Review of the Year

UNITED STATES
OTHER COUNTRIES
Civic and Political

Politics and Intergroup Relations

The period under review was not the best, nor the worst, for advances in intergroup relations. The marked progress for minority groups in income and employment in the last two decades was slowed down by the economic recession. At the same time, there was a growing conviction that the social, economic, and educational measures initiated in the Kennedy era were not working as expected. They suffered in part from bureaucracy and incompetence, in part from lack of funds. Moreover, the thrust toward equal opportunity was clouded by pessimism and doubt in the validity of many programs, and sharp questions were increasingly raised about what N. J. Rossant, director of the 20th Century Fund, called "the beguiling notion that money could bring about social change."

Contrary to the generally held belief that depression breeds antisemitism, there was no evidence that America's economic problems had increased anti-Jewish attitudes or activities during the year. The Jewish community, however, was confronted with serious questions affecting Israel, the issue of quota hiring for minorities, the plight of Soviet Jewry, and an effort by the Arab-Soviet coalition to stir up international antisemitism. Despite this, and perhaps contrary to expectations, American Jewry appeared to have gained considerable sympathy and support from the general public for its problems. Evidence pointed to significantly improved understanding of the Jewish community in the United States and increasingly friendly relations between Christians and Jews.

The Jews

Antisemitism

There appeared to be no increase in antisemitism in 1975. Rather, the events of the year appeared to fit into the trend over 20 years, or longer, of steadily improving Jewish-Christian relations. A major obstacle in definitely assessing the situation has been the apparent inability to arrive at a precise definition of antisemitism and the

1 Harper's, January 1976, p. 62.
failure of scholars and polling organizations to use identical questions over the years.

The most sophisticated study of attitudes toward Jews by non-Jews in recent years was undertaken by Louis Harris and Associates between late December 1975 and early January 1976. Using a sample of 3,000, Harris analyzed some positive as well as negative stereotypes of Jews. He also secured Jewish perceptions of what Christians believed. Harris concluded that American Jews "take off into fantasy on the subject of anti-Semitism." When polled by Harris about General George S. Brown's 1974 statement regarding Jews (AJYB, 1976 [Vol. 76], pp. 125–26), 61 to 18 per cent of Americans (78 to 15 per cent of leadership group) disagreed with the general. On the other hand, 45 per cent of Jews thought that a majority of non-Jews would agree with him, 42 per cent did not. Jews were similarly mistaken in their expectations regarding such questions as "Jews are irritating because they are too aggressive" and "when it comes to choosing between people and money, Jews will choose money."

Harris concluded that 31 per cent of America's non-Jews were likely to hold antisemitic beliefs and that antisemitism was far from dead. He warned, however, that major overestimation of hostility could become a self-fulfilling prophesy, and he cautioned Jews against consistently ignoring their natural allies in the fight against antisemitism by underestimating their support.

Taking into account all the available data, including the increasing acceptance and leadership in American life of Jews, it is reasonable to assume a decline in antisemitism. There appeared to be no significant increase in overt antisemitism in 1975. For a number of years, the incidents of vandalism, violence and similar acts have remained fairly stable at an average of 55 recorded annually. They included painting swastikas on synagogues; burning a swastika on the lawn of Century Village, an almost entirely Jewish Palm Beach suburb; throwing a rock through a window of the Hebrew Academy in Atlanta, Ga.; smearing a swastika on a synagogue in Boston; vandalizing a cemetery in Huntington, Long Island—all senseless acts of a few small groups and individuals operating on the fringe of decent society.

Not specifically related to 1975, but indicative of the role of schools in dealing with antisemitism in this country, is an important University of California study. Conducted in three smaller cities with varying percentages of Jewish residence within a 100-mile radius of New York, the study found that the schools have evidently failed to reduce anti-Jewish (and anti-black) prejudice. According to the study, antisemitism actually increased among students in grades 9 through 12, and was strongest among students with the lowest academic achievement. It was also found that antisemitism was more prevalent in cities with larger proportions of Jews.

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3Compiled by the research departments of the Anti-Defamation League for the author.
The annual report approved by the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council in June indicated that the record for 1975 "would seem to support the conclusion that Jews are gaining significantly in political acceptance and advancement: that the Jewish group is widely accepted by the general public as a part of the American pluralism, giving its primary loyalty to America; that anti-Semitic hate-mongery is deemed contemptible and repugnant to the American people; and that even in a period of profound economic stress and political turmoil, Jewish scapegoating by responsible figures is not tolerated." This assessment was approved by an overwhelming majority of representatives of national and local agencies throughout the nation. Yet the report noted that the American Jewish community was deeply "uneasy" and "apprehensive," and that evidence would not necessarily indicate that this apprehension was unwarranted: "mistaken, perhaps; excessive, surely."

Observable restrictions against Jews were largely confined to private clubs and in "executive suite" hirings and promotions, particularly in banks. Steady progress in these areas has continued over a period of years.

EXTREMISM

The activities and influence of extremist organizations, both left and right, substantially decreased in 1975. The extreme left appeared to lose its appeal with the disappearance of Vietnam as an issue and, indeed, seemed to be somewhat confused by Washington's policy of détente with Russia and China. And the right wing, too, apparently failed to capitalize on any issues that might have had appeal for the substantial number of potential followers in the country. The John Birch Society, one of the largest of its organizations which, though not overtly antisemitic, had many antisemites in its ranks, declined in membership. However, its 1975 budget remained quite substantial, an estimated $8 million, and it did not curtail its radio program, which was carried by some 87 stations. The openly antisemitic Liberty Lobby, with an estimated membership of 25,000, claimed to have broadcast its five-minute programs on 600 stations. The fact was that the stations were reduced to fewer than 100 when the Mutual Broadcasting System, in January 1974, barred the use of its network to the group.

Among the now largely ineffectual professional antisemitic hatemongers of the right were Rev. Carl McIntire and Billy James Hargis. A new group of would-be rescuers of the American way of life, the Posse Comitatos, was headed by Henry L. Beach of Portland, Ore., a former member of the pro-Nazi Silver Shirts. Its members, men and women carrying sheriff's badges, guns, and handcuffs, have been engaged in sporadic vigilante operations tending to disrupt democratic and liberal

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efforts like those of organizers of the United Farm Workers in California. This openly antisemitic group has taken on other enemies, including the Federal Reserve System, the income tax, fire-arms control, environmental protections, and regional planning.

Another newcomer was David E. Duke, national director of the revived Knights of the Ku Klux Klan who, at the age of 25, was perhaps more progressive than his predecessors and, at the moment, enjoyed some following. Working out of Baton Rouge, La., he has been using radio and modern public relations techniques to advertise a sanitized version of the Klan. His activities were reported as "all part of the new cleaned up image he is trying to impart to the Klan—college educated, media oriented, the man in the gray flannel bedsheet." Duke polled one-third of all the votes cast in the race for the Louisiana State Senate, in which he campaigned as national director of KKK and its Grand Dragon in the state, on a platform opposing gun control and busing for integrated schools. He has made every effort to gain the support of extremist dissidents, as on his visits to South Boston where he spoke against busing.

Arab groups, among them the American Palestine Committee and the Islamic Center in Washington, made efforts to align themselves with anti-Jewish far-right elements. In May a meeting cosponsored by the Holy Land State Committee and an antisemitic group called Citizens for American Survival was attended by Arab envoys from such countries as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and by representatives of the Arab League. Speakers variously castigated American Jews for being Zionist, Communist, and a threat to patriotic Americans.7

Israel

American attitudes toward Israel are considered here only in light of their possible effect on Christian-Jewish relations. There has been ample evidence that criticism of some Israeli policies does not constitute antisemitism. However, there are boundaries of legitimate comment beyond which critics become suspect. Thus the use of Zionism as an instrument of attack must be considered an antisemitic manifestation. Bertram Gold, executive director of the American Jewish Committee, stated: "Attack on the right of Israel to exist, questioning not about particular policies of the Israeli government, but about the legitimacy of the State itself, becomes an attack on the legitimacy, security, the safety, of Jews everywhere." John T. Paulikowski, acting president of the Catholic Theological Union, concurred when he stated, "if, as is true in many cases, a criticism of Israel policies leaves the distinct impression that Israel has forfeited its right to exist because of some policy failures,

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8 Keynote address to American Jewish Committee National Executive Committee, October 31, 1975.
then the criticism might with good justification be placed in the anti-Semitic category.'19

There appeared to have been no deterioration in American attitudes toward Israel in the past year. Indeed, opinion polls indicated that there has been no substantial difference in support for Israel by Americans since the temporary upsurge of support immediately following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Those whose sympathies were with Israel usually outnumbered those favoring the Arabs by between 7 and 9 to 1, a ratio that has remained fairly constant.

Another, and perhaps more important, criterion of support for Israel and, by inference, probably for American Jews was the action taken by Congress in passing pro-Israel resolutions and granting large-scale aid to Israel at a time when other expenditures were curtailed. Another was the landslide of opinion against the Arab-Soviet sponsored UN Assembly "Zionist-racist" resolution (p. 97).

POLLS

An American Jewish Committee analysis of the findings of various polls20 showed that:

should war break out [American] sympathy would be with:  

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<td>Harris, January 1975</td>
<td>52%</td>
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<td>Yankelovich, October 1974</td>
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<td>Gallup, January 1975</td>
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The Harris poll sample was twice as large as Gallup's, and therefore assumed to be more accurate. It should also be noted that both the Yankelovich and Harris results were consistent with previous findings during the last five years. A follow-up survey by Yankelovich indicated, according to a January 1976 analysis by Geraldine Rosenfield, that support for Israel had increased by 1 per cent since an October 1974 poll.

The polls also sought to establish public opinion on the attitudes of American Jews toward Israel. Yankelovich asked in August 1974, and again in January 1975: "Do you feel that most of the Jewish people in this country feel closer to the United States or Israel?"21 In the five-month interval the percentage that thought American Jews "closer to the United States" rose from 41 to 51; the percentage that thought them "closer to Israel" dropped from 34 to 25. Among blacks, there was a rise from 30 to 47 in the percentage that agreed Jews were "closer to the United States."

Another question in these two polls asked which groups were believed to have too

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much influence on United States Middle East policy. The percentage of respondents who thought American Jews could be so designated had risen from 29 to 46. However, the changes in percentages for other groups were: organized labor, a rise from 24 to 44 per cent; for big business, from 66 to 74 per cent, and for oil companies, from 77 to 81 per cent. For Arab interests, the percentage dropped from 54 to 53 per cent.

Louis Harris's December 1974-January 1975 survey probed attitudes of two major groups—a representative national cross-section and the leadership community, i.e., opinion leaders in such areas as business, government, religion, education, labor, and communications—toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and toward the Jews in the United States. In an evaluation of this poll,12 Harris asserted that "American Jews have vastly overestimated their problems as well as the precariousness of Israel's position." Antisemitism, the survey found, "is holding at traditional levels." As for support for Israel, it "is deep and wide among non-Jews," in fact "at a record peak," with 56 per cent of the leadership group expressing such support and only 5 per cent supporting the Arabs. The proportion of those wishing to supply Israel with arms "has grown enormously": 66 per cent of the national sample were in favor and 26 per cent against; among leaders, the respective percentages were 75 and 13. Also, while Arafat was gaining recognition as the leader of the Palestinians, negative attitudes toward him have grown; his appearance before the UN was opposed by 58 per cent of the public, while 30 per cent favored it. Harris's "pivotal" question was worded as follows: "If . . . the only way we could get Arab oil in enough quantity and at lower prices was to stop supporting Israel with military aid, would you favor or oppose such a move by this country?" Abandoning Israel to get enough oil was opposed by 64 against 18 per cent, with near unanimity on the question by the leadership sample—93 against 5 per cent. However, when a national cross-section of Jews was asked how they thought non-Jews would respond, 45 per cent were of the opinion that Israel would be traded for oil, 34 per cent were not.

It was evident from interviews of 50 professional heads of associations in various industries conducted by Yankelovich in New York and Washington during January and February 1975 that industry generally was not concerned with Middle East problems, except as they related to oil. Industrialists, he found, did not openly support Arab countries, but appeared eager to do business with Arab nations and to encourage Arab investment in the United States. And although they considered the Jewish lobby too powerful, Yankelovich summed up, "as a group, they are not anti-Jewish."13

Commentators have talked about the waning support for Israel of liberal-left groups. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset, who conducted a study of college and university faculty members, reported that the traditionally strong

12"Oil or Israel?", op. cit.
13Geraldine Rosenfield report, American Jewish Committee, August 1975 (mimeo).
support of intellectuals for Israel may be eroding. While support of Israel remained high among college faculty—57 per cent, against 8 per cent who favored the Arabs—it was slightly lower than among the college-educated generally. Of the faculty members interviewed, 76 per cent opposed the “Zionist-racist” concept; 77 per cent believed Israel should keep Jerusalem as its capital; 73 per cent favored continuing United States supply of weapons to Israel, and 65 per cent approved Israel’s right to retaliate against Arab terrorism. On the other hand, 64 per cent of them preferred a more even-handed United States Middle East policy. Half thought the United States should pressure Israel to give in more to Arab demands, as compared to 75 per cent of Jewish faculty members who oppose such American action. Ladd and Lipset concluded that, although faculty support for Israel has been substantial, differences between liberal-left and Jewish faculty members could lead to serious conflict, particularly if Israel’s survival is threatened.

There have been indications of growing resentment of intensive lobbying, partly triggered by the Turkish-Greek dispute over Cyprus. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield on a “Meet the Press” broadcast on July 27 expressed concern about the role of ethnic lobbies in shaping foreign policy, and remarked: “I give loyalty to one country—the United States of America.” American Jews were more directly affected when columnist Tom Braden quoted Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as having said: “I am the Secretary of State of the United States, not the representative of Hadassah.” Columnist Charles Bartlett, in a strange non sequitur, claimed the Turkish arms embargo was not lifted because of the Israel lobby, whose sole concern, he claimed, has always been the interest of Israel. In his column, Jerry ter Horst wrote of what he called Israel’s political clout, and declared that the Jewish lobby was exerting unwarranted pressure.

Arabs

PROPAGANDA

Arab propaganda in the United States has been aimed not only at undermining support for Israel; the “Zionist-racist” thrust indicates that an effort was also being made to foment antisemitism. Arab propaganda activities in this country have increased substantially, as manifested by more extensive newspaper advertising campaigns and increased efforts to place the Arab viewpoint before the business, financial, political, academic and church communities. Greater exposure of the American public to pro-Arab opinion has resulted from the concentrated attention given to Middle East affairs and the obligation of the media to present all points of

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view. Anti-Israel spokesmen appearing with increased frequency in the press, on radio, and television rarely failed to espouse the "Zionist-racist" line especially in interviews, where this concept has almost always been challenged. With grants from the OPEC nations, expenditures on Arab propaganda in this country have been estimated at $45 million annually.16

Pro-Arab publications have been proliferating. In 1975 the Arab League Propaganda Center in Washington launched the periodical, Arab Report, and the Arab Information Center in San Francisco began publication of the monthly Arab West Coast Report. Palestine, a Palestine Liberation Organization monthly information bulletin, began publication in Beirut in January. A second publication, Palestine Lives!, also carried the imprint of the PLO Department of Information in Beirut.

The National Association of Arab-Americans (NAAA), with headquarters in Washington, was attempting to coordinate lobbying for the Arab cause. On March 8, 1975, it published in the Washington Post a quarter-page ad headlined "An Open Letter to the United States Congress," which urged an end to the "unbalanced support of Israel, to the detriment of American interests and moral standing." NAAA claimed to represent 105,000 constituents in 43 states.

Indicative of the American effort to secure business in the Middle East were advertisements placed in the NAAA publication by such diverse business organizations as Allis-Chalmers, Goldman, Sachs & Co., Goodyear Tire and Rubber, and others. The U.S. Arab Chamber of Commerce continued to promote trade between the United States and Arab nations. Besides holding meetings, this organization has been publishing the Arab Economic Review.

The Arab presence at American colleges and universities has increased significantly. Some 25,000 Moslem students studied in the United States in the 1974-1975 academic year, and an enrollment of nearly 35,000 was expected for 1975-76. These students have been trying to aid the Arab cause. For example, the Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG), headquartered in Detroit, has attempted to disseminate propaganda and to place speakers. At its 1975 convention, it passed a resolution "to condemn Zionism in the Middle East and apartheid in South Africa." On the whole, however, increased studies at American universities seemed to reflect a desire to secure the best possible education for future leaders in the Arab world. It was expected that most of the future intellectual leaders of the Middle East and the Arab-speaking nations in North Africa will have received their higher education in the United States.

BOYCOTT

A change, in 1975, in the posture of the United States governmental agencies toward the Arab boycott resulted from publicly supported pressure by Jewish

agencies. An intensive campaign was waged against Arab attempts to exclude American corporations doing business with Israel or employing Jews from getting Arab contracts and to prevent Jewish businesses from participating in such contracts. In May the American Jewish Committee succeeded in eliciting commitments from a representative group of American industrial and banking corporations, among them General Electric, Westinghouse, Xerox, Ford Motor Company, Eastman Kodak, U.S. Steel, First National City Bank, and Chase Manhattan Bank, to resist any boycott that would discriminate against Jews or Israel. Some 100 colleges and universities responded to a similar American Jewish Committee inquiry that they would not submit to Arab pressure, and backed up their statements with action. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for example, turned down a $2 million contract to plan and design Saudi Arabia's water- and electric-power facilities. Michigan State University suspended participation in a consortium of American colleges, which had undertaken to assist Riyadh University in Saudi Arabia, when its dean, a Jew, was refused a visa by Saudi Arabia. This moved the entire consortium to back out of the project.

Statements condemning the Arab boycott generally dealt with its discrimination against American Jews. President Gerald Ford spoke out against Arab attempts to discriminate against financial “institutions or individuals on religious or ethnic grounds,” which, he said, were totally contrary and repugnant to American principles.17 Sidney Sober, State Department deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, echoed this sentiment when he stated before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: “I want to reemphasize that we oppose the boycott and will continue to make our opposition known and will continue to oppose any efforts to discriminate against American firms or individuals on the basis of religion or ethnic background.”18

The Wall Street Journal, on the other hand, dealt with the entire boycott issue when it declared that Arab pressures had taken an “ugly turn” with the revelation of an Arab blacklist, and argued: “In terms of both morality and self-interest, it is incumbent on western businesses to resist such pressure, and on the United States government to press for an early end to the whole Arab blacklist.”19 However, the line between discrimination against American Jews and against the Arab blacklist of American business corporations was generally not clearly drawn. Newsweek reported that the Arabs were encouraged to maintain the boycott because “western corporations were only too willing to play the blacklist game.”20

The extent of government indignation at the boycott may be gauged by the introduction in the House or Senate, during the first five months of 1975, of 20 bills and one resolution to put a stop to excessive Arab investment in the United States

18 Department of State Bulletin, April 7, 1975.
20 Newsweek, March 10, 1975.
or to boycott activities. The states of New York and Illinois passed laws making it illegal for corporations to adhere to the boycott. Action by the government, according to Business Week of December 1, 1975, came to a head following the UN General Assembly vote equating Zionism with racism. Commenting on the many anti-boycott measures then being considered by Congress and a statement by the White House, the weekly stated: "The flurry of activity is a reaction against the Arab-sponsored resolution labeling Zionism as a form of racial discrimination adopted by the United Nations General Assembly."

Earlier in the year, national attention had focused on the boycott when Secretary of Commerce Rogers C.B. Morton refused to make available to a House Commerce Subcommittee confidential reports of Arab pressures on American companies. The subcommittee retaliated by seeking a citation of contempt against Morton. It had been the policy of the Commerce Department to distribute to American companies invitations to bid on contracts with Arab nations containing boycott provisions. The department claimed it was not a party to the boycott, since it enclosed in each invitation to bid a statement to the effect that the boycott was contrary to its policy. Nongovernmental agencies generally interpreted this as meaning that the Departments of State and Commerce would look the other way when boycott efforts were initiated by the Arab nations. Late in 1975 the Commerce Department reversed itself by indicating that it would not distribute any such invitations that required adherence to the Arab boycott.\(^{21}\) The move may have been in response to a suit filed by the Anti-Defamation League in federal court to prevent the Commerce Department from violating United States law and policy by promoting Arab boycott operations that restricted free trade and discriminated against American Jews.\(^{22}\)

Following Commerce Department action, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Arthur F. Burns moved against the boycott in the financial community. In a letter to the 5,800 Federal Reserve member banks, he declared: "The participation of a U.S. bank, even passively, in efforts by foreign nationals to effect boycotts against other foreign countries friendly to the U.S. is, in the Board’s view, misuse of the privileges and benefits conferred upon banking institutions."\(^{23}\)

However, there were within the administration differences in the stand on the Arab boycott. The Federal Reserve Board cautioned American banks against issuing letters of credit in transactions involving the boycott of Israel, an action supported by Attorney General Edward H. Levi, a "hardliner." On the other hand, Secretary of State Kissinger, who was seeking a "softer" line to advance peace efforts, was supported by the Treasury and Commerce Departments for economic reasons. The latter, it was reported, believed that discrimination against American citizens should be prohibited, but that economic pressure against Israel should be ignored, a position advanced by President Ford in November.\(^{24}\)

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\(^{24}\) Business Week, January 19, 1976.
The "softer" line apparently won out. On January 20, 1976, the Federal Reserve Board sent a "clarification" to banks indicating, in effect, that the main concern was discrimination against American Jews. Attorney General Levi, however, has continued to press his case and has instituted a test case against the giant Bechtel Corporation, charging the concern with violation of the anti-trust laws in its rejection of contractors who ignored the boycott in Middle East construction projects.25 Thus far, the effects of the resolute action in the United States to prevent participation of American corporations in the Arab boycott could not be fully assessed. However, in testimony before a House Committee, the Anti-Defamation League listed a number of diverse institutions against whom suit had been brought for boycott-related discrimination against American Jews. Among them were Northwestern University, the Bendix Corporation, American Bureau of Shipping, Aramco, the Hospital Corporation of America, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Lockheed Aircraft, and the International Schools Services (the last later signed a conciliation agreement ending discriminatory practices).26

PETRODOLLARS

The 1973 embargo on oil shipments by the Arab oil-producing nations to the United States and other countries, and the quadrupling of the price of oil, gave rise to fears of the misuse of economic power by the Arabs. Jews in America were concerned that it would bring about discrimination and encourage antisemitism. In 1974 a World Bank study predicted that the OPEC surplus would reach $1.2 trillion by 1985—a sum equal to the total United States gross national product for 1973 and ten times as much as the interest received by American business for foreign investments.27

The fear of oil financial blackmail has so far proved unfounded. Writing in the New York Times, Edwin L. Dale, Jr., asked "What happened to all the oil billions?" According to a Brookings Institution report, Dale said, "problems arising from the financial surpluses of members of OPEC are inherently manageable and will in any event steadily diminish." Oil-producing nations, he continued, spent their money on imports faster than they had thought possible, so that surpluses were diminishing and some nations were even forced to borrow money. There was, too, almost no attempt to "buy up" industries, although a few Arab investments were made where they were welcome. Dale predicted the problem of the oil shock to the world economy would grow less as time goes on.28

A development in the availability of Arab oil money, which was of particular

26Ira Gissen, Anti-Defamation League, testimony before the Oversight Hearings, Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities, Committee on Education and Labor, January 22, 1976. (For a review of anti-boycott legislation and action, see Middle East Review, Winter 1975/6.)
27The Petrodollar Explosion, Institute of Human Relations, October 15, 1975 (mimeo.).
interest to the Jewish community, was a proposal for a Middle East trip of the 70-member Southern Conference of Black Mayors, by its president, Mayor A. J. Cooper, Jr. of Prichard, Ala., to secure petrodollars for their communities. While the majority voted in favor of the trip, there was opposition, and one of the "loudest and angriest voices" was that of Mayor Charles Evers of Fayette, Miss., the lone member of the executive committee to oppose it. Georgia State Senator Julian Bond, keynote speaker at the convention, cautioned the mayors against alienating American Jews with their plan, but stopped short of outright opposition. Plans for the trip seem to have been quietly dropped.  

A controversial petrodollar project was the purchase for $17.4 million of Kiwah, a ten-mile island off the South Carolina coast, for a resort development by the Kuwait Investment Company. The 3,000-member Charleston Jewish community, as well as conservation groups, protested the development. The manager of Kiwah Beach Company stated that his company had pledged nondiscrimination and was now doing business with Jewish-owned enterprises. Ultimately, the Charleston city council agreed to rezone the island for resort purposes.

Richard A. Debs, chief administrative officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, reported that cooperation between the Federal Reserve Bank and the central banks of the OPEC nations has reduced possibilities of disruption of the world monetary system. He stated that 20 per cent of the 1974 OPEC "investible surplus" of $55 billion was invested in the United States. In 1975 there was a shift from time deposits to investments in federal government securities. Equity investments for OPEC nations have been estimated at $2 billion, largely in securities for portfolio purposes, "not for the purpose of acquiring control of individual companies."

**Soviet Jewry**

The Jewish community in America which for years had actively striven for freedom for Soviet Jewry, both with regard to emigration and life within the Soviet Union, was briefly heartened by an international agreement to which the Soviet Union subscribed. In August, 35 nations committed themselves to the Helsinki Agreement, which dealt not only with political and military relations but with such matters as human rights and the reunification of families. Included in the list of agreements was the freedom to emigrate. The interpretation of the Soviet Union of what was hoped would be a step toward the extension of freedom within the Soviet Union was not long in coming. In an unusual action on August 2, the prominent Soviet Jewish activist Aleksander Lerner was called to the office of an immigration official to discuss a letter he had written to Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev. Lerner reported he was told that "no policy change is planned toward Jews wanting to leave for Israel and there is no need to change it, since this

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With reference to the Helsinki document relating to increased freedom of movement and increasing contact between people, Lerner was told this would be accomplished "by allowing reunion of families of Soviet Jews with their relatives in Israel and by treating every application for exit in a positive spirit." It was stressed, however, that this will not mean free emigration for all Soviet citizens, whether Jew or non-Jew.

During the year American Jews and many others watched with dismay as the distressing list of Jews who were militant or had applied for exit visas were being called before the courts, many receiving punishment for such offenses as "hooliganism."

A major effort in the United States to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union to ease restrictions on emigration of Soviet Jews had apparently failed; on January 10, 1975, the Kremlin scrapped its 1972 trade agreement with the United States following the adoption of the Jackson-Vanick amendment and a clause limiting Eximbank credits (AJYB, 1976 [Vol. 76], pp. 160-70). What actually caused the Soviet response has been debated at length. According to William Korey, "If the Kremlin now unleashed a strong propaganda attack upon the Jackson Amendment, it is apparent that the principal target of its criticism was the credit limitation. Until the limitation became certain, the Soviet Union avoided any indication that it would not adhere—even if unenthusiastically—to the objective of the amendment."

Critics [of détente] all across the political spectrum, who insisted that there must be a clear quid pro quo, fastened on the idea of linking the trade agreements to a Soviet agreement on the emigration of Jews. Rather than submit, Moscow cancelled the trade agreement.

Even such critics of Mr. Kissinger as Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia University acknowledged that he was probably right. Jewish emigration exceeded 30,000 as a result of Mr. Kissinger's quiet diplomacy and dropped sharply after the controversy. Nevertheless, Professor Brzezinski, an expert on Soviet affairs, maintained that Kissinger's policy was morally neutral and that it was wrong to separate détente from human rights issues. He is joined in this view by Senator Jackson and many intellectuals.

During the first nine months of 1975, the emigration of Soviet Jews dropped by nearly 50 per cent from that in the same 1974 period. It was 1,017 in September and 1,278 in October. In January 1975, 35 per cent of the immigrants went to countries other than Israel, in October 44 per cent. This was seen as an indication that the Soviet Union was practicing selective approval of exit visas to discourage emigration to Israel.

The announcement by the Soviet Union that five Russian rabbinical students would be allowed to come to the United States for training was widely regarded as a small gesture rather than any significant change in anti-Jewish policies. Indeed,
information received by the National Conference on Soviet Jewry indicated that the implementation of the plan was questionable.

Christian-Jewish Relations

The efforts of Catholic and Protestant churches to remove from their teaching and other materials passages nurturing antisemitism, especially those blaming the Jews for the crucifixion of Jesus, have greatly improved Christian-Jewish relations. An important step in this direction was a call issued to American Catholics by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops at a scholarly convocation, held in Washington, D.C., on December 16, observing the tenth anniversary of the “Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to non-Christian Religions.” It condemned antisemitism “as opposed to the very spirit of Christianity,” and urged Catholics “in the church who work in the area of education, whether in the seminary, the school or the pulpit, not only to avoid any presentation that might tend to disparage Jews or Judaism but also to emphasize those aspects of our faith which bear witness to our common patrimony and our spiritual ties with Jews.” Taking its authority from the Vatican Council statement, the Conference asserted that “the Jewish people never were, nor are they now, guilty of the death of Christ.” Earlier, at its annual meeting, the National Conference had called upon Catholic teachers and priests to avoid “any presentation that might tend to disparage Jews or Judaism.”

The Rev. Pierre de Contenson, secretary to the Vatican Commission for Relations with the Jews, reported that the United States was far ahead of the rest of the world in efforts to improve Catholic-Jewish relations. While admitting that there remained some problems and difficulties, he had particular praise for the stepped-up activity of the U.S. Bishops’ Conference to combat ignorance and misunderstanding.

Progress in this direction was manifested in many other ways. In June, at a national conference on “Faith Without Prejudice,” sponsored by the American Jewish Committee and St. Louis University in cooperation with the National Catholic Education Association, the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., and other organizations, attention was focused on textbook and curriculum revisions in all religious educational institutions. Similar conferences were planned at the community level. Dr. Eugene Fisher, a leading Catholic educator of the Archdiocese of Detroit, reported at a meeting of the American Jewish Committee Executive Council that Catholic teaching materials had become much more positive in the last decade: “To my knowledge,” he declared, “there has never been such an extensive interreaction on the personal, social, and professional basis between Jews and Christians in any period in history during the past 1,900 years as there is today, especially in the United States.”

Seminars for academicians and scholars designed to effect changes in curriculum in colleges, universities, and seminaries were held, for the fifth year, at Princeton Theological Seminary and, for the fifth year, at the Vanderbilt School of Theology. These seminars, cosponsored by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, substantially contributed to the work of hundreds of scholars and teachers now developing new courses, revising textbooks, and raising the visibility of Jews and Judaism in current courses in religion, philosophy, history and literature. In December the Evangelical Christians, a group previously not conspicuously active in Jewish-Christian dialogue, cosponsored with the American Jewish Committee a national conference which discussed plans for joint Christian-Jewish activities and steps to combat antisemitism.

Studies conducted over the last two decades have found startlingly inaccurate and prejudicial statements about Jews also in public-school textbooks. The systematic effort to eliminate any statements of this kind was particularly successful in 1975, when the major publishers moved to make such changes. Among them were Allyn and Bacon, a major textbook publisher who made substantial changes in many of its texts, correcting erroneous as well as prejudiced statements about Jewish history and Judaism. A teachers' guide to a revised edition of one of its series included explanatory notes designed to correct misconceptions about Jews. And Ginn Publishers corrected a harmful version of the story of the crucifixion in the textbook, *The Story of Man's Past.*

Another indication of improving attitudes toward Jews in the Christian religious community was the increase in the publication of books by Christian scholars designed to improve Christian-Jewish relations and understanding, among them Rosemary Reuther's *Faith and Fratricide* (Seabury Press, 1975) and Franklin H. Littell's *The Crucifixion of the Jews* (Harper & Row, 1975).

**Black-Jewish Relations**

The consensus among leaders of the black and Jewish communities was that relations between the two groups have improved in the course of 1975. The New York *Times* of April 14, 1975, published “Blacks and Jews Viewed as Drawing Closer Again,” which reported interviews with a number of black and Jewish leaders reflecting this view. Eleanor Holmes Norton, chairman of the New York City Commission on Human Rights, stated there was no question in her mind that “there has been a notable improvement in the last year.” In what may be considered a landmark editorial, the important New York black weekly *Amsterdam News* of April 16 issued a strong statement of support for the Jewish community. The editorial, titled “Our Time to Choose,” declared that the black community had to choose between “benign neutrality” or fighting on the side of right. Jews, it continued, faced the same choice in the 1960s and they chose to fight on the side of right.

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"Black people in 1975 cannot afford to do less." Readers were reminded that "the contributions of our Jewish allies become all the more epic when one recalls that the Jews did not have to enter this fight at all."

There were many evidences of support of the Jewish community's aspirations by black leaders, particularly with regard to the plight of Soviet Jewry, support of Israel, and the UN resolution equating Zionism to racism. On the initiative of Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton, a statement of solidarity with the civil-rights struggle of Russian Jews, signed by a group of 22 black government, business, religious, and communal leaders, was placed as an advertisement in the *Amsterdam News* on the occasion of "Solidarity Sunday" on behalf of Soviet Jews.19

Frequent expressions of support for Israel came from black leadership, including the Black Political Caucus. The A. Philip Randolph Institute organized the "Black Americans in Support of Israel Committee" (BASIC), a national leadership group of some 200 politicians, organization heads, business executives and other personalities. Bayard Rustin, the Institute's executive director and head of BASIC, called for the rooting-out of discrimination and urged the black community not "to sit idly by while the government cooperates with foreign interests trying to import bigotry into America."40

The United Nations resolution on Zionism and racism drew immediate and widespread condemnation in the black community from leaders and publications like the *Amsterdam News* which, on November 12, also published a strong editorial calling the Arab boycott "white collar antisemitism" and asking blacks to oppose it. A strong statement was issued by Roy Wilkins, director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). In a syndicated column headed "A Setback for the U.N.," Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., director of the National Urban League, asked: "Is the General Assembly majority saying that national self-determination is for everyone except Jews?" and added, "Smearing the 'racist' label on Zionism is an insult to intelligence. Black people can easily smell out the fact that 'Zionism' in this context is a code word for anti-Semitism."41

The A. Philip Randolph Institute, in a news release of November 13, 1975, declared: "Zionism is not racism, but the legitimate expression of the Jewish people's self-determination, just as the liberation of 43 African countries in the last thirty years was the expression of their self-determination. To condemn it alone of all the movements for self-determination was an act of gigantic hypocrisy." In his column, published on the same day, Bayard Rustin commented: "It was a sad day because the battle against racism was set back and a terrifying day because a supposedly anti-racist resolution gave approval for anti-Semitism, one of the oldest and most virulent racisms the world has ever known."

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40BASIC press release, October 10, 1975.
41Report of Communications Department, National Urban League, November 12, 1975.
Not without effect has been the change of attitudes of the Black Muslims toward whites since the death of its spiritual leader, Elijah Muhammed, who had depicted all white people, including Jews, as devils. The New York Times of August 31, 1975, published a report of the first party ever given in a Black Muslim compound in Chicago attended by whites, at which all participants mingled freely. The action of one Black Muslim, Muhammed Ali, who provided an estimated $150,000 for a recreation center for aged Jewish concentration-camp survivors no doubt had a favorable impact on blacks in view of his remarkable charisma.

In August the Daniel Yankelovich organization polled some 100 local, grass-roots black leaders in various cities throughout the country on their opinions on Israel, the Middle East, and American Jews. Some expressed ambivalence toward Israel, particularly with regard to American money being sent to Israel when it was needed for the solution of social problems at home. At the same time, there was significant admiration for the American Jewish community's support of Israel. The findings revealed that Jews were believed to be less anti-black than other whites. About one-quarter of the respondents thought that relations of blacks with Jews had improved; a similar number thought they had worsened. Slightly fewer thought that "relations had stayed as good as in the past." This survey certainly is no indication of all black opinion. It does, however, strongly support the view that a gap exists between the national and community black leadership.42

Reverse Discrimination

The controversy over reverse discrimination remained unresolved in 1975, after several years of debate, attempts to clarify government policy, and resort to courts. Jewish community organizations have generally pressed hard for equality of opportunity, but have vigorously objected to equality of results to be achieved through preferential treatment or reverse discrimination. Preferential treatment has, for the first time, been discussed in depth in a widely noted book, Affirmative Discrimination (Basic Books, 1976) by Nathan Glazer.

The interpretation of affirmative action, goals, and quotas had caused confusion and resulted in litigation, such as the DeFunis case (AJYB, 1976 [Vol. 76], p. 132), which became a focus of debate between black and Jewish, and many other groups. The problem of preferential treatment, or reverse discrimination, manifested itself in business and academic hiring and promotion practices, college admissions, and seniority rights. It arose, at least in part, from inadequate governmental guidelines, confusion, and lack of action on the part of governmental agencies.

The enforcement of equal-employment opportunity through the threat of withholding federal contracts was critically reviewed by James Hyatt in the Wall Street

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Journal of November 11, 1975. In his view, "the government's stiffest civil rights stick—the threat to withhold federal contracts from companies that discriminate against minority and female workers—is becoming a comic foam-rubber club. That's the surprising unanimous conclusion of groups on all side of the enforcement effort." Employers, he continued, "despair of ever receiving clear and consistent regulations regarding their obligations to hire minorities and women." Hyatt pointed out that while there is confusion as to what is meant by goals and good-faith efforts in industry, perhaps the muddle is even worse in higher education. There is considerable feeling in the academic community that employment goals have become quotas "resulting in forced hiring of unqualified minorities and women and diluting the concept of excellence in education."

Aside from the uncertainties in enforcement and compliance procedures, the present economic situation has necessitated retrenchment, which was usually carried out according to the principle of "last hired, first fired." Resentment against this practice was strong among minorities and women, who felt that they should receive preference to compensate them for past restriction of opportunities. Seniority, on the other hand, has been considered a precious contractual right by organized labor. Stated the AFL-CIO, "we reject the spurious notion that the seniority system must be destroyed just when it is needed most to protect all workers, without regard to race or sex. The AFL-CIO will continue to support every valid effort to protect workers threatened by the current recession while opposing any and all effort to weaken or dilute the seniority system."

A rash of court cases has resulted from the last hired, first fired system, with varying decisions. Examples of court cases dealing with seniority involved the Jersey Central Power and Light Co. and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; Waters v. the Wisconsin Steel Workers of the International Harvester Co.; Watkins v. United Steel Workers of the Continental Can Co. Higher courts have supported seniority systems containing no intent to discriminate. The cases were now headed toward the Supreme Court.

Jewish concern has been concentrated mainly on academic fair-employment practices. Pressure on the part of Jewish agencies produced what hopefully was a clarification by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). A directive issued by HEW to college and university presidents toward the end of 1974 stated that goals were good-faith estimates, but that merit was the decisive factor in hiring policies (AJYB, 1976 [Vol. 76], p. 135). Colleges and universities, however, have continued to feel pressured to appoint women or minorities, although their qualifications may have been lower, to make them "look good." Jewish organizations reported a large number of apparent violations of HEW guidelines, but their processing seemed interminably delayed. Hook and Todorovich wrote an article citing more than 100 reported cases of discrimination which involved thousands of

persons in post-secondary education institutions. They quoted from letters received by applicants for academic positions, such as the following from a university in Florida: "... the decision is that all unfilled positions in the university must be filled by blacks or females. Since I have no information regarding your racial identification, it will only be possible to consider you for a position in the event that you are black."44

A report prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education warned that quick judgment on sex discrimination was dangerous in that apparent inequities may result from decisions women themselves have made regarding occupation, marriage, and children. These decisions may have been a result of widely held views of parents, teachers, and advisers on the appropriate position of women. The fact of choice of occupation was an important one. The report pointed out, for example, that women were holding less than half of 1 per cent of Ph.D.s in engineering, and constituted an even smaller percentage of university engineering faculties. The report then asked, "if an engineering department in a major university has never had a female faculty member, does that university have a 'deficiency' and can it be charged with 'excluding women'?"45

In Atlanta, an affirmative action plan "that goes beyond anything on the federal government's books" has been energetically pushed by the first black mayor of the city, Maynard H. Jackson, Jr. According to the program, any white-owned business securing a city contract must share 15 to 25 per cent of the job with blacks who are to act as partners or subcontractors. The result has been considerable controversy and bitterness. One architect called the provision blackmail. A federal grand jury was investigating whether undue pressure was being exerted on white-owned firms to adhere to this program.46

Jewish agencies were generally agreed that preferential treatment was required in cases where there had been willful and persistent violation of court-ordered steps to end discriminatory practices. For a year, Chicago was under order by Federal District Judge Prentice H. Marshall to require its police department to begin hiring by quotas until police personnel reflected the proportions of blacks and Hispanics in the city's population. The city was appealing the decision. Similar Justice Department action was taken against the State of Alabama, which now must hire a black state trooper for every white one hired.47 A number of court decisions were to be tested in the Supreme Court.

46Business Week, November 17, 1975.
Black Community

A recently published study of black progress carefully traced economic, educational, and social gains and losses from 1960 through 1972. Completed too early to take into account the serious effects of the recession, the study concluded that "blacks have made substantial gains." The authors pointed out that during the decade ending 1972 blacks made great strides in all job areas, especially white-collar occupations. Black women made relatively the greatest advances, almost reaching equality with white women in earning power. Educational gains were "dramatic," with the proportion of nonwhites between the ages of 25 and 29 holding college degrees rising from 6 to 12 per cent. Health improvement matched that of whites. The study pointed out, however, that family life deteriorated. More than one-third of black births each year were illegitimate. "The problems in this dimension are serious," it states. "Two-fifths of black children are growing up poor, of whom two-thirds are in female-headed households."

While the authors of the study and others in the field have advocated the expansion of government-sponsored programs, some of which have been successful, there has developed a backlash against pouring money into social programs that appeared to have fallen short of the desired results. Poor reading scores, for example, seemed to point to failure in the field of education. Overzealous use of affirmative action resulting in quotas and attack on the seniority system has brought vigorous opposition jeopardizing all social legislation. There appeared to be growing resistance nationally to experimentation and growing conservatism with regard to expenditures for social programs.

A Bureau of the Census spot study for 1974 indicated uncertain progress in the 1970s. While blacks made important gains in education and politics, like whites they have experienced a substantial loss of income and jobs. Also, the number of black women as heads of families has continued to grow, rising to 35 per cent in 1975 from 28 per cent in 1970.

Other items, positive and negative, were reported. The total black population of central cities in metropolitan areas has grown annually by 1.6 per cent, somewhat more slowly than in the 1960s, while the white population has decreased annually by 1.6 per cent. The jobless rate for blacks was 13.7 per cent, against 7.6 per cent for whites. The median black family income was $7,800 in 1974, an increase of 7.4 per cent over 1973; but after adjusting for the effects of inflation, actual purchasing power of black families has declined 3.2 per cent. Blacks


holding elective office in May of 1975 totaled 3,503—an increase of 1,643, or 88 per cent in four years, but still less than 1 per cent of all elected officials. The proportion of 20-to-24-year-old blacks who completed high school was 72 per cent in 1974, up from 65 per cent in 1970; for whites it was 85 per cent. Enrollment of blacks in colleges has increased by 56 per cent in the 1970s, against a gain in white enrollment of 15 per cent. College attendance among blacks between the ages of 18 and 28 was 18 per cent, against 25 per cent of whites. In an address at a meeting sponsored by the magazine Black Enterprise, reported in the New York Times of January 29, 1976, Dr. Andrew Brimmer, former member of the Federal Reserve Board, maintained that whereas blacks constituted 16 per cent of all federal government employees, they were underrepresented in the private sector of the economy. He called for more employment opportunities for blacks in private industry.

Roy Wilkins pointed to the substantial progress made by blacks, but conceded that much more remained to be done. There were, he said, 16 black United States Congressmen, one black Senator, over 100 black mayors, and more than 3,000 other black elected officials. "At the same time," he continued, "they have registered gains in employment, education, housing and the administration of justice which represent merely a beginning on human rights. Their hard-going against stiff odds has been made more rocky by the efforts to block their path through technical interpretations of some aspect of affirmative action and equal opportunity. But, speaking for myself, I feel that the difficulties will be resolved, especially by those who know well the road."

A point of view not frequently voiced in the black community was forcefully expressed by Rev. Jesse L. Jackson, director of Operation PUSH, in a call for discipline in the black community, particularly in the schools. He urged that less time be spent convincing black children that they have been victimized and more time demanding that they take responsibility for the course of their lives.

Desegregation

Desegregation of schools by busing was a source of extensive and, at times, bitter intergroup controversy during 1975. Enforcement efforts ran into such massive public resistance, and frequently violence, that Congress seriously considered legislation to ban desegregation efforts through busing. Thomas Pettigrew, the eminent social psychologist, pointed out that desegregation can be accomplished, given the will and effective administration, as for example in Norfolk and Oklahoma City, which had been the most segregated of all urban centers in 1967 and were among the least segregated five years later. He indicated that it was in the major cities, such as Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, and New York,

with roughly one-third of all black Americans, where desegregation had not improved materially.\textsuperscript{52}

There has been some recognition that the flight of whites from the inner cities to the suburbs was a major factor in frustrating desegregation. A solution for the Detroit area, advanced in the June 1973 ruling in the now famous \textit{Milliken v. Bradley} case, provided for the busing of black Detroit children to the suburbs and of white children from the suburbs to achieve racial balance in the area schools (AJYB, 1974–75 [Vol. 75], pp. 99–100). The Supreme Court declared the decision unconstitutional in 1974.\textsuperscript{53} Whether those opposed to metropolitan solutions liked it or not, intercommunity solutions imposed on suburban areas the busing from inner cities—and possibly vice versa. In Louisville, which had a merged system with 120,000 students of whom 70 per cent were white, 11,300 black students were bused to the suburbs and a similar number of white suburban students to inner-city schools. It required some 1,000 National Guardsmen, aided by large numbers of state and local police, to control white demonstrators; more than 500 were arrested and some 50 injured.\textsuperscript{54}

On the plus side was the experience of Pontiac, which has bused children for five years. It may be recalled that the Ku Klux Klan in 1971 bombed ten school buses in that city. Approximately 11,000 of its district’s 20,000 students, most of them at the elementary level, were now being bused. However, here too, white enrollment has been reduced by 25 per cent. A scientific survey found that white attitudes toward busing had changed from an initial “negative to less negative or neutral and has not changed since.” The survey also indicated that 53 per cent of the white and 87 per cent of the black students attending schools that were half black and half white preferred this racial mix.\textsuperscript{55} The most publicized effort to achieve desegregation by busing was that in Boston (AJYB, 1976 [Vol. 76], pp. 129–30), where violence, racism, and bitter intracommunity feuding continued throughout the year.

The counterproductive effects of busing for racial balance, which found its rationale in the “Coleman Report” (AJYB, 1967 [Vol. 68], pp. 86–87), emerged from a five-year study Dr. James H. Coleman was conducting for the Urban Institute, a research organization in Washington, D.C.\textsuperscript{56} In the study Coleman analyzed desegregation data from the 20 largest school districts in the country, and compared the information with that from the 50 next largest districts. The preliminary findings were that in the largest districts “induced integration” by court order, particularly the use of busing, had led to the flight of middle-class whites and resegregation. In the smaller cities, integration appeared more stable. Dr. Coleman pointed out that

\textsuperscript{52}Wayne Law Review, March 1975.
\textsuperscript{55}\textit{Ibid.}, December 3, 1975.
\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Ibid.}, June 6, 1975.
the nature of integration had changed drastically. Integration was more acceptable to whites when the black students in question were bright, middle-class children. The problem arose, Dr. Coleman stated in a press interview, with the attempt in the big cities at mass integration of lower-income blacks with lower-income and middle-class whites—class integration as opposed to racial integration. According to the findings, "class distinctions more and more played a determining role in integrating the schools," with the result that "white racism and the fear of blacks combined with the disruptive nature of lower-income blacks to maintain a vicious circle, each phenomenon feeding on the other." White racism, he continued, put great pressure on the black community, and lower-income black youngsters "reacted with violent behavior." He cited Boston as an example. The experience with integration, Coleman felt, would have been "much more positive," if "integration had been limited to racial integration," and there had been no attempt at class integration.

Coleman was attacked by a panel of prominent sociologists and psychologists led by Kenneth B. Clark, the State Regent and psychologist, for his academic methodology, but, above all, for publicizing his findings before other sociologists had the opportunity to study them. Dr. Clark called Coleman's study part of a "revisionist" move by some prominent social commentators to reverse the effect of court-ordered integration in the North. Harvard psychologist Thomas Pettigrew argued that the period examined by Coleman was "too brief to reflect real changes," and that the study failed to consider nonschool-related reasons for white departures from the cities. Other participants on the panel were Professor Isidor Chein of New York University; Alfred McClung Lee, who had collaborated with Chein in preparing the sociological foundations for the 1954 Supreme Court desegregation decision, and Professors James Jones, Hyland Lewis, and Lawrence Plotkins.

However, Coleman was not alone in questioning busing as a satisfactory method of desegregating schools. Dr. Eleanor P. Wolf of Wayne State University doubted the competence of the courts to rule on details of procedure on the basis of social science data: "The court is the only place where we can decide if a man is guilty of murder, but it is not a good place to study the causes of homicide." Michael Novak, noted scholar on ethnic problems, stated flatly that "Busing is, in important ways, the Vietnam of the 1970s. It is a quagmire; a lost cause; taxation without representation; a policy of massive social engineering with little clear prospect of benefit; mistake; a tragedy; breeder of endless demonstrations, riots, and dissent." As he saw it, "blacks do not need buses; they need jobs. Under improved economic conditions, a black middle class and working class will integrate with whites as economic, social, cultural, and educational equals." Professor Derek Bell, who had battled segregated schools as a lawyer for the NAACP, had this to say: "I started

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off as a true believer in desegregation everywhere—and it has been painful to change my mind." He has been urging civil-rights leaders to abandon their "suicidal rigidity" in pressing for racial reassignments in many places where "meaningful" results are "virtually impossible."59

A serious complication in the efforts to achieve integration has been the establishment of private schools. Writes B. Drummon Ayres, "to the despair of civil rights activists and public educators, many of the 3,000 or so private 'academies' hastily set up to avoid desegregation in the South in recent years are gaining a semblance of permanence." About one of every ten white students in the South attended an academy which, Ayres said, divided people not only by race but also by class, though at times token blacks may be invited to register. Private schools in the North, especially in the larger cities, were gaining in popularity. In New York, for example, they had long waiting lists. In contrast to the Southern academies, however, northern private schools had black students and at times were recruiting middle-class blacks and even offering scholarships.60

Diane Ravitch, Columbia University educator, discussed disagreements among educators concerning desegregation as a major cause of white flight from the urban schools and the consequent change in the racial composition of the major American cities. She tended to support the thesis, and cited supporting data: Between 1964 and 1970 Boston lost 13 per cent of its white students, but the loss rose to 40 per cent between 1970 and 1975, mostly in the two years since busing began. Busing, she stated, has been considered successful in small cities like Wichita, Des Moines, Rockford, and Las Vegas, as well as in county schools in Florida. According to HEW, however, over 70 per cent of black students attending all-minority schools lived in 19 cities. Atlanta, where successfully integrated schools once seemed a possibility now had an 83 per cent black school population. In view of these statistics, Dr. Ravitch questioned whether desegregation was required for academic success of minority groups, whether it was necessary for every child to be in a desegregated school, and what can be done to draw whites back to the cities. She finally asked: "How much individual free choice can a democratic nation permit or deny?"61

Dr. Charles V. Willie, professor of education and urban studies at Harvard, was more optimistic about integration, suggesting that "in due time the suburbs and cities will reunite. And their union will be based on self-interest and the mutual respect of the people who populate each area."62

According to a report in the National Observer of September 6, 1975, half of the Americans polled by Louis Harris five years ago said that they were willing to see

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their children bused under court order. Scarcely a year later, the supporters had dwindled to 20 per cent, and only 52 per cent of the blacks said they were for busing for racial balance. "Today's support has shrunk still further, even though a wide majority of Americans favor school integration and nearly 90 per cent favor busing as a convenience," the Observer continued. Faced with trade-union demonstrations against busing in Louisville, AFL-CIO president George Meany found it necessary to warn Kentucky AFL-CIO leaders not to give any aid or support whatever to labor groups seeking to frustrate AFL-CIO policy, which favored busing.41

Housing

The movement of blacks to the suburbs, begun well over a decade ago, continued in 1975. In a front-page article, the New York Times of October 18, 1975, pointed to Shaker Heights, a high-income suburb of Cleveland, as an example of what can be accomplished by planned desegregation. Ever since black professionals first moved from Cleveland to Shaker Heights 20 years ago, a community planning committee has been facilitating the movement of blacks to this suburb, until they now constituted some 15 per cent of its population. In a more thorough study of the movement of blacks to suburbia, the New York Times (January 4, 1976) wrote that a growing number of middle-class black families for the first time had money to move into white or nearly all-white suburbs, and that they were doing so primarily because of the inadequacy of central-city schools. Bureau of the Census statistics indicated that the proportion of blacks in the suburban population rose from 4.5 per cent in 1950 to 5 per cent in 1960, and 6.3 per cent in 1970. In Chicago the percentages were 2.9 in 1950, 3.1 in 1960, and 3.5 in 1970. In Los Angeles, the corresponding figures were 2.9, 4.7, and 8.4 per cent. These percentages, however, may in fact represent a much larger increase in numbers, since whites have been moving to the suburbs at an ever increasing rate. The fact is that in the last two decades the black suburban population has increased by 1.5 million.

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has severely criticized government agencies for not having "gone nearly far enough to have a major impact on racial, ethnic and sex discrimination. The positive actions they have taken have generally been either superficial or incomplete and have had little impact on the country's serious housing discrimination problem." The Commission further stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1968 provided only for informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion, which "have proved inadequate to bring about prompt compliance with the law."42 "The opening of the suburbs to low-income residents was given impetus when a U.S. District Court in Hartford, Conn., denied $4.4 million in grants to seven Hartford suburbs because the communities had not implemented provisions of the

Civil Rights Act requiring plans for low-income housing.\textsuperscript{45} Governmental inadequacy was also charged in a National Urban League report of the first year's experience with programs made available by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. The Act had not achieved its purposes particularly because HUD had avoided "issues of prime importance," such as the practice of diverting monies made available from intended lower income beneficiaries.\textsuperscript{46}

Senator William Proxmire, chairman of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, made public a survey which established the following: "Black applicants for mortgage loans are turned down almost twice as frequently as white applicants at the same income levels." The study, conducted in the last half of 1974, included six metropolitan areas—Bridgeport, Cleveland, Memphis, Montgomery, Topeka, and Tucson. In the Senator's view, the study supported the need for the Equal Credit Opportunity Act he had introduced, which would make discrimination in granting loans illegal.\textsuperscript{47} The legislation adopted was a weakened version of the Proxmire bill which, for the first time, recognized by law the concept of "redlining" and provided ways to put a stop to this practice.\textsuperscript{48}

\textbf{Voting and Freedom of Information}

The Voting Rights Act, first passed in 1965 and extended in 1970 and 1975, has been a major factor in the political progress of minorities. It becomes effective in any state where less than one-half of voting-age population registered or voted in elections years, or where literacy tests or similar devices were being used. The remarkable rise in the number of black voters, particularly in the South, and black elected officials throughout the country attest to the law's effectiveness. Laws enacted in 12 states to permit voter registration by mail will, no doubt, add to the rolls many voters who hitherto had been prevented from voting.

The United States Commission on Civil Rights pointed out that, as a result of the act, the percentage of registered blacks in the South nearly doubled between 1960 and 1972, and continued to rise since then, as did voter turnout. This was particularly remarkable in view of the fact that, as the report states, "For many minority voters entering a polling place is crossing into dangerous territory, where personal experience and the shared heritage of centuries tell them they do not belong."\textsuperscript{49}

The first participation of blacks in the inaugural ball in Mississippi and in the state's regular Democratic party were indications of growing black political power and movement toward full equality. Black organizations, such as the National

\textsuperscript{45} Business Week, February 16, 1975.
Conference on Black Politics, were working to increase the black vote as well as the
number of blacks in elective office.°

In the black community and among Americans generally there was indignation
when it was revealed that the FBI had attempted to use confidential information,
secured by illegal means, to damage the reputation of the late Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. These efforts began in 1963 and continued after his death.°°It was also
learned that the FBI tried to create internal dissension in the black community to
damage the cause of civil rights. The Freedom of Information Act, which opened
up official files upon request by those accused of wrongdoing, and by others, and
improved control of government investigations, will prevent the recurrence of such
activities.

OTHER MINORITIES

Women

The movement toward equality of women made further gains in 1975, despite
some political setbacks and inner organizational conflict. In a year-end feature, Time
magazine listed the impressive achievements of American women during the year.
Among them were: Carla Hill was appointed head of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development; Ella Grasso of Connecticut became the first woman
governor, “elected in her own right”; Susy Sharp of North Carolina was the first
woman to be elected chief justice of a state supreme court; Jill Conway became the
first woman president of Smith College; Navy Lieutenant Commander Kathleen
Vyelii was appointed a top aide to the fleet’s training commands; Carol Sutton was
the first woman to hold the job of managing editor of a major newspaper, the
Louisville Courier-Journal; Sarah Caldwell was the first woman to conduct at the
New York Metropolitan Opera, and, most recently, Anne Armstrong was appointed
United States ambassador to Great Britain, a major diplomatic post.

Other examples of progress were noted. In the 1,300 largest corporations, there
were about 150 women directors, compared with 20 five years ago. Between 1971
and 1975 attendance of women at the Wharton School of Business, University of
Pennsylvania, rose from 4 to 24 percent; in the same discipline at Columbia Univer-
sity, it increased from 6 to 33 per cent. In the military, all activities except those
involving combat have been opened to women, and there were 4,600 nonmedical
officers including two brigadier generals. In 1976 West Point was expected to admit
100 women cadets, the Naval Academy 80, and the Air Force Academy 100.
Mississippi and Kentucky elected women as lieutenant governors.°°The increasing
appearance of women in the business world prompted the influential Business Week

°°Time, January 5, 1976.
to comment on this phenomenon at length and to establish a new department, "The Corporate Women.""

Recognition of women's place in the economy was reflected in the scheduled changes in three principal sections of the Federal Reserve Board regulations. These, according to Reserve Board Chairman Burns, were that part-time earnings of women would no longer be disallowed as an applicant's credit asset; questions about child-bearing intentions of a credit applicant would be banned; in the case of business loans to women, the signature of the applicant's spouse or any other second signature would not be required.

Individual and class action suits against corporations to achieve equal employment status and back pay for discriminatory action multiplied. A class action suit was filed against Chase Manhattan Bank, charging discrimination. The first case of this type cost the Bank of America $3.75 million."

Hiring and promotion of women in academic positions have made progress. Precise data were not available for the year 1975, as compared with previous years; but the National Center for Educational Statistics indicated that the percentage of full-time women faculty members had increased from 22.3 per cent in 1972-73 to 24.1 in 1974-75.

Another indication of the advance of women in occupations closed to them before was that they constituted 2 per cent of all ministers in the United States and that female enrollment in some seminaries had jumped to more than 30 per cent. Excluded from the priesthood were Roman Catholics, Episcopalians, Missouri Synod Lutherans, and some of the Fundamentalist sects. There were five women rabbis in the United States; a sixth one was now in training. Full-time women Hillel chaplains on college campuses numbered 26; there were three in 1970.

Perhaps the greatest disappointment for supporters of the women's movement was the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in the New Jersey and New York State November 1975 elections. A November 7 editorial in the New York Times expressed the widely held opinion that the campaign against ERA, which used scare tactics predicting dire results ranging from alleged financial threats to women to the abolition of separate rest rooms, changed the minds of many voters. However, the introduction of radical issues was also bound to alienate many who otherwise might have voted for the amendment. There was, for example, a call for a one-day women's strike in September, which was a complete failure. As the New York Times of November 15, 1975, pointed out, "the women's movement has increasingly allowed itself to be dominated, at least in the publicity that surrounds it, by radical splinter groups and issues which lack support among the majority of women," e.g., greater sexual freedom, lesbianism, and the so-called "open family."

Conscious of the need to change the feminist image, a group of eminent women,  

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including such pioneers as Betty Friedan, proposed a reappraisal of the women's movement and constituted itself a "network" to represent the forefront of feminist thinking. In its view, the leading women's liberation movement NOW was "overstressing lesbian rights and alienating housewives with firebrand oratory."\footnote{Time, December 1, 1975.}

Indeed, the UN-sponsored International Women's Year Conference in Mexico City may have lost support for the women's movement in the United States. The delegates, most of them from Arab and Third-World countries, refused to condemn sexism which has been rampant in their own countries. They did, however, pass a resolution condemning Zionism. (p. 115-18).

Jewish organizations have generally taken a strong stand on behalf of women's rights and the Equal Rights Amendment. Among actions in support of women's rights was a resolution adopted at the annual convention of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council. A conference of 200 women of diverse ethnic, religious, class, and racial backgrounds, sponsored by the Institute on Pluralism and Group Identity of the American Jewish Committee, discussed "The Challenge of the Women's Movement." The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith announced the forthcoming publication of a book on the history of women's rights in America. The National Council of Jewish Women, at its 1975 biennial convention, recognized women's rights as a top priority, issued a "Women's Issues Guide", and actively supported ratification of Equal Rights Amendments in states where the issue was relevant.

Hispanics

It was estimated that more than 2,000 volunteer organizations were operating in the Hispanic community.\footnote{New York Times, July 21, 1975.} But there seemed to be no strong central leadership or organization, which was sorely needed. Apart from discrimination and prejudice, the Hispanics, like other minorities, have suffered from the economic recession because of unavailability of jobs and lack of employment seniority. The plight of Hispanic migrant farm workers in California has been particularly severe. However, here too there were indications of upward mobility and increasing political power, especially for Hispanics outside New York. A Columbia University Bureau of Applied Research study indicated that Puerto Ricans living in New York state lagged considerably behind Puerto Ricans born on the mainland and living elsewhere. The average income of the 25 through 64 age group among the latter was $1,200 higher than that of the New York residents. Island-born Puerto Ricans, despite less schooling, also did better in other states, earning $1,000 more a year than New Yorkers. The study reveals that of all Puerto Ricans in the United States 36 per cent were island-born and lived in New York state; 22 per cent were island-born and lived in other states; 27 per cent were mainland-born and lived in New York,
and 15 per cent were mainland-born and lived elsewhere. With regard to occupations, the study reported, mainland-born Puerto Rican men between the ages of 35 and 44, "compare rather favorably with the general U.S. male population." 78

There have been indications of growing organization and power of other Spanish-speaking Americans. The efforts of the United Farm Workers (UFW) and its leader, Cesar Chavez, appeared to have some success. The California action giving workers a choice between joining UFW or the International Brotherhood of Teamsters has thus far been quite advantageous for the former. The Voting Rights Act has increased the registration and voting of Hispanics. During the last two years in the Southwest, Hispanics have for the first time ousted "Anglos" from political leadership in some communities, and have been elected to office in New Mexico and Arizona. 79

However, tensions and prejudices continued. Bitter feelings between farmers, migrant workers, and teamster representatives were clearly evident, with more subtle methods replacing violence, and at times, murder. "The fear of losing one's job as a result of political activity is replacing the gunshot in the back," stated Dr. Charles L. Cotrell, a faculty member of St. Mary's University, San Antonio, who reported the use by whites of the threat of job loss to prevent Mexican-American political activity. 80

The growth of political strength of the Hispanics was evident from a conference of Democratic Spanish-surnamed elected officials, held in Washington October 31-November 1, 1975, one of whom explored ways of strengthening the political clout of "12 million Latin people in the United States." Participants were encouraged by the extension of the Civil Rights Act to allow bilingual elections. Only some 35 per cent of all eligible Spanish-surnamed voters over 18 years of age were currently registered.

The economic success of Spanish-speaking Americans of Cuban and Central and South American origins contrasted sharply with the difficulties of the poorer and less educated immigrants from Puerto Rico and Mexico. Former Cubans, especially, have shown striking ability to achieve success quickly, as demonstrated in the New York and Miami areas.

The organized Jewish community has been sympathetic to all aspects of social and economic progress. The Program Plan for 1975–1976 of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, representing the national Jewish community-relations agencies, for example, contained much of concern to the nation as a whole, and not specifically to Jews: jobs and crime, government and the economy, housing, revenue sharing, immigrants from Southeast Asia, capital punishment, and gun control, among others. A notable indication of support for the Spanish-surnamed

was the action of the Synagogue Council of America in joining with Christian groups in a call to synagogues and churches to participate in an Annual Observance of Farm Workers Week, May 4 to 10, 1975.

The Ethnics

The trend away from the earlier melting pot concept and toward emphasis on ethnic identity, spurred by the Ethnic Heritage Studies Act of 1972, continued to make headway in 1975. The “ethnics” have in fact become a subject of national focus, not always one of approval. In the schools and in the media, ethnic groups demanded and received attention. Southern and Eastern European immigrant groups and others, inspired by the attention blacks were achieving through black studies and recognition as a minority, with certain attendant benefits and grants, made their influence felt. Federal and other funds were secured, and academic programs for ethnic groups proliferated, as a Rockefeller Foundation report indicated.\(^\text{81}\) Examples cited in *Time* magazine were the introduction of a course in “The Armenian Immigrant Experience” in Belmont, Mass., public schools and of bilingual elementary-school classes for Portuguese-Americans in the San Francisco area.\(^\text{82}\)

Emphasis on ethnicity has not been without drawbacks. That it can be overdone has become evident in Englewood, N.J. With about half of its population black or Spanish-speaking, Englewood’s city council also recognized Jews, American Indians, Asian-Americans, and women as minority groups. This brought the apt comment from one resident that “no one will be in a minority because we’ll all be a minority. And then we can start from ground zero again.” Harvard sociologist Orlando Patterson, himself a black, thought white ethnicity was an alarming “symptom of fragmentation” in society and that it was “tacitly or potentially anti-black.”\(^\text{83}\) This fear was, in a sense, echoed by Meg Greenfield writing in *Newsweek* of September 29, 1975. She pointed out that the organization and subsequent demands of previously ignored groups, such as the blacks and Chicanos, have given impetus to counterclaims and counterorganizations, aided and abetted by the recent willingness of the government to deal with organizations on the basis of their ethnic origin. The question then is, “do we really want government and the various institutions that have some power over our affairs to believe that we should be rewarded, penalized or otherwise dealt with on the basis of whether we were born Lassiters or Vitales or Jeffersons or Morgensterns?”

Michael Novak, a leader of the ethnic movement, rejected the notion that ethnicity implied tribalism or group thinking. He rather defined it as a “shared social

\(^{82}\)“Ethnics All,” *Time*, December 8, 1975, p. 57.
\(^{83}\)Ibid.
The noted historian John Higham assigned to ethnic pluralism an important role in modern American thought. Pluralism, he contended, has countered "authoritarian claims to exclusive wisdom" and became an important factor in rectifying inequalities.

**Indians**

The strategy of American Indians in their pursuit of perceived right to forest, grazing, and mining areas was undergoing a change as Indian organizations increasingly resorted to litigation and demands for legislation to achieve their objectives. True, conflicting tribal loyalties, internal opposition, and struggles for power at times hampered effective action. But here, too, progress was being made, as indicated by a meeting in Denver of 26 tribes, describing themselves as a small "Indian OPEC," to plan strategy to secure maximum payment for coal and water on their lands. In whatever moves were to be taken, the Indians no longer depended on such official agencies as the Bureau of Indian Affairs. They now could turn to lawyers in their midst who had gone through law schools on federal scholarships. There were about 100 such lawyers in the United States, of whom some 60 specialized in tribal rights.

The implications of these developments were of great importance to the United States in its attempt to achieve energy self-sufficiency, since Indians were claiming rights to vast water and coal resources. The Navajos occupying the nation's largest reservation voted in 1975 to postpone renewal of the lease for a coal gasification plant of the El Paso Natural Gas Company. And some 3,000 Indians on the Northern Cheyenne Reservation at Lame Deer, Mont., were opposed to the commercial mining of rich coal deposits on their land, rejecting offers that would bring them over $300 million over 25 years—more than $100,000 for each Indian on the reservation. The Cheyenne have begun an all-out fight to cancel all present agreements and start afresh with plans that would give them more control of the use of their land.

Indian alienation and aggressiveness have increased. A notable activist move was the seizure of an unused Roman Catholic novitiate in Gresham, Wis., by the Menomines. The building and land were later turned over to the tribe, which could not finance its upkeep. Tom Wicker, writing in the *New York Times* of February 2, 1975, called the peaceful evacuation of the novitiate and the deeding of the 262-acre property to the Menomines for $1.00 "a triumph of good sense and humanity. Nobody was killed on either side and the forces of law and order are being officially served."

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"*Christian Science Monitor*, January 24, 1975."
However, violence continued to occur in internal and external Indian conflict. The FBI reported in April that since the beginning of 1975 there had been six killings and about as many assaults, including tomahawk and hammer bludgeonings, on the reservation at Pine Ridge, the site of the 1890 Wounded Knee massacre. "It is," stated the New York Times on April 22, 1975, "a caldron of violence, intimidation, alleged economic corruption and virulent political animosity between Russel C. Means, leader of the 1973 takeover, and Richard Wolfson, Travel Council President—a power struggle which has erupted into gunfire at times." In June another outburst of violence occurred as two FBI agents were shot and killed when they tried to serve arrest warrants on identified residents of the Sioux Reservation at Pine Ridge, S. Dak.

The radical American Indian Movement (AIM) asserted at its national convention that religion, education, and the United States government were the major enemies of Indians. Its leaders demanded that Indians must control the education of their children, who should attend schools teaching Indian religion, culture, and traditions.\footnote{The Indian community, which had fought on both sides of the American Revolution, was ambivalent about the bicentennial celebration. AIM threatened to "blow out the candles in the white man's birthday cake" if Indian demands for a better life were not met and treaties recognized. "Who wants to celebrate 200 years of being ripped off?" asked Arthur Vine Deloria, Jr., writer and leader of the more moderate element. "There are 300 broken treaties." He decided to serve on the Colorado Bicentennial Commission because he regarded the celebration as a means of securing funds for Indian projects and of publicizing the treatment accorded Indians throughout American history. The Navajo Bicentennial Commission announced plans for a number of projects, including films on Indians. "You can't separate a Navajo from being an American," said Edward T. Begay, a member of the Tribal Council of the New Mexico Bicentennial Commission.\footnote{The difficulties of the American Indian were many and far from solved. A poignant example, revealed in Association on American Indian Affairs studies, was that significant numbers of Indian children were being taken from their parents without sufficient cause and due process of law by welfare organizations, and that 25 to 35 per cent of all Indian children were now being raised in non-Indian homes or institutions.\footnote{New York Times, June 18, 1975.\footnote{Washington Post, March 18, 1975.\footnote{Christian Science Monitor, October 10, 1975.}}}}
The United States, Israel, and the Middle East

Although the United States continued its efforts to move toward Middle East stability and lasting Arab-Israel peace during the period under review (1975 and early 1976), its success was limited to the Sinai agreement of September 1975 (p. 485) owing to a variety of factors over which it had little or no control. Among these were the persistence of such local conflicts as the Greco-Turkish controversy over Cyprus and the fierce rivalries and shifting alignments in the Arab world.

Arab Discord

Most serious was the transformation of the long-simmering tensions in Lebanon between the Christian and Moslem communities, and between the privileged and disadvantaged elements of society, from a political struggle to reform the country’s parliamentary and economic system into a full-scale civil war, with escalating participation by militant Palestinian bands and deepening direct involvement by Syria and other Arab states. As of this writing (August 1976), more than 50 ceasefires had been announced only to be quickly broken, and none of the mediation efforts by American, French, and Arab-League diplomats had yet brought an end to the conflict, in which some 30,000 persons, mostly unarmed civilians, had thus far lost their lives.

The volatility and unpredictability of the Middle East area were underscored by several other developments. Although the assassination of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in March 1975 by his nephew led to no major change in that kingdom’s policy, a new controversy erupted between Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania over the future of the Spanish Sahara, which Morocco sought to annex.

Libya’s President Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi continued to be at loggerheads with his neighbors. Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat accused Qaddafi of fomenting the Lebanese civil war by sending money and arms to extremist elements involved and of having offered the Soviet Union naval bases in Libya as part of a $12 billion arms deal concluded during Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin’s visit to Libya in May 1975. Qaddafi, who had previously denounced the Soviet Union for its atheistic Communism, explained the arms deal as a strictly commercial transaction and denied having granted the Russians bases. (Western military analysts estimated the initial arms sale at around $1 billion, but noted with concern that even this was well beyond Libya’s defense needs.) Qaddafi expelled thousands of Egyptians after Egypt had given asylum to two members of Qaddafi’s Revolutionary Council who had failed
in an assassination attempt against him. In spring 1976 Libya expelled thousands of Tunisians when Tunisia sentenced one Libyan infiltrator to death and two others to prison for the attempted assassination of Tunisian Premier Hedi Nouira. According to Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, Qaddafi had also plotted to kill him.

The running feud between the rival factions of the Ba'ath party ruling Syria and Iraq was exacerbated in April 1975 by Iraqi charges that Syria was using a new Soviet-built dam to deprive Iraq of its fair share of the Euphrates waters. Saudi mediation attempts failed to resolve the dispute; Syria closed its air space to Iraqi flights and moved some troops from the Golan Heights to the Iraqi border. There was a brief improvement in relations in the fall when Syria and Iraq joined in opposing the Egyptian-Israeli Sinai agreement, but relations once again deteriorated in spring of 1976 when Iraq cut off the flow of oil through the pipeline to Syria's refinery and stationed troops along the Syrian border to put pressure on Syria to stop its armed intervention in Lebanon on the side of the Christian and rightist elements.

Meanwhile, Syria's diplomatically and militarily isolated position led it to improve relations with Jordan's King Hussein, despite past clashes over ideology and the Palestinian issue. Baghdad gained new freedom to concentrate its attention on Syria when Iraq ended its long-festering border conflict with Iran in an unexpected agreement with the Shah in March 1975, achieved through the mediation of Algerian President Houari Boumediene at an OPEC summit conference in Algiers. The Shah won Iraqi agreement to modify the frontier line in Iran's favor, thereby providing his country with navigational rights on the Shatt al-Arab, the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. In return, Iran agreed to end military support of the Kurdish rebels, who had long been fighting for cultural, economic, and political autonomy of their region in northern Iraq. Beyond this, Iraq and Iran, despite their contrasting ideological leanings, shared a common interest: to strengthen the bargaining power of the oil-producing countries by maintaining a united front in OPEC's negotiations with the consumer countries.

U.S. and Sinai Negotiations

The one major American diplomatic achievement in the Middle East in 1975 was the September Egyptian-Israeli agreement on Sinai. The military disengagement provisions of the accord were completed on schedule in February 1976; the Egyptians in November 1975 carried out their pledge to permit ships carrying cargo to Israel to transit the Suez Canal; the Egyptians have continued to rebuild the cities along the Canal, and there have been no armed clashes between Egyptian and Israeli forces. On the other hand, there has not yet been any sign of Egyptian readiness to move toward normalization of civilian relations or even the cessation of hostile propaganda as a result of the agreement. Hope in this direction had been raised by reports that Egypt had worked behind the scenes at the Organization of African Unity's Conference in Kampala in July and at the conference of nonaligned nations
in Lima in August to defeat extremist Arab demands to call for Israel's expulsion from the United Nations. However, any hope for Egypt's dissociation from the Arab anti-Israel propaganda campaign were quickly dashed when, shortly after the completion of the Sinai accord, Egypt joined the other Arab states in the UN in backing resolutions equating Zionism with racism and condemning Israeli actions (p. 101). Similarly, while President Sadat had closed down the PLO's Voice of Palestine broadcasts from Cairo on September 11, after the PLO had joined Syria in vehement denunciation of Egypt's agreement with Israel, Egypt continued to support the PLO's full participation in UN debates. And when Syrian armed forces entered Lebanon in the spring of 1976 and clashed with their former PLO allies in the widening civil war, Sadat responded to PLO leader Yasir Arafat's appeal for Egyptian help by allowing the resumption of these broadcasts.

Israel was also unsuccessful in its efforts to include in the Sinai agreement a formal Egyptian commitment to end the Arab boycott. However, the Egyptians indicated to the United States that they would be prepared to permit some individual American companies like the Ford Motor Company, which had been blacklisted because of their business activities in Israel, to resume or begin operations in Egypt provided they were at least as extensive as the operations they were conducting in Israel. While there have been reports of negotiations, no agreement to establish new plants has yet been announced.

The long-range impact of the Sinai agreement on prospects for achieving lasting Arab-Israel peace continued to be the subject of sharp controversy both in the United States and the Middle East. The process of step-by-step diplomacy and the personal negotiating style of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger were also increasingly subjected to critical scrutiny, in contrast to the widespread acclaim that had greeted his earlier successful efforts at shuttle diplomacy.

EGYPT'S STAND

The breakdown of the first stage of the negotiations, in March 1975, reflected at least in part the extent to which the domestic and international difficulties facing the United States government at the time had led to a hardening of the negotiating stances of states in the Middle East. Kissinger told columnist Joseph Alsop of a conversation with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad on one of his trips to Damascus during the March shuttle, in which Assad expressed his surprise that Sadat continued to go along loyally with the American plan to secure a compromise peace with the Israelis. If Sadat were only patient, Assad predicted, the Arabs could name their own terms without worrying about American interference. Clearly, the United States was already abandoning Vietnam and Cambodia—Saigon and Phnom Penh finally fell to the Communists only a few weeks later; it had cut off Turkey, its old and faithful ally, over the Cyprus dispute, and it appeared ready to abandon South Korea. “Against this background,” Assad concluded, “how could any man of sense fail to foresee that the United States would also abandon Israel before long?” Assad
reportedly was unimpressed by Kissinger's declaration that the United States would abandon neither Korea nor Israel.

Obviously, Kissinger made this conversation public to demonstrate the harmful effect of the Congressionally mandated cutoff of all United States military aid to Southeast Asia and to Turkey on the administration's ability to negotiate for peace in the Middle East. The Arabs and the Israelis, however, each drew their own conclusions from these international developments and the Ford administration's predicament in March. President Sadat, who had previously stated that he believed the United States held "99 per cent of the cards" in the negotiations with Israel, apparently concluded that the Ford administration was so desperate for a foreign-policy success in the Middle East that it would force Israel to accept whatever conditions the Egyptians made. Accordingly, Sadat would not budge from his demand that the Israelis return the oil fields and withdraw totally from the Gidi and Mitla passes. Sadat rejected the Israeli counteroffer of a half-way withdrawal in return for an Egyptian pledge of "non-use of force," after he had dismissed out of hand the Israeli demand for a declaration of nonbelligerence. The Israelis, at Kissinger's urging, dropped this formal demand and instead asked only for some practical signs that Egypt was turning away from belligerence. They regarded the Egyptian response as inadequate. The duration of the proposed agreement was yet another point of dispute. Most upsetting for the Israelis was Sadat's refusal to permit them even to maintain a radar station at Umm Khashiba on a peak near the passes, to enable them to verify Egyptian compliance with the proposed disengagement.

**U.S. Pressure on Israel**

On March 19, after the talks had reached an impasse, a strongly worded message from President Gerald R. Ford to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin urged the Israelis to accept the Egyptian offer and warned that failure to do so would force the United States to reassess its policy. Despite Kissinger's denial, Rabin charged that Kissinger had himself instigated and possibly even drafted Ford's letter. But whatever the letter's origin, there was no reason to doubt that the President personally was deeply interested in the successful conclusions of the negotiations. Ford was not only disappointed but, as he later told a friend, angry that, after all his years of staunch support of Israel, the one time he had asked the Israelis to do something for him they turned him down.

After the American attempt at direct pressure backfired and the Israel Cabinet voted to turn down the U.S.-endorsed Egyptian proposal, Kissinger assured the Israelis that there would be no recriminations. Before leaving Jerusalem he issued a statement which said "we believe both sides have made a serious effort to reach a successful outcome," but "unfortunately, the differences on a number of key issues have proven irreconcilable." Similarly, a White House statement declared that the President "appreciates the sincere efforts of all concerned," and reaffirmed the United States' commitment to continue its efforts to assist the parties in reaching
a just and lasting peace. In numerous background press briefings and "private" conversations, however, Kissinger made no secret of his view that the Israelis had made a "tragic" mistake in rejecting the Egyptian terms. He accused them of "shortsightedness," arguing that even a defective agreement with Egypt was preferable to renewed war and another oil embargo, which he claimed would erupt within a year, or the alternative of reconvening the Geneva conference, where Israel would have to face the collective demands of all Arab states, with the Soviet Union playing a prominent role. Kissinger also contrasted Sadat’s decisive leadership with the weak and divided coalition government in Jerusalem, whose various ministers were constantly jockeying for position and none dared take the politically unpopular measures which Kissinger insisted were necessary. Ford also told reporters he wished Israel had shown greater "flexibility."

There is no doubt that by standing up to United States pressure Rabin had improved his popularity in Israel. Both the Keneset and the Labor party’s central committee endorsed the cabinet’s decision by overwhelming votes, and in Israeli public-opinion polls Rabin’s standing rose dramatically from a mediocre 35 per cent to 84 per cent approval of his move.

If Rabin and his colleagues believed that they could not sell the proposed agreement to the Israeli public, it was because they shared the opposition’s serious misgivings about it. They were convinced that the few intangible political concessions Kissinger managed to extract from Sadat were completely out of proportion to the major tangible strategic and economic assets Israel was being asked to relinquish. The Israelis suggested that Kissinger was using Israeli territorial concessions not to win Arab political recognition for Israel, but to buy Arab friendship for the United States. American eagerness to prevent a new oil embargo was understandable, as was Kissinger’s interest in demonstrating that he could get more for the Arabs through negotiation than the Russians had promised them through war, but Jerusalem was not prepared to help the United States at the expense of its own security.

The Israelis had by now also become somewhat disenchanted with Kissinger’s negotiating style and felt that he had not always kept them fully informed. Their confidence was further shaken when in the midst of the March negotiations they learned that Kissinger had abruptly ordered withdrawal of all American support for the Kurds, in keeping with the Shah of Iran’s agreement with Iraq. The sudden American sellout of the Kurds, whom the Israelis, in cooperation with Iran and the C.I.A., had been secretly supporting, deeply troubled the Israeli leaders, who knew of Kissinger’s and Nixon’s earlier promises of support to veteran Kurdish leader Mustafa Barazani.

The Israelis were also convinced that had they given in to the Ford-Kissinger pressure, they would have reinforced Sadat’s view of the Israelis as mere puppets of the Americans, to be manipulated at will. The result, the Israelis argued, would have been not progress toward peace, but, on the contrary, a signal to the Arabs to intensify their campaign for stronger United States pressure on Israel.
"REASSESSMENT" OF AID TO ISRAEL

The breakdown of the talks led Kissinger to announce the "reassessment" of American policy about which Ford had warned Israel, adding that the United States would now have to consult with the Russians about reconvening the Geneva conference. While at this point the United States obviously had to reexamine its diplomatic options, it soon became apparent that the formality and widespread publicity given to this exercise was intended to place pressure upon Israel. The cancellation of Defense Minister Shimon Peres's scheduled trip to Washington for talks on additional U.S. arms supplies to Israel, pending the outcome of the reassessment, convinced the Israelis that the Ford administration was determined to use Israel's heavy dependence on American aid as a lever to move the Israelis to change their policy. The President's foreign-aid requests to Congress for fiscal 1976 and 1977 omitted any requests for Israel—as well as Egypt, Syria, and Jordan—with the explanation that he was deferring aid requests until the "review of our policies in the Middle East" were completed "later this summer."

NIXON-THIEU CORRESPONDENCE

While the "reassessment" was at its height, the publication of two secret letters from President Richard Nixon to President Nguyen Van Thieu before the Paris cease-fire agreements caused further concern about American commitment to its allies. They were made public by a former South Vietnamese cabinet official on April 30, shortly after Saigon fell to the Communists. In response to Thieu's deep concern about the continued presence of North Vietnamese forces in the area and the fact that the proposed Paris accord contained no provisions to prevent Communist violations, Nixon wrote on November 14, 1972: "You have my absolute assurance that if Hanoi fails to abide by the terms of this agreement it is my intention to take swift and severe retaliatory action. At the same time, however, he warned Thieu: "But in order to do this effectively it is essential that I have public support and that your government does not emerge as the obstacle to a peace which American public opinion now universally desires."

Friends of Israel saw this letter, which was almost certainly drafted by Kissinger, as a precedent for the current Kissinger campaign to turn American public opinion into a weapon against Israel because of its refusal to go along with the deal he had negotiated with Sadat. Nixon tried to allay Thieu's continued fears for South Vietnam's security by maintaining that there was no need to worry about particular clauses, since he was convinced the agreement was "honorable and fair" and could be made "essentially secure by our joint determination." In a second letter, on January 5, 1973, Nixon reiterated that he considered the problem of North Vietnamese troops as "manageable under the agreement" and pledged that "we will respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam." In fact, the Paris agreement was soon massively violated by the Communists, but the
American commitment that Nixon had secretly given Thieu became worthless in
the face of Congress's insistence upon American withdrawal and its cutoff of mili-
tary aid to Saigon.

The publication of the letters affected subsequent Middle East negotiations in
several ways. It strengthened the determination of Congress to oppose any future
secret presidential promises and to subject to meticulous Congressional scrutiny and
Senate approval any proposed American commitments in the Middle East. It con-
vinced the Israelis—if such convincing was needed—to insist on precise and tangible
arrangements, and not to rely on vague assurances and verbal understandings from
the Secretary of State, or even the President himself. The Senators were also stung
by the administration's allegation that it was their cutoff of aid to the Saigon regime
that had turned the United States into a weak and unreliable ally. They were
particularly responsive, therefore, to a move by Israel's supporters to demonstrate
that it was wrong to draw an analogy between Congress's opposition to the Vietnam
war and its attitude toward Israel.

SENATORS WRITE TO FORD

Later in May, 76 of the Senate's then 99 members joined in a letter to President
Ford which implicitly rejected the administration's attempts to blame Israel for the
breakdown in the negotiations and explicitly opposed withholding American aid
from Israel. Recalling that "a substantial majority"—71 members—of the Senate
had written Ford in December 1974 to urge a reiteration of the United States' long-standing commitment to Israel's security "by a policy of continued military
supplies and diplomatic and economic support," the letter maintained that the best
approach to a solution of the Arab-Israel conflict was to continue the 1967 Ameri-
can policy of establishing "secure and recognized boundaries that are defensible"
through "direct negotiations between the nations involved." While the Senators
called the suspension of the second-stage negotiations in Sinai "regrettable," they
asserted that "the history of the Arab-Israel conflict demonstrates that any Israeli
withdrawal must be accompanied by meaningful steps toward peace by its Arab
neighbors."

In an obvious allusion to the collapse of South Vietnam and Cambodia, they
further maintained that "recent events underscore America's need for reliable allies
and the desirability of greater participation by the Congress in the formulation of
American foreign policy." They offered the President their support in "strengthening
our ties with nations which share our democratic traditions and help safeguard
our national interests." They rejected the thesis that the United States could win
Arab friendship only by weakening its ties with Israel: "we believe that the special
relationship between our country and Israel does not prejudice improved relations
with other nations in the region." It was, they stressed, "imperative that we not
permit the military balance to shift against Israel" because "a strong Israel consti-
tutes a most reliable barrier to domination of the area by outside powers." Israel
needed more arms to offset the recent "heavy flow of Soviet weaponry to Arab states." They also warned that "withholding military equipment from Israel would be dangerous, discouraging accommodation by Israel's neighbors and encouraging a resort to force."

Consequently, the Senators hoped that in his foreign aid requests to Congress for fiscal 1976, the President's "recommendations will be responsive to Israel's urgent military and economic needs. We urge you to make it clear, as we do, that the United States acting in its own national interests stands firmly with Israel in the search for peace in future negotiations, and that this premise is the basis of the current reassessment of U.S. policy in the Middle East."

Supporters of Israel quickly nicknamed the letter "Spirit of 76," for it asserted the Senate's independence from the Ford-Kissinger pressures on Israel. The letter also raised the spirits of Israel and its American supporters, who had become fearful and disheartened over recurrent press reports of an erosion of American popular support for Israel. While some of the signatories of the Senators' letter had privately expressed some doubts as to the wisdom of certain Israeli governmental statements and action—as did even some American Jewish supporters of Israel and many Israelis themselves—their statement made it absolutely clear to the Ford administration that whatever the shortcomings of the current Israeli leadership, they did not justify blaming Israel for the breakdown of the negotiations with Egypt or withholding American support from Israel.

**Ford-Sadat Meeting**

The Senators' letter was publicized a week before Ford's trip to Salzburg for meetings with President Sadat. Ford praised the "statesmanship and wisdom" of Sadat who, he said had "demonstrated beyond any doubt" his "sincere desire for peace." Ford also publicly assured Sadat that the United States "will not tolerate stagnation in our efforts for a negotiated settlement." Sadat indicated that he wished Dr. Kissinger to make yet another attempt to negotiate an Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, apparently because he continued to regard American diplomatic mediation as more likely to yield quick territorial concessions from Israel than would a reconvened Geneva conference. Even the Russians, who had been repeatedly calling for early resumption of the Geneva conference, now reportedly began to have second thoughts about it in view of the deep divisions among the Arab states and the inability of the Palestinian factions, themselves, to agree on a political consensus and common negotiating strategy vis-à-vis Israel.

As a further inducement to Sadat to strengthen his relations with the United States, Ford and Kissinger impressed upon him its readiness to provide Egypt with much needed technological and managerial assistance, as well as support of the Egyptian economy with aid from the United States and a consortium of international banking institutions, including the World Bank.
Sinai Negotiations Resume

While Sadat was unwilling to yield on his basic demands of return of the oilfields and Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai passes, he now realized that Israel would make no concessions without practical reassurances that its security would not be jeopardized. Sadat first suggested that the Israeli radar station at Umm Khashiba be turned over to the United Nations. However, when Kissinger explained that the Israelis did not trust the UN, Sadat proposed that the United States, itself, take over the site. This was the germ of the idea, later modified and refined by Israel Defense Minister Shimon Peres, for the stationing of American technicians in the Sinai, which became a crucial element in winning Israeli approval of the accord in September.

Meanwhile, tension was eased when Rabin announced, on the eve of the scheduled Egyptian reopening of the Suez Canal on June 5, that Israel would pull back half its tanks and troops and all its artillery a distance of 18 to 24 miles from the Canal. Kissinger called the Israeli initiative "a constructive move" and a "hopeful contribution" to the peace process. Sadat, surprised by the Israeli gesture, called it "a very encouraging act" of potentially "great significance." Yet, he hedged about when Israeli cargoes would be permitted through the Canal, saying that depended on "the conduct of Israel." When Washington learned that Israel was about to test Sadat's earlier pledge to the United States to permit the passage of Israel-bound cargoes after the Canal was reopened, the State Department asked Israel to defer its plan so as not to "embarrass" Sadat.

In early June, after the Ford-Sadat meetings, Rabin was invited to the White House. His objective, as stated in an Israeli Cabinet resolution, was to "strive to achieve understanding and accord" with the United States not only on the terms of a Sinai agreement, but also on the "further stages of the political processes toward the attainment of peace, which may be undertaken after an interim agreement with Egypt is signed." Thus Israel wanted to make certain that if it made more territorial concessions in Sinai, it would not immediately be subjected to new United States pressures to go to Geneva or to make similarly significant concessions to Syria or Jordan. The other Israeli concern was to obtain prompt and favorable action on its pending aid requests.

With regard to aid, the Senate on June 6, a few days before Rabin's arrival in Washington, approved by a vote of 68 to 22 Senator Henry M. Jackson's (D., Wash.) amendment to the Defense Procurement Authorization Act extending through December 31, 1977, the President's authority to provide Israel with aircraft and other military equipment either on credit or by sale. Senator John C. Stennis (D., Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, opposed the amendment on the procedural ground that it should have been brought before the Foreign Relations Committee. Opposition to the substance of the amendment was voiced by Senator James Abourezk (D., S. Dak.), who called it another "blank check" by the Senate to allow Israel to maintain its "obstinate position" of refusing to deal with the Palestinians, and by Senator James McClure (R., Idaho), who said it constituted an
“overcommitment” to Israel, which would destroy the United States ability to help negotiate a settlement.

In the summer, after further consultations with Egyptian and Israeli officials, the outline of an agreement emerged. Kissinger returned to the Middle East in August, and after a 12-day shuttle completed a complicated package of agreements and understandings which together constituted the Egyptian-Israeli accord on Sinai.

**American Presence in Sinai**

The major new element in the agreement was the increased direct involvement of the United States in its implementation, which sustained its viability in several ways. The most novel of these was the United States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai. To save face within the Arab world, Sadat could not allow Israel alone to supervise compliance with the disengagement provisions. Yet Israel refused to relinquish direct participation in monitoring the Egyptians in view of its bad experience in August 1970, when Egypt in one night moved Soviet SAM missiles up to the Canal in violation of the cease-fire negotiated by Secretary of State Rogers, and it then took Israel several weeks to convince the State Department of the seriousness of the violations. Under the proposal, which became a key part of the current agreement, the Early Warning System was to “be entrusted to the United States.” As reassurance, Israel would continue to operate its own station “to provide strategic early warning,” with up to 250 technical and administrative personnel conducting “visual and electronic surveillance.” The United States agreed to build for the Egyptians an equivalent station overlooking the Israeli position. Sadat was satisfied with this formal sign of equality, and the disengagement agreement went into effect on schedule, even though construction of the Egyptian station had not been completed.

A team of up to 200 United States civilian personnel was to verify that the personnel at the Israeli and Egyptian stations were indeed engaged only in surveillance, and would “immediately report any detected divergency” to “the Parties to the Basic Agreement [Egypt and Israel] and to the UNEF” [UN Emergency Force]. The Americans would also establish and operate three “tactical early warning” stations in the Mitla and Giddi Passes, and a network of three unmanned electronic sensor fields implanted at both ends of the passes and the areas surrounding the watch stations. Any movement of armed forces (other than those attached to UNEF) or any military preparations were to be reported by the Americans immediately to both sides and to the UN. The Americans were to be allowed to move freely throughout the area and were to be granted privileges and immunities by Egypt and Israel similar to those accorded the UNEF forces.

The question was how to prevent a recurrence of the May 1967 situation when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser had ordered UNEF at gunpoint to move so that Egyptian forces could take over the installations at Sharm el-Sheikh to blockade Israeli shipping. The United States affirmed in the proposal that it would
continue to perform its functions "for the duration of the Basic Agreement." Defense Minister Shimon Peres, who in March had strongly opposed the previous disengagement proposal, was not convinced that direct American monitoring made a significant difference.

To forestall almost certain opposition to the proposal in Congress which, despite its basic sympathy for Israel, was determined not to repeat its mistakes in Vietnam in authorizing an open-ended military commitment, an escape clause was inserted permitting the United States to withdraw its personnel from Sinai "if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized." At a news conference on September 9, Secretary Kissinger was asked how the United States would handle the risks the Americans in Sinai would face in view of the publicized threat by PLO that the "Palestine revolution regards the U.S. military presence in the Sinai as an enemy target and should be shot by every struggler and every nationalist in our Arab nation." Kissinger replied that "there aren't that many strugglers in the Sinai," since the Americans would be in an area with no civilian population and with several thousand UN personnel between the areas controlled by the Egyptian and Israeli armed forces. He also expressed the hope that "once the immediate passions have died down" and "a more sober calculation is undertaken," all the Arab nations and the Palestinian groups would realize that the Sinai agreement was the only possible step toward peace that could now be taken.

Israeli leaders, for their part, made it clear that they did not wish to see any Americans in Sinai killed. Prime Minister Rabin, Peres and others also reiterated the traditional position of all Israel's governments that their country was determined to fight its battles exclusively with Israeli manpower. The function of the Americans in Sinai was not to enter the conflict, but only to sound a timely alarm. If the Americans had to be evacuated because of impending Egyptian attack, this would clearly demonstrate to the United States who was responsible for the collapse of the agreement, an important point for Israel in its continuing struggle to maintain American support.

CONGRESS DEBATES PROPOSAL

In the intense Congressional and public debate over the proposed American role in the Sinai, its supporters emphasized the significant differences between it and the unpopular American military involvement in the Far East: In Vietnam the United States actively supported one side against the other; in the Middle East both sides requested the American involvement. In Vietnam the United States sent military advisors and combat troops; in Sinai the American presence was to be limited to civilian technicians. Most importantly, the Americans in Sinai were to operate exclusively in a UN buffer zone from which the armed forces of both sides were to be excluded, and the UNEF would continue to patrol the area. In a sense, the new American role was merely an extension to the ground level of the American aerial reconnaissance, so vital in monitoring compliance with the first stage disengagement
agreement. The present agreement provided for the continuation of aerial reconna-
sance.

Opponents argued that properly trained "civilian" technicians would probably
have to be drawn from former Defense Department employees. This, the Pentagon
responded, was neither unprecedented nor cause for alarm, for some 36 trained U.S.
military officers had long been serving without incident as part of the UN Truce
Supervision Organization in the Middle East.

Congressional critics also feared that the technicians, while unobjectionable in
themselves, would be used by the Administration as justification for an open-ended
and constantly deepening American involvement. To make absolutely certain that
the President could not exceed the authority it explicitly granted him, Congress, in
its joint resolution authorizing the implementation of the proposal, stipulated that
the United States personnel be removed immediately in the event of an outbreak of
hostilities or if Congress, by joint resolution, determined that their safety was
jeopardized. It further stated that "Nothing contained in this resolution shall be
construed as granting any authority to the President with regard to the introduction
of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involve-
ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." Another stipulation
was that the technicians be limited to volunteers, and that the President send
Congress at least semiannual reports on the status, scope, and anticipated duration
of the mission, and on "the feasibility of ending or reducing as soon as possible their
participation by substituting nationals of other countries or by making technological
changes." Congress also declared that its approval of the proposal "does not signify
approval of the Congress of any other agreement."

With these provisos, the joint resolution was approved by the House on October
8 by a vote of 341 to 69, and by the Senate a day later by a vote of 70 to 18. While
Egyptian and Israeli representatives had signed the disengagement agreement at UN
headquarters in Geneva on September 4, Israel deferred signing the protocol putting
the agreement formally into effect until Congressional approval had been assured.

One reason for the close scrutiny by Congress of the proposal was that, in the
course of the negotiations, Kissinger had drawn up many classified documents
containing assurances and promises of undertakings by the United States to Israel,
Egypt, or both. Some of these were legally binding commitments, others merely
statements of political and diplomatic intent. These had not been intended for
publication, Kissinger explained to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on
October 7, to avoid unnecessary public controversy among the governments in the
Middle East and to protect the capability of the United States to serve as a mediator
in the future.

After the publication in the New York Times and Washington Post of what
appeared to be authentic texts of these documents, Congress and the press became
suspicous that the administration was again circumventing Congress, as it had in
Vietnam, and making unauthorized commitments. In response to a Senate Foreign
Relations Committee request for "all the assurances and undertakings by the U.S. on
which Israel and Egypt are relying in entering into the Sinai Agreement," Kissinger gave to the committee what he certified in the name of the President to be all the documents containing legally binding assurances, undertakings, and commitments, as well as extracts of other documents which the United States did not consider binding, but might be so regarded by Egypt or Israel. The legal adviser of the State Department also provided the Foreign Relations Committee with his assessment of the legal character of all the documents submitted earlier.

Kissinger went out of his way to emphasize that Congress was not committing itself on any other issue. He emphasized that "even if the United States were unable to fulfill all of the intentions we have expressed, the parties—Egypt and Israel—would nonetheless remain bound by the Sinai agreement. The obligations of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement are clear, direct and unqualified; they stand on their own."

Some of Israel's ardent supporters as well as vehement opponents of any new American commitment suggested that all the Kissinger documents be codified in formal treaty language, the former because they wanted once and for all a formal American commitment to Israel that was clearly spelled out, the latter because they wished to defeat even the stationing of Americans in Sinai by raising the spectre of a formal, open-ended American treaty commitment to Israel. Kissinger, however, warned Congress to "take care not inadvertently to create commitments that were never intended," explaining that, in view of the "special position of trust enjoyed by the United States" in both Egypt and Israel, he had been able to use statements of American intentions "as a lubricant in this most recent negotiation," just as he had in every previous mediation effort. However, not wishing to leave the impression that he had misled the Israelis or the Egyptians, Kissinger added that this "does not mean, of course, that the United States is morally or politically free to act as if they do not exist. On the contrary, they are important statements of diplomatic policy and engage the good faith of the United States so long as the circumstances that give rise to them continue." (Emphasis added.) Congress heeded Kissinger's advice, and the attempt to place all the assurances in treaty form was abandoned.*

U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Agreement

The main American assurances contained in the U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Agreement were as follows:

The United States, the document began, "recognizes" that the Sinai agreement, under which Israel would withdraw from "vital areas in Sinai, constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part in the pursuit of final peace." At the same time the statement that the United States government "will make every effort to be fully responsive on an on-going and long-term basis to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy requirements and to its economic needs" was reassurance to the Israelis about any future politically motivated inter-

*The texts were never officially released. Quotations are from the versions published in the New York Times.
ruptions in the supply of arms though it was hedged by the qualification, "within the limits of its resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation."

If Israel, which was to make its own commercial arrangements to replace the oil it would have extracted from the ceded oilfields, was unable to obtain a sufficient supply for its domestic needs, the United States would, under ordinary circumstances, "promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel" to meet all its normal requirements and also "make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport." It would "meet Israel's essential requirements" even if faced with an embargo. This commitment was for a minimum of five years. An amount to cover the additional Israeli expenditure for oil import would be included in the administration's "overall annual" request to Congress for aid to Israel. (The administration refused to publicize this amount separately in response to some criticism that the United States should not appear to be rewarding Israel for returning oil that did not belong to it. Israeli sources estimated the cost of the additional oil at $350 million the first year.) The administration also promised to ask Congress for sufficient funds for Israel to build more oil storage facilities within the next four years to increase its reserve stocks from a six months' to a full year's needs.

Several memorandum provisions dealt with Israel's freedom of navigation. The United States would not expect Israel to implement the latest Sinai accord before Egypt, in accordance with the January 1974 agreement "permit[s] passage of all Israeli cargoes to and from Israeli ports through the Suez Canal." Declaring that it regarded the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb (at the southern entry to the Red Sea) and the Strait of Gibraltar international waterways, the United States promised "to support Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage through such straits." It also recognized Israel's right to freedom of flights over these straits and the Red Sea and would "support diplomatically the exercise of that right."

One clause of the memorandum dealt with the eventuality of direct Soviet armed intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict. An unwritten understanding long operative in American-Israeli relations was that such intervention would not only pose a threat to Israel, but would upset the global balance between the superpowers. In the past, the United States had made it clear through firm diplomatic messages backed by movements of the Sixth Fleet and even Strategic Air Command alerts that it would not permit such intervention. The post-Vietnam climate moved Israel to seek reassurance that American policy in this regard had not changed. While some in Israel would have preferred a formal defense treaty, they had to settle for the following language in the memorandum:

In view of the long-standing U.S. commitment to the survival and security of Israel, the United States government will view with particular gravity threats to Israel's security or sovereignty by a world power. In support of this objective, the United States will in the event of such threat consult promptly with the government of Israel with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices.

When at a September 16 press conference President Ford was asked whether this clause did not come close to being a security treaty with Israel, he replied: "That
language does not constitute a treaty. The words speak for themselves.” He also indicated that the package of economic and military aid and diplomatic assurances should not be seen as a reward for Israel’s agreeing to the Sinai accord, but as a reaffirmation of a longstanding American policy. The United States, he noted, has been supplying Israel with “very substantial amounts of military hardware,” because “we have always felt that the survival of Israel in the Middle East was very important,” and “it is our plan to do so in the future.” In fact, the memorandum provided that the two governments would “at the earliest possible time, and if possible, within two months” conclude a contingency plan for a U.S. “military supply operation to Israel in an emergency situation.” Such advance logistical planning, Israel hoped, would prevent the recurrence of the difficulties in obtaining American supplies during the first days of the Yom Kippur War, particularly in view of the growing reluctance of America’s NATO allies to be involved in any American supply operation.

**Middle East Aid Bill**

In keeping with the promise, President Ford on October 30, 1975, asked Congress to approve for the 1976 fiscal year $2.24 billion in aid for Israel: $1.5 billion for military supporting assistance—two-thirds on credit terms and one-third as a grant—and $740 million in economic assistance. At the same time, he recommended $750 million in economic supporting assistance for Egypt, as well as the sale of some $200 million worth of American commodities, mainly wheat and tobacco, to be paid for by Egypt in local currency under the P.L. 480 program. The President also requested $50 million for a Special Requirements Fund, of which some $13 million was to go to Egypt to help construct its early-warning station in Sinai.

Questions arose in Congress about the size of the foreign-aid request, which was submitted at a time when the country was just beginning to emerge from a recession and when the administration was cutting back on domestic-spending programs advocated by Congress. The administration explained that this aid should be seen as insurance against renewal of hostilities and another oil embargo, which Kissinger estimated had cost the United States more than $10 billion in 1973, not counting the inflationary and recessionary effects of the embargo and the opportunity it gave OPEC to quadruple prices. An investment of $3 billion in Middle East peace, Kissinger stressed, was “trifling compared with what a war could cost us,” an argument Congress accepted.

The final compromise appropriations bill, which was signed by the President on June 30, 1976, the very last day of the year it was to cover, contained the following changes: It raised to $750 million the amount Israel would not have to repay, cut the security-related economic assistance to $700 million; granted an additional $15 million to resettle immigrants from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and forgave a $28 million debt owed to the United States by nine Israeli educational institutions under earlier loans. It cut by $55 million economic supporting assistance
to Egypt. Under the Middle East aid package, Jordan was granted $72.5 million in supporting assistance, $50 million in military grants and $75 million in military loans, and Syria $80 million in economic aid—$55 million less for Jordan and $10 million less for Syria than the administration had requested.

THE PERSHING MISSILE

A separate addendum on arms expressed United States resolve to "maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft." The next sentence read: "The United States agrees to an early meeting to undertake a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with a view to giving a positive response." Administration officials explained that this was not a commitment to sell but only to study weapons systems, whose development would in any case take several years.

The proposed consideration of the Pershing missile caused consternation in Congress and a furor in the Arab world, for the only existing one, used by NATO, had a nuclear warhead. During a visit to Washington a few days after publication of the memorandum, Israel Defense Minister Shimon Peres promised that Israel would not mount nuclear warheads on the Pershings, although it was natural for outsiders to think otherwise. Still, Arab officials and some members of Congress refused to believe that Israel would use the very expensive Pershing for a conventional payload. For the Arabs, the missile was of great symbolic significance. "We're the last to deny a 'special relationship' between Israel and America," one of Sadat's advisers complained, "but this turns the tables: America has become Israel's satellite."

Peres explained that Israel needed the Pershings as a deterrent to potential attack on civilian centers by Egypt, Syria, or Libya, which had used several Soviet-supplied Scud missiles against Israeli targets during the Yom Kippur war. Western intelligence sources confirmed that the Scuds were capable of carrying nuclear warheads and that there was evidence that during the 1973 war some Russian warships with nuclear warheads had stopped in Egyptian ports, but apparently did not turn them over to Egypt. Peres told the National Press Club on September 17 that, in view of the escalating flow of modern weapons to the Arab states from both Soviet and Western sources—estimated by Israel at up to $14 billion since 1973—Israel had to maintain a qualitative advantage to deter a renewal of conflict.

In an address to the UN General Assembly on September 30, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon referred to the "senseless competition" for arms in the Middle East and expressed regret that Israel was forced to take part in it so as not to "invite immediate aggression." He declared:

Israel is ready at any time, even before peace is made, to consult with its neighbors on measures to limit the arms race, with all its dangerous consequences, without materially affecting the relative defensive capacity of any of the parties to the consultation.
Israel supports the proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East and will be ready to enter into negotiations with all states concerned in order to attain this objective.

The issue of the Pershings was quietly shelved after Israeli officials indicated to the United States that they would not press for a quick decision on the matter; that Israel might forego the Pershings altogether if real progress were made with the Arabs on arms control and the Scuds were removed from the Arab arsenals.

OTHER U.S.-ISRAEL CLARIFICATIONS

The United States memorandum gave Israel other assurances which were essentially statements of policy requested by Israel. They were designed to anticipate various contingencies to help prevent recurrence of the dispute that had characterized the "reassessment" period, which Kissinger now declared to be over. Thus in one clause, "the United States Government agrees with Israel that the next agreement with Egypt should be a final peace agreement," meaning that Washington would not ask Israel to make further territorial concessions in Sinai until Egypt was prepared for peace. Moreover, the United States government position was stated to be that Egypt's commitments to Israel under the Sinai agreement "are not conditional upon any act or developments between the other Arab states and Israel," that the United States "regards the agreement as standing on its own."

In case of an Egyptian violation of the agreement, the United States was "prepared to consult with Israel as to the significance of the violation and possible remedial action by the United States." (An identically phrased assurance was given by Kissinger to Egypt in the event of an Israeli violation.) The United States also declared that a withdrawal of the UNEF, without prior agreement of both sides, would not affect the agreement, which "shall remain binding in all its parts." It further stated that it would veto any Security Council resolution "which in its judgment affects or alters adversely" the agreement. A more general sentence pledged that the United States "will not join in and will seek to prevent efforts by others to bring about consideration of proposals which it and Israel agree are detrimental to the interests of Israel." The phrasing left open the question of what proposals were in fact detrimental to Israel's interests, which was, of course, what the disagreement between Kissinger and the Israelis in March was all about.

In another paragraph the United States "shares the Israeli position that under existing political circumstances negotiations with Jordan will be directed toward an overall peace settlement." This meant the United States would not attempt in the near future to revive its abortive efforts in 1974 to get the Israelis and Jordanians to agree to an interim agreement involving a partial pullback of Israeli forces from the Jordan River and return of Jericho to Jordanian administration (AJYB, 1976 [Vol. 76], pp. 141, 156-58).

There was no mention in this memorandum—at least not in the published document—of negotiations between Israel and Syria. However, the United States stated in the memorandum to Egypt that it "intends to make a serious effort to help bring
about further negotiations between Syria and Israel, in the first instance through diplomatic channels." This statement was helpful to Sadat in responding to criticism from Syria and other Arab states which accused him of having selfishly betrayed the Arab cause by agreeing, in effect, to make a separate peace with Israel.

The prospects for early Syrian-Israeli negotiations, however, were not good in view of Israeli statements that the Golan was too small for more than "cosmetic" changes in any new partial agreement, and the Syrian rejection of such tokenism and insistence on the return of the entire Golan Heights and satisfaction of the demands of the Palestinians.

**Agreement on Geneva Conference**

The assumption in September 1975, therefore, was that there would be an attempt to reconvene the Geneva peace conference. Here, too, Israel sought to obtain advance American agreement on overall strategy and diplomatic tactics. A separate memorandum of agreement, signed by Secretary of State Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon, provided that the time of reconvening the Geneva conference would be coordinated between the United States and Israel. The United States also promised to "make every effort to insure that all the substantive negotiations will be on a bilateral basis," an Israeli request based on its experience at the Lausanne conference following the 1948 Arab-Israel war, when the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), trying to follow up the separate armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, brought all the Arab states together on one side to confront Israel. The most extreme Arab position prevailed; the Arabs refused even to sit down with the Israeli delegation, and after two years of fruitless effort the PCC abandoned this initiative.

The United States stated, too, that it would oppose, and if necessary veto, "any initiative in the Security Council to alter adversely the terms of reference of the Geneva peace conference or to change Resolutions 242 and 338 in ways which are incompatible with their original purpose" (AJYB, 1974–75 [Vol. 75], pp. 182–83). At the same time, the United States promised to "seek to insure that the role of the co-sponsors" would be consistent with the United States-Israeli understanding reached before the first Geneva conference in December 1973, designed to prevent the Russians or the Americans from imposing their own terms on the Israelis. The United States and Israel also were "to concert action" to make certain that the Geneva conference adhered to its declared purpose of advancing a "negotiated peace between Israel and its neighbors," and would not impose a settlement.

**PLO Recognition**

An issue of gravest Israeli concern was the growing Arab, Soviet, and general international pressure that the Palestinians be considered a separate party to a reconvened Geneva conference, with the PLO as their representative. Neither Reso-
olutions 242 nor 338 had specifically referred to the Palestinians, and the "parties" to the negotiations were understood to be the existing states. Some prominent "Palestinians" had, in fact, attended the first Geneva conference, but they were either Palestinian Arabs in the Jordanian delegation (who, indeed, constituted a majority in the delegation) or Israeli Jewish representatives, who under the British Mandate had been designated "Palestinians." Kissinger pledged to Allon the continuation of the present United States policy not to recognize or negotiate with the PLO so long as it "does not recognize Israel’s right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338." The United States, he stated, will "consult fully and seek to concert" its position and strategy with Israel on this issue, as well as on the participation of other states in the conference. Kissinger also reconfirmed acceptance of Israel’s right to veto participation by the PLO, which Israel had made a condition to its own participation in December 1973. The paragraph read: "It is understood that the participation at a subsequent phase of the conference of any possible additional state, group or organization will require the agreement of all the initial participants."

Israeli suspicion that Washington was contemplating a change in the United States stand on the PLO was first aroused by a comprehensive statement on the Palestinian question before a Congressional committee on November 12 by then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Harold H. Saunders. The Israelis were not reassured by State Department comments that Saunders’ testimony was only "an academic exercise," provided at the request of the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations, which was in fact holding a series of hearings on "The Palestinian Issue in Middle East Peace Efforts," at which Israeli and Palestinian scholars had also been asked to testify. Newsweek reported, however, that Saunders’ statement had been cleared by Kissinger in advance and was intended, in the words of one U.S. official, "to unfreeze the Palestine debate."

The Israel Cabinet took the unusual step of announcing its unanimous "severe criticism" of the Saunders statement, claiming it was replete with "factual and political errors and misrepresentations." There actually was only one fundamental factual error in Saunders’ statement: he described as the official and public objective of the PLO the replacement of Israel by a "binational secular state." The fact is that PLO has insisted that Palestine become a secular, democratic Arab state, which is fundamentally different from the binational state in Palestine, advocated in the 1920s and 1930s by such Jewish idealists as Martin Buber and Judah Magnes. Yasir Arafat’s statements and the PLO Covenant make it abundantly clear that the PLO does not recognize the concept of a Jewish collective identity or of Jewish national or ethnic rights. All the PLO has been prepared to acknowledge officially are the religious rights of Israeli Jews as individuals.

Without citing evidence, Saunders claimed "there are some indications that coexistence between separate Palestinian and Israeli states might be considered" by the PLO. While some PLO members have indicated a readiness to establish, as a tactical first step, a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza, no PLO leader has
indicated a readiness to give up the ultimate objective of Israel's dissolution. Shortly after Saunders' testimony, this objective was reiterated by PLO "foreign minister" Faruq Khaddoumi in an interview published in *Newsweek*'s international edition on November 17, 1975. Citing growing Arab strength and petrodollar wealth as assuring his movement's ultimate success, he declared: "This Zionist ghetto of Israel must be destroyed. We will unite the whole region in one state, not just Palestine. I bet you."

What upset the Israelis more than Saunders' overly optimistic view of a possible reconciliation of PLO and Israeli national objectives was the timing and general tenor of his testimony. After stating that "the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict" and discussing the various options advanced for resolving the issue, Saunders reaffirmed the United States policy that "we cannot envision or urge a negotiation between two parties as long as one professes to hold the objective of eliminating the other." In this context, he warned that the Palestinians would have to curb the PLO's terrorist practices if they wanted Palestinian involvement in the negotiating process. He supported a call for an evolution of thinking on the Palestinian issue "on all sides" with a quote from a Kissinger statement that "we are prepared to work with all parties toward a solution of all issues yet remaining—including the issue of the future of the Palestinians" (emphasis in original text issued by State Department, but not in version published by the House Committee). In what was seen as an implied criticism of the Israeli posture, Saunders concluded: "We are prepared to consider any reasonable proposal from any quarter, and we will expect other parties to the negotiation to be equally openminded."

A partial explanation of the reason for choosing this moment for a high State Department official to make this sort of statement indicating an American openness to new approaches to the Palestinian issue may be the unexpectedly vehement Syrian attacks on both Egypt and the United States over the Sinai agreement. Damascus, the Palestinians, and other militant Arabs denounced it as signaling United States efforts to remove Egypt from the conflict with Israel and American unwillingness before the 1976 elections to really press for further Israeli concessions to Syria, Jordan, or the Palestinians. The mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights was to expire on November 30, and the United States was naturally concerned that failure to renew the force would increase tensions in the area. To show Syria's displeasure at American policy, President Hafez al-Assad pointedly rebuffed an offer by President Ford to meet during Ford's planned trip to Europe. The Saunders testimony thus may have been intended as a signal that the United States shared Syria's concern over progress on the Palestinian issue.

**Conditions for UNDOF Extension**

The Syrians, however, demanded much more. They asked, in November 1975, that Resolution 242 be amended to expand the simple reference to "a just settlement
of the refugee problem” into an explicit endorsement of Palestinian political rights and a formal invitation to PLO to participate in Security Council discussions on the Middle East. In the General Assembly, they worked for a basic change in the peace-making process from negotiations “between the parties concerned,” as called for in Resolution 338, to a settlement imposed upon Israel by the Council, a call for a timetable for total Israeli withdrawal, and recognition of Palestinian rights, as stated in General Assembly resolutions. As part of this campaign the Assembly on November 10 approved, despite American and Israeli opposition, the creation of a special Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. Most of the 20 states appointed to that committee had either never recognized Israel, or had broken off diplomatic relations. (At the same time, the Syrians attempted to de-emphasize Resolution 242’s requirement linking Israeli withdrawal to Arab acknowledgment of Israel’s “right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”)

In lengthy behind-the-scenes negotiations, the United States resisted these pressures, and the formal Security Council November 30 resolution extending UNDOF for six months made no reference to PLO. It did, however, call for resumption of the Middle East debate on January 12, 1976, “including the Palestinian question, taking into account all relevant United Nations resolutions.” The Soviet Union actively supported the Syrian and Palestinian effort. Soviet delegate Yaakov Malik, who was the Council’s chairman for November, then announced that the majority of Council members had agreed to invite PLO to participate in the January debate. The Russians, displeased by the renewed American influence in Egypt, saw the Syrian and PLO discontent as a convenient vehicle for moving the discussion back to the Security Council and attempting to amend the ground rules for the Geneva conference to pressure Israel into accepting the Arab demands.

Could the United States have done more? Some Israeli and American observers believe that if the United States had threatened to veto the UNDOF extension, the Syrians would have dropped their demand for the January Palestinian debate. Moreover, by enabling the Syrians to gain a point for the Palestinians, in contrast to Egypt, which had not linked the annual UNEF extension to the Palestinian issue, the United States had further exposed President Sadat to extremist Arab attack.

Egypt’s advocacy of PLO participation in the Council debate on Israeli raids against PLO bases in Lebanon in early December was seen as an inevitable attempt to outbid the Syrians and save face. On the other hand, this was not a new Egyptian position, for Sadat, in his address to a joint session of Congress on November 5, had stressed that “a sympathetic stand on the part of the United States toward the Palestinians and their right to establish their own state” would contribute much to a speedy solution of the Palestinian question, “the heart and core of the entire dispute.” Earlier, in an October 29 address to the UN General Assembly, Sadat had explicitly called for “including the Palestine Liberation Organization” in the reconvened Geneva conference.
Reaffirmation of U.S. Policy on PLO

But this did not change official United States policy. On November 1 Ford reiterated that "we, of course, strongly back the state of Israel in its attitude that there must be recognition [for Israel] before there can be any contact or any participation by the Palestinians in any negotiations." Ambassador Patrick D. Moynihan and Dr. Kissinger both publicly reaffirmed that no matter what extravagant anti-Israel resolutions the Arab-dominated General Assembly sought to foist upon the Council, the United States had not changed its position on the PLO and continued to regard only Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 as "relevant" to the peace negotiations. They contended that a United States veto of the resolution extending UNDOF would have increased tensions and unnecessarily antagonized the Syrians. But even if the United States had vetoed the resolution, State Department officials pointed out, it could not have vetoed an Arab move supported by a majority of the Council to invite PLO to participate in the discussion, which was a procedural matter not subject to veto.

The United States did, however, exercise its veto on December 8 to kill a Security Council resolution condemning Israeli air raids against Palestinian bases in Lebanon and issuing a "solemn warning" to Israel that repetition of such raids would move the Council to consider sanctions against Israel. Ambassador Moynihan explained that while the United States "strongly deplores" the Israeli action, it had voted against the resolution because it failed to condemn even in a general way Arab terrorist violence against Israel.

Council Debates Palestine Issue

At the end of the Security Council's two-week-long Palestine debate, on January 26, 1976, the United States also vetoed a resolution sponsored by Pakistan, Tanzania, Rumania, Panama, Guyana, and Benin and supported by France, the Soviet Union, and Japan, which explicitly called for Israel to withdraw from "all Arab territories" occupied since June 1967; affirmed the Palestinians' "inalienable national right of self-determination, including the right to establish an independent state in Palestine," and affirmed the right of Palestinian refugees to repatriation or compensation. It also explicitly mentioned "the Palestine Liberation Organization, representative of the Palestinian people." The State Department issued a statement explaining that the United States had vetoed the resolution because it would have "blocked the surer and tested way to a settlement in favor of one that would not have worked." Britain, Italy, and Sweden abstained.

China and Libya, the only Arab member on the Council, refused to participate, apparently because the resolution, although clearly anti-Israel in character, implied the continued existence of Israel in a paragraph stating that "appropriate arrangements should be established to guarantee, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of
all states in the area and their right to live within secure and recognized boundaries."

Yet, Faruq Khaddoumi, the PLO spokesman, declared in his January 12 address to the Council that PLO regarded Israel's creation as a violation of the UN Charter and that a condition of Israel’s admission to UN membership had been its compliance with UN resolutions, which he claimed Israel had consistently flouted over the years. He made it quite clear that total Israeli withdrawal to the June 5, 1967, lines would not be enough; that even the UN General Assembly's November 1947 partition plan—under which Western Galilee would have been part of the Arab state and Jerusalem would have been internationalized—gave Israel too much territory. He cited with apparent approval the abortive proposal of the late UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948 to amend the partition plan by taking the Negev from Israel. In conclusion, Khaddoumi declared that what the PLO wanted was to restore Palestine to its “historic role as a bridge between the Arab States west and east of Suez and between Africa and Asia.”

Khaddoumi’s speech could be interpreted as a trial balloon for the legal arguments PLO would advance at Geneva, assuming that the PLO groups could overcome their deep divisions and agree to participate in a Geneva conference. The Russians had for some time been urging the PLO to do so. While the Soviet public statements continued to mention the Soviet Union's support of the creation of Israel as a legitimate expression of Jewish nationalism, they were ambiguous on whether Moscow regarded the June 4, 1967, armistice lines or the 1947 partition borders as “legitimately” Israel's.

For Washington and Jerusalem, Khaddoumi's proposal confirmed Israeli fears that a Geneva conference would not lead to peace, but would be a vehicle for growing pressures on Israel for more and more concessions intended to leave it physically truncated, economically unviable, and ultimately, militarily defenseless.

George E. Gruen
UN Resolution on Zionism

Two events at the 30th session of the UN General Assembly were illustrative of the political and ideological tendencies prevailing in the human rights work of the UN. One was the United States presentation—and subsequent withdrawal in the face of imminent rejection—of a draft resolution on "Amnesty for political prisoners" in the Third Committee, on November 12, 1975 (A/C.3/L2175); the other was the adoption by the General Assembly, on November 10, 1975, of Resolution 3379, which "Determines that zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination."

United States delegate Patrick D. Moynihan, in the argument for his amnesty resolution, pointed out that two General Assembly committees already had approved, with United States support, resolutions on amnesty for political prisoners—in South Africa and Chile. "Is there, however, any reason to stop there," he asked, "to limit our concern to only two members of the UN, when there are altogether 142 [now 144] members?" And, he added:

the selective morality of the UN in matters of human rights threatens the integrity not merely of the UN, but of human rights themselves. Unless standards of human rights are seen to be applied uniformly and neutrally to all nations, regardless of the nature of their regimes or the size of their armaments . . . it will quickly be seen that it is not human rights which are invoked . . . but simply arbitrary political standards dressed up in the guise of human rights.

Though the United States initiative failed, it drew attention to two critical aspects of the international human rights problem: the suppression of the right of peaceful dissent in many countries; and the UN's "selective morality," dwelling on alleged wrongs in a few states while protecting others from criticism. The latter condition was even more dramatically highlighted by the debate and voting on Resolution 3379.

Hostile references to Zionism were nothing new at the UN. For many years they had been a staple of Arab and Communist anti-Israel rhetoric, not only in debates on the Middle East but in many others as well. In the early 1960s, for example, a Communist-Arab coalition, by moving to insert into the text of the draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination such a reference, had blocked a United States-Brazil proposal to include a condemnation of antisemitism.

With the growth of Arab influence, resulting from the increase in UN member-

1See Appendix for full text of resolution.
ship, and the change in international alliances—giving the anti-Israel forces assurance of 19 Arab votes, the 16 Communist votes, most of the votes of the 47 Organization of African Unity (OAU) states and of most other nonaligned countries—the radical Arabs accelerated their offensive in the UN.

It was intensified in the wake of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war and, again, after the Yom Kippur war of October 1973, and moved into high gear at the General Assembly's 1973-1975 sessions. During that period, other UN bodies like the Commission on Human Rights and various specialized agencies, besides granting the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) official observer status, adopted critical or punitive resolutions against Israel, including references to Zionism.

Thus, on December 14, 1973, Israel and Zionism were equated—for the first time—with racism in General Assembly Resolution 315, which "condemns, in particular, the unholy alliance between Portuguese colonialism, South African racism, Zionism and Israeli imperialism." In November 1974 the UNESCO General Conference voted to withhold aid from Israel in the fields of education, science, and culture, and to exclude it from UNESCO's European regional group, the only one to which it had a chance of admittance (AJYB, 1976 [Vol. 76], pp. 158-59).

On February 21, 1975, the Commission on Human Rights, by a vote of 22 in favor, 1 against, and 9 abstentions, adopted a resolution on human rights violations in the occupied territories, which deplored Israel's "continued grave violations" of international law and conventions, in particular the 1949 Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians in war time, "as war crimes and an affront to humanity." Another example was the declaration and measures adopted at the International Women's Year (IWY) Conference held in Mexico City in June 1975 (pp. 115-17).

Anti-Israel Moves: General Assembly, 1975

On the morning of November 10, 1975, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3375 requesting that the PLO, as representative of the people of Palestine, be permitted to take part in all conferences on the Middle East on an equal footing with all other parties. It adopted a second resolution, 3376, establishing a special committee to recommend a program for implementing the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and requesting the Security Council to adopt measures which would enable the Palestinian people to exercise these rights. On December 5 it adopted Resolution 3414 calling on all states to cut off economic and military aid to Israel so long as it held on to occupied territory or denied the national rights of the Palestinian people. Ten days later it adopted a three-part resolution, 3525, deploring Israel's "continued and persistent violation" of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and calling on its Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories to continue its investigations. Resolution 3379, adopted on the afternoon of November 10, was thus but one of a spate of anti-Israel measures adopted during the General Assembly's 1975 session.

Various interpretations have been offered of the immediate impetus for, and the
timing of the resolution. Some believed that it was casually initiated as a routine rhetorical harassment and that the intensity of the reaction, largely attributable to the diplomatic style of Ambassador Moynihan, was not anticipated. Others viewed it as a "consolation" prize given Arab radicals by Third World moderates who, at the Kampala, Uganda, meeting of the Organization of African Unity in spring 1975 and at the Lima, Peru, meeting of nonaligned states in the summer, had refused to endorse the proposal of the radicals to seek Israel's suspension or expulsion at the forthcoming Assembly. Still others saw it as an effort by the radicals to recoup the prestige and position they had lost as a result of Egypt's Sinai agreement with Israel and to shift the scene back to the UN where they enjoyed strategic advantages.

Whatever the immediate causes, the resolution's true nature and the ultimate purpose of many, if not all, of its Arab sponsors clearly was to undermine the legitimacy of the State of Israel in world opinion and in UN jurisprudence, thereby laying the basis for its suspension or expulsion from the world organization. In other words, while the attack was directed against Zionism, its real target was the state of Israel. The aim was to legitimate continuing pressure and attacks on that "racist" state, as against South Africa, both within and outside the UN system, in order to eliminate it and replace it by a Palestinian Arab state, and to intimidate Jews and other friends of Israel into withdrawing their support.

Leonard Garment, United States representative to the Commission on Human Rights, expressed a similar view in an April 1, 1976, address assessing the UN Commission on Human Rights. In it he saw at work a conspiratorial pattern to weaken "the ideas and forms of the democratic West" and to strengthen "the ideas and forms of totalitarianism." A part of this pattern, he stated, was the use of the human rights concepts developed by the UN largely as a result of Western initiatives to "erode the legitimacy of the State of Israel. The syllogism is by now a familiar one: Racism is illegal; Zionism is racism; Israel is a Zionist State; Israel is therefore illegal. So step by step, resolution by resolution, in New York, Geneva, Nairobi, at UNCTAD [UN Conference on Trade and Development], WHO [World Health Organization] and so on, Israel is to be cast out of the international community."

Zionism Resolution and Decade Against Racism

The attack on Zionism began in the Assembly's Third Committee on October 2, 1975, when Cuba, South Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and Syria jointly introduced

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2Said Norman Podhoretz, editor of Commentary: "The very idea of a sovereign Jewish state in the Middle East (Zionism), let alone the actuality of one, no matter what its boundaries might be, was by definition declared criminal (racist). In the eyes of this resolution, Israel could only cease to be criminal if it ceased to be both Jewish and sovereign—if, in other words, it ceased to exist. Returning to the boundaries of 1967 or even the boundaries of 1948 would not make the slightest difference: ("The Abandonment of Israel," Commentary. July 1976, p. 23).

an amendment (A/C. 3/L.2157) to a routine Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) draft resolution relating to the UN Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination (A/10145). The word "zionism" was to be inserted into the text wherever critical references to apartheid, racism, racial discrimination, colonialism, and/or alien domination appeared. And a new operative paragraph was to "Consider(s) zionism as a form of racial discrimination to be included in the Decade."

The Decade, launched by a General Assembly resolution on November 10, 1973, called on UN bodies and specialized agencies, governments, regional intergovernmental organization, nongovernmental organizations, educational institutions, mass media, and other sectors of society to join in the struggle against racism and racial discrimination. The program annexed to the resolution included recommendations favoring the establishment of governmental complaint procedures; the elimination of discrimination in educational systems and immigration policies; involvement of the mass media in public education against racial discrimination; support for people suffering from racial oppression, including the creation of regional and international aid funds; updating existing UN racial studies and undertaking new ones, and production for public use of film, radio, and TV programs on racial questions. By incorporating Resolution 3379, this program offered innumerable opportunities for anti-Zionist and anti-Israel political activity and propaganda.

Vigorous objections from the United States and Western European as well as from several Latin American and African delegations—many of the last out of concern that the inclusion of Zionism would lessen support for the Decade and blur its focus on Southern Africa—led to the withdrawal of the amendments. It was hoped that this would end the matter. Then, on October 16, Somalia, joined by two dozen other states—19 Arab, two black African (Benin [Dahomey] and Guinea), Afghanistan, Cuba, and the Ukrainian SSR—introduced a new resolution (A/C. 3/6.2159) which seemed not to be tied to the Decade but dealt exclusively with Zionism.* Prior to the voting, however, in response to an insistent query from Sierra Leone as to its pertinence to the various agenda items, Somalia, as spokesman for the sponsors of the resolution, stated for the record (A/C.3/SR.2133, p. 11) that it "was connected with agenda item 68(a)," namely the Decade.

The resolution was adopted by the Third Committee on October 17 after heated debate, during which Sierra Leone and Zambia unsuccessfully moved for deferral. Their deferral motion was defeated by a vote of 68 to 45, with 16 abstentions. The vote on the principal resolution was 70 to 29, with 29 abstentions (and 14 absentees). The yes votes thus totaled less than half of the UN membership at the time, 70 out of 142.

Before the vote, Leonard Garment charged that the Third Committee was about "to perform a supreme act of deceit, to make a massive attack on the moral realities

*It was later adopted by the plenary as Resolution 3379.
of the world;" that under the guise of a program to eliminate racism, it was endorsing antisemitism; that the resolution would both morally and politically discredit the UN's efforts against racism and would encourage antisemitism and group hostility. It was, he said, an "obscene act." On October 21, in an address before the Appeal of Conscience Foundation, Ambassador Moynihan said of the resolution:

The real problem is very different, and vastly ominous. It is that the UN has become a locus of a general assault by the majority of the nations in the world on the principles of liberal democracy which are now found only in a minority of nations, and for that a dwindling minority. It was not Zionism that was condemned so much as the significance of Israel as one of the very few places, outside of Western Europe and North America and a few offshore islands, where Western democratic principles survive, and of all such places, currently the most exposed.

He characterized the resolution as "the very quintessence of the totalitarian mode. A total inversion of meaning . . a total distortion of truth . . a reckless act, one of the most grievous errors in the 30-year life of the United Nations."

Resolution in Plenary

THE VOTE

When the Third Committee's draft resolution came before the plenary session, Belgium, speaking for the European Economic Community (EEC), proposed, in the hope of killing the resolution for the current session and possibly forever, to defer it until the next Assembly session. The proposal was defeated 55 in favor, 67 against, with 15 abstentions (and 5 absentees). The deferral move would have won with a shift of seven votes, an outcome which well over half the members would have preferred.

Once the deferral motion was defeated, however, some states which voted for it or abstained (Mexico and Portugal, among others) felt obliged to vote for the principal resolution. It was passed by a vote of 72 to 35, with 32 abstentions and three absentees (Rumania, Spain, and South Africa). As pointed out by the UN Association—USA's Interdependent, "The combined 35 nays and 32 abstentions were the largest number to unite against an anti-Israel proposal in recent memory."

The resolution's 72 supporters included the 19 members of the Arab League, 12 Communist states, 21 black African states (not counting Arab League members, but including some that are predominantly Muslim or with influential Muslim minorities), four Latin American countries (Brazil, Grenada, Guyana, and Mexico), and

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Press Release, USUN-123 (75).
See Appendix for tabulation of vote.
three European states (Malta, Portugal, and Turkey). The 35 nos included five from Africa, one from Asia (Fiji), ten from Latin America, and 18 from the “Western European and other” (U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand) category. Abstentions included 12 black African, eight Asian, 11 Latin American, and one West European (Greece) states.

PROVISIONS

The resolution, itself, cited precedents in four of its five preambular paragraphs. The second recalled the General Assembly’s condemnation, on December 14, 1973, of “the unholy alliance between South African racism and zionism.” The third noted the provision in the IWY declaration calling for the “elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, Zionism, apartheid and racial discrimination in all its forms.” The fourth stated that Resolution 77, adopted by the Organization of African Unity at its 12th session in Kampala, Uganda (July 28-August 1, 1975), referred to “the racist regime in occupied Palestine,” which had “a common imperialist origin” with “the racist regime in Zimbabwe.”

The fifth paragraph of the preamble cited the declaration of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned Countries, held in Lima, Peru (August 25-30, 1975), which, it said, “most severely condemned Zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology.” (Because of opposition by many black African states as well as by Egypt, then negotiating the interim Sinai agreement, both the Kampala and the Lima conferences had declined to approve the more radical Arab resolutions advocating Israel’s expulsion from the UN, a call issued several weeks earlier in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, by a summit conference of the foreign ministers of 39 Islamic states and PLO.)

Resolution 3379 concluded with one operative sentence, which declared Zionism to be a form of racism and racial discrimination.

At the same meeting, just before the vote on the Zionism resolution, the General Assembly adopted two other resolutions under the same agenda item (i.e., “the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination”). One, adopted by a vote of 117 to 19, with 5 abstentions, called for measures to implement the program for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. The other, adopted by a vote of 116 to 18, with seven abstentions, stated that a world conference to combat racism and racial discrimination was to be held as a major feature of the Decade. Those voting against, or abstaining on, these resolutions gave as reason the connection of the Decade with the Zionism resolution.

THE ARGUMENTS

Besides the officially designated plenary session spokesmen for and against the Zionism resolution—the representatives of Benin and Israel—many other delegates
spoke on the issues before and after the vote. Most incisive were Patrick D. Moynihan for the United States and Faye al-Sayegh for Kuwait.

The debate touched on many issues—philosophical, semantic, political, legal, procedural. Among those discussed were: the motives of the resolution's sponsors—whether the target was the State of Israel or only the Zionist ideology or movement; the meaning of Zionism and racism—whether or not exact definitions existed and, if so, whether they had legal and scientific validity; Zionism's claim to being a national liberation movement; the purpose of the Decade Against Racism and the impact the resolution would have on it, as well as on the UN generally; the question of selective morality (or double standard), i.e., why this one state or ideology should be singled out; the proper role of the General Assembly—whether it should function as an instrument for harmonizing differences or as a forum for confrontation.

Arab speakers attacked Zionism and the State of Israel as though they were interchangeable, an equation which led to the implied but not explicitly stated conclusion that Israel, having been founded on the immoral and illegal basis of Zionism, had no right to exist. On the other hand, some non-Arab supporters of the resolution like Brazil, while affirming their recognition of Israel's right to exist, explained that their vote was based not on opposition to the state's existence, but on disapproval of particular actions by Israel, or of the Zionist ideology.

The supporting arguments were essentially repetitions of what had been said in every Middle East discussion since 1948 (with the addition, since 1967, of arguments centered on the Israeli occupation). Besides Benin and Kuwait, the main advocates of the resolution were Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, the PLO observer, Cuba, and Yugoslavia. (No other Communist states participated.) They asserted, among other things, that Israel had expelled the indigenous Palestinian inhabitants to make room for European Jews, with the aim of establishing a Jewish state; that Israel oppressed, and discriminated against, the remaining Palestinian Arabs by the same methods as South Africa used against its black population; that European Israelis discriminated against Jews of Oriental background; that Israeli laws and practices (including the Law of Return giving all Jews the right to automatic Israeli citizenship immediately upon immigration, but denying this right to non-Jews) were discriminatory; that these laws, derived from Zionism, were inherently racist because they held that all Jews were one people having the right to their own state in biblical Palestine, to the exclusion of others, and that while Arabs abhorred Zionism, they respected individual Jews and the Jewish religion.

Sayegh, the principal speaker on the Arab side, pointed out that under the UN-approved definitions, as provided in Article 1 of both the UN Declaration and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, racial discrimination was not merely a question of color or genetics, but also descent and national and ethnic origin. Zionism, he argued, defined Jewishness in ethnic rather than strictly religious terms and entailed in both theory and practice discrimination against the original Arab inhabitants, who either had been expelled or were being treated as second-class citizens. Sayegh denied that Zionism was a
national liberation movement and rejected the equation of Zionism with Judaism and of anti-Zionism with antisemitism. Christian and Moslem Arabs, he maintained, revered Judaism as a religion. He attacked the motives of the West European states for opposing the Zionism resolution, challenging their good-faith commitment to the aims of the Decade, as proved by their support of South Africa.

The delegate of Benin was outspoken about how far the supporters of the resolution were prepared to go for the Palestinian cause. Urging the adoption of the resolution, he stated: "If we run the risk of seeing the United Nations break down, or of causing the Program of Action of the Decade to fail, we assume our responsibility, because rather than seeing the UN survive bogged down in compromise, we prefer to see the UN dead to see it break down for having defended and brought about the triumph of truth and justice." The delegate of Iran, which voted for the resolution, frankly admitted that the term Zionism "may be interpreted in different ways and is not very clear to us in the context of this draft resolution." Nevertheless, his country had acted "out of a spirit of solidarity with our Arab brothers."

The Israeli and United States delegates delivered the principal opposition speeches, but all West European and several Latin American and African delegates, as well as one Asian, Fiji, also spoke against the resolution. Israel's Chaim Herzog argued that Zionism was the national liberation movement of the Jewish people and was recognized as such as far back as 1947 in a historic speech by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in the UN; that the unbroken connection of the Jewish people with the land of Israel went back to biblical times, a fact acknowledged by the League of Nations and the UN; that in the guise of anti-Zionism, Resolution 3379 was an antisemitic attack on the Jewish people and their religion; that its purpose was to deny the Jewish people what the UN Charter purported to grant, namely, the right to national self-determination, now being enjoyed by the "Arab nation" in 20 sovereign states occupying 4.5 million square miles with immense riches; that Arabs in Israel had complete equality and more freedom than did Arabs elsewhere; that the real racists were the Arab states, which had expelled and confiscated the property of 800,000 Jews who had lived there for 2,000 years. Herzog further drew attention to the plight of the Kurds in Iraq, the Christians in Lebanon, and other minorities in Arab states. Having opened his address with a moving evocation of the 1938 Kristallnacht in Nazi Germany, which step-by-step led to the death camps—and to which he likened the Zionism resolution—he closed with a gesture of defiance and contempt by dramatically ripping the text of the resolution.

Moynihan charged that the resolution projected a "political lie of a variety well known to the 20th century," that it constituted "a massive attack on the moral realities of the world." The term racism (in contrast to the term racial discrimination), he pointed out, had never been legally defined by any UN body. It had been associated in both popular and scientific usage with invidious discrimination based on a belief in innate and unchangeable genetic differences. Zionism, he said, was rather a political-religious movement that rejected this thesis. Israel's population
was in fact drawn from diverse racial stocks—black, brown, white, oriental, and Western—and large numbers were non-Jews, including Muslims and Christians of Arab and other national origins. Many of its non-Jewish inhabitants were citizens, and those who were not could acquire citizenship by legal procedures very much like those in Western Europe.

Racism in the sense of belief in a hierarchy of rights based on innate differences among people, Moynihan argued, was altogether alien to Zionism, a political and religious movement that was part of a “general upsurge of national consciousness and aspiration that overtook most other people after 1848, and that in time spread to all of Africa and Asia.” The very idea of the Jews constituting a “race” was invented by 19th-century antisemites to replace the old religious grounds for antisemitism, which had begun to lose force.

He further asserted that among the “terrible consequences” of the adoption of a resolution which, in the words of Andrei Sakharov, gave the “appearance of international sanction” to the “abomination of antisemitism” would be the discrediting of UN efforts against racism. By today perverting the meaning of racism and tomorrow other terms in the human rights lexicon, it could irreversibly damage the very idea of human rights. Moynihan concluded with a ringing statement that his country “will not abide by, will not acquiesce in this infamous act.”

Other opposition speakers argued that the resolution was confusing and imprecise (Canada, France); that no case had been made to support the contention that Zionism was tantamount to racism (Barbados); that the purported anticolonialists were, in fact, attacking the world’s oldest national liberation movement; that to equate Zionism with racism was to confuse racism with nationalism; that the resolution was an invitation to genocide against the Jews (Costa Rica); that it did not further the cause of eradicating racism to introduce the specific problems of the Middle East into the deliberations on that topic (Austria); that it was wrong to stigmatize one party to what essentially was a boundary dispute as being colonialist and racist (Haiti); that apartheid and Zionism had different histories and perspectives (Ethiopia); that the governments of the EEC countries categorically rejected the concept that Zionism was a form of racism and racial discrimination (Italy); that the term “black Zionism” had been used in a positive sense in West Africa “to denote the movement to return to Africa the displaced Africans uprooted from their homelands and sold into slavery in the western world” (Sierra Leone); that the OAU action at Kampala had not been unanimous (Liberia); that the resolution would divert the Decade Against Racism from its intended focus on Southern Africa, reduce support for it and the UN, and would encourage the very evil it was intended to eradicate (Barbados, Liberia, Zambia); that the Zionism resolution would exacerbate religious animosities in many parts of the world (Australia); that the UN should seek to harmonize and not exacerbate differences; that many countries suffered from some form or degree of racial discrimination and that it was therefore unfair to single out one particular country (Fiji).

The West European delegates gave one or more of these reasons for voting against
the Zionism resolution, as well as against the two other resolutions offered under the same agenda item: on the Decade Against Racism and the world conference against racism projected for 1977. Like the United States, they stated that they would not cooperate with the Decade and would not help finance the world conference.

On the day after the vote, reporters asked delegates why they voted for the resolution. The New York Times (November 12, 1975) enumerated the various reasons given: Arab oil and other Arab political pressures; pressure of membership in the Islamic Conference (Iran); Arab propaganda and effective lobbying by Palestinian and Moslem representatives in Latin America and in the UN; spillover from the anti-American pique of some Latin American and other Third World countries; role of Arab extremists and Cuban guerrilla specialists who had latched on to anticolonialist liberation movements in Africa; actual belief of some new black African governments that Zionism, capitalism, and American imperialism were all faces of the "same monster."

**Governmental and Public Reactions**

The Assembly’s action evoked an unprecedented flood of protests from the United States government, political parties, citizens’ groups, the press, artists, scientists, and intellectuals throughout the United States. Jointly and separately, international Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) accredited to the UN issued statements of criticism.

**UN-ACCREDITED NGOS AND OTHER ASSOCIATIONS**

In a joint declaration issued after the Third Committee vote (October 30), over 60 representatives and observers of UN-accredited international and national NGOs deplored the resolution “as a perversion of historical and contemporary fact, as unrepresentative of the decent opinion of mankind . . . harmful to the effectiveness of the important world struggle against racial discrimination, including apartheid,” and “a means to incite racist hatred—anti-Semitism—against Jews and Jewish communities whose sympathies lie with the State of Israel.”

On the same day, the International Commission of Jurists stated that the resolution exemplified a tendency to disregard juridical norms in UN initiatives; it was adopted without defining Zionism and without study by any UN organ of the various meanings attributed to the term. The State of Israel, it said, was established and recognized by the UN as a legitimate expression of the aspiration to national liberation and statehood of the great majority of the Jewish people after having experienced unspeakable racial persecution during World War II. Therefore, the

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7 See pp. 147–48 for the reaction of the Jewish community. For reactions abroad, see pertinent chapters in the reviews of the various countries; Mexico is discussed in a section below.
Commission declared, "to categorize Zionism as racism is to equate nationalism with racism." At the same time, it held that it was erroneous to denounce opposition to Zionist aspirations as antisemitism.

The International League for the Rights of Man, in an open letter of November 21 to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, stated: "Our concern for the human rights efforts of the UN, including its responsibilities in the Middle East conflict, prompts us to express our dismay over this unwarranted resolution and to hope that it will be treated with the minimal attention it deserves."

U.S. GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL AND LOCAL

Congress reacted with speed and anger. Many members of both Houses condemned the resolution and called for retaliatory action through total or partial withholding of funds or of participation in the UN, e.g., Senators James D. Allan (D., Ala.), Richard Stone (D., Fla.), and Lloyd M. Bentsen (D., Tex.); Representative Lester L. Wolff (D., Nassau Co.). Others urged serious review of the United States commitment to the UN and of the UN's voting system and structure, e.g., Senators J. Glenn Beall, Jr. (R., Md.), Hiram L. Fong (R., Hawaii), Harrison Williams, Jr. (D., N.J.), Charles McC. Mathias (R., Md.), and Robert Taft, Jr. (R., O.). Others, while condemning the resolution, opposed withdrawal from the UN and cautioned against precipitous action: Senators Joseph P. Biden, Jr. (D., Del.), Hubert H. Humphrey (D., Minn.), Charles H. Percy (R., Ill.), and Representative Jonathan B. Bingham (D., N.Y.). Senator Humphrey pointed out that many Africans had voted against the resolution, and a small shift in the vote could have defeated it. Senator Percy observed that United States withdrawal would leave no one to explain America's policies, or to speak for Israel.

On November 11 both Houses of Congress unanimously adopted resolutions denouncing the Assembly's action as "contributing to anti-Semitism," opposing United States participation in the Decade, and calling on the General Assembly to rescind Resolution 3379. The Senate urged immediate hearings by its Foreign Relations Committee and by the House Committee on International Relations to "reassess the United States' participation in the UN General Assembly."

The administration also reacted quickly, though with more restraint. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger declared on November 11 that "the United States will ignore this vote and pay no attention to it;" that the UN "will damage itself if it continues in this way." A day later, he called it "extremely unhelpful and highly irresponsible," and adding to existing "tensions and rifts and distrust." This, he said, might lead to a breakdown in efforts recently initiated by the United States in the UN for long-term economic cooperation with Third World countries. At the same time, he reminded critics of the resolution that the Security Council served

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*Congressional Record, November 11, 1975, pp. S 19591; H 10911.*
the useful purpose of cooling off passions and the United States had more to gain from staying in the Assembly than from withdrawing; that whatever the immediate irritations, we must retain the possibility of cooperation; that many African states were trying to act responsibly, and that, having in the past overrated the UN's values, we should not now go "to the other extreme of not realizing some of the benefits that the United Nations with all its failings still has for the United States."

On November 13 President Gerald R. Ford stated that he did not intend to reduce the size of his request to Congress for the United States share of the UN budget.

The resolution was condemned by the Wisconsin Governor's Commission on the United Nations, the Massachusetts senate, the Detroit and Los Angeles city councils, the Baltimore County executive, and other state and local legislative bodies in the United States.

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

On December 12 the quasi-official U.S. National Commission for UNESCO warned that the resolution might "encourage anti-Semitism which is itself a form of racial discrimination as that term is defined in Article I" of the Convention on Racial Discrimination. It viewed "with alarm" the existing situation at the UN, where so many nations were demonstrably ready "to pervert long-standing concepts of human rights for temporary political advantage."

The U.S. Committee for UNICEF, in a statement on November 19, denounced the resolution as "divisive" and recalled the "long, positive and continuing association" between Israel and UNICEF. The board of directors of the United Nations Association—USA, on November 21, urged the United States government to lead efforts to prevent a repetition of such actions in the UN and other international forums, and recommended nonsupport of the Decade and other UN programs which attempt to implement the resolution, as well as official expression of displeasure with governments that voted for it.

A group of 55 distinguished United States intellectuals, academicians, and Nobel Laureates issued a protest statement on November 10, which read: "The UN resolution against racism, in its present form, may well inflame racial hatred and legitimize anti-Semitism on an international scale. It is a disruptive and subversive measure aimed at reducing the Jewish people to pariah status, as part of the Arab states' campaign to destroy the State of Israel." The National Education Association called for repeal of the resolution as departing from UN ideals. The president of the League of Women Voters addressed a letter to President Ford, Secretary Kissinger and other foreign policy leaders saying that "Recent events have caused many of our members to question their long-time support [of the UN]."

Leaders of national ethnic and minority organizations, meeting in Chicago on

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1Initiated by Professors for Peace in the Middle East Ad Hoc Protest Committee; see APPME Bulletin, November 1975.
November 26, issued a statement charging that the resolution "denies to the Jewish people the same right of self-determination that is accorded to other peoples. To equate Zionism, a humanitarian movement, with racism is both a blatant lie and an insult to Americans whose ethnic and racial backgrounds make them sensitive to all forms of bigotry." The statement, read to a rally of 10,000 in Chicago by Aloysius A. Mazewski, national president of the Polish American Congress and a delegate to the UN, was signed by representatives of Greek, Lithuanian, Hispanic, Black, Irish-American, Belgian, Chinese, Italian, Swedish, Japanese, Ukrainian, and other groups.

The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, at its meeting in Atlanta in August 1976, resolved that it "rejects categorically and specifically the legal basis for and assertion by" the Zionism Resolution and "deplores the appeal inherent in said Resolution to the basest of human frailties (anti-Semitism) rather than moving to co-exist on the basis of mutual respect consistent with the world rule of law." The report accompanying the ABA resolution stated in part: "The United Nations resolution necessarily evinces a commitment to the destruction of the modern state of Israel as a homeland of the Jewish people and is therefore incompatible with the United Nations Charter and with international law."

CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY

Numerous Christian bodies and leaders, both Protestant and Catholic—including many normally neutral in regard to Middle East issues, or even critical of Israel—joined in the attack on the Zionism resolution. Dr. Philip A. Potter, general secretary of the World Council of Churches, declared his organization's "unequivocal opposition to the equation of Zionism with racism." Zionism, he stated, did not fall under the commonly understood meaning of racism, which UNESCO's 1967 Statement on Race defined as discriminatory beliefs or acts justified on grounds of "immutable and innate" characteristics. Maintaining that the resolution exacerbated the explosive conflict in the Middle East by diverting attention from the task of resolving it through peaceful negotiation, he called on the General Assembly to "reconsider and rescind" it.\(^\text{11}\)

Dr. Robert V. Moss, president of the United Church of Christ, declared: "We should not be deceived by the use of the term Zionism. The sponsors of the resolution meant by it Jews and Judaism as well as the state of Israel."\(^\text{12}\)

The United Church Board for World Ministries condemned the resolution as an "ill-advised propaganda device," and rejected its method of "voicing opposition to Israel's policies and unwillingness to comply with UN resolutions on the Middle East."\(^\text{13}\) At the same time, such groups as the Council of Bishops of the United

\[^{12}\] Ibid.
\[^{13}\] Ibid., November 24, 1975.
Methodist Church expressed concern over the potential loss of support for the UN as a consequence of the resolution.\textsuperscript{14}

Sixty Catholic and Protestant church leaders from 21 states, participating in an interfaith workshop in Memphis, Tenn., sent to the UN Secretary-General a sharply critical statement calling the resolution "a revival of the all too familiar anti-Semitism which has plagued mankind through the centuries. It is, moreover, a falsehood without historical justification."\textsuperscript{15}

In "A Statement of Conscience on Zionism and Racism," 21 Christian religious leaders in California declared: "It is ironic that those nations that are spearheading this anti-Zionist campaign are themselves the product of national liberation movements. They are denying to the Jewish people the fundamental right of national self-determination which they claim for themselves."\textsuperscript{16}

The leaders of the Catholic Church were particularly outspoken. John Cardinal Krol, Archbishop of Philadelphia, commented in a November 13 address at St. Joseph's College that "all reasonable people realize that facts are not determined by majority vote and that unsupported charges discredit the majority and not the target of their charges." John Cardinal Cransberry of St. Louis called the vote "regrettable" and "distressing," a "reckless statement" by the General Assembly that was "a far cry from the high ideals expected by John XXIII."\textsuperscript{17} Archbishop Joseph L. Bernardin, president of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, deplored the resolution in a public statement as opening the door "to harassment, discrimination and denial of basic rights to members of the Jewish community throughout the world."\textsuperscript{18}

There were statements also by Archbishop Thomas A. Donnellan of Atlanta, who, at a conference commemorating the tenth anniversary of Vatican II, denounced the resolution as "not in accord with the facts and [is] productive of much harm,"\textsuperscript{19} and by Archbishop Peter L. Gerety of Newark who condemned it as an "abhorrent action" and an "outrage."\textsuperscript{20}

Both the National Catholic Conference of Interracial Justice and the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights characterized the resolution as an expression of antisemitism.\textsuperscript{21} The Catholic Interracial Council of New York recognized "Zionism itself as part of the long fight against racism" and observed that, therefore, "to seek to enlist the UN in a global campaign against Zionism as a form of racism is not only to distort the truth, but it is a means likely to incite racist hatred and

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., November 20, 1975.
\textsuperscript{15}New York Times, November 9, 1975.
\textsuperscript{16}Los Angeles Times, November 5, 1975.
\textsuperscript{17}Religious News Service, November 17, 1975.
\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., November 12, 1975.
\textsuperscript{19}Atlanta Constitution, October 25, 1975.
\textsuperscript{20}Newark Star Ledger, November 16, 1975.
antisemitism against Jews and other groups whose sympathies lie with the State of Israel."\(^2\)

Condemnation of the resolution by the Catholic press, particularly the diocesan weeklies, was prompt and strong: the *Criterion* in Indianapolis said, "We were wrong. Accolades for a tyrannical buffoon are small potatoes compared with the attack this week on Israel and Jews everywhere who see Israel as their spiritual homeland;" the *Monitor* in San Francisco called November 10 "a day of shame;" the *Voice* of Miami maintained, "It is those who voted in bad conscience for the resolution who are racists;" the *Catholic Free Press* in Worcester, Mass., commented that "in the context of the UN mentality today, a slur upon Zionism is an attack against Judaism."\(^3\)

Independent Christian publications were equally outspoken. *Christianity Today* stated: "If religious considerations are part of the indictment in the Committee's resolution, it is only fair to observe that in this area Judaism is no match for Islam and its strictures against non-Muslims. Muslims who have converted to Christianity can tell the world of the social, economic and political sanctions that follow as a matter of course. For the Arabs to press this line tells us more about them than about the State of Israel;" or the Kansas City *National Catholic Reporter*: "By equating Zionism with racism, the UN is transformed from an arena for serious debate into a collection of nationally and ideologically labeled soapboxes for declamation, not dialogue;" and the Baltimore *Catholic Review*: "The UN resolution on Zionism is so absurd, it is tempting to write it off as a clownish prank of an adolescent mob. Unfortunately anti-Semitism is too serious an evil for anyone—especially Christians—to ignore the resolution."\(^4\)

Greek Orthodox Archbishop Iakovos attacked the vote as "deplorable and offensive."\(^5\)

**THE PRESS**

The resolution was overwhelmingly denounced in columns, editorials, letters-to-the-editor, and advertisements in newspapers throughout the United States. An Anti-Defamation League survey\(^6\) of 50 top-circulation newspapers showed that 34 (68 per cent) viewed the resolution as tantamount to antisemitism; 3 (6 per cent) opposed it, but did not regard it as antisemitism, and 13 (26 per cent) did not touch on the antisemitism question.

The *New York Times* condemned the resolution in editorials entitled "Cynical

\(^2\)Ibid., November 13, 1975.
\(^3\)Ibid., November 17, 1975.
\(^4\)Ibid., November 17, 1975.
\(^5\)News Release, Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, December 10, 1975.
\(^6\)Memorandum of November 26, 1975.
Diplomacy" (October 24, 1975), and "Shame of the UN" (November 13, 1975); the San Francisco Chronicle (November 17, 1975) in one headed "The Hypocrites in the Woodwork." The Washington Post expressed the opinion that the resolution blessed "every wayward international impulse to undermine Israel and to hate Jews." The Chicago Daily News noted the "philosophical kinship" between anti-Zionism at the UN and Nazism. The Los Angeles Times observed that while to be anti-Zionist is not necessarily to be antisemitic, "the resolution was bad business" and "belie the integrity of those Arab states that protest their willingness to co-exist with Israel." The Portland Oregonian spoke of "Jew-baiting" in the Assembly. The Seattle Times commented on the irony that a generation after Hitler, "the UN itself would officially indorse anti-semitism." Among other critics were the Richmond News Leader (November 13), Monitor of Concord, N.H. (November 12), the Indianapolis News (November 12), and the Syracuse Herald-Journal (November 12).

A strong statement came from Lewis H. Lapham, editor of Harper's:

Intended as an attack against Israel (and by extension against the ideas associated with democracy, civil liberties, and human rights), the resolution encourages the member states to look upon support for Israel as a criminal act. If enforced by literal-minded governments . . . the resolution could transform anti-Semitism into a noble cause. . . . The cheering that accompanied the counting of the votes in the General Assembly contained the mockery of self-defeat. Once conceived as the last, best hope of peace in the world, the U.N. appeared to have changed itself into a headquarters tent convenient for plotting wars.

At the same time, though to a far lesser extent, some newspapers carried items defending or explaining the resolution. Terence Smith of the New York Times (November 16, 1975), while dissenting from the resolution, cited evidences of legal and factual discrimination against Arabs in Israel, but also noted that they were much better off than Arabs in certain other Middle East countries. An Arab League-sponsored advertisement, reproducing a letter of Elmer Berger, the anti-Zionist ideologist and cofounder of the American Council for Judaism, charged that Israel was indeed a racist state in that Jews were accorded a status superior to that of others in the society as a matter of public law.

M. T. Mehdi, secretary-general of the Action Committee on American-Arab Relations, contended that though Zionism had arisen as a response to antisemitism and racism, it had itself evolved into a racist movement by claiming for Jews rights denied to others. It had occupied and established in Palestine a Jewish state "against the will of the people of Palestine." A paid advertisement in the Providence Journal of January 6, 1976, signed by a group of persons of Arab descent and others, denied

that anti-Zionists were antisemites and repeated the litany of Arab charges against Israel.

I. F. Stone found truth in the arguments of both the critics and the defenders of the resolution. While agreeing that the sponsors were hypocritical in that many were themselves guilty of discrimination, he believed that Arabs did have legitimate grievances against Israel.

BLACK COMMUNITY

Spokesmen for the black community, too, condemned the Zionism resolution as antiseptic as well as harmful to the UN drive against racism.

Before and after the Third Committee vote, Black Americans to Support Israel Committee (BASIC), headed by A. Philip Randolph, sent statements to all African delegations to the UN, which said, in part: "Condemning Zionism as racist will sow a harvest of bitterness, turmoil, and divisiveness that can only confuse the battle against racism and apartheid. The attempt to label Zionism as a form of racism obscures the roots and nature of racism. The fight against racism will not be advanced by the sanctioning, however indirect or tacit, of anti-semitism..." The organization inserted a full-page advertisement in the New York Times (November 23, 1975), with a quotation from a column by Bayard Rustin, which said: "Zionism is not racism, but the legitimate expression of the Jewish people's self-determination. From our 400 years experience with slavery, segregation, and discrimination, we know that Zionism is not racism." Among other black groups expressing such sentiments were 28 American scholars, educators, and other intellectual leaders, including C. Clyde Ferguson of Harvard Law School; Charles H. Wesley, former director of the Afro-American Museum in Philadelphia, and Luther Foster, president of Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, who appealed to the General Assembly on November 8 to set aside the Zionist resolution because "concern for [its] anti-Semitic implications... will heavily compromise African hopes of expunging apartheid from the world conscience."

Vernon E. Jordan, executive director of the National Urban League, in his syndicated column, said the UN action reminded him of the League of Nations, which became irrelevant when, in the case of Ethiopia, it "refused to stand up to protect the integrity of small countries." He saw a parallel between the code words "forced busing" and "law and order," which were used to victimize blacks, and "Zionism," a code word for antisemitism. Dr. Thomas W. Matthew, president of the black self-help organization NEGRO, declared, "...Zionism is not racism just as Black Power is not racism—both are self-help movements invented by peoples who are

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22 BASIC release, n.d.
victims of long standing oppression." Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton joined with the four other borough presidents of New York in condemning the Zionism resolution as "a blatant power play on the part of some Arab nations" whose passage would kick off a "new era of antisemitism."

LABOR

Illustrative of organized labor's view on the Zionism resolution was a statement issued by AFL-CIO President George Meany on October 31:

The American people will not be fooled by a resolution which absurdly asked the U.N. to declare "that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination." Zionism is not; it is precisely the product of revulsion against these evils, especially as they reached their culmination in the holocaust of Adolph Hitler, for whom some of the promoters of this resolution can scarcely conceal their admiration. The resolution is all the more ludicrous in light of the persecution of religious and national minorities rampant in the lands of its sponsors. Let those sponsors look to the plight of Jews in Syria, of the Kurds in Iraq, of the Christians in Lebanon and southern Sudan—not to mention the attempted wholesale liquidation of national minorities in the Soviet Union.

But the real struggle that must be waged against racism on a global scale can only be weakened and disoriented when the term racism itself loses meaning, falling victim to ideological warfare. The Third Committee's resolution will not advance the struggle against racism but set it back.

Popular support for the U.N. is eroding in the United States. In the view of the AFL-CIO, which represents a massive cross-section of the American people, the General Assembly must defeat the resolution on Zionism or gravely jeopardize United States participation in the United Nations.

On November 3, 1975, Harry Van Arsdale, president of the New York City Central Labor Council, AFL-CIO, presented to the United States Mission to the UN on behalf of the top officials of 20 affiliates a statement attacking the Third Committee's anti-Zionism resolution and saluting Ambassador Moynihan for his role in fighting it. Excoriating the UN as "the sinkhole" with "113 dictatorships and totalitarian regimes [that] far outnumber the two dozen remaining democracies," the statement continued: "How dare the majority in the UN condemn Zionism as racism when they know that in Israel every resident, of every race, color and creed has equal rights as a citizen of the state? Isn't it hypocrisy when Africans surrender to Arab oil blackmail and kiss the feet of those who sold them into slavery? It wasn't the Americans or the Jews who started the African slave trade; it was these same Arab potentates." The executive board

of the United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO, condemned the resolution as an “affront to the Jewish people who have been history’s primary victims of racism.”

**PUBLIC OPINION POLL**

A Harris poll taken in mid-December examined the attitudes of the American people toward the Zionism resolution. According to the findings, 49 per cent disapproved of it, 9 per cent approved, and 42 per cent were not sure. The percentages were about the same as those for and against the Israeli or Arab causes, indicated by public opinion polls for some years. Significantly, however, while a large majority opposed having the United States “take itself out of the United Nations now,” 49 against 24 per cent approved reducing the United States contribution to the UN, and 43 against 26 per cent were in favor of putting the UN on notice that the Americans would pull out “if such prejudice is shown in the future.”

**Mexico, Zionism Resolution, and IWY**

Held in Mexico City in June 1975, the International Women’s Year Conference adopted the “Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and their Contribution to Peace, 1975,” a world plan of action for the advancement of women, and 34 separate resolutions on many subjects, including the rights of the Palestinians. Israel and Zionism were violently attacked by conference speakers and in the Declaration and resolutions. One of the paragraphs in the Declaration stated that “international cooperation and peace require the achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, Zionism, apartheid, racial discrimination in all its forms as well as the recognition of peoples and their rights to self-determination.” An Israeli amendment to delete the mention of Zionism was rejected, and the Declaration was adopted by a vote of 89 in favor, three against (Denmark, Israel, and the United States), with 18 abstentions.

The conference also adopted a resolution on Palestinian women, appealing to all states and international organizations “to extend assistance to the Palestinian and Arab women and people in their struggle against Zionism, foreign occupation and alien domination, foreign aggression, and help them restore their inalienable rights in Palestine.” (66 to three—Israel, Netherlands, and the United States—with 35 abstentions). The United States representative stated (July 2) that “References to ‘Zionism’ appear to associate this conference with a campaign against the State of Israel, and carry the implication that the State of Israel should be eliminated. The

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40*UN Press Release round-up, IWY/68 and 69, July 3, 1975.*
United States strongly opposes any provisions of this nature directed against one member of the United Nations."  

Mexico's support of the Zionism resolution in the General Assembly resulted in a precipitous drop in organized and individual tourism by American Jews. This, in turn, produced heavy pressure on the Mexican government from local business interests to reach an accommodation with Israel and American Jewish organizations. Mexican President Luis Echeverria commissioned former President Miguel Aleman, newly appointed president of the Mexican Tourist Council, to fly to New York (November 25) to extend to leaders of the major Jewish organizations an invitation to fly to Mexico City for a meeting with Echeverria. Early in December Echeverria sent Mexican Foreign Minister Emilio Rabasa to Israel to placate its leaders. After meeting with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, Rabasa issued a public statement in Israel saying that Mexico considered Zionism "honorable." He stated that, as host country to the International Women's Year world conference, Mexico would have to vote in the General Assembly in favor of the conference Declaration and resolutions, which contained offensive references to Israel and Zionism, but that Mexico would use that occasion to correct the impression that it was anti-Zionist. Allon expressed satisfaction with this "retraction."

American Jewish leaders met with Echeverria in Mexico City on December 12, at which time he declared that Zionism and racism could not be equated, and promised that Mexico would not again vote in the UN in a manner that could be construed as anti-Zionist. He said Rabasa was flying directly from Israel to the UN General Assembly to instruct Mexico's representative to cast its affirmative vote in a way that would "distinguish our Third World policy from anything which might even resemble anti-Zionism." He said: . . . we are not anti-Zionist. We understand the historical and honorable meaning of Zionism. He in no way identifies Zionism with racism and the votes of his delegation at the United Nations were not intended to convey that impression." He had taken steps "to insure that future votes by Mexico cannot be interpreted or misunderstood as equating Zionism with racism."

The results of the IWY conference—the Declaration of Mexico, the Plan of Action, and the several Conference resolutions—were approved by the General Assembly's plenary in a series of separate resolutions. One of these, Resolution 3519, on "Women's Participation . . . in the struggle against colonialism, racial discrimina-

41 Department of State Bulletin, August 18, 1975.
42 Among various reasons given for this were: extensive Arab propaganda activity; anticipated commercial relationships with the Arab countries; aspiration to a position of leadership in the Third World and to a role as its link with the industrialized countries, and the Mexican president's rumored ambition to succeed Secretary-General Waldheim or to head some kind of new Third World organization.
43 Transcript of minutes.
tion, . . .” was adopted by 90 to 21, with 22 abstentions. A second, Resolution 3520, on a “World Conference of the International Women’s Year,” was adopted 107 to one (Israel), with 26 abstentions.

In the debate in the Third Committee on these resolutions, Western delegations repeated their objections to the inclusion of extraneous political matters, in particular the references to Zionism. The United States delegate said: “Although the Mexico City Conference had its constructive aspects, it had also its negative ones. . . . the United States had objected to the references to Zionism in the Declaration of Mexico and to the wording of a few of the resolutions adopted at the Conference. . . .”

These arguments were repeated in the plenary. Libya stated: “The inclusion of Zionism in the Declaration of Mexico was proof of its importance.” Syria understood resolution 3519 to equate Zionism with racism. Iran “regretted that certain phrases were included in the Declaration of Mexico which were out of place,” but considered that the “Declaration did contain important principles.” The United States strongly objected to “the efforts of some to politicize the World Conference” and “to the reference to Zionism in the Declaration of Mexico and to the wording of a few of the resolutions of the Conference.” Canada reaffirmed its total rejection of the reference to Zionism in the Declaration and to certain of the resolutions. The EEC states declared they considered Resolution 3519 a “manifesto containing political propaganda.” Venezuela explained that its affirmative vote on all the resolutions should not be interpreted as being against the State of Israel or its practices. Mexico said the “reservations certain delegates had about the decisions of the Mexico Conference should not be an obstacle to voting in favor of the draft. Mexico was a co-sponsor of the draft, but that did not mean that it unconditionally accepted all the words used in the decisions of the Conference.”

In explaining Mexico’s vote in favor of one of the resolutions, its delegate said (December 15): “If we mean by Zionism the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Jewish people, within the terms of the UN Charter, our vote should not be interpreted as being against the State of Israel or its practices. Mexico has already condemned.”

Ambassador Herzog, who had not been informed of Allon’s understanding with Rabasa, criticized the statement. However, the Israel government issued a conciliatory statement which, recalling Rabasa’s promise, hoped that Mexico would keep its promise in voting on the subject of Zionism in UNESCO and in other international organizations, which were expected soon. The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, on the other hand, issued a statement on December 16 which said it was “deeply disturbed by the failure of Mexico’s representative . . . to make clear the position conveyed to Jewish leadership last week by the President of Mexico” and urged Echeverria “to direct the representatives of his
government to reflect and demonstrate the understanding and sympathy he displayed in their meeting in all future votes.”

Subsequently, Mexico’s posture on Zionism and on Israel-Arab questions vacillated. Though it absented itself from the voting on resolutions at the meetings in December of UNESCO and the International Civil Aviation Organization, in both of which the Arabs requested the incorporation by reference of the Zionism resolution, it continued to curry favor with the Arabs, voting with them in various UN bodies and agencies. Mexico went out of its way to demonstrate this support when it sent a gratuitous letter to the President of the Security Council which was considering the OAU complaint of Israeli aggression against Uganda in connection with the Entebbe incident. Though the letter condemned “all terrorist acts” and the hijacking “by an extremist Palestinian group,” and affirmed “the right of each of the States of the region to live in peace and security,” it was implicitly critical of Israel’s rescue operation and defensive of the PLO.

The Aftermath

It was evident that the anti-Zionist campaign in the UN was continuing and that, as an Arab League spokesman predicted, Resolution 3379 was being exploited for this purpose.

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION

At the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) conference in Rome in November 1975, Iraq and Libya called for the expulsion of Israel as a racist state and, as noted in the final report of the Conference, “several delegates” cited the anti-Zionism resolution in urging that food aid should go to liberation movements —implicitly including the PLO—struggling against foreign domination and racism. The Western participants objected, and United States delegate Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz warned that the politicization of the FAO was eroding American support for the organization.

UNESCO

In December in Paris, at a UNESCO-sponsored conference of governmental experts mandated to define the role of the mass media in combating war propaganda, racism, and apartheid, Yugoslavia, acting for the Arab participants, proposed an amendment to the conference draft declaration which contained a reference Resolution 3379. When the amendment was approved by a vote of 36 to 22, with seven abstentions, the nine states of the European Economic Community (EEC), Aus-

*S/12135. Since Mexico was not a member of the Security Council, it had no need to place itself on record.
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tralia, Canada and the United States walked out. Before withdrawing, the United States delegate declared: "... we oppose any text which directly or indirectly equates racism with Zionism ... we condemn the evils of racism as it is traditionally understood. We will not condemn Zionism and will not participate in an Orwellian distortion of those terms."

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

At the 32nd session of the Commission on Human Rights, February 2-March 5, 1976, the Arab and Communist states secured the adoption of a resolution (No. 9) containing provisions which, though couched in general terms, were understood to be aimed at the Zionism resolution. It requested the Sub-Commission on Discrimination and Minorities at its next session to "prepare suggestions on effective ways and means and concrete measures for securing the full and universal implementation of the United Nations resolutions and decisions on racism, racial discrimination ... and related matters and to submit its suggestions and proposals to the commission at its thirty-third session." This resolution drew the Sub-Commission's attention specifically to "the deliberations and decisions of the General Assembly at its thirtieth session ..." wording designed to incorporate indirectly the Zionism resolution.

The resolution was adopted by a vote of 19 to eight, with one abstention. The United States refused to participate in the vote. The United Kingdom, speaking also on behalf of France, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany, explained that they opposed the resolution because it contained a disguised reference to Assembly Resolution 3379, against which they had voted. Jordan said the resolution provided an opportunity to establish once and for all that racial discrimination did exist in Israel, and that it was appropriate for the Assembly to have equated Zionism with racism.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

When the 60th session of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), April 13-May 14, 1976, discussed the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination the Arabs again used the occasion to inject the Zionism issue by indirect. One of the resolutions related to the Secretary-General's report of progress of activities by UN bodies, governments, and nongovernmental organizations.

On the motion of the Arab members, ECOSOC had added language welcoming adoption by the Assembly and other UN bodies and agencies of "resolutions and/or measures bearing on racism, racial discrimination, apartheid, decolonization and self-determination called for under the Programme of the Decade," and urging all

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states "to cooperate loyally and fully in achieving the goals and objectives of the Decade." Another resolution dealt with Ghana's offer to host the world conference to combat racism and racial discrimination, intended as a major feature of the Decade. This resolution contained a paragraph asking the General Assembly to establish as the purpose of the conference "to mobilize world opinion and adopt measures likely to secure the full and universal implementation of United Nations decisions and resolutions on racism, racial discrimination, apartheid, decolonization and self-determination." The radical Arabs failed to get the necessary support for the inclusion of explicit references to the Zionism resolution. Nonetheless, United States, Canada, the EEC states, and several Third-World states opposed both resolutions as tainted by the indirect link to the Zionism resolution.

The resolutions were approved by votes of 40 to one (Canada), with nine and eight abstentions, respectively. The United States declined to participate in the vote. The Arabs, however, declared that they indeed interpreted the wording as encompassing the Zionism resolution, and would so insist in the 1976 General Assembly session.

During the debate, William Scranton, who succeeded Moynihan as U.S. Ambassador to the UN, made a special appearance to present the United States position on the Zionism resolution:

It [zionism] was a justifiable and understandable manifestation of national feeling on the part of a people whose claim to a homeland had been recognized by the United Nations almost 30 years ago. The United States would never accept the thesis of General Assembly resolution 3379 (xxx) any more than it would agree that other legitimate national movements were to be condemned as forms of racism or racial discrimination. That policy was not the policy of a particular Administration at a particular moment; it was a view strongly held in the Congress, in the Executive Branch and throughout the nation as a whole. The United States felt so strongly about the Assembly resolution that it had announced that it could no longer participate in the Decade or support it or attend the proposed Conference in Ghana. It would adhere to that position and could resume its participation in the Decade only if the latter were to return to its original basis, which had once been accepted by a broad consensus.48

The publicized visit of South African Prime Minister John Vorster to Israel while ECOSOC was in session gave the Arab members additional ammunition. Democratic Yemen, for example, observed that discrimination against the Palestinians and Africans could not be separated; that the Vorster visit highlighted the traditional ties and the unholy alliance between the two countries; that agreements on economic and scientific cooperation signed during Vorster's visit reflected the determination of both governments to carry out policies of racial discrimination. He suggested that the General Assembly adopt punitive measures against governments practicing racial discrimination.

The PLO observer spoke of a "Praetoria-Tel Aviv axis." The Soviet Union, commenting that Vorster had been welcomed in Israel with "open arms," also spoke

of the "unholy alliance between Praetoria and Tel Aviv." The Byelorussian SSR observer said that despite attempts by several countries to conceal the fact that Zionism was racist, Vorster's recent visit to Israel was proof of that fact. He added: "The Zionist ideology, recently restated at the World Zionist Congress, was in clear violation of Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination." Cuba said that Vorster's visit proved that the Zionism resolution was justified. The Syrian delegate stated that the growing "collaboration between Praetoria and Tel Aviv" was endangering UN efforts against racial discrimination and drew attention to the concern expressed by the chairman of the General Assembly's Special Committee Against Apartheid over Israel's collaboration with South Africa in defiance of UN resolutions.

SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID

At a meeting of the Special Committee against Apartheid, which coincided with both the Vorster visit and the ECOSOC meeting, the Arab League observer urged all UN bodies to condemn the Israel-South Africa collaboration. Sudan proposed that the Apartheid Committee make a detailed study of this collaboration and submit it to the General Assembly, together with recommendations of ways and means to eliminate racism in South Africa and Israel. The Committee requested that its Subcommittee on the Implementation of UN Resolutions and Collaboration with South Africa prepare, on a priority basis, a report on the increasing collaboration between Israel and South Africa, for transmittal to the Organization of African Unity, the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, the League of Arab States, the Security Council, and the next session of the General Assembly.

HABITAT

The UN's Habitat (Human Settlements) Conference, held in Vancouver, Canada, May 31–June 11, 1976, offered still another opportunity to introduce the Zionism issue. There were, of course, the usual explicit assertions that Zionism was racist in statements by PLO and other Arab representatives. The Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements, 1976, adopted by the Conference, had included in draft form a principle (No. 4) that stated: "Human dignity and the exercise of free choice consistent with overall public welfare are basic rights which must be assured in every society. It is therefore the duty of all people to join the struggle against any form of colonialism, foreign aggression and occupation, domination, apartheid and any other discrimination." The Conference approved an Iraqi amendment to insert, in place of the last three words the phrase "and all forms of racism and racial discrimination as referred to in resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations."

Though the Declaration contained other language implicitly directed against Israel, opposition to the document centered mainly on this Iraqi amendment. It was
adopted by a vote of 89 to 15, with ten abstentions; most of the negative votes and abstentions came from the Western nations. Three Latin American states abstained, as did Portugal, which had voted for Resolution 3379. Brazil and Mexico voted yes, as did the Holy See. (A member of the Holy See delegation later explained: "We didn't agree with the interpretation that some people place on that paragraph. It could have been construed as being anti-Zionist or anti-Jewish, but it was not specifically so. The Holy See did not consider that it was being anti-Jewish by voting yes on the declaration. We are definitely not anti-Jewish.")

The Conference ended with a series of statements by Western delegations repudiating this and other politically motivated provisions in the Declaration and recommendations. Christian Herter Jr., acting head of the United States delegation, hinted at a possible United States boycott of future UN technical conferences: "we are sorely disappointed that so much time and effort has been expended in discussion of problems of a political nature essentially extraneous to the substantive work of this Conference. There is good reason to believe that public esteem for the United Nations will be seriously impaired by this record. Continuation of this type of tactic does not bode well for my country's support and participation in future UN conferences concerned with global problems demanding international attention."49

* * *

The persistence of the effort to inject the Zionism-racism equation into UN deliberations is disquieting. Still, the voting pattern on the Zionism issue did not reflect a genuine international consensus. At most, it represented the opinions of various Arab-Muslim-Communist states and other nations aligned with them or having to vote with them for political and other reasons, once the issue was raised. Thus, as the Human Rights Committee of the International Law Association (American Branch) concluded in its 1975 report, Resolution 3379 could not be considered an international-law, norm-creating source.

SIDNEY LISKOFSKY

APPENDIX

3379 (XXX). Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination

Date: 10 November 1975  Meeting: 2400
Vote: 72–35–32 (roll call)  Report: A/10320

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1904 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963, proclaiming the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and in particular its affirmation that “any doctrine of racial differentiation or superiority is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous” and its expression of alarm at “the manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in some areas in the world, some of which are imposed by certain Governments by means of legislative, administrative or other measures”;

Recalling also that, in its resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, the General Assembly condemned, inter alia, the unholy alliance between South African racism and zionism,

Taking note of the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and their Contribution to Development and Peace, proclaims by the World Conference of the International Women’s Year, held at Mexico City from 19 June to 2 July 1975, which promulgated the principle that “international co-operation and peace require the achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, zionism, apartheid and racial discrimination in all its forms, as well as the recognition of the dignity of peoples and their right to self-determination”;

Taking note also of resolution 77 (XII) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its twelfth ordinary session, held at Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, which considered “that the racist régime in occupied Palestine and the racist régimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin, forming a whole and having the same racist structure and being organically linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity and integrity of the human being”;

Taking note also of the Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International Peace and Security and to Intensify Solidarity and Mutual Assistance among

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1E/5725, part one, sect. I.
2See A/10297, annex II.
Non-Aligned Countries, adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, which most severely condemned Zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology,

Determines that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.

### ROLL-CALL VOTE ON RESOLUTION 3379 (XXX):

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