians and Jews."

THE JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE

A very pessimistic view of antisemitism was taken by Rabbi Meir Kahane, international chairman of the Jewish Defense League, who now lives in Israel (p. 505). Declaring that the dangers to American Jews were mounting at an alarming rate, he urged in an article on the Op-Ed page of the New York Times of May 26 that the American Jewish communities and organizations convene an emergency conference to develop a campaign for explaining this threat and planning for mass emigration to Israel. The JDL in this country continued to be the subject of public controversy throughout the year largely in connection with its efforts to dramatize the plight of Soviet Jewry. Three members pleaded guilty in a federal court in Brooklyn to charges related to bombing incidents in 1971 at two offices and property of the Soviet Union in New York. Three teenagers identified by police as members of JDL were arrested in connection with the bombing of impresario Sol Hurok's office on January 26, in which a secretary was killed and 13 persons, including Hurok, were injured.


Christian Evangelism

Jewish anxieties were aroused by intensified nationwide campaigns of Christian evangelism. Plans were developed during the year for Key '73, a year-long effort for the first time involving mainline Protestant denominations, as well as Roman Catholic and Evangelical bodies, "to saturate the entire nation with the claims of Jesus Christ in 1973." Jewish leadership worried about a possible revival of the prepluralistic ideology of a "Christian American" nation. While the campaign, as such, was not directed specifically at Jews and involved no antisemitism, there were during the year stepped-up efforts to proselytize among Jews, spearheaded by old-line evangelical groups like the American Board of Missions to the Jews.

A well-financed media campaign was developed in 1972 utilizing nationwide television programs ("The Passover") and full-page advertisements ("So Many Jews are Wearing 'That Smile' Nowadays") in major daily newspapers around the country.

A special target of some evangelical groups was Jewish youth, whom they tried to reach through the "Campus Crusade for Christ" chapters at colleges and universities and "Youth for Christ" organizations. Time magazine, on June 12, quoted Rabbi Samuel Cunin of the Lubavitch House at the University of California, Los Angeles, as saying "young Jews are converting to Christianity at the rate of 6,000 to 7,000 a year." Richard Gelwick, chairman of the department of religion at Stephens College, warned in Christian Century of the "threat of anti-Semitism emanating from the 'Jesus revolution' as a result of the dogmatism stemming from biblical literalism."  

There was little indication, however, that these efforts were very successful. A B'nai B'rith survey of 80 major colleges found that only a "negligible percentage" of Jews were responding to appeals of the Jesus Freaks, the Campus Crusade for Christ, and other fundamentalist groups. The year, in fact, saw the continued upsurge of Jewish identity following the six-day war. Jewish studies had become a new campus favorite, with more than 300 colleges offering such courses. And Charles Berlin, bibliographer in Judaica of the Harvard College library, estimated that, not counting seminary faculties, there were 250 major academic posts in the field, about twice as many as a decade ago. The writings of Elie Wiesel, Isaac B. Singer, Chaim Potok, as well as other fiction dealing with Orthodox and hasidic life, found a ready market. A group called Jewish Nostalgic Productions even began an

effort to revive the Yiddish theater with a new production of "Yoshe Kalb" on Second Avenue in New York. While the depth and significance of the "Jewish revival" was open to question, an increasing sense of identity was clearly developing among Jews.\(^{75}\)

A special issue emerging for Jews in 1972 was a growing insensitivity on the part of the general community with regard to their feelings and concerns, as for example the invitation by the National Council of Churches in Dallas to black militant Imamu Baraka (LeRoi Jones) to address its members in December, despite his record of antisemitism. The June issue of the Anti-Defamation League publication *Facts* contained an analysis of the increased use of anti-Jewish slurs, stereotypes, and insulting innuendos in various media. The report noted the "callous indifference on the part of public figures and public officials to incidents of raw anti-Semitism."

Of special concern, Robert Alter felt,\(^{76}\) was the appearance of birthday cards, allegedly comic posters, and "party books," representing the Jews as "prickly bearded, hideously hook-nosed, money-grubbing, sordidly scheming slobs." Alter was particularly critical of what has emphatically been called "the age-old self-mockery of Jewish humor" which in the case of Roger Lamanski's pamphlet, *It's Fun To Be Jewish*, was nothing so much as the kind of material contained in the classic literature of European antisemitism. (Lamanski: "Q. What's the difference between a German Jew and a Russian Jew? A. Nothing—it depends on what language you want to get gypped in.")

Another favorite of the caricaturist was the Jewish woman who has been receiving clinical analysis for a number of years.\(^{77}\) The archetype of the destructive "Jewish Mother," Sophie Portnoy, was a central figure in Philip Roth's novel *Portnoy's Complaint* and of the film released in 1972. Fred Hechinger, reviewing the film in the New York *Times* of July 16, labeled it antisemitic and strongly objectionable: "All that emerges is a vulgar and offensive portrait of an unpleasant cast of Jewish characters." The fact that some of this material was written by Jews made it no less disturbing. ADL, taking a serious view of this cultural phenomenon, said it was "acceptable" because it relied upon "deep and ancient wellsprings of anti-Semitism in the Western and American experience." Alter saw it as an indication that the "tacit moratorium on vocal anti-Semitism after the Holocaust is now definitely over." Another interpretation might be that "jokebook" Judaism


was an indication that Jews have lost their minority and victim status and no longer required sensitive treatment.

Black America

The Election

A growing sense of black group identity continued as a powerful force, often turning into a quest for separatism. Black fraternities made significant gains at a time when white fraternities were slipping. Increasingly, black economists, journalists, ministers, teachers, accountants, lawyers, psychiatrists, and even nuns were leaving integrated professional organizations to form their own groups. Professor Charles L. Sanders of Atlanta University and Hunter College reported to the National Association of Black Social Workers the formation of at least 22 all-black national professional organization.\(^78\)

Nationalist and integrationist factions and viewpoints sharply divided the black community. This split, together with a growing white backlash on issues of concern to blacks, kept the latter from playing a major role in the election outcome. By and large, voters were not responding sympathetically to either faction, so that there was no meaningful discussion of, or action on, issues of vital concern to this normally important segment of the electorate by either presidential candidate.\(^79\)

The landslide reelection of Nixon was keenly disappointing to most blacks. Roy Wilkins, head of NAACP, wrote in his syndicated column that the "secret issue" in the campaign was race. Mayor Richard G. Hatcher of Gary, Ind., also felt that the election was a victory for racism: the big losers were blacks and other minorities. To many, therefore, the election was still another manifestation of racial retrogression in line with the pullback on commitments to open housing, appeals against "forced integration" and "forced busing," and the "no quotas" directive of the President. The fear persisted, as a study of 1,890 blacks living in Philadelphia and Charlotte, N.C. by Dr. Castellano Turner, a black psychologist at the University of Massachusetts, reaffirmed, that whites would try to decimate future generations of blacks through birth control, sterilization, and other planned programs of genocide.

However, a closer look at the situation suggested a more complex picture. A 1972 Harris poll reported that whites were more acutely aware of discrimination against blacks than in 1969; and blacks, themselves, felt that there had been substantial gains in reducing discrimination. The poll also


reported that the percentage of whites who thought blacks were "moving too fast" had declined from 70 in 1966 to 52. Three new black congressmen and congresswomen were elected—Andrew Young in Atlanta, Mrs. Barbara Jordan in Houston, and Mrs. Yvonne Brathwaite Burke in Los Angeles—and all 13 black congressmen were reelected, including Washington, D.C.'s nonvoting delegate, Walter Fauntroy. Young and a number of others had significant white support. Republican Senator Edward W. Brooke won reelection in Massachusetts, which had only a small black population.

While the November election indicated a weakening of political strength by blacks on the national level, their gains were striking at state and local levels. The Joint Center for Political Studies reported in March that there were 2,264 black elected officials in the country, an increase of 21.7 per cent over 1971. After the 1972 election, the Center reported there now were 222 black state legislators, a gain of 22. For the first time, blacks were elected in Arkansas, Minnesota and Oregon legislatures. Black lawmakers in California and Michigan were described by a New York Times survey conducted earlier in March, as wielding considerable influence, both individually and as a group. And in 22 other states, where there was only a single black, their presence affected the way legislative business was done.

Blacks made significant showings in elections in the South, according to the Voter Education Project, with some 598 blacks voted into office, to make a record high total of 1,144. (Arkansas had been the last Southern state without black representation.) The greatest advances were made in Alabama. In Selma, where black demonstrators in 1965 were assaulted by state police as they sought to march to Montgomery to petition for the right to vote, black registration had risen from 2.3 per cent in that year to 67 per cent in 1972, and half of the 10 city council seats were won by blacks. Blacks were elected, for the first time, to the city councils of Brunswick, Ga., Natchez, Miss., and Seguin, Tex. and to the Orange County, N.C., board of supervisors. More significantly, in recent years the growth of Negro suffrage and the success of Republican candidates in replacing Democratic incumbents in the South made for a major decline in the power of Dixiecrat congressmen.

There also had been an increase in black influence in the Democratic party, which was crucial in keeping a number of cities Democratic, among them New York, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. After the election, blacks received more representation on the Democratic National Committee, and Basil Patterson of New York was reelected as vice-chairman.

At the same time, blacks were becoming politically more sophisticated. Although Illinois went to Nixon, Democratic candidate for state's attorney Edward V. Hanrahan, campaigning with the support of the Mayor Richard J. Daley machine, was defeated. His defeat was in part the result of a carefully

targeted campaign of blacks to topple him because he had been charged with, though later acquitted of, obstructing justice in connection with a police raid in 1969, which took the lives of two Black Panther members. Hanrahan, the incumbent, also tried to capitalize on the crime issue by announcing the capture of alleged members of a black terrorist band called “De Mau Mau,” charged with nine random murders of whites. For days newspapers printed articles about a “3,000-strong” murder band, which several days later retracted in apologetic editorials.

In Mississippi many blacks split their vote to support McGovern and the Republican foe of segregationist Senator James Eastland, though without success. Two months earlier, blacks provided nearly half the votes for the man who unseated Representative John McMillan (D., S.C.), chairman of the House District Committee and longtime foe of home rule for the heavily black District of Columbia. They also helped defeat conservative Congresswoman Louise Day Hicks in Boston and Congressman Earle Cabell in Texas.

Citing black political gains in recent years, some with the aid of whites, Bayard Rustin denied in his column, which appeared in a number of black newspapers, that race was the predominant issue in the election. Those asserting the contrary were writing off the possibility of “a vibrant interracial political party,” and this was both dangerous and defeatist.81 A study prepared by the National Urban League’s Research Department, however, found claims of growth of black political power to be exaggerated. Black elected officials represented only 0.4 per cent of the total, and black congressmen, 3 per cent. There was only one black senator and no black governor. Only 1.6 per cent of all elected state officials, 0.7 per cent of all elected municipal officials, and 0.2 per cent of all elected county officials in the nation were black.

The study also found continued barriers to voting or representation by blacks, including inaccurate census data, one-year residency requirements in more than 30 states, and disqualification of convicted felons and ex-convicts in most states.82 The fact remained that only 41 per cent of the black voting-age population went to the polls, 14 below the national percentage.83

MIDDLE CLASS

A significant aspect of the 1972 election was the continued evidence it provided of the emergence of a black professional and suburban middle class

83 Focus, December 1972.
which tended to vote more conservatively. On the basis of returns from black wards in 22 cities, the Joint Center for Political Studies estimated that the black vote for Nixon had increased from 10 per cent in 1968 to 13 per cent. The Nixon vote was probably understated since information was not yet available from suburban areas, at the time of the center's release on November 10. Black columnist Lu Palmer reported an increase from about 5 or 6 per cent in 1968 to 15, while columnist Marianne Means said the President received 21 per cent of the black vote. According to Lipset and Raab, over 90 per cent of the black vote in slum areas was for McGovern; but it was 80 per cent in other city areas and only 67 per cent in suburbia.

When Nixon began on his first term of office, Daniel P. Moynihan advised him of the existence of a black middle class and urged that their values and needs be considered. The Nixon administration responded with contracts and grants to encourage black enterprise and increased the number of blacks employed in the federal government and federally funded programs. U.S. Commissioner of Education Sidney P. Marland, Jr., reported in the summer of 1972 that federal assistance to predominantly black colleges and universities had increased by 58 per cent, from $108 to $171 million in the previous three years and the preliminary estimate for the 1972 fiscal year was $200 million. Also, the number of black families with annual incomes of $10,000 or more, particularly from 1965 to 1970, increased sharply, although their number was proportionately lower than whites.

Much of the President's new black support came from holders of federal contracts and grants, federal employees, or persons working in federally funded programs and projects. Among them were some former civil-rights activists, such as Floyd McKissick, former director of CORE and founder of Soul City, N.C., and Albert Sampson, former aide to Ralph Abernathy, president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Among Nixon supporters were also several black entertainers, including former football-star-turned-actor Jim Brown, soul singer James Brown, and actor-singer Sammy Davis, Jr. Their endorsement of Nixon stirred deep resentment among many black leaders. "The President has bought them, and they have sold out," Congressman Louis Stokes (D., Ohio) declared. Davis, of whom a picture embracing Nixon at the Republican National Convention in August was carried in newspaper and other publications across the country, was booed at the annual Black Expo in Chicago early in October.

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85 Lipset and Raab, op. cit.
Blacks strived for unity during the year, but the effort only underlined existing sharp divisions. This was dramatically demonstrated at the National Black Political convention, held in Gary, Ind., on March 10-12, and attended by over 4,000 delegates from across the country. The meeting was convened on the premise that blacks were beginning to hold the balance of power in a number of states; that it therefore was possible for them to form a political entity through which black political and economic demands could be realized or maximized. A key issue was whether blacks should continue working on their agenda within the two major political parties, or develop an independent black politics. Militants like Imamu Baraka, one of the three convention co-chairmen, wanted to set up a Black Political party, but initially agreed not to press the issue since this would polarize the convention. Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm (D., N.Y.) indicated she was available as a candidate around whom blacks and others might rally.

NAACP entered the convention with a public attack on the proposed preamble to the National Black Political Agenda which preached racial superiority. The platform finally adopted called for "a permanent political movement, the reshaping of American institutions, proportional representation in political office, full employment, local control over police, reparations, and a guaranteed annual income." In a separate section passed in the closing hours when many delegates had already left, the convention adopted two resolutions that created widespread disagreement within the black community: one condemned the forced busing of school children in the name of integration and called for "supreme quality education for all our youngsters"; the other called for the cessation of all American economic aid in "supporting the fascist government of Israel"; advocated Israel's "dismemberment" and "self-determination for Palestinians."

In releasing the agenda to the press, the convention's two other co-chairmen, Gary's Mayor Hatcher and Representative Charles Diggs (D., Mich.), publicly dissented from the two controversial resolutions, as did Walter Fauntroy, the District of Columbia delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives. After the convention, NAACP announced its total withdrawal from, and disassociation with, the convention. It attacked the two

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resolutions as "not only repugnant to our basic principles, but which we must vigorously and unqualifiedly oppose." The 13 black members of the U.S. House of Representatives, too, condemned the resolutions and released their own set of demands in a "Black Bill of Rights."

A steering committee charged with shaping all resolutions into final form released on May 19 a Black Political Agenda which somewhat softened the two controversial resolutions. The one on busing rejected as false the notion that black children were unable to learn unless they attended school with whites, and set as its goal "supreme quality education for all our children." The other resolution, essentially unchanged, condemned Israel's "expansionist policy" despite sharp criticism from Jewish leadership.90

The black unity sought at the convention therefore proved paper thin. In its aftermath, most nationally prominent blacks declined to support the candidacy of Mrs. Chisholm; blacks opposed other blacks in local contests, and there was little willingness to submerge differences for maximum black political effectiveness. However, the effort to keep alive the convention's political aims and its theme, "Unity Without Uniformity," continued at the first meeting of the National Black Assembly in Chicago, October 21-22. It was intended as a permanent body consisting of 427 members, who were chosen every two years. Less than half that number, among them only one black congressman, attended. NAACP and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference stayed away. Imamu Baraka emerged as the key figure and was later named the Assembly's secretary general, with responsibility for day-to-day detail. He had written an article that appeared in the October issue of Black World, denouncing most members of the Congressional Black Caucus and other black leaders. The Assembly did not endorse any political candidate, and it was unclear whether any resolutions were passed. By this time, too, the earlier enthusiasm of the black press for the Gary convention had evaporated. The Assembly came under criticism by the Chicago Defender and Jet magazine for failure to bring blacks together.91

The use or misuse of black power was sharply condemned during the year by a number of black leaders. Bayard Rustin continued to criticize "the growing tendency to apply 'black solutions' to social problems that cut across racial lines" and the "'infection' by black power of the rest of society with a 'new tribalism' that prevents development of a progressive movement."92

The most significant comment, however, came before the election from


Arthur A. Fletcher, former assistant secretary of labor in the Nixon administration and now executive director of the United Negro College Fund. Commenting on the clearly impending Nixon landslide and the sense of failure it engendered among black leaders, he criticized these leaders for playing "very poor politics" at a time "when sophisticated pragmatic politics should have been the order of the day." He contrasted the black role during the previous four years with that of organized labor and the Jewish community, two groups, he wrote, which disagreed on a number of administration policies, but which acted as groups in backing the President on issues they could support. Many blacks, Fletcher said, refused to take jobs in the administration. And those who did not isolate themselves politically were rendered powerless by criticism.93

Perhaps symbolically, former President Lyndon Johnson, at a symposium on civil rights at the University of Texas, in what was his last public appearance, interposed in a dispute between rival black ideological factions. Johnson, who had won his early political reputation as a congressional mediator, urged the participants to unite behind a "program of objectives" and take them to the President.94

BLACK EXTREMISM

In recent years a number of black groups and individuals dedicated to separatism or revolutionary violence, or both, gained national attention; but by 1972 virtually all were in sharp decline. Stokely Carmichael returned to the United States during the year after four years of self-imposed exile. He called for an All African Peoples Revolutionary party, but found no support in the black community. Angela Davis, who was tried for murder, kidnapping, and criminal conspiracy, was found innocent. After her release from prison, she made personal appearances around the country, but, though a striking figure, her popularity was not translatable into political strength.95

The Black Panthers continued in decline and to the degree they were active, it was in electoral politics rather than revolutionary violence. During the summer Erika Huggins and Bobby Seale, Panther leaders who had been on trial for murder 16 months earlier in Connecticut, sought public office. Huggins was elected a member of the Berkeley (Calif.) Community Development Council, the city's anti-poverty agency, and Seale became a candidate for mayor of Oakland.

Only the Black Muslims, viewed with disfavor by the major black civil-rights groups, continued to remain influential with segments of the black community. Early in the year, a violent internal struggle appeared to be underway after a shoot-out in Baton Rouge, La., in which two policemen and two young Muslims died. The conflict revolved around the reaction of the growing Muslim youth movement to the distribution of wealth within the organization. The American Jewish Committee charged that the Muslims encompassed "a significant strain of anti-Semitism." Its official publication, *Muhammad Speaks*, on July 7 headlined a story on the political campaign, "Zionist Ring in Politicians' Nose." Because of its influence in the slums, AJC felt, it posed a greater problem for Jews than when it first came into prominence a decade earlier.\(^{96}\)

**DEFEAT OF WELFARE REFORM**

The defeat of the Family Assistance Plan (FAP) as a welfare reform measure and the growing movement to cut back on welfare in the states were further evidence of conservative trends working against the relief of the plight of the minority group population. A new version of FAP, originally proposed by President Nixon in 1969, had passed the House in 1971. As it came before the Senate in an election year, the bill set $2,400 as the minimum income for a family of four, but did not require states to maintain food subsidies for the poor. Also, to keep down government costs it raised to 67 per cent the tax of 50 per cent on earned income above $720. This meant that a person on federal relief would take home only 33 cents of every dollar earned above $720, and this would reduce the incentive to work. Besides, the new plan required all welfare mothers with children over the age of three to register for work, but did not guarantee a job or provide funds for day care.

The measure became caught in a squeeze between liberals, who wanted to make the plan more generous to the poor, and conservatives, who resented the increased cost of doing so and were worried about dangers of a guaranteed income to the traditional "work ethic." The President, himself, reinforced the latter view in his Labor Day speech. "We are faced this year," he said, "with the choice between the 'work ethic' that built this nation's character—and the new 'welfare ethic' that could cause that American character to weaken." The one, he argued, represented the traditional American ethic of striving and sacrifice and the other, a new and alien ethic of indulgence and passivity.

During spring 1972 Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D., Conn.) and HEW Secretary Richardson had hammered out a compromise for a $2,600

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minimum income, annual cost of living increases, and a 60 per cent tax on earnings. But the President, who was about to depart for Moscow, put the matter off until June 16, and by this time McGovern had put forward his own costly welfare-reform proposal. On his return the President chose to go with his less costly $2,400 "middle ground" plan, thereby creating an election issue. This angered liberal FAP supporters who, together with conservatives, voted to kill the measure in the Senate on October 4. In addition, on July 1, a "workfare" law (Talmadge Amendment) forcing welfare recipients to take jobs or face loss of benefits went into effect. Many welfare and employment officials believed that the current lack of jobs and the failure of training programs hampered the success of workfare.

**BLACK CULTURE**

If blacks met setbacks at the polls on a national level and from an economy-minded Congress, they were increasingly penetrating the culture as dancers, painters, poets, playwrights, and film producers. This came into focus at a four-day Black Exposition in San Francisco, which featured black poets who read their work; a drama festival that reflected the black experience of the 1960s, and a film festival offering nearly 60 presentations featuring the widely known work of Melvin Van Peebles and Gordon Parks, as well as younger film makers not yet seen on the commercial screen.

In a sense, 1972 saw an explosion of black films, many of them among the industry's top money-makers, such as Parks' *Shaft* and Van Peeble's *Sweet Sweetback's Badass Song*. There were black Westerns (*Buck and the Preacher*), black horror films (*Blacula*), black documentaries (*Malcolm X*), black social films (*Sounder*), black biographical films (*Lady Sings the Blues*), and numerous black exploitation films (*Slaughter, Hammer, Trouble Man*). Criticism of many of these productions by black organizations mounted during the year. It was charged that the "shuffling" menial black stereotype had been replaced by another demeaning stereotype, the "Supernigger," who possessed great physical strength but little brain power. Parks and others responded that the films were a success among blacks because they were portrayed, for the first time, as "winners."

There was worry, too, that many of these films presented pimps, pushers, and prostitutes as role models. *Super Fly*, one of the few technically superior films, featured a narcotics dealer as the hero. There was also danger that films designed to show the triumph of black good over white evil, often in a volley of bullets, would exacerbate racial tensions. "Only in wartime," Pauline

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Kael of the *New Yorker* observed, "have Hollywood movies used this primitive power to encourage hatred of race." In a number of theaters around the country these potential dangers moved managers to hire armed guards; but no outbreaks of violence were reported. Some black leaders asked that black review boards censor all black-theme films before production and preedit them before release. Roy Innis, national director of CORE, demanded that producers turn over part of their profits to the black community for scholarships and film education. During the winter Harlem leaders halted filming of *Come Back, Charleston Blue* until money was donated to black improvement funds.

**Quotas and Preferential Treatment**

The debate over the adoption of quotas to increase the number of women, blacks, and other minorities in jobs and other areas of American life to make our political processes more representative, which began in 1971 (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], p. 137), became, in *Newsweek*’s phrase, "the sleeper issue" of the election.98 The Democratic party entered the year with a new set of presidential convention rules, narrowly approved in 1969, calling on every state party to take "affirmative steps" to encourage participation by members of minority groups, persons between the ages of 18 and 30, and women "in reasonable relation to their presence in the state."99

As a result of these reforms of the Democratic party’s Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, chaired by Senator McGovern, control of the Democratic convention and its outcome were taken out of the hands of traditional party forces and turned over to elements more representative of "new politics" liberalism. The Miami convention included far higher proportions of women, blacks, and youth. The political strength and influence of the lower-middle and working classes depending for representation on regular party leadership and labor officials were weakened.

The anti-Mayor Daley delegation from the ethnic stronghold of Chicago, which was approved by the convention as representative, included only three Poles and one Italian; New York’s delegation had only three representatives of organized labor, but had nine persons publicly identified with the Gay Liberation movement.

"New Politics" elements were frequently drawn from more affluent, leisured, and suburban elements, especially housewives and students. A *Washington Post* survey found that 39 per cent of the delegates had taken some postgraduate work, as compared to 4 per cent of the general population.

The annual incomes of 31 per cent of the delegates exceeded $25,000 while those of another 31 per cent fell between $15,000 and $25,000. In place of blacks from NAACP chapters or Democratic party organizations, there was a heavy infusion of militant leaders like Jesse Jackson.\(^{100}\)

Concurrent with these developments in the party, the year saw continued frustration with the results of a decade's effort to broaden the involvement of minorities and the victims of discrimination in American life. That women were disadvantaged was quite obvious. For example, the annual salary of 62.7 per cent of women on college faculties was less than $10,000, compared to 28 per cent of men.\(^{101}\) However, there were indications throughout 1972 that efforts were being made to rectify the situation. Many colleges and universities were broadening minority representation and hiring more women, frequently by the use of quasi-quota systems under HEW guidelines threat of withdrawal of federal funds. In September Columbia University received HEW approval of a 326-page affirmative-action plan indicating it would make "every effort" to add about 900 women and members of minority groups to its academic and nonacademic staffs by 1977. This followed HEW's freezing of $138 million in federal research contracts because of the university's failure to come up with an acceptable plan. In June City University of New York was threatened with loss of $13 million because it refused to make data on salary, sex, race, and "source of referral" of employees by name available to HEW's Office of Civil Rights.\(^{102}\)

Aside from pressures of this kind, the message from the federal government early in the year seemed to be to hire and promote more minorities and women, even if this meant some relaxation of standards. The State University at Stony Brook, N.Y., announced plans to fill 100 faculty vacancies in the next three years with blacks, of whom half would be women. The University of California, Berkeley, law school agreed to reserve 30 per cent of its fall admissions for minority group members. There were indications that HEW was hesitating to denounce universities for reverse discrimination because of the possible reaction by women and minority groups.

Standards and testing for hiring and promotion also sparked controversy. Minorities charged that civil-service tests were inherently discriminatory because they were culture-bound, not job-related, and therefore favored middle-class applicants. The courts seemed to be moving toward the interpretation that, once a statistical case of low employment of minorities was made, the test-giver must demonstrate that the test used was reasonably


\(^{101}\) *New York Times*, October 8, 1972.

\(^{102}\) Goodman, *op. cit.*
job-related. Civil service examinations came under attack in San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Atlanta. In a case involving the Minneapolis fire department, whose hiring practices had effectively kept out blacks, the Court of Appeals, while not setting a definite quota, suggested that a lower court might properly order the department to fill 20 of its next 60 vacancies with black firemen.

In the spring the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld a lower court which had ruled in favor of an NAACP contention that the New York City Board of Examiners be deprived of its authority to pass on school principals on the basis of written and oral tests. It found insufficient proof that the examinations were related to performance on the job. The lower court had found, also, that "white candidates passed at one and one-half times the rate of black and Puerto Rican candidates." The ruling froze appointments from existing "eligibility" lists and barred further tests for supervisors. "Acting" appointments were made by the Board of Education and community school boards.

The intergroup problems and conflicts in the New York situation were evident from the following: of 937 fully licensed principals, only 11 were blacks and one was Puerto Rican (another 40 were without license, tenure, or full principal's salary). While student enrollment in the city was 55 per cent black and Puerto Rican, only 4.2 per cent of the principals and 9 per cent of the teachers belonged to these groups. At stake were—in addition to principalships—money, 1,851 assistant principalships, 943 department chairmanships and, possibly, 62,000 teaching posts. At one point in the controversy, 80 black and Puerto Rican Fordham University trainees for principalships asked the Board of Education to give them a special examination so that they might step right into these posts. The Board refused.

Underlying this situation was black-Jewish conflict. The New York school system was 60 per cent Jewish, with a high proportion of Jewish educators in higher-level positions. Regardless of the outcome of court tests, it was clear that in big-city school systems throughout the country the opportunities were expanding for minorities and contracting for whites in the historic pattern of ethnic succession in American life.  

To many Americans, particularly to blue- and white-collar workers, however, a quota system was anathema. Beyond the immediate question of who got what jobs and promotions, some worried that the principle of quotas might become a permanent part of American life; that this would mean positions and promotions would be allotted on the basis of proportional representation of groups in the population, rather than in some reasonable relationship to qualifications or merit. Social critic Norman Podhoretz had

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been warning of the danger of quotas to the viability of American society in a series of articles in *Commentary* in 1971 and 1972.

**Quotas and the Jewish Community**

The issue aroused deep anxieties among Jews in particular. Quotas had been used as a form of discrimination against them, a means of placing a ceiling on their opportunities and aspirations. Two specific developments moved the organized Jewish community to assume leadership during the year in an attack on the quota movement. For months HEW had been debating revision of its guidelines on the hiring practices of colleges and universities who received federal grants or contracts. These guidelines, according to numerous complaints addressed to Jewish agencies, encouraged or permitted the development of rigid quota systems for hiring minority or female employees.

In May six Jewish agencies met with HEW Secretary Richardson and Stanley Pottinger, director of the department's Office of Civil Rights, to discuss the issue. There was agreement, in principle, that affirmative-action programs, which the groups supported, were not intended to establish quotas prohibited by civil rights laws, and that the guidelines should be revised to make this clear. The agencies were invited to submit case material illustrative of what they believed to be dangerous trends resulting from misinterpretations of HEW contract compliance and affirmative-action programs by college, university, and some government officials.\(^{104}\)

The second development occurred at the Democratic National Convention in July. At a meeting of Jewish delegates and alternates concern was voiced about a story in the New York *Times*, quoting Walter Fauntroy as having said that Senator McGovern had pledged 10 per cent of federal patronage jobs to blacks, if he was elected. McGovern sent to the group a message repudiating the story—as did Fauntroy—but this never received news coverage. McGovern aides expressed concern that the public would believe the senator favored a quota system.

Early in August Philip E. Hoffman, president of the American Jewish Committee, wrote letters to both presidential candidates, urging them to "reject categorically the use of quotas" in "implementing vitally essential affirmative action programs." President Nixon responded that quotas were not an "appropriate means of achieving equal employment opportunity" and that "numerical goals, although an important and useful tool to measure progress which remedies the effects of past discrimination, must not be allowed to be

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applied in such a fashion as to, in fact, result in imposition of quotas, nor should they be predicated upon or directed towards a concept of proportional representation." Nixon indicated he had asked all departments for a review of programs "to insure conformance with these views." McGovern replied: "I share the concerns you have expressed and reject the quota system as detrimental to American society." 105

The exchange of letters between the American Jewish Committee and the two candidates produced an intense public debate, especially when the Civil Service Commission, on August 18, sent to every federal agency a memorandum in which the key sections of the President's response to Hoffman were included as a statement of governmental policy. A number of black leaders feared that the presidential ban on quotas would slow down affirmative action and the hiring of blacks and other minorities, at a time when the government seemed to be pulling back on other civil rights fronts.

The American Jewish Committee came under sharp attack from Congressman Stokes, chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus. He called the letters "high handed at best and racist at worst," and voiced deep concern because the American Jewish Committee believes that "by crossing our fingers, closing our eyes and hoping for the best, minority poor and disadvantaged Americans will receive a fair share of opportunity." In an effort to insure that there would be no slowdown on legitimate affirmative-action programs, the American Jewish Committee Washington office sought, and received, assurance in a letter from Robert Hampton, chairman of the Civil Service Commission, that "there will be no letup in efforts to eliminate discrimination and assure equal opportunity for all persons under the Federal merit system."

In the course of the continuing public discussion the claim was made in September that the Philadelphia Plan and similar programs designed to place minority-group members in jobs in the construction industry were about to be scrapped. This was flatly denied by the administration. However, officials of civil-rights and women's organizations released a memorandum issued by Secretary of Labor James D. Hodgson on September 15, clarifying President Nixon's policy on goals or quotas in hiring minorities and women and reminding department heads that the administration's policies "do not provide for quotas or proportional representation." It was possible, the memo said, that in some cases policy directives may have been misinterpreted and misapplied. Goals based on a percentage of an area's population, it added, were not to be used in determining the hiring of minorities and women. 106

Despite denials, it was clear that the administration was pulling back from earlier plans based on proportional representation. There were indications,

105 Ibid.
too, that this decision had been taken before the American Jewish Committee letter was written.\textsuperscript{107} A New York \textit{Times} story, on December 19, on Office of Federal Contract Compliance officials, whose job it was to insure fair hiring practices by companies receiving federal funds, indicated the agency was receiving virtually no support or direction from the administration.

The administration's position during the year on quotas and preferential treatment was equivocal at best. Leonard Garment, special consultant to the President, argued that there was a practical difference between affirmative-action programs, which included numerical goals and timetables as to what was "realistically and reasonably attainable," and quotas, which required fixed results.\textsuperscript{108} "This ignores the fact," \textit{Newsweek} wrote on September 18, "that such targets effectively put ceilings on the hiring of other workers not defined as minority-group members—as a quota would do."

As the 1972 election neared, the administration began to retreat somewhat on this front. The phrase "affirmative action" was dropped from the party platform because it would be widely interpreted as another way of saying quotas. In a Labor Day radio address, the President said: "In employment and in politics, we are confronted with the rise of the fixed quota system—as artificial and unfair a yardstick as has ever been used to deny opportunity to anyone." However, Nixon was not alone in political jockeying on the quota issue. In an interview with the \textit{National Journal}, Senator McGovern was quoted as boasting about the changes in the Democratic party convention rules: "The way we got the quota thing through was by not using the word 'quotas.'"\textsuperscript{109}

President Nixon's tough new line on quotas and growing criticisms of their use brought new HEW guidelines on university hiring on October 4. They stressed the need to avoid discrimination, placed greater emphasis on merit, stressed good-faith effort rather than rigid, numerical goals, and related affirmative-action results to availability of labor pools rather than to gross percentages of various groups in the population. A month later Pottinger announced that his office was investigating 15 allegations of discrimination against white male faculty members. He felt that action taken in a few cases of such "reverse discrimination" might quiet fears among white male teachers that their careers were jeopardized by the federal guidelines. At the same time he warned the federal program to enforce equal hiring and promotion opportunities was "losing ground" to a growing rhetorical backlash from male faculty members and administrators, and called for greater support of the program from the academic community.\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Washington Letter}, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{108} Philadelphia \textit{Inquirer}, October 6, 1972.
\textsuperscript{109} Kemble and Muravchik, op. cit.
Equal Educational Opportunity

SCHOOL BUSING FOR DESEGREGATION

The election of 1972 may have been the first presidential race in the nation's history where education was a central issue. Much of the debate was on school desegregation and busing to achieve racial balance in the schools, despite the fact that most Americans, including a majority of blacks, were opposed to busing. Polls of white Nixon and McGovern supporters indicated opposition to "busing children to achieve race balance." Governor Wallace's landslide victory in the Michigan primary earlier was achieved largely because of his strong stand against busing.

In a check in 1972 of a number of communities, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found "widespread acceptance of desegregation" by students and teachers.111 More students were to be bused in only four sizeable cities—Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Jacksonville, and Augusta—as a result of desegregation plans. According to Secretary Richardson, only about 3 per cent of the nearly 20 million American public-school children were bused in 1971 because of desegregation plans, and the figure was about the same for 1972. New busing was ordered under the Swann decision in 1971 as a means to "dismantle the dual system in the South" (AJYB, 1972 [Vol.73], p. 129). Civil rights proponents were encouraged that Supreme Court Justices Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William H. Rehnquist had denied requests for delays of busing in Augusta and Oklahoma City, respectively. Twelve of the 20 largest urban centers, with a total population of over 31 million, however, faced desegregation including the possibility of busing.112

On June 14, a month after Governor Wallace's victory in the Michigan Democratic primary, Federal District Judge Stephen J. Roth ordered the busing of 310,000 Detroit children for desegregation in the fall, with blacks from the city going into the suburbs and whites from the suburbs moving to city schools. The order was stayed pending appeal to the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, thereby preventing implementation of the plan in the midst of the election campaign. The Roth decision broke the coalition between black Detroiters and white suburban automobile workers that had been the basis of liberal Democratic victories in the state for years. Senator Robert P. Griffin, a Republican who emerged during the year as a leading opponent of busing in the U.S. Senate, was reelected, in part on this issue. The year before, he had opposed Nixon's choice of Clement Haynesworth, considered a segregationist by civil rights leaders, for the Supreme Court.

111 Five Communities: Their Search for Equal Education (Clearinghouse Publication 37, December 1972).
On June 6 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth District stayed the January action of a federal district court ordering the predominantly black Richmond, Va., school district merged with two largely white suburban districts. It held the district judge had overstepped his authority in giving the suburban counties a share of responsibility for inner-city segregation. At year's end, the Detroit and Richmond cases, together with suits in Indianapolis and Denver, were moving toward the Supreme Court. The Denver case, argued on October 12, was the first to come before the High Court appealing a busing order in a northern school system. The issue here was whether a city must desegregate all of the schools when discriminatory actions by school officials caused segregation only in certain schools (de jure) and others were racially segregated due to neighborhood residential patterns (de facto). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had affirmed a district court ruling only as to de jure segregated schools, reversing as to the de facto segregated ones. The case was seen as having broad implications for determining how much desegregation was required in communities that had never had dual systems.

The approach by the presidential candidates and their parties to busing was a matter of concern to many voters, although about the same percentage of white Nixon and McGovern supporters said they would be more likely to vote for a candidate who would improve opportunities for blacks. The Democratic party platform said busing "must continue to be available according to Supreme Court decisions to eliminate legally imposed segregation." Psychologically more attuned to the public mood, the GOP platform flatly declared that the Republican party was "irrevocably opposed to busing for racial balance." Refusing to join the anti-busers, McGovern worked hard to neutralize the issue, but did not succeed. In a speech before union shop stewards, in Detroit on September 22, he argued that the matter should be resolved by the courts. Emphasizing the need for "quality education for all children," he stressed throughout the campaign that busing was one of the legitimate tools to achieve desegregation.

President Nixon sought to minimize the federal government's role in desegregation, which had reached a peak during his first four years in office, and to shift responsibility to the courts and voluntary compliance. HEW, which in 1970 stopped enforcing the federal cut-off provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, was ordered by a U.S. District Court shortly after the 1972 election to resume enforcement of the law.

In a message to Congress on March 17, the President proposed legislation calling for a moratorium on all court and government orders requiring additional busing until July 1, 1973, or until Congress set up permanent desegregation standards. He suggested, instead, additional funds for upgrading minority schools, indicating a continuation of the shift away from
government supported desegregation to compensatory education programs. The evidence cited by the President in support of such programs was quickly disputed by a number of education experts in and outside of government.

Lawyers for the Nixon administration argued during the year for a reversal of the lower court ruling in the Richmond case. However, they were denied permission to enter the Detroit case on the side of the defendants. Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold filed a “friend of the court” brief in the Denver case opposing the transfer of students as overturning “long standing neighborhood school” policy. The brief argued that achieving equal educational opportunity required elimination of disparities in the schools rather than the dispersal of students. To some, however, the cure he advocated brought back memories of the “separate but equal” concept which the Supreme Court had struck down in 1954.

In his stand-in role for the President during the campaign, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew made a number of references to busing in his speeches. He told a Nashville audience that the administration wanted to put an end to all school busing for desegregation, and that the President’s proposal for a moratorium would do just that. However, as the election campaign progressed, the issue seemed to diminish in political importance, except for areas directly involved, and it was rarely mentioned by the presidential candidates. The reason for this was court delays in implementing busing orders and little new integration as school opened in the fall.\footnote{New York Times, October 27, 1972.}

In Congress, however, the matter remained a hot issue. On August 18 the House passed by a vote of 282 to 102 a tough anti-busing bill, somewhat stronger than the President had asked for. It prohibited court and federal agencies from requiring that any student be assigned to a school other than the one “closest or next closest” to his home that provided the proper grade level. It also permitted the reopening of school cases already settled by the courts, to make certain that they conformed to the restrictions in the legislation. Senate liberals and civil-rights groups called the measure “terrible and destructive” and “one of the most far-reaching and ill-conceived pieces of anti-civil rights legislation to come before Congress since Reconstruction.”\footnote{Alexander M. Bickel, “Untangling the Busing Snarl,” New Republic, September 23 and 30, 1972.} Although the bill had the support of a majority of the Senate and the Nixon administration it was unable after three attempts to marshal the necessary two-thirds vote to break a filibuster by northern senators of both parties, and it died on October 12.

In a major radio address on October 25 President Nixon reaffirmed his anti-busing stand and said he would press the next Congress for passage of legislation to end “arbitrary, court-ordered busing of children out of their
neighborhoods." He reiterated his earlier position that the answer to inequities in the education system was to spend more money on learning and less money on busing. But civil-rights activists believed that, once the election was over, pressures for such legislation would be less intense.

**SCHOLARS DEBATE EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY**

During the year social scientists sharply debated the busing issue, as well as the usefulness of school desegregation for improving the opportunities of minority children. Several furnished scientific corroboration of the administration view. Harvard Professor David J. Armor, who had done research in the Boston METCO program, concluded from his findings and from data in reports on integration programs in four other Northern cities throughout the country that: "The available evidence . . . indicates that [mandatory or induced] busing is not an effective policy instrument for raising the achievement of black students or for increasing interracial harmony," though it does lead to higher black-student enrollment in colleges. But he suggested that voluntary integration programs like METCO and the Hartford, Conn., Project Concern be continued and encouraged on an experimental basis by federal and state grants for "symbolic" and possibly long-range benefits.

Nathan Glazer launched a broader attack on school desegregation strategies. He criticized court decisions requiring large-scale busing for desegregation because it meant that white children were being conscripted to create an environment which, it had been decided, was required to provide equality of educational opportunity for black children." The burden of integration, he noted, often was borne by the lower middle class; the more affluent could flee to the suburbs or send their children to private schools. In his view, recent lower-court decisions on busing only tended to deepen alienation, for they made impossible community participation and community control.

Frederick Mosteller and Daniel P. Moynihan edited a collection of scholarly papers which reevaluated the Coleman Report (AJYB, 1967 [Vol.68], pp. 86–87). While the original findings were reaffirmed, the educational benefits of integration were found to have been somewhat less than was first reported. In a letter to the *Public Interest*, Summer 1972 issue, Coleman, himself, held that the courts "had used inappropriately" the findings of his report—that academic achievement of children from lower

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socio-economic backgrounds benefited from being in schools with children of higher socio-economic backgrounds—to order racial balance in the schools. Equal educational opportunity, he wrote, could not be provided by the state, for inequality originates in the home. This did not mean, of course, that state actions leading to increased racial or socio-economic segregation should not be corrected by the courts; but they should not do so on the mistaken assumption that this would create equal educational opportunity.

The most widely reported discussion, *Inequality*, by Christopher Jencks and seven other Harvard scholars,\(^{119}\) argued that, while school reform was not useless, it would not eliminate inequality in cognitive skills, nor economic inequality and poverty among adults. It could not change the economic social conditions outside the school. Schooling is important for the acquisition of basic knowledge and skills, they wrote, but spending more money on improving schools does not raise achievement or increase the likelihood that students will attend college. Desegregation, the authors declared, was somewhat more effective than raising revenues, but not much. (In an article, "Busing—The Supreme Court Goes North," in the New York Times for November 19, Jencks summarized the data from research studies on busing as a means of improving test scores of blacks. He wrote that even if six years of busing could cut the test-score gap between blacks and whites by 20 or 30 per cent—and the evidence here was not conclusive—this was "statistically insignificant" when spread over one or two years. Nevertheless, he concluded, the average effect was a gain.) Troubled by the possible effects of his analyses and conclusions, Jencks later said that his research did not justify cutting school expenditures, abandoning desegregation, or giving up efforts at school reform. The basic mistake, he again stressed, was the expectation that equality of educational opportunity could eliminate problems like poverty and injustice.\(^{120}\)

The "sobriety" and "second thoughts" about educational reform (to use Irving Kristol's terms) brought sharp rejoinders from integrationist scholars, civil rights leaders, and educators. Social psychologist Thomas F. Pettigrew of Harvard, who had helped provide the social science basis for many desegregation efforts in the 1960s, attacked Armor's research for its "methodological defects"; presenting an incomplete list of research findings on busing and emphasizing negative results Armor, he said, failed to mention at least seven controlled investigations that reported positive findings.\(^{121}\) Harold Howe 2d, former U.S. Commissioner of Education, argued that Coleman, Mosteller, Moynihan, and Jencks "present no clear case for or

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121 Psychology Today, November 1972.
against integration of the schools as an important social goal, although they suggest its limited usefulness as far as certain measurable outcomes of schooling are concerned." He held that, while these analysts made a worthwhile contribution to social-science methodology, their findings should "not supersede the moral and legal basis on which we have determined that segregated education denies equal protection of the laws."  

Noting that the reforms under attack by some social scientists were developed specifically to deal with the special problems of slum schools, Bayard Rustin declared that the schools have not completely failed the black child. An indication was that between 1965 and 1970, a period when many innovative ideas were introduced, black college enrollment nearly doubled.  

The small or no gains—depending on which social science views one accepted—of busing to achieve greater integration were purchased at a high price in 1972. The issue helped divide further an already strongly polarized society and open the door to reversing important desegregation gains made since 1954. Besides providing some politicians with the opportunity to capitalize on inflamed feelings, busing gave rise to some violence in the North. Late in October in the Canarsie section of Brooklyn, mainly Jewish and Italian parents, who shortly before had fled declining neighborhoods and schools, locked the doors and blocked the steps to the John Wilson Junior High School for three days and brought about an area boycott of schools in protest against the enrollment of 31 black and Puerto Rican seventh-graders who were bused to the school from nearby Brownsville. Pontiac, Michigan, the scene of violence in 1971 in a busing dispute, saw renewed violence on November 27, when five students were shot and wounded, one seriously, in a high school courtyard after a confrontation between black and white students.

PROPERTY TAX AND EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

Second thoughts were being had, also, on the value of equalizing educational expenditures for local school districts as a means of assuring equal educational opportunity, following court decisions in California, Texas, Minnesota, and other states in 1971 and 1972 (AJYB, 1972 [Vol.73], p. 131). The Supreme Court agreed on June 7 to consider whether 49 of the 50 states violated the Fourteenth Amendment by relying largely on local property taxes to finance their school expenditures, thereby discriminating against children, often minorities, in poor communities.  

Property tax reform, seen in 1971 as a bright hope for the poor and

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oppressed, and included as a plank in the Democratic party platform in 1972, was attacked by Chester E. Finn, Jr., and Leslie Lenkowsky as putting "more money into the pockets of the largest group of college-educated, state certified, middle class professionals."\(^{124}\) They repeated the arguments drawn from the Coleman Report and Jencks that variations in academic achievement of schools could not be attributed to such "inputs" as facilities, teachers, and curricula. They pointed out, too, that the effect of lower-court decisions, like the *Serrano* case in California, might mean less money for schools in poor districts. Many central cities with large numbers of banks, factories, and other economic institutions, they indicated, provided a higher tax base and funded their schools more heavily than those in suburbia, so that suburban schools would be more likely to benefit from property tax reform. Daniel P. Moynihan made many of the same points in urging the courts to stay out of this issue. If they felt they must enter it on the side of the *Serrano* case, he argued, their ruling should be accompanied by an order that total expenditures not be increased, so that the people could decide whether to spend more money on education.\(^{125}\)

Suburbs, too, were worried about equalization formulas. They feared that, once money no longer was raised locally, control of the schools would be taken out of their hands. If property taxes were struck down, or modified in some way, money would have to be found elsewhere. A major factor in the political reaction in 1972 to educational expenditures was rising public resentment against high taxes. In the election, voters in four states—California, Colorado, Michigan, and Oregon—resoundingly defeated proposed state constitutional amendments that would have killed, or sharply limited, the property tax as a source of funds for public education. This threw the issue to the Supreme Court, which was expected to rule on it in the spring of 1973.

The arguments in support of equalization were marshaled most comprehensively by Robert Lekachman, professor of economics at the Stony Brook campus of the State University of New York. Although "equal dollars" for each child was not the same as genuine equality of opportunity, much less equality of outcome, he declared, the schools should not add to the environmental and genetic handicaps of children. "It is surely a nonsequitur," he concluded, "to suggest that because money alone does not guarantee literacy . . . attempts to rectify the legal and practical inequities that currently disgrace school finances are therefore unimportant."\(^{126}\)

\(^{124}\) "'Serrano' vs. the People," *Commentary*, September 1972.

\(^{125}\) "Equalizing Education—In Whose Benefit?", *Public Interest*, Fall 1972.

SCHOOL DECENTRALIZATION

In a year of intense political discussion and reexamination of educational reforms, school decentralization, too, came in for its share of criticism. In an effort to deal with the low achievement of poor and minority children, New York City had been experimenting for three years with a decentralized school operation of 31 school districts. In East Harlem Community School District 4, a boycott by Puerto Rican and black parents shut down, or virtually emptied, more than half the area's schools early in December to protest the inadequate education they felt their children were receiving. In May Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, a member of the State Board of Regents and one of the architects of the school decentralization movement, said in a radio broadcast that school decentralization failed to improve education, charging that local school boards were more interested in power than in better schools. In testimony before the City Charter Revision Commission on November 10, he indicated willingness to scrap the entire idea. He asserted that the "selfish forces" responsible for failure included the "racial politics" of small groups and the United Federation of Teachers that protected teachers regardless of their quality. This could "only be at the expense of teaching . . . children to read and write and to speak correctly, and to think."127

A more mixed response to community control was Leonard J. Fein's in The Ecology of the Public Schools: An Inquiry into Community Control.128 He argued that alongside community public schools should be established state-subsidized black parochial schools which could provide the values of black consciousness. Blacks would then have the choice of going to either school. However, Fein raised the question of whether, at a time when so many educational reforms were being challenged, it would be wise to fragmentize further educational effort to insure equal opportunity.

The reexamination of old premises by many of the new critics coincided with, and confirmed, the views of many Middle Americans that they were being forced to bear unduly the social and economic costs of programs devised by social scientists and intellectuals that did not work or, in fact, did harm. The new critics also provided a rationale for the Nixon administration to limit education and welfare expenditures and abandon efforts to achieve greater desegregation. In a highly publicized pre-election interview with Garnett D. Horner of the Washington Star-News, which was released only later, President Nixon said: "What we have to realize is that many of the solutions of the 60's were massive failures. They threw money at the problems and for the most part they have failed. . . ."

A number of liberals were emerging with similar views. A distinguished group of Brookings Institution economists, including some of the Johnson administration's social engineers, reported in May that many of the reforms of that era had failed. In a book-length analysis of national priorities they concluded that the multiplication of dollars and programs brought no solutions for welfare reform, day care, and city finance, but multiplication of problems. The underlying reason, these scholars contended, was lack of knowledge. Others, however, were worried that this "crisis of confidence" would hinder efforts to find new ways of dealing with severe problems in intergroup relations and remedying racial inequities.

Civil Rights

In response to criticism by the Congressional Black Caucus and other groups, the Nixon administration, early in 1972, issued its first official report on progress in civil rights and related social programs. Among its highlights were: the percentage of black students in all-black schools had dropped from 40 per cent in 1968 to 12 per cent in the fall of 1971; the Internal Revenue Service had halted tax deductions for contributions to segregated public schools; government aid to minority businesses will have risen from $200 million in 1969 to $505.8 million for 1973, and housing starts for low and moderate-income families under federally subsidized programs stood at 156,000 in 1969 and were expected to reach over 566,000 in 1973. In 1972 Congress also passed an Equal Employment Opportunities Act giving the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforcement powers it never had before. Under the Act, EEOC stepped up enforcement of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; its case-load rose from 33,000 in 1971 to 52,000 total entries in 1972.

The self-image of the Nixon administration in civil rights was one of "doing" rather than "talking." This estimate was challenged, as the year progressed and the administration campaigned against "forced busing," "forced economic integration," and eased its support of the Philadelphia Plan. The Washington Post for December 18, in its own evaluation of the civil-rights progress report, concluded that most of the achievements were small and grudging. It said Nixon did not assert leadership and encouraged "decent people and the middle" to turn away from the difficult civil-rights problem, thereby causing despair for minorities.

Symbolic of the position of strong civil-rights advocates after the election was the resignation of the Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh as chairman of

the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Since its inception in 1957, the Commission, which has no enforcement powers, had been a major civil-rights watchdog and gadfly. Perhaps the foremost "conscience" in the nation with regard to civil rights, Hesburgh had been openly critical of the Nixon administration in this area.  

Social-Club Discrimination

Civil-rights groups actively seeking to curb social-club discrimination received a setback during the year. Representative K. Leroy Irvis, the black majority leader of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, had been denied admission as a guest at Moose Lodge No. 107 in Harrisburg. He brought action against the club, charging that it had violated the equal-protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. He argued that this violation of his constitutional rights called for "state action," since the club held a Pennsylvania liquor license. On June 12 the case came before the Supreme Court, which ruled, by a vote of 6 to 3, that it was constitutional for a state to grant a liquor license to private social clubs, even though they practiced racial discrimination. It did not, however, make the issuance of such a license mandatory (Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 [1972]).

On July 31 the same Moose lodge was barred by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from denying admission to Representative Irvis as a guest based on race, for by opening its facilities to Caucasian guests, the court held, the club became, to that extent a place of public accommodation and therefore was in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected an appeal of this decision on December 11.

The meaning of the two rulings by the Supreme Court appeared to be that fraternal organizations may practice racial discrimination in choosing their members, but may not in deciding whether or not to serve food and drink to guests. In developing the law on this issue, the Court left it to the discretion of a state to grant or deny a liquor license to a racially discriminatory club. The Maine Supreme Court, on December 11, upheld the validity of a state law which denied liquor licenses to clubs practicing discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin. At year's end, the case was awaiting a ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Violence

The period under review saw the growth of a "politics of crime," as well as continuing widespread fear of crime. Much of the political discussion
involved angry charges by candidates around the country and claims by the administration that it was winning the war against crime, rather than efforts to illuminate a complex social problem. In a radio address on October 15, President Nixon said he had fulfilled his 1968 pledge of law and order. "We have fought the frightening trend of crime and anarchy to a standstill." He cited as evidence the FBI crime index, which showed an increase of only one per cent during the first half of 1972, the closest the nation had come to registering an actual decline in 12 years. Senator McGovern and his advisors, however, denied the administration’s claims. McGovern charged in October that the administration had brought pressure on police departments to falsify crime figures. James Vorenberg, who headed his panel on crime and justice, said at a press conference in October that the most significant aspect of the statistics was the steady increase of crime in 1972. He pointed out that, despite the President’s promise to stem the tide, crime had grown considerably in the last four years.

Efforts to win the "law and order" vote continued at all levels. In October Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst told the International Association of Chiefs of Police at Salt Lake City that he did not like to see a major party’s presidential candidate refuse to recognize their accomplishments in controlling crime. There were indications at the end of the year that politicians were beginning to prepare "law and order" campaigns for 1973 mayoralty elections in New York, Los Angeles, and other cities. "You know what a conservative is?" asked former Police Commissioner and new Philadelphia Mayor Frank L. Rizzo, "That's a liberal who got mugged the night before."

The facts on crime continued to be grim. While there was a drop in the increase of serious crime during the year, there was more violent street crime in such cities as New York, Boston, Memphis, and Denver. According to the FBI, 112 policemen lost their lives in 1972, down somewhat from 125 in 1971 but above 1970 and 1969 figures. Especially disturbing was the upsurge of crime and violence in the schools. During a 16-day period in the fall, at least 14 New York City teachers were robbed or assaulted inside their schools. There was a sharp increase, too, in suburban crime—5 per cent in the first half of the year. In February the U.S. Department of Commerce published a report estimating the national cost of ordinary crime at $16 billion. Small business suffered more severely than big business.

The statistics were barely indicative of the seriousness of the problem, since the method of collecting them varied in different parts of the country, and "victimization" studies showed that less than one-third of all crimes were reported. As serious as crime, itself, was the fortress mentality it engendered

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among many Americans, with the resultant reduction in personal freedom and quality of life. A Gallup Poll survey published in January 1973 showed that half of all persons interviewed thought crime had gone up in their neighborhoods in 1972.

Inevitably, crime continued to drive a wedge between disadvantaged blacks and other minorities constituting a disproportionately large part of the prison population, and whites seeking protection in any way possible. There was some indication that part of crime and criminal violence—no one seemed to know how much—represented guerrilla warfare by some black militants. Early in the year, the police in New York announced they were hunting members of a small group calling itself the Black Liberation Army in the slaying of two policemen in the East Village on January 27. The New York Times of February 9 carried the story on the front page with a headline, “9 in Black ‘Army’ Are Hunted in Police Assassinations.” And at the height of the election campaign, an October 17 Philadelphia Inquirer headline covering most of the top of a page read, “Nationwide Link Sought in Chicago ‘De Mau Mau’ Slayings” (p. 165).

Yet blacks clearly remained the major victims of criminal and even official violence. A sharp reminder of this was a report late in the year by a 12-member investigation commission on the deaths of two black students on the Baton Rouge, La., campus of Southern University after a confrontation with the police in November. The commission, headed by the state’s attorney general who had been appointed by a liberal governor, laid the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the police, and turned its findings over to the local district attorney for possible criminal prosecution.

Violence involving largely black prisoners that had erupted in 1971, notably at Attica in New York, was analyzed by a nine-member commission headed by Robert B. McKay, dean of the New York University School of Law. It reported that the riot did not stem from a revolutionary conspiracy, but was rather a “spontaneous burst of violent anger” of a new breed of prisoners unwilling to accept the “petty humiliations and racism that characterize prison life.” Going beyond its instructions, the commission came up with a seven-point program to restructure the state’s prison system, with emphasis on prisoners’ rights. The official report, together with several other analyses published during the year, indicated that the decision to crush the “revolution” at Attica, rather than preserve the lives of the inmates and hostages, was based on the belief that a strong stand had to be taken on the issue of law and order. As such, this too was a political decision based on “the politics of crime.”

Accompanying public anger about crime was growing discontent with efforts to make the streets safe. Since 1969, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in the Department of Justice dispersed over $2 billion in anti-crime grants. Despite public statements announcing progress, there were indications within the Nixon administration in 1972 of dissatisfaction with the program. A report on Law and Disorder, prepared by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law for the National Urban Coalition and released in November, indicated that most of the grants went to criminal-justice agencies for traditional purposes; few agencies had used the money to experiment with reforms.

The most promising sign of possible change, or at least improvement in public morale, was the rapidly developing movement of citizen involvement in the war on crime. It ranged from "courtesy patrols" in the black wards of Washington, D.C., and mothers of the child-safety patrol on Manhattan's East Side, to the 13 concerned fathers in Clear Lake City, Tex., who formed the unpaid Company N of the Harris County Sheriff's Reserves. On the whole, these were not vigilante groups, although there was concern that some might be. These groups sought to restore a sense of community through programs utilizing neighbors and inexpensive communication and lighting equipment. There was some evidence that in well-organized neighborhoods efforts of this kind were cutting down on thefts.

**Extremism**

**GEORGE WALLACE**

The radical right found itself with no place to go in 1972 as a result of the President's "Middle America" and "Southern" political strategy. And in the process of emerging as a full-scale presidential candidate on the Democratic ticket until he was crippled by an assassination attempt, Governor Wallace moved closer to the political center. His candidacy in 1968 (AJYB, 1969 [Vol.70], pp. 97–100) had been backed by funds and the political organization of a coalition of racists, political extremists, and various antisemitic elements. By 1972 he and his key supporters attempted to put a wall between him and these groups.

In campaigning around the country, Wallace was less bellicose and much more moderate on the race issue. The "segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever" theme was now replaced by a broader, populist appeal. In his Florida campaign he attacked some senators who, he said, took the nation into a "no win" war and permitted the U.S. to become a

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secondary power, as well as "welfare giveaways" and high taxes, which brought the average taxpayer to his knees and permitted the rich to enjoy tax loopholes. Wallace skillfully played on the dissatisfactions and resentments of the little man and the working man, who were angered by government policies and disturbed by certain directions American life was taking.\textsuperscript{135}

He emerged from the Florida Democratic primary in March with 42 per cent of the statewide vote. Humphrey, who came in second, had only 18 per cent and Senator Jackson 13 per cent, according to the Miami News. Two months later Wallace won 51 per cent of the Michigan primary vote, as compared with 27 per cent for McGovern and 16 per cent for Humphrey. A survey conducted by Daniel Yankelovich for the New York Times (May 17) of a cross-section of Democrats, Republicans, and independents who voted for Wallace in the open primary in Michigan indicated they did so largely because of his opposition to busing, welfare, and high taxes.

At the end of May the New York Times’ tabulation of Democratic delegate strength gave Wallace 317 votes to McGovern’s 503. He was ahead of Humphrey (305) and Muskie (160). However, it was generally conceded by this time that his support had peaked even before he was wounded. Thereafter he maintained silence regarding his choice of presidential candidate; but most political observers believed the bulk of his supporters threw their votes to President Nixon. At year’s end Wallace, now fully disassociated from the American Independent party, was operating as a Democrat and presumably readying himself for a presidential bid in 1976. In a four-page letter to the Democratic National Committee on December 9, he urged the group to “listen to the people” and “unite on common ground to avoid another Presidential defeat.”

JOHN SCHMITZ AND THE AMERICAN PARTY

Even before Wallace’s Democratic party primary bid right-wingers found themselves without a leader. For a while some rallied around Republican Congressman John Ashbrook of Ohio, but he aroused little interest in the primaries. Right-wing promoters also created a paper organization called Americans for Agnew in an effort to keep Agnew from being dropped from the Republican ticket. Group Research Report wrote on September 18 that Agnew was used by the Nixon administration as liaison with dissident conservative Republicans dissatisfied with the President’s leadership.

With Wallace out of the picture, the American party in its first national convention nominated lame-duck Congressman John Schmitz of California and Thomas Anderson as its presidential and vice-presidential candidates,

respectively. Both were members of the John Birch Society’s National Council, and many of the 2,000 delegates gathered in Louisville, Ky., on August 3 were Birchers. In effect the Birch Society, which always had denied being a political party, was now running a presidential slate. Schmitz’s followers, according to a New York Times analysis, were a “dedicated, generally affluent group of white Americans who deeply believe that the Republic is threatened by a conspiracy masterminded by fat cat international financiers in league with China and Russia and protected from public view by a Com-symp American press.”\(^\text{136}\) The Anti-Defamation League charged the American party and Schmitz with “approving and distributing anti-Semitism.” The American party had adopted also a plank at its convention calling for prohibition of the sale of arms and of private banking loans to the State of Israel, and of the sale of Israeli bonds in the United States.\(^\text{137}\)

Although an election year provided an opportunity for both the extreme right and left to insinuate their ideas into the campaign, it was remarkably free of antisemitism. The right-wing press and anti-Jewish publications, such as Thunderbolt, Common Sense, Herald of Freedom, Washington Observer, and The American Mercury, together with the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 166–67), kept up a steady attack on Henry Kissinger, the President’s chief foreign-policy advisor. Kissinger was at times erroneously described as the son of a rabbi. The wooing of the “Jewish vote” was seen as reaffirmation of the bigot’s view that both major political parties were controlled by Jews and were lackeys of Israel.

Both the American Communist party and the Socialist Workers’ party ran presidential candidates whose campaigns were strongly anti-Israel. The latter called for the outright destruction of Israel, while the former stopped just short of this. The Anti-Defamation League charged both with having “crossed the line into outright anti-Semitism.”

The election results showed little success for extremist groups. Schmitz, who was on the ballot in 32 states, received only 1,200,000 votes, sharply under Wallace’s 10 million in 1968. However, a number of right-wing congressmen, including John M. Ashbrook (R., O.), John R. Rarick (D., La.), and John H. Rousselot (R., Calif.), the latter an avowed Bircher, were reelected.

In addition, the respectable Conservative party of New York, which elected Senator James L. Buckley in 1970, got twice as many votes on its line of the ballot for Nixon as the Liberal party obtained for McGovern.\(^\text{138}\) Summarizing


the situation of the radical right in 1972, veteran observer Milton Ellerin said that antisemitism was not marketable in America today, nor was it a lure for mass membership. On the whole, he noted, the right has been a staunch defender of Israel since the 1967 six-day war. "More affluent and more numerous than the followers of the hard core anti-Semites," Ellerin concluded, "the radical right . . . became an aborted phenomenon—a negligible force in contemporary America with little if any real potential for growth." ¹³⁹

MURRAY FRIEDMAN

¹³⁹ "Is Anti-Semitism on the Rise?", Reform Judaism, October 1972.
The United States, Israel, and the Middle East

THE YEAR 1972 was generally one of consolidation of both Israel's position and American interests in the Middle East. Bilateral relations between the United States and Israel remained on the high plateau attained in the meeting between President Richard M. Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir in December 1971, when agreement was reached for the continuing supply of American Phantom jets and other military equipment to Israel, various forms of economic assistance, and American assurances that United States peace efforts would not be accompanied by attempts to impose a settlement to which the parties had not agreed.

Although the continuing strong American support for Israel drew vocal criticism from the Arab world, 1972 witnessed a marked improvement in American relations with several Arab states. On July 1, during the visit of Secretary of State William P. Rogers to Sana, capital of the Yemen Arab Republic, it was announced that diplomatic relations with the United States would be resumed. Yemen thus was the first of the six Arab states that had broken off relations with Washington after the Arab-Israel war of 1967 to restore formal ties.

U.S. Resumes Relations With Yemen and Sudan

Yemeni Premier Moshen al-Ayni emphasized that his country was in need of development assistance and looked forward to reestablishing “strong relations and fruitful cooperation” with the United States. Cairo’s semi-official al-Ahram called for Arab League intervention against Yemen and the Sudan for “selling out the Arab cause for several million American dollars.” Yemeni President Kadir Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani declared the decision had been based on national interest, charging that the Arab states had done nothing to help with Yemen’s serious financial problems whereas the United States had offered to resume aid.

The Egyptian threat of Arab League action also failed to deter President Gaafar al-Nimeiry of the Sudan from resuming diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level with the United States, ostensibly in gratitude for an American donation of $4.45 million for the resettlement of Sudanese refugees who had been displaced during the country’s long, just ended civil war. Formal announcement came on July 25. The act also reflected Nimeiry’s growing disenchantment with the Soviet Union and his continued annoyance with Egypt and Libya for their involvement in the abortive coup against him (AJYB, 1972 [Vol.73], pp. 163-64).
Toward the end of the month it was announced in Washington that two American diplomats would be stationed in Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, to open an American "interests section" under the aegis of the Belgian embassy. While this was a step short of restoration of normal diplomatic relations, State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray said the United States hoped this would "begin the process of re-establishing a direct diplomatic channel to the Iraqi government," in keeping with the "general pattern of the improvement of our relations" with Arab states. The improved relations with Yemen, the Sudan and Iraq, he said, were the fruits of the very patient efforts "inspired by Secretary Rogers' own view that the United States had compelling reasons to reopen, where possible, and maintain where it exists, direct diplomatic dialogue with as many of the states in the area as possible."

Direct Negotiations Supported

In a move that would have been dismissed as "counterproductive," if not unmentionable, in the State Department a few years earlier, Secretary Rogers took the occasion of a press conference in Kuwait on July 4 to recommend direct negotiations between the Arab states and Israel "if a Middle East settlement was to be achieved." Rogers cited President Nixon's trips to Peking and Moscow, the discussions between East and West Germany, North and South Korea, North and South Vietnam, India and Pakistan, and between the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus as examples of the value of direct talks between adversaries in settling longstanding disputes. He said all of them had felt obliged "to meet and start a dialogue." Why, then, "should not these talks be direct" in the Middle East? Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat rejected the American suggestion as "unthinkable" as long as Egyptian territory was occupied. Nevertheless, in later speeches Secretary Rogers continued to stress that the Middle East today "is the only major exception to the trend toward dialogue" and to urge "serious negotiations" seeking solutions to "the complex and emotional problems involved" in the Arab-Israel conflict.

Soviet-Egyptian Discord

While the United States benefited from improved bilateral relations with various Middle East states, the major improvement in its strategic position in the region resulted from the sharp setback in Soviet-Egyptian relations following the withdrawal in July of nearly all Soviet military personnel from Egypt at President Sadat's request. Although various domestic and foreign policy considerations prompted Sadat's decision, there is little doubt that, to a significant extent, it can be traced back to the firm stance adopted by the Nixon administration in mid-1970 with regard to Soviet encroachment in the
The tough and coordinated American and Israeli postures during the Syrian-Jordanian crisis of September 1970 may well have had a major influence on the Soviet decision to be more cautious and not to provide the additional offensive equipment the Egyptians requested. President Nixon, in his 1972 "State of the World" message (U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace; A Report to the Congress), issued on February 9, as "I prepare to set out on my summit trips to Peking and Moscow," he explicitly warned the Russian leaders:

The Soviet Union's effort to use the Arab-Israeli conflict to perpetuate and expand its own military position in Egypt has been a matter of concern to the United States. The USSR had taken advantage of Egypt's increasing dependence on Soviet military supply to gain the use of naval and air facilities in Egypt. This has serious implications for the stability of the balance of power locally, regionally in the Eastern Mediterranean, and globally. The Atlantic Alliance cannot ignore the possible implications of this move for the stability of the East-West relationship.

U.S. Warning to Russia

In measured but firm diplomatic language Nixon made it clear that the Soviet Union could not exploit tensions in the Middle East for its own strategic advantage if it hoped to reach understandings with the United States on the improvement in East-West relations and progress on strategic arms limitation; mutual phasing out of forces in central Europe; increased trade relations, and other areas of common interest. Nixon concluded:

The U.S. and the USSR can contribute to the process of settlement by encouraging Arabs and Israelis to begin serious negotiation. The great powers also have a responsibility to enhance, not undermine, the basic conditions of stability in the area. Injecting the global strategic rivalry into the region is incompatible with Middle East peace and with detente in U.S.-Soviet relations.

The Russians got the message and acted accordingly. In June the Beirut weekly, al-Rayah, published comments allegedly made two months earlier by high-ranking Soviet officials on the draft political program drawn up by a militant faction of the Syrian Communist party. It quoted Soviet military experts as telling the Syrians that the Egyptian and Syrian armies could not possibly defeat the Israeli armed forces and that renewed warfare would "bring fresh catastrophes to progressive Arab regimes." The Russians reportedly cautioned further that Moscow would not support the Arabs in actions that could lead to a confrontation between Russia and the United States. Western sources accepted the report as genuine, since al-Rayah speaks for a pro-Soviet faction of the Syrian Baath party and the contents were consistent with other sources.
The Russians also disassociated themselves from the Syrian Communist group's support of the Palestinian guerrillas' call for the dissolution of Israel. The Russians reportedly stressed that "the Israeli nation exists; calling for its liquidation is wrong both tactically and as a matter of principle." The Russians advised the Arab Communists to focus their struggle on "strengthening the progressive democratic regimes and enabling socialism to triumph." As for the conflict with Israel, the only practical course was the one being pursued by the Soviet Union: "The struggle for a just peaceful settlement." As Sadat was to reveal in July, the Egyptians were getting the same advice from the Soviets.

**Moscow Summit**

Soviet-American relations in the Middle East were discussed at the Moscow summit. The two sides stated their respective positions on the Arab-Israel conflict, but failed to reach agreement on the specific terms of a settlement. All they could agree on, as indicated in the joint communique issued on May 29 by President Nixon and Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, was to "reaffirm their support for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242." This in itself was significant because, despite the disagreement on the extent of Israeli withdrawal required by this resolution and the details of its implementation, the communique ruled out active Soviet support for an Arab military solution and implicitly supported Israel's right to live within secure and recognized boundaries. The communique further said that the Soviet Union and the United States confirmed their desire to contribute to the success of the mission of the UN Secretary-General's special representative Gunnar V. Jarring, who had been appointed to help the parties reach agreement under Resolution 242. They also declared "their readiness to play their part in bringing about a peaceful settlement in the Middle East."

Despite this formal endorsement of Ambassador Jarring, his mission made no progress during 1972, and the stalemate continued. The Israelis agreed to an American proposal for close-proximity talks, under which Egyptian and Israeli negotiators would occupy separate suites in the same hotel and an American or other chosen diplomat would serve as go-between for discussions on a special Suez Canal agreement. The Egyptians refused to participate without a prior Israeli commitment to eventual total withdrawal.

**Limiting Superpower Confrontation**

Although the Moscow summit brought no immediate results in the peace-making area, it did appear to signify Soviet acceptance of the basic ground rules for limiting Soviet-American competition and avoiding
confrontation in the Middle East, as set forth in Nixon's State of the World message. The declaration of "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations," signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow, contained several points directly relevant to their relations in the Middle East:

First. They will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

Second. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means.

Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives.

Third. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. have a special responsibility, as do other countries which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions.

**Egyptian Reaction**

Egyptian President Sadat correctly concluded that owing to Israel's strength and Moscow's fear of a confrontation with the United States the Russians were not prepared to give him the military support he needed to force the Israelis to withdraw. He had known this earlier; but before the Moscow summit the 15,000 to 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Egypt had been an unknown quantity with which Israel and the United States had to reckon. As such they had at least been a political card Sadat could threaten to play.

After the summit, as Sadat later indicated, the Russians became a liability rather than an asset. The Israelis were able to garner American popular support and governmental military assistance by pointing to the Russians in Egypt as proof that Israel was confronting not simply its Arab neighbors but the vanguard of Soviet Communism. Since Sadat was convinced that effective political pressure on Israel could be exerted only by Washington, he wanted to improve Cairo's standing in the United States by removing the Soviet military.

The Russians had become a liability domestically as well. They were highly unpopular among the Egyptians generally, and the friction between the Soviet advisers and the Egyptian military was an open secret. Egyptians were beginning to wonder aloud whether they had struggled for 80 years to get rid of the British "temporary" occupation only to become subservient to the Russians. Sadat, an old-time conspirator and member of the young Free
Officers who had successfully plotted the overthrow of King Farouk, was no doubt uneasy about the presence of Russian advisers in all sectors of the Egyptian army. After his purge of pro-Soviet elements, Sadat may well have feared that the Russians might secretly be grooming a group of disgruntled young Egyptian officers to overthrow him.

On July 18 Sadat announced that he had decided immediately to "terminate the mission of Soviet advisers and military experts who came at our request" and that all military equipment and installations built after June 1967 were to become the property of Egypt and be manned by Egyptian forces. He "invited" the Russians to discuss more effective cooperation in the future, emphasizing rather lamely that his decision would not mean a postponement of "our battle against Israel, since it was never our intention to make our friendly Soviet experts fight with us." The Russians responded with unexpected alacrity, pulling out their men and taking with them the more sophisticated missiles and other equipment they had not turned over to the Egyptians. The Russians also stopped using Egyptian bases to fly surveillance missions over the United States Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.

If Sadat hoped his dramatic move would bring the West running into his arms, he was mistaken. His expeditions to obtain alternative weapons from Britain and other Western states proved largely unsuccessful; for in the climate of East-West detente they had no ideological interest in fanning the arms race. Some European powers like Britain and France may have been interested in selling arms for hard currency; but the Egyptians, still heavily in debt to the Russians for past military and economic aid, were in no position to pay. Consequently, the Egyptians in desperation turned back to the Russians, who agreed to provide Egypt with some advanced SA-6 surface-to-air missiles. These were superior to the Egyptian-operated SA-2 and SA-3 missiles in that they were effective as low as 100 feet from the ground and thus could intercept low-flying Israeli fighter-bombers. By mid-November some 60 missiles were being turned over to the Egyptian forces, and with them reportedly came several hundred Russian technical advisers and training specialists to teach the Egyptians to operate and maintain the new missiles and other Soviet equipment that had been left in Egypt. The Russians made it clear, however, that they would not return in any fighting role, and by year's end the Soviet Union had not provided Egypt with any new offensive weapons.

American Elections and the Middle East

If Sadat also hoped by his ouster of the Russians to convince the United States to put pressure on Israel, then his move was particularly poorly timed. He acted at the height of the American presidential campaign when the major parties were vying with each other in issuing pro-Israeli statements.
Democratic candidate George McGovern emphasized that his opposition to American involvement in Vietnam and his proposed cutbacks in defense expenditures would not mean a new isolationism. In his speech accepting the Democratic nomination, he pledged to keep America militarily strong and its defenses "fully sufficient to meet any danger." He explained that "we will do that not only for ourselves but for those who deserve and need the shield of our strength—our old Allies in Europe and elsewhere, including the people of Israel who will always have our help to hold their Promised Land."

POSITION OF DEMOCRATS

The Democratic party platform, as strengthened in a floor amendment by supporters of Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) and accepted by Senator McGovern, provided that the United States would "maintain a political commitment and a military force in Europe and at sea in the Mediterranean ample to deter the Soviet Union from putting unbearable pressure on Israel." The platform also pledged to make a long-term commitment to provide military assistance to Israel; to seek to bring the parties "into direct negotiation" toward a permanent political settlement based on agreement on "secure and defensible national boundaries"; to "recognize and support the established status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, with free access to all its holy places provided to all faiths," and to move the United States embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem "as a symbol of this stand." It also called for the world community to recognize its responsibility "for a just solution of the problems of the Arab and Jewish refugees."

POSITION OF REPUBLICANS

The Republican platform supported "the right of Israel and its courageous people to survive and prosper in peace." Specifically, the Republicans pledged "to help in any way possible to bring Israel and the Arab states to the conference table, where they may negotiate a lasting peace." They declared they would continue "to prevent the development of a military imbalance which would imperil peace in the region and elsewhere by providing Israel with support essential for her security, including aircraft, training and modern and sophisticated military equipment." At the same time, the Republican platform supported continuation of programs of economic assistance, including special aid to help Israel resettle Russian immigrants. The support of Israel was balanced by an offer of help to "friendly Arab governments and peoples, including support for their efforts to diminish dependence on outside powers."

Regarding the balance of power, the Republicans pledged to "maintain our
tactical forces in Europe and the Mediterranean area at adequate strength and high levels of efficiency." The Republican platform went on to characterize as "irresponsible" McGovern's proposals to cut back the number of aircraft carriers from 16 to 6 and to undertake unilateral troop withdrawals from Europe. It flatly rejected these "dangerous proposals," charging that they "would increase the threat of war in the Middle East and gravely menace Israel." This was denied by McGovern.

The platform made no mention of Jerusalem. At a press conference in Miami, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew supported the GOP decision not to recommend transfer of the United States embassy to Jerusalem at this time, calling the Democratic plank "counterproductive" and liable to lead to "much misunderstanding among the parties" in the Middle East.

AID TO ISRAEL

Aside from this, there was little difference in the declarations of support for Israel by the two major parties. The main dispute centered on who had been the more consistent friend of Israel and which party had given Israel the greatest practical support. The Republicans noted that, under defense contracts signed in 1972, the United States had agreed to sell Israel all the planes, tanks, sophisticated electronic equipment, and other military hardware that Mrs. Meir had requested, with deliveries continuing through 1973. To help Israel pay for the equipment, Congress had in the past two years approved, and the administration had provided, more than $825 million in long-term credits. In addition, in 1971, for the first time in more than a decade, the United States gave Israel an outright grant of $50 million in supporting assistance to help its economy meet the extraordinary pressures of defense and immigration absorption. Israel was also expected to receive the bulk of $85 million voted by Congress for resettlement of Soviet Jews.

This was aside from the ongoing program of loans for Israel's purchases of United States surplus food under the Public Law 480 Food for Peace Program, which has been running at a rate of some $55 million per year, and a variety of smaller grants to schools and hospitals in Israel and a loan guarantee for immigrant housing. On September 27 Secretary of State Rogers and Israeli Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir signed an agreement in New York to establish a United States-Israeli Binational Science Foundation to promote cooperation "in research in science and technology for peaceful purposes on subjects of mutual interest." Each side agreed to contribute $30 million in Israeli pounds, with the United States share consisting of allocation of the Public Law 480 loans, which Israel would otherwise have had to return for United States use.

The Committee for the Re-election of the President claimed that in the four years of the Nixon administration Israel was receiving more American assistance than "during the previous nineteen years." (A table issued by the
committee, however, gave the total of military and economic assistance to
Israel by the administration as $1,175.8 billion, compared with $1,285.9 for
the period from 1949–1968. Precise comparisons are difficult because the
earlier period included a greater percentage of outright grants; the purchasing
power of the dollar has declined, and some still classified military credits in
1969 and 1970 were omitted.) While conceding that current United States aid
to Israel was running at unprecedentedly high levels, Democratic supporters
pointed out that aid to Israel has long received widespread bipartisan support
in Congress and that in many instances it was Democrats, such as Senator
Jackson, who took the initiative or pressed for higher sums than the
administration had requested.

Israeli leaders from Prime Minister Meir on down made no secret of their
"appreciation" for President Nixon’s economic aid and political support.
Some American Jews considered these statements inappropriate during an
election year, since they could easily be interpreted as endorsements of the
President’s reelection, notwithstanding Israeli disclaimers that the Israelis did
not intend to interfere in American domestic politics.

The Israeli sentiments were less blatant than the formal August 19
endorsement of McGovern by the Action Committee on American-Arab
Relations. Dr. Mohammed T. Mehdi, the Iraqi-born leader of the group,
called on all Arab Americans to support the Democratic ticket. He explained
that he considered the Republican platform plank on the Middle East more
“pro-Israeli” than the Democratic and that he had “confidence in the
essential integrity of Senator McGovern who, as President, will reduce
American military aid to Israel.” Earlier in the year Mehdi had supported
Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm’s unsuccessful campaign for the Demo-
cratic nomination. McGovern repudiated Mehdi’s endorsement, terming it a
cynical attempt “to embarrass or discredit me with Americans of all creeds
who believe, as I do, that the cornerstone of American policy in the Middle
East must be the survival of an Israel that is militarily secure and
economically sound.” He charged the Arab group with “a calculated
attempt” to win support for Nixon. (For an analysis of the issues and the vote
in the presidential election, see pp. 155-57).

Any Arab hope that a new Nixon would emerge after his landslide victory
in November and put pressure on Israel was not fulfilled in the months
immediately following the election. While 1972 witnessed a consolidation of
American-Israeli friendship and an improvement in the United States position
in the Middle East, there also emerged long-range trends that threatened to
undermine this position unless it was supported by appropriate policies.
Among these destabilizing trends was the Chinese-Soviet rivalry for Arab
support reflected in the heated United Nations debates and in the search for
positions of influence along the Middle East air and sea routes to the Indian
subcontinent. Related to this and to the question of access to, and assured
Quest for Oil

In April the Soviet Union and Iraq signed a 15-year treaty of friendship and cooperation pledging to "continue their determined struggle against imperialism and Zionism." The treaty spoke of "cooperation in the field of strengthening each other's defense ability," and stipulated that neither country would join any alliance hostile to the other. The treaty, similar in its general terms to those concluded earlier by the Soviet Union with Egypt and India, was expected to enable the Soviet Union to expand its role in the Iraqi oil industry and to utilize the Iraqi port of Basra for increased naval activity in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin marked the occasion by attending ceremonies opening a Soviet-financed oil field seized by Iraq in a dispute with Western oil companies. The United States countered by selling increasing quantities of modern arms to pro-Western, non-Arab Iran, Iraq's leading rival in the Gulf, and to Saudi Arabia. The United States maintained only a small naval task force of its own in the area, in the calculated hope that a small United States presence with reliance on friendly regional states would help restrain the Soviets from introducing a large-scale naval force of their own into the Gulf.

Also of growing concern to the United States were the economic forecasts that rising energy demands would make the United States increasingly dependent on Middle East oil in the coming decade, with possible far-reaching political and economic consequences. In recent years, Western Europe and Japan, already dependent on the Middle East and North Africa for most of their oil and gas, have shown greater caution in being identified with Israel and have gone out of their way to avoid antagonizing the Arabs. Some Arab spokesmen have already suggested using oil as a means to force the United States to modify its policy toward Israel.

So far, however, the Arab states have concentrated on improving their economic position. Increasing demand and the slow progress of the West in developing nuclear power plants and alternative sources of energy made it possible in 1971 for the Arab states in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to conclude agreements to substantially raise the price of their oil. This was followed in October and December of 1972 by a series of new agreements under which four Arab Persian Gulf countries—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi—were to obtain immediately a 25 per cent "participation" in the oil companies operating in their countries, with the host government's share rising gradually to 51 per cent in 1983. Although the companies were unhappy about the prices they were paid in these forced sales, they regarded the demand as a lesser evil, since the alternative was
nationalization by decree that had hit Western companies in Libya, Iraq, and Algeria.

The pattern of participation agreements was expected to spread to the other major oil producers as well. Middle East analysts were anxiously watching to see whether the Arab states would follow the example of Iran, which used its expanded oil revenues to embark on an ambitious program of economic and social development at home, or the example of Libya, whose flamboyant leader boasted of utilizing his oil wealth to "persuade" Uganda and several other African states to cut their ties with Israel, and to subsidize terrorist "liberation" movements against Israel and Northern Ireland.

The UN and Arab Terrorism

While the Palestinian liberation movements failed to dislodge Israel from any part of the territory it has held since the June 1967 war and Israel appeared militarily stronger than at any time in the recent past, terrorist groups in 1972 made several spectacular and wanton attacks. These were against civilians in Israel, including Christian pilgrims at Lod airport, and hijackings and murderous assaults in places as far distant from the scene of the Middle East conflict as Munich and Bangkok. The terrorist tactics of sending letter bombs to Zionist and Jewish leaders throughout the world and the indiscriminate killing of noncombatants clearly showed that the problem of terrorism was global in scope. However, the response of the international community, as represented in the United Nations, was far from adequate and continued to show the application of a double standard.

The pattern was already set in February. After terrorists based in southern Lebanon had fired a bazooka point-blank into a truck carrying a young Israeli couple home from a bar-mitzvah celebration, killing both and leaving three small orphaned children, the Israelis launched land and air raids against guerrilla encampments in the Lebanese border region that had come to be known at "Fatahland." Upon Lebanon's complaint, the UN Security Council on February 28 adopted by a vote of 14 to 0 a brief resolution calling on Israel to "immediately desist and refrain" from military action against Lebanon and "forthwith withdraw" all its forces from Lebanese territory. The United States abstained after an American-sponsored preambular sentence deploiring "all actions which have resulted in the loss of innocent lives" failed to be adopted. The implicit American criticism of the Arab terrorist acts gained eight votes, one less than the required majority of nine. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were among the four states voting against the preamble. Three members abstained.

When on May 30 three Japanese extremists working for Arab terrorists attacked Lod airport, killing 27 civilians and wounding more than 70 others, the UN Security Council failed to adopt a resolution condemning this mass
murder. However, after Israel again launched a raid against terrorist bases in Lebanon, the Council, in a resolution sponsored by Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, condemned the "repeated attacks of Israeli forces on Lebanese territory and population," and called on Israel to release five Syrian officers and four Lebanese military personnel "abducted" in the raid. Arab terrorism was criticized only implicitly in a preambular clause "profoundly deploiring all acts of violence." The resolution was adopted by a vote of 13 to 0, with the United States and Panama abstaining. Ambassador George Bush explained that the United States could not support a resolution that was neither fair nor balanced, and did not condemn Arab terrorist acts as well as the Israeli attacks. He supported Israel's proposal for an over-all exchange of prisoners, urging "all governments concerned to repatriate all military prisoners in their custody." (Besides the five Syrian officers, Israel reportedly was holding 40 Syrian military personnel, four Lebanese prisoners and 60 Egyptians. Egypt was said to be holding 10 Israeli pilots and Syria, three.)

The double standard of the United Nations was even more glaringly displayed in the aftermath of the Munich massacre on September 5, in which eight Arab terrorists of the Black September group, disguised as athletes, invaded the Olympic compound and kidnapped and eventually killed 11 Israeli athletes and trainers (p. 451). President Nixon branded the murders "a senseless tragedy" and a "hideous perversion of the Olympic spirit." Among the Arab leaders, however, only King Hussein of Jordan condemned the terrorists' act as a "despicable crime" against humanity committed by "sick minds" against the interests of "the Palestinian people and the real Arabs." The UN Security Council took no action on the Munich incident.

FIRST U.S. VETO ON MIDDLE EAST

A few days after Munich the Israelis launched air strikes in Syria and Lebanon on ten bases of al Fatah, the reputed sponsor of the clandestine Black September terrorists. The following day, in a Syrian-Israeli air clash, three Syrian bombers were shot down over the Golan Heights. This prompted Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Guinea to introduce a resolution in the Security Council, calling for the immediate end of all military operations by "the parties concerned." Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium submitted amendments also deploiring all acts of terrorism, but they were defeated by Soviet and Chinese opposition. Finally, 13 states including the Europeans voted for the resolution; only Panama abstained. At this point the United States exercised its veto right to prevent adoption of the resolution. This was the first time the United States used its charter power to veto a resolution on the Arab-Israel dispute; it was only the second American veto in the history of the UN. Some Arab delegates charged the Nixon administration took this historic step to court the Jewish voters in the United States.
In a statement on the American veto, Ambassador Bush told the Council that "Munich was so horrible, so vicious, so brutal, so detrimental to order in the world and to peace in the Middle East that we simply must not act here as if it did not exist." He had earlier introduced a resolution of his own condemning "the senseless and unprovoked" Munich attack and calling upon the states harboring and supporting terrorists to cease their aid and to "take all necessary measures to bring about the immediate end of such senseless acts."

The American resolution was never put to a vote when it became obvious that it had no chance of adoption.

Bush noted that the Council instead chose to discuss Syria's complaint, "that stands out for its unreality. It makes no reference to the tragic events at Munich." The government of Syria, he declared, had not issued a single word of outrage or condemnation "for this despicable act." On the contrary, it "continues to harbor and to give aid and encouragement to terrorist organizations which openly champion such acts." Bush insisted that each member of the Security Council and of the international community "has responsibility to make clear that those who practice such acts, or aid and abet them in any way, are the ones deserving a censure and condemnation. Only then will we begin to eliminate this scourge from the earth, and with it the acts of counterviolence to which history inevitably proves it gives rise."

ROGERS INITIATIVES ON TERRORISM

UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim asked the General Assembly, when it convened in September, to consider international measures to protect "innocent victims" such as airline passengers from acts of political terrorism. Secretary Rogers devoted a major portion of his address to the Assembly on September 25 to the issue of terrorism. He noted that the UN Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948 affirmed that every human being has the right to life, liberty, and "security of person." Yet in 1972 alone, he noted, 25 airliners from 13 countries were successfully hijacked and 26 other attempts frustrated; 140 passengers and crew were killed and 97 wounded in terrorist acts. In the past five years, he noted, 27 diplomats from 11 countries had been kidnapped and three assassinated. There were also threats against various missions and embassies around the world, including Arab and Soviet missions to the UN, and the mailing of letter bombs to Israeli diplomats.

Secretary Rogers then proceeded to spell out specific actions to be taken by the international community. In addition to urging all states to ratify the existing conventions that impose severe penalties for the hijacking and sabotage of aircraft and require states to extradite or prosecute hijackers and saboteurs, Rogers called for 1) completion and approval of a draft treaty to prosecute or extradite those who kidnap or attack diplomats or officials of international organizations; 2) accelerated consideration by the International
Civil Aviation Organization of a treaty providing for suspension of all air service to countries that fail to punish or extradite hijackers or saboteurs of civil aircraft to make it clear that "a nation which is a haven for hijackers should be outlawed by the international community," and 3) convening of an international conference to conclude a new treaty for the prevention and punishment of acts of international terrorism. He concluded by challenging the General Assembly to "be the driving force for the specific and vigorous steps that are required. Let it prove that the United Nations can meet this test." Rogers circulated at the session a 14-article draft convention providing for the universal condemnation of acts of terrorism and requiring the prosecution or extradition of persons who kill, seriously injure, or kidnap innocent civilians in a foreign state for the purpose of harming or forcing concessions from a state or international organization.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISCUSSION

Despite strong Arab and African opposition, the General Assembly voted 66 to 27 to discuss the issue of international terrorism and "its underlying causes." Half of the Assembly’s members abstained, including the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc. Some of the African opposition stemmed from fear that antiterrorist measures would be utilized by colonialist powers to undermine national liberation movements against South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal. Most Arab states charged that the American antiterrorist campaign, despite its general terms, was really intended against the Arabs.

Rogers had attempted to forestall these criticisms by noting in his speech that "the issue is not war—war between states, civil war, or revolutionary war. The issue is not the strivings of people to achieve self-determination and independence." He acknowledged that many criminal acts of terrorism "derive from political origins" and that the international community must seriously consider questions of self-determination. "But political passion, however deeply held," he insisted, "cannot be a justification for criminal violence against innocent persons." The real and crucial issue, he said, was "whether the vulnerable lines of international communication—the airways and the mails, diplomatic discourse and international meetings—can continue, without disruption, to bring nations and peoples together."

The terrorism item was referred to the Assembly’s legal committee where the Arabs and their Soviet and Chinese supporters formed a coalition with many of the Afro-Asian states to deflect the Assembly from taking immediate action. On December 11, after lengthy debate, the committee adopted an Algerian resolution which called only for a study to determine the underlying causes of terrorism. The resolution indicated where its backers thought the blame should be put by explicitly condemning "the continuation of repressive
and terrorist acts by colonial, racist and alien regimes in denying peoples their legitimate right to self-determination and independence and other human rights and fundamental freedoms."

The resolution was adopted by a vote of 76 to 34—well over the two-thirds necessary for General Assembly approval—with 16 abstentions and six absent. The United States voted against the resolution, as did most of the West European and Latin American states and some members of the British Commonwealth. The only Middle East states to vote against the resolution were Israel, Iran, and Turkey, which was only recently plagued by foreign-trained and -financed urban terrorist groups. When the General Assembly plenary passed the resolution a week later, by a similar vote, Ambassador Bush said it was "tragic" that the United Nations had failed to formulate "an adequate response to the deadly menace of international terrorism."

OTHER MIDDLE EAST ISSUES

The Assembly dealt with the political issues of the Middle East conflict in a resolution reflecting Arab and Soviet efforts to have the Assembly condemn Israel and to give Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 a largely pro-Arab interpretation. The Assembly resolution deplored Israel's noncompliance with its 1971 resolution calling on the state to respond favorably to Dr. Jarring's peace initiative, which the Assembly fully supported. The resolution further invited Israel "to declare publicly its adherence to the principles of non-annexation of territories through the use of force," declared null and void changes "carried out by Israel in the occupied territories in contravention of the Geneva Convention of 1949," and called on Israel forthwith to rescind all such measures and to "desist from all policies and practices affecting the physical character or demographic compositions of the occupied Arab territories."

The Arab states had been pressing for compulsory economic sanctions against Israel by all UN members. To gain majority support for the resolution, the Arab states agreed to amendments which toned down the demand. The resolution, as adopted,

Calls upon all States not to recognize any such changes and measures carried out by Israel in the occupied Arab territories and invites them to avoid actions, including actions in the field of aid, that could constitute recognition of that occupation; . . .

The resolution won overwhelming support and was approved on December 8 by a majority of 86 to 7, with 31 abstentions and 8 absent. Only six Latin American states joined Israel in voting against the resolution. The United States abstained. Ambassador Bush, who had argued against the resolution, expressed regret at its adoption. The United States, he explained, believed
such a resolution "cannot render constructive assistance to the processes of
diplomacy," since several paragraphs "appear calculated to upset the careful
balance of Security Council Resolution 242" which linked Israeli withdrawal
from occupied territories to agreement between the parties on a just and
lasting peace.

The American refusal to support the Assembly resolution clearly indicated
that there would be no change in United States aid to Israel. In any case, the
Assembly resolution was of a recommendatory, not mandatory, character.
Only the Security Council can adopt decisions formally binding on member
states. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority supporting the resolution
represented a further erosion of Israel's position in the international
community. It reflected not only moral opposition to Israel's continued
occupation of Arab territory but also the practical reality of the unwillingness
of many states to oppose the Arab states, based either on their dependence on
Arab oil or their desire for improved political and economic relations with the
Arab states.

George E. Gruen
American Response to Soviet Anti-Jewish Policies

The full impact of the resurgence of Jewish consciousness in the Soviet Union, and especially the growing demand of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel, was felt throughout the world in 1971-1972. This awakening of Soviet Jews was a long-delayed reaction to Soviet antisemitism and the systematic strangulation of Jewish institutions, spurred by Israel’s victory in the six-day war of June 1967. What began with surface signs of Jewish identity, such as the Simhat Torah manifestations in Moscow and in one or two other Soviet cities developed into a widespread movement, especially among young people, to leave for Israel. The outside world learned of this movement among Soviet Jews when reports began to appear in the Western press of petitions demanding “repatriation” to their “ancient homeland,” often accompanied by a rejection of Soviet citizenship.

The Soviet crackdown on Jewish activism started with a wave of arrests in Leningrad, Riga, and Kishinev in June 1970 following the attempted hijacking of a Soviet airplane at Leningrad’s Smolny airport, in what was reported as preparation of a show-trial of a group of “Jewish Zionist traitors.” In the first Leningrad trial in December two of the twelve defendants accused of the hijacking were sentenced to death (AJYB, 1971 [Vol.72], p. 407). News of these convictions outraged the free world. A fresh group of trials of Jewish activists and some who had applied for emigration to Israel took place in Leningrad, Riga, Odessa, and Kishinev between January and June 1971 (AJYB, 1972 [Vol.73], pp. 541-42). One of the nine defendants in the second Leningrad trial in May was sentenced to up to ten years in a strict-regime labor colony; the other sentences were between one and seven years.

Protest demonstrations and news coverage of the trials throughout the United States over a period of many weeks, from the end of December 1970 through April and stretching into May 1971, no doubt helped moderate the sentences imposed on the three men and one woman, the 24-year-old nurse, Ruth Alexandrovich, who were tried in Riga in June. Ruth Alexandrovich’s mother Rivka, who was allowed to emigrate to Israel before the trial, came to the United States in the hope that a vigorous campaign to marshal American public opinion on her daughter’s behalf would help avert a severe sentence. She traveled throughout the country, speaking at dozens of meetings and rallies, as well as to the press, interfaith groups, and gatherings in New York,
Boston, Washington, Chicago, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and many other cities, with extensive coverage in the press. She was given a standing ovation by the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church which she addressed in May 1971 for the defendants.

American Jewish Response

Throughout 1971 and 1972 American Jews responded to the trials and the increasing flow of petitions and demonstrations by Russian Jews with an outpouring of concern and support not seen since the six-day war. The response was spontaneous, widespread, and deeply emotional, especially among Jewish youth. Public concern generally was stimulated by the news media, which looked upon the airplane incident in Leningrad, the death sentences, the spate of "show trials" and the demonstrations in response to them as a fresh story. For the first time the New York Times and dozens of other newspapers in cities of different sizes gave it consistent front-page treatment. At the same time Christian groups, labor organizations, leading personalities, and others sent thousands of messages to Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin and other Soviet leaders, protesting the convictions and demanding that the prisoners be set free; Jewish communities elicited similar statements from state legislatures, governors and other public officials.

The Organized Community

In the past, and ever since its creation in 1964, the largely New York-based Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry has been a mainstay—certainly in the East and before the establishment of a funded New York Conference on Soviet Jewry—in sustaining interest in Soviet Jews. It has succeeded in doing so, despite severe limitations of budget and staff, under its director Jacob Birnbaum and New York coordinator Glenn Richter. The group formally became a member agency of the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry only in 1971.

The momentum of the popular response finally moved the Jewish communities and national Jewish organizations to give the issue top priority treatment in staff and funding. This made possible a dramatic increase in educational and protest activities, notably in Los Angeles, Cleveland, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., and Minneapolis. Demonstrations and protests by Jewish and non-Jewish groups were conducted in well over one hundred cities throughout the country.

By the end of 1972 the majority of community member agencies in the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council and the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds had formed special committees on
Soviet Jewry. At the same time national agencies, including the American Jewish Congress, American Jewish Committee, B’nai B’rith, and the Anti-Defamation League, greatly increased their budgets for developing interpretive and educational materials, as well as for sponsoring conferences, symposia, meetings, demonstrations, direct contact programs, and a host of other efforts on behalf of Soviet Jews.

Illustrative of the change was the general evaluation, by Jerry Goodman, of attitudes in the mid-1960s:

With few exceptions, notably Jewish defense organizations in the United States (American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, B’nai B’rith, National Community Relations Advisory Council), Jewish opinion had previously remained unconvinced of the special nature of anti-Jewish discrimination in the USSR. Most Jewish organizations in the United States had been content to employ “quiet diplomacy” and to restrict their activities to meeting with low-echelon Soviet officials who had assured them that there was no Jewish problem in the USSR. (AJYB, 1965 [Vol.66], p. 312).

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY

In the late spring of 1971 the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry, which had been housed, staffed, and largely financed by the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC) since 1964, was reorganized. The reason was that the work for Soviet Jewry had become of such importance that national programming required the exclusive attention of an independent board and staff. Relieved of this responsibility, NJCRAC could now devote itself to the over-all task of coordinating the work of the local communities. This author served as the coordinator of the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry from 1968 to 1971 and Rabbi Hirschel Schacter served as its chairman in 1970-1971. Jerry Goodman was appointed executive director of the newly-organized group, the National Conference on Soviet Jewry; Richard Maass, chairman of the American Jewish Committee’s Foreign Affairs Committee and a vice-chairman of the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry, was elected its chairman.

The plenum of the National Conference now included all members of the American Jewish Conference and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, and a stipulated number of representatives of welfare funds and community relations councils designated jointly by the NJCRAC and the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds which became a member agency in 1971.

After many years of prodding, the effort in New York City was finally given the funding adequate for a city with the largest Jewish population in the United States. In August 1971 the Greater New York Conference on Soviet Jewry, too, was reorganized and Malcolm Hoenlein became its first full-time executive director.
UNION OF COUNCILS OF SOVIET JEWS

There had evolved in a dozen or so communities local Soviet Jewry groups not representative of the organized Jewish community. Considering themselves more militant, they were unwilling to work under the jurisdiction of local Jewish community relations councils and federations, and developed their own individual programs and styles. For the most part, these groups did not conduct mass protest activities, except for a few well-attended "candlelight walks" and Simhat Torah rallies in Los Angeles and San Francisco. However, some of them—notably in Cleveland, the San Francisco Bay Area, and Los Angeles—developed the first person-to-person programs with Soviet Jews, by mail and phone, which were later adopted by the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry. The wide activities of these groups were largely uncoordinated until 1971 when ongoing, though loose, contacts were established between about 12 of them. In that year they were federated into a national organization, the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews. Louis Rosenblum, head of the Cleveland Council on Anti-Semitism, the first local group on Soviet Jewry to be formed, was elected chairman.

BRUSSELS WORLD CONFERENCE

A major effort on behalf of Soviet Jewry was the World Conference of Jewish Communities on Soviet Jewry, which met in Brussels, Belgium, in February 1971. It drew some 800 delegates from 38 countries on all continents. The United States delegation of over 200, the largest, represented the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the two major organizers and American sponsors of the meeting. 1

On the last day of the meeting, the delegates proclaimed the Brussels Declaration, 2 which was a firm commitment by organized Jewry throughout the world to escalate the protest movement in support of Soviet Jewry. On the day the conference opened, Jewish activists in the Soviet Union cabled to Brussels directly to express their solidarity with its aims. A panel of recent Soviet emigrants to Israel also issued strong statements calling for continued action. One of the most poignant of these was by Grisha Feigen, a much

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1 Jewish Defense League leader Rabbi Meir Kahane, who attempted to present to the conference a 10-point program focusing on confrontation and personal harassment of Soviet diplomats all over the world, was denied entry since he was not an appointed delegate. His subsequent deportation by the Belgian government received world-wide publicity.

decorated former army major from Riga, who had been committed to an insane asylum as punishment for his demands to leave for Israel.

For weeks before the opening of the conference, the Soviet government, through its diplomats and in the Soviet news media waged a campaign of vilification against the conference sponsors and the host country. Failing to pressure the Belgian government into withdrawing permission for the conference, the Kremlin used every possible propaganda device to discredit the assembly. It even dispatched a group of "representative" Soviet Jews, headed by General David A. Dragunsky, one of the "official Jews" and propagandists for the Soviet Union, to hold a competing "conference" in Brussels (AJYB, 1972 [Vol.73], p. 499). These ploys only served to focus world attention on the conference.

In the weeks following the World Conference, Soviet authorities granted exit permits to Jews in markedly increasing numbers. Because many of those allowed to emigrate to Israel were leaders of the Jewish activist movement, there was conjecture that the move had a two-fold purpose: to eliminate the leadership of Jewish assertiveness and, at the same time, assuage public opinion in the United States, the seat of the United Nations where the question of human rights was a sensitive one, especially among the emergent African and Asian nations. Perhaps the increase in exit permits and the suspension of trials also reflected the Soviet wish to avoid criticism from Communist parties in other countries (some of which had protested in the past) during the Communist party congress held in Moscow in April 1971. No doubt, the global attention received by the Brussels conference was a factor.

INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATION ON SOVIET JEWRY

A follow-up to the Brussels Conference was the International Consultation on Soviet Jewry held in London in March 1971. It was attended by top echelon Jewish leadership from many nations, including a delegation from the United States. In a formal declaration, the conference observed the "more realistic" emerging policy of the USSR, especially the increase in emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union since the Brussels Conference. It noted, however, that those allowed to leave "represent only a fraction of the number who have applied to emigrate" and that "the basic condition of Soviet Jewry remains unchanged." Reaffirming the determination of world Jewry to work for the freedom of Soviet Jews "to choose their own destiny," the statement condemned all Soviet discrimination against Jews and reasserted the principle that "the Jewish people of the Soviet Union are entitled to develop their culture, Hebrew and Yiddish languages and literature, to practice their religion and in all ways to preserve their historic heritage, as are other nationality groups."
The new priority given by American Jewry to the Soviet Jews resulted in nation-wide activities. Jewish holiday themes were often transformed into programs on their behalf. During Passover of both years their plight received prominent treatment in news reports of synagogue services and outdoor sedorim. A "Matzah of Hope" dedicated to the Soviet Jews—with a relevant passage written in Hebrew, English, and Yiddish—was incorporated into the seder services in tens of thousands of Jewish homes. In 1971 alone, more than a million copies of the text were distributed in communities and to synagogues and community centers through the Conference on Soviet Jewry and NJCRAC. Tishah be-Av was the occasion for Freedom Fasts for Soviet Jews.

The High Holy Days, and the traditional Rosh Ha-shanah greetings, were also co-opted on behalf of the Soviet Jews. Member organizations of the National Conference encouraged communities to send tens of thousands of letters, cables, and telephone greetings to individual Soviet Jews. On Simhat Torah, when Russian Jews demonstrated their Jewishness by dancing and singing outside the synagogues in Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities, more than a hundred simultaneous gatherings were held in America to express solidarity with them.

In December 1971 over 25,000 persons jammed Madison Square Garden in a "Freedom Lights for Soviet Jewry" Hannukah celebration, which was addressed by Ruth Alexandrovich, who had been freed in November.

The subsistence diet on which prisoners in Soviet labor camps were forced to live was the focus of special protests during Human Rights Week observances. In 1971 over 30 communities conducted programs on behalf of the POCs, the Soviet Jewish "prisoners of conscience." These were sponsored by the Leadership Conference of National Jewish Women's Organizations in cooperation with NJCRAC and the National Conference on Soviet Jewry. In 1972 such programs were conducted in more than 50 cities by coalitions of Jewish and non-Jewish women's organizations. Several times during the two years POCs in the Potma prison complex in the Soviet Union conducted hunger strikes; simultaneous sympathy demonstrations were held in several northern and western cities in the United States.

As part of the over-all effort, recent Soviet Jewish immigrants to Israel, many of whom spoke fluent English, continued to be brought to the United States to tour communities and university campuses, giving personal testimony before Jewish and non-Jewish audiences and at meetings with federal officials, members of Congress, and White House staff. Several spoke movingly of close relatives from whom they had been separated by the
arbitrary issuance of exit visas, and many spoke of husbands and wives who had been imprisoned because they wanted to emigrate.

SOVIET VISITORS TO UNITED STATES

Another method of expressing solidarity with Soviet Jews was to confront Soviet artists, performers, intellectuals, academicians, and diplomats visiting American cities with protests against Soviet anti-Jewish policies. At the same time, their audiences and listeners were reminded that Jewish culture was being strangled in the Soviet Union. In more than 40 cities that were toured by the Osipov Balalaika orchestra, a Russian hockey team, and other groups, as well as by Soviet Minister of Health Boris Petrovsky, newspaper advertisements "welcoming" the Russians also expressed concern for Soviet treatment of Jews; flyers were distributed, and meetings with the Russians were arranged. High Soviet officials on diplomatic visits abroad were greeted with outpourings of protests by impressive crowds of demonstrators.

Evidence of Soviet Sensitivity

The Soviet Union's sensitivity to world-wide reaction, as noted earlier in connection with the Brussels Conference, became evident from a number of defensive moves. Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin in Montreal, Communist Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev in Paris, and Soviet diplomats elsewhere mouthed the customary clichés about the freedom of "the people's democracy" from antisemitism. A mission headed by General Dragunsky toured a number of United States cities to persuade Americans that Soviet Jews enjoyed equality with other Soviet citizens. The effort was largely negated when publicity by local Jewish host organizations on the occasion of his visits to Jewish and secular educational institutions, centers, social service agencies, and other installations, took issue with the palpable apologetics of the Russian.

Yevgeny Yevtushenko returned to the United States for a tour of readings, including one on national television, of his work Babi Yar, a memorial to the nearly 100,000 Jews murdered by the Nazis in a Kiev ravine. Wherever he appeared, however, he also made a statement deploring what he called "isolated" instances of antisemitism in the Soviet Union. In a South American appearance Yevtushenko deprecated those Soviet Jews who wished to go to Israel.

At the same time Soviet authorities exploited the departure from Israel of a few disgruntled Soviet Jews who had failed to adjust to the unfamiliar way of life as evidence of the foolhardiness of emigration. But this had no visible
effect on the determination of Soviet Jews to emigrate. As for American public opinion, the impact of such departures was negligible, since these represented just a fraction of one per cent of the ever-growing number of Russian emigrants to Israel.

Violence Condemned

Some young people and adults resorted to violence, molestation, disruption, and similar tactics in the belief that such actions would more effectively call attention to the situation of Soviet Jews and secure better results. Such tactics were used especially by the Jewish Defense League (JDL) with increasing frequency in 1971 and 1972. Leaders and members of the JDL were indicted and some convicted of unlawful conduct.

The organized Jewish community, especially the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry and its constituent organizations, disassociated itself from the threat or use of violence by American Jews as a means of forcing an amelioration of the situation of Soviet Jews, and denounced it as “inimicable to the true interests of both American and Soviet Jews.”

Some of these acts had tragic consequences, as the death of a young woman employee in an explosion set off in the offices of impresario Sol Hurok. In late May several young Jews carrying JDL membership cards were allegedly caught in the act of assembling explosive devices in the washroom of a Long Island synagogue. The arresting officers found on their persons directions for reaching the suburban estate of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations. Though JDL has denied knowledge of these acts, many felt that the organization has probably contributed toward violence by condoning them, thereby encouraging further violence.

In a statement adopted at its June 1972 plenary session, NJCRAC, representing nine national Jewish organizations and 93 local community groups, said “violence gives grist to the mill of Soviet propaganda, both in the Soviet media where it is used to support the myth of Jewish or Zionist terrorism and in other parts of the world where it serves to alienate Russian intellectuals who are sympathetic with Soviet Jews.” It condemned “the use of violence in any cause, whether it be one that we endorse or one that we oppose. . . . Employed in the cause of Soviet Jewry it is conspicuously destructive of the very objective it seeks to promote and turns public sympathy away from Soviet Jewry to the victims of violence.”

Mikhail Zand, Soviet Jewish scholar-activist who, after waiting several years, was finally granted permission to emigrate to Israel, denounced the violent tactics of JDL at the convention of the Zionist Organization of America in late 1971. He revealed that the Kremlin exploited reports of anti-Soviet violence in America to brand all Jews barbarians; that prominent
Soviet Jews were being pressured into signing denunciations of such violence, and that these were distorted into repudiations of all activity in support of Soviet Jewish rights and freedom.

**Appeals to the World**

Soviet Jews increasingly addressed appeals for help to the outside world. Many letters were sent to the United States, particularly emotional pleas for assistance to President Nixon (to his wife from women activists), to Senators George McGovern and Hubert H. Humphrey, and to many other leading political figures in the 1972 election campaign. Throughout this period hardly a week passed without reports of a new confrontation between the Soviet authorities and Jews, or the publications of a petition, signed sometimes by a few, sometimes by hundreds of Jews. One such petition, dated September 20, 1972, was signed by nearly a thousand Jews in several Soviet cities. One petition from Georgian Jews, which called for "Israel or death," was indicative of the intensity of feeling that prompted these petitions.

Just before Rosh Ha-shanah and again on Yom Kippur, thousands of Jews from many parts of the Soviet Union gathered at Babi Yar near Kiev, at Rumbili near Riga, and at Ponari near Vilna—all sites of mass murders of Jews by the Nazis—to mourn the many thousands of martyrs buried there and to protest the official Soviet attempt to suppress the fact that they were murdered because they were Jews. Jewish students expressed solidarity with the Soviet Jews by simultaneously conducting memorials at the Isaiah Wall facing the United Nations in New York City.

Jewish protests and appeals found support in the liberal intellectual movement that has surfaced in the Soviet Union in recent years. In fall 1971, for example, the outstanding non-Jewish Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov, who headed the Committee on Human Rights in the Soviet Union, addressed an open appeal to the Supreme Soviet to permit both Jews and non-Jews who wished to leave the country to do so (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], p. 545).

Increasingly throughout 1972, Soviet Jews heavily relied on American intercession with the Soviet authorities to help their cause, as indicated in letters smuggled out of the USSR and in the many telephone calls which, despite interruptions and interdictions, were routinely put through from American to Soviet Jews. Some spoke freely of their desire to emigrate and gave news of harassments and arrests of relatives and friends. It was through such a phone call from a Hadassah leader in Chicago to the Moscow activist Lydia Kornfeld that news came of the expulsion in January 1972 of Congressman James H. Scheuer for allegedly having "incited" Soviet Jews to seek emigration to Israel. He and other Congressmen visiting the Soviet Union had privately met with Jewish activists. Eight governors who toured the USSR in the spring insisted on making public visits to synagogues in
Moscow and Tiflis and repeatedly queried Soviet officials about their policies with regard to the Jews. Such visits to the Soviet Union by American officials gave moral support to the Soviet Jews and also helped publicize their plight.

**Nixon Visit to Moscow**

Programmatic efforts by the organized Jewish community to bring about official United States intercession with the Soviet authorities at the highest levels was pressed on the eve of President Nixon's departure for summit negotiations with the Russians in late May 1972. A campaign for signatures on petitions asking the President to make the emigration of Soviet Jews a priority agenda item in his meetings gathered more than a million and a half names. On Sunday, April 30, a National Day of Solidarity was observed in more than 100 American cities with parades, marches, rallies, and other events. Outstanding was the parade down Fifth Avenue in New York City, sponsored by the Greater New York Conference on Soviet Jewry, in which close to 100,000 persons participated. These observances were given extensive coverage by the nation's news media. Soviet Jews heard about them from the Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and Kol Yisrael. Although there was no definite announcement that the question of Soviet Jewish emigration was on the officially announced agenda of items to be discussed between Nixon and Brezhnev, the President's foreign policy advisor, Henry Kissinger, indicated at a press conference after Nixon's return that the subject had been "mentioned" in the course of the talks. In later months the President, himself, told Jewish leaders that it was discussed.

In a move apparently calculated to remove Jewish activists from the scene during the Nixon visit, many younger Jews in Moscow and other cities were ordered to report for military service in late April and early May; others, anticipating such calls, went into hiding. A number of prominent activists were arrested and detained for as long as 15 days without charges. American Jews made hundreds of telephone calls to the Soviet Union during the Nixon trip in attempts to focus attention on these activists. Many of these calls were interdicted, and the American media expressed strong concern over the interference. Several American journalists who accompanied Nixon engaged Soviet authorities in well-publicized dialogues on the question of antisemitism in the Soviet Union and the expressed desire of many Jews to emigrate. The wire services, and particularly the press, gave extensive coverage to the departure of James Michener from a press conference when a Soviet editor made disparaging remarks about Jews.

Besides the many petitions sent to the President before he left for Moscow, there was wide participation of elected officials and other public figures in rallies. In at least 35 states, legislative actions, gubernatorial proclamations, denunciations of Soviet persecution of Jews, and appeals asked that the
President raise the question of the Soviet Jews on his visit. Hundreds of cities joined with municipal enactments or mayoral statements. A caucus of six black Congressmen addressed a similar letter to Soviet Ambassador Anatole Dobrynin, and on March 19, 1972, a National Interreligious Consultation on Soviet Jewry was held in Chicago with 600 participants, mainly Christian clergy joining in a statement of conscience. Later in 1972 a permanent Secretariat of this Interreligious Task Force was set up to work with national Christian groups on behalf of Soviet Jewry. R. Sargent Shriver, former director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, and Sister Ann Gillen, executive director of the National Council of Nuns, were appointed honorary chairman and executive director, respectively.

**Official U.S. Action**

The United States repeatedly condemned the Soviet Union’s treatment of its Jewish citizens through official representatives in various United Nations agencies, particularly the Commission on Human Rights. However, the most notable altercation occurred between Ambassador George Bush and Soviet Ambassador Yakov A. Malik in 1972 after the latter had unleashed a blatantly antisemitic attack in a Security Council debate. Earlier, at a press conference on the occasion of the Riga trial, official State Department spokesman William Bray denounced the arrests and trials as "totally unjustified and indefensible."

After several years of discussions by the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry, and later by the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, with the State Department and the United States Information Agency, strong public pressure was exerted for the Voice of America to add to its broadcasts to the Soviet Union programs directed especially to Soviet Jewry. Finally, in 1972, Voice of America initiated a regularly scheduled one-minute broadcast of this kind, which was repeated three times weekly, but this was criticized as wholly inadequate by Jewish organizations.

In 1972, following Nixon’s publicly stated concern, officials of the National Conference, joined at times by the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, met with members of the White House staff for further consideration of the question.

**Koch Bill**

In March 1971 Congressman Edward Koch (D., N.Y.), who had been involved in activities on behalf of Soviet Jewry for some years, introduced a bill in Congress to set aside 30,000 visas for the immigration of Soviet Jews. A number of national Jewish organizations, ranging from the Workmen’s Circle to the Religious Zionists of America (Mizrachi), supported Koch’s
move which appeared to be designed to build up official United States pressure against restrictive Soviet emigration policies. The bill created a good deal of public discussion. There was a difference of opinion among Jewish organizations on whether the bill should be passed, since the issue here was for the Russian government to ease curbs on emigration rather than for the United States to ease further its immigration policy which had become considerably liberalized in the last decade. In evident agreement with that view, Koch later withdrew his bill. However, the interest created by the publicity given the Koch Bill was extremely helpful in eliciting a promise from the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to make full use of existing immigration statutes and to expedite procedures for Russian Jews who would be allowed to leave the Soviet Union for the United States. In 1971 close to 300 were admitted; in 1972 the number was almost 500. Major assistance to these immigrants was given by United HIAS.

**Emigration to Israel**

Under rising pressure, the Soviet government permitted some 13,000 Jews to leave for Israel in 1971, and well over 32,000 in 1972—a large number compared to the total of 5,675 who had been permitted to do so in the preceding four years.\(^3\) No doubt, many more Soviet Jews would have registered for emigration but for the very high visa fee of approximately $1,100. Applicants were also beset by delay, hostile interrogation, harassment, and economic and social sanctions. Among the most onerous requirement for emigration was a character reference (harakteristika) from employer, housing superintendent, and others. Those asking for such reference were at once exposed to mistreatment, hounding, and the contempt of fellow employees and neighbors, and often suffered the loss of employment and expulsion from schools and other institutions.

**"Ransom" Tax**

Concomitant with the dramatic rise in emigration was the imposition on August 3, 1972, of an additional, exorbitant exit fee scaled to the educational attainments of the applicants and ranging up to $35,000. American public opinion reacted strongly in scores of editorials denouncing the odious practice

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\(^3\) Of the Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel during 1972, one-third were from Georgia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and some from Tashkent, Bokhara, and Samarkand and areas under Soviet control since the end of World War II. It seemed clear that it was in the Russian heartland, where most Soviet Jews were living and where the most rigorous restraints were being placed upon Jewish religious and cultural activities and the greatest pressures exerted for assimilation, that visas for Israel were most difficult to obtain.
of putting "a price tag on human beings," an act reminiscent of the Nazi holocaust. A resolution "not to pay blackmail" was passed overwhelmingly at an emergency conference of world Jewish community leaders, called in London in September 1972. Many Soviet Jewish activists concurred in messages and appeals sent to the conference. The decision not to pay was also buttressed by resolution at the assembly of the Jewish Agency meeting in Jerusalem at the same time. Although there was a significant decrease in the number of Jews with higher education as well as academicians and scientists arriving in Israel after the imposition of the new tax, immigration remained fairly stable at a 2,000 monthly average. However, Israeli authorities put the number of applications for visas to Israel which were being held up at about 100,000. At the same time, harassment of activists and applicants for emigration increased with several arrests and trials of individuals that began in July and August, and continued throughout 1972 into the spring of 1973 (p. 487).

Jackson Amendment

Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) initiated legislation that took issue with the Soviet government's new policies by linking trade privileges sought by the Soviet Union with an easing of emigration restrictions. At an emergency conference convened by the National Conference on Soviet Jewry in Washington, D.C., on September 26, 1972, in which Jewish communities and national agencies around the country participated, Jackson outlined his proposed amendment to the East-West Trade Act that barred non-Common Market countries from having most-favored-nation (MFN) status if they denied their citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate, or imposed more than a nominal tax on emigration, until such time as the President determined the country was no longer in violation.

The Jewish community traditionally favored a relaxation of tensions and détente between the United States and the Soviet Union and the encouragement of trade in the hope that this would afford greater opportunity to influence the Soviet Union with regard to its treatment of Soviet Jews. However, the Jewish leadership now fully backed the Jackson amendment's rationale that the pressure of linking trade with the question of Soviet Jews must be employed in the struggle to alleviate their plight. Support came from many other sectors of American society. More than 70 Senators cosponsored the amendment, and close to 200 Congressmen sponsored a similar bill in the House of Representatives under the leadership of Congressman Charles A. Vanik (D., Ohio). Significantly, the chairman of the powerful House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur Mills, later joined in leading the sponsorship.

During the 1972 election campaign many statements supporting the
Jackson Amendment were made by leaders of both parties and by candidates for various offices. Against this background, the Soviet need for developing trade with the United States became increasingly clear as Soviet trade delegations fanned out throughout the country in July, August, and September in a search for upgrading Russian technology and industrial know-how. Many important American firms announced exploratory talks with their Soviet counterparts and, indeed, several banks and important companies began opening offices in Moscow. In a coup scored by a Russian trade mission several huge grain purchases were made during the summer of 1972 with no fanfare and awareness of massive crop failures in the Soviet Union.

Although the grain purchases were not affected by the Jackson Amendment, it assumed importance when suddenly, in late October, large numbers of well-known Jewish activists were allowed to leave the Soviet Union without paying the education tax—a clear nod to President Nixon and an attempt to win over Congress. (The proposed amendment would have had to be reintroduced after the November elections.)

Russian Jews seized upon Soviet vulnerability by stepping up demands for the right to emigrate. Sit-ins and demonstrations were conducted with regularity outside the Kremlin, at the Supreme Soviet, at visa headquarters, and at central telephone and telegraph offices in several Russian cities. The authorities struck back by arbitrarily cutting off telephones, threatening induction in the armed forces, and a variety of other bullying tactics that sought to dampen the spreading movement for emigration.

Nevertheless, toward the end of the year, arrivals in Israel continued at the rate of 2,500 or more per month. Among them were representatives of what still remained of the Jewish life-style in the Soviet Union: the sister-in-law of Vladimir Jabotinsky, founder of the Zionist Revisionist movement; the widow and son of Peretz Markish, the Yiddish writer who had been killed in the wholesale executions of Jewish intellectuals in August 1952, and the daughter of the late Rabbi Yehuda Leib Levin of Moscow.

As 1972 ended, coordination of programmatic activities on behalf of Soviet Jews in America rose to new heights. This was evident in mid-December, during Human Rights Week, when dozens of new coalitions of Jewish and non-Jewish women’s organizations focused protest activities on the more than 40 young men and women who were serving harsh prison terms. Demonstrations took place in more than 50 cities, again under the sponsorship of the Leadership Conference of National Jewish Women’s Organizations with the staff assistance of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry and the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council.
APPENDIX

Brussels Declaration By the World Conference
of Jewish Communities on Soviet Jewry

We, the delegates of this Conference, coming from Jewish communities throughout the world, solemnly declare our solidarity with our Jewish brothers in the Soviet Union.

We want them to know—and they will take encouragement from this knowledge—that we are at one with them, totally identified with their heroic struggle for the safeguarding of their national identity and for their natural and inalienable right to return to their historic homeland, the land of Israel.

Profoundly concerned for their fate and future, we denounce the policy pursued by the government of the Soviet Union of suppressing the historic Jewish cultural and religious heritage. This constitutes a flagrant violation of human rights which the Soviet Constitution pledges to uphold and which is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To cut them off from the rest of the Jewish people, as the Soviet authorities are attempting to do, is a crime against humanity.

Soviet spokesmen claim that there is no need for Jewish culture and education, that there is no Jewish problem in the Soviet Union and that there is no anti-Semitism. These assertions have been proven false by the Soviet Jews themselves. The entire world has heard their protest.

Tens of thousands of Jews have petitioned the Soviet authorities for the right to settle in Israel and raise their children in the Jewish tradition and culture. Letters, messages and petitions, sent at the signatories’ peril from the Soviet Union to individuals, to governments, to the United Nations and other international organizations, all demand recognition of these rights.

The reaction of the Soviet authorities to this Jewish awakening has been to mount a campaign of harassment, arrests and virulent anti-Jewish propaganda. The Leningrad trial, shocking to the world, was but one manifestation of such persecution. Far from being crushed by such intimidation, Soviet Jews today demand their rights with ever greater courage and determination.

This conference urgently calls upon the civilized world to join with us and with the Jews of the USSR in urging the Soviet authorities:

To recognize the right of Jews who so desire to return to their historic homeland in Israel, and to ensure the unhindered exercise of this right.

To enable the Jews in the USSR to exercise fully their right to live in accord with the Jewish cultural and religious heritage and freely to raise their children in this heritage.

To put an end to the defamation of the Jewish people and of Zionism, reminiscent of the evil anti-Semitism which has caused so much suffering to the Jewish people and to the world.

We assembled in this Conference commit ourselves, by unceasing effort, to ensure
that the plight of Soviet Jewry is kept before the conscience of the world until the justice of their cause prevails.

We will continue to mobilize the energies of all Jewish communities. We will work through the United Nations and other international bodies and through every agency of public opinion.

We will not rest until the Jews of the Soviet Union are free to choose their own destiny.

LET MY PEOPLE GO!

February 25, 1971