Review of
the Year

UNITED STATES
OTHER COUNTRIES
Introduction

As an issue, religion dominated the 1976 presidential campaign to a greater extent than any elections since 1960, when John F. Kennedy’s Catholicism became a pivotal question. Kennedy sought to remove religion as a valid criterion for his capacity to govern, and as a proper subject of debate. Jimmy Carter, by contrast, emphasized his religion, with the result that there was considerable public speculation, if not debate, about whether this profound religious conviction might not cloud his judgment or determine his course of action in matters affecting the national interest.

While it was Carter who injected the religious issue into the campaign by frequent declarations to the effect that “a profound religious experience” has “changed my life dramatically,” and assertions that religion was “the most important thing in my life,” other presidential candidates too, spoke of their religious commitment. As U.S. News and World Report wrote, on May 3, 1976, Gerald Ford often referred to a “spiritual reawakening” in this country and to his own personal “commitment to Christ.” And Ronald Reagan’s staff let it be known that he was a member of the Christian Church (formerly the Disciples of Christ), that his religious beliefs had, in fact, influenced “some of his political positions, such as his strong stand against abortion.” In sum, as U.S. News observed, “Politicians discovered that it’s okay to talk about religion.”

Other candidates found that their religion, or lack of it, was being used against them. Paradoxically, the publication continued, Representative Morris K. Udall of Utah was attacked as a former member of the Mormon Church, which denies blacks admission to their priesthood, and for having left that church because of a “deep-seated conscientious difference with church doctrine regarding blacks,” as well as “a lack of feeling any need for organized religion.” California Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., a late entrant into the Democratic presidential primaries and a former Jesuit seminarian, evoked speculation on whether or not he was a practicing Catholic (St. Louis Review, May 21, 1976).
It was the nature of Carter's religiosity, however, that caused the most concern, particularly among Jews and Catholics. As New York Times columnist James Reston noted (June 6, 1976), he "identified with many members of his church who have a long record of anti-Catholicism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Communism." The Carter candidacy, quite apart from its political aspects, focused public attention on the nature of evangelical Christianity, and according to Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum, national director of interreligious affairs of the American Jewish Committee, "raised questions in the minds of some about the commitment to religious pluralism, separation of church and state, and freedom of religious conscience of political candidates whose creed involves the call to evangelize." In regard to Jewish, and indeed Catholic and liberal Protestant, anxieties, Rabbi Tanenbaum explained, "most northern Jews have no personal experience with evangelical Christians, and based their perceptions on historical and literary images which are overwhelmingly negative. But what most northerners do not understand is that there is today a pluralism of theologies as well as social visions among evangelicals as there is among Catholics and Jews." He urged individual voters to take the trouble to "do your homework and not vote on the basis of prejudice, mythologies and stereotypes."

A number of religious questions surfaced as campaign issues. One, the morality of unrestricted abortion, which was brought to the fore by the Catholic hierarchy and viewed by many as a Catholic issue, was also debated in the Democratic primaries contest. Another was sparked off by a Carter interview in the September-October issue of Liberty, a Seventh Day Adventist publication, in which his advocacy of "taxation of church properties other than the church building itself came under fire not only from religious groups, but also from the Republicans who opposed it as endorsing taxes on church-owned hospitals, schools, and orphanages (Christianity Today, October 22, 1976).

However, there was no evidence of any attempt by either evangelical Southern Baptists or evangelical Episcopalians to stimulate block voting along religious lines. C. Welton Brady of the Southern Baptist Christian Life Commission delineated in an article in the Baptist press, what proved to be the operating guideline: "Southern Baptists must neither support nor oppose Jimmy Carter simply because he is a fellow Southern Baptist. Episcopalians should neither support nor oppose Gerald Ford because he is an Episcopalian" (ibid.).

1"Carter has spoken of his conversion experience in terms that have set some rabbinic teeth on edge" (Christianity Today, October 21, 1976).

PRIMARIES

Democrats

In the first presidential election in the post-Watergate era, the Democratic party presidential nomination seemed to be worth striving for, particularly since the Republicans appeared divided and beatable. This, as well as partial government financing of candidates, which made it possible for persons with limited means to enter the race for the presidency, encouraged a record number of Democrats to become avowed candidates.¹

CANDIDATES

The first Democrat to announce formally his candidacy was Congressman Udall, who, in a Manchester, N.H., news conference on November 23, 1974, made known his intention to run a campaign "dominated by the three E's—environment, energy, and the economy" (Congressional Quarterly, November 30, 1974). He was followed, in exact order, by former Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter (December 12, 1974); former Oklahoma Senator Fred Harris (January 11, 1975); Senator Henry A. Jackson, Washington (February 6); Senator Lloyd M. Benton, Texas (February 17); former North Carolina Governor Terry Sanford (May 29); former vice-presidential candidate Sargeant Shriver (September 20); Pennsylvania Governor Milton J. Shapp, the first Jew ever to declare formally his candidacy on the ticket of a major political party (September 25); Indiana Senator Birch Bayh (October 21), and Alabama Governor George C. Wallace (November 12).

George Wallace entered the 1976 campaign in a far better position than any other announced candidate. A Gallup poll, whose findings were published on March 30, 1975, showed him to be the leading choice of a combination of registered Democrats and independent voters. Despite his enforced withdrawal from the 1972 campaign, his smooth-functioning political organization remained intact, and he became the first candidate to qualify for up to $5 million in matching federal grants (Congressional Quarterly Weekly (April 19, 1975). While consistently maintaining that he was seeking the Democratic party nomination, he kept his option open as a possible third-party candidate.

¹The Presidential Campaign Fund Act, passed by Congress in 1971 to finance the 1976 presidential election, was expected to provide at least $60 million in funds to cover the general election campaign, national party nominating conventions, and up to one half of the possible costs of the pre-nominating campaigns. Under provisions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1974 (PL-93-443), candidates who raised $5,000 in contributions of $250, or in at least 20 states, and who were so certified by the Federal Election Commission were eligible to receive public matching grants after January 1, 1976, in amounts up to $5 million, one half of the $10 million spending limit for renomination campaigns (Congressional Quarterly Weekly, April 19, 1975).
As the Democratic candidates began their long primary races, there was, except for Wallace, a marked similarity in their basic stands on the major issues. In sharp contrast to the view of the avowed Republican candidates, the Democrats believed that unemployment, rather than inflation, was the prime economic problem. They favored the continuation of arms limitation negotiations with the Soviets, but mindful of the experience with earlier grain sales to the USSR, cautioned against any disadvantage for the United States. They opposed constitutional amendments outlawing abortion and busing, and favored revision of federal laws which would tax the wealthy more and the poor less. They advocated a major effort to discover new sources of energy and control of the soaring price of oil, and took a jaundiced view of the major oil companies' economic power. They wanted federal control of handguns, but not of rifles and shotguns. They endorsed some form of national health insurance.

Whatever differences there were among candidates were in emphasis and priorities. Udall concentrated on environmental protection; Carter "pledged" to reorganize the executive branch of the government to make it more efficient; Henry Jackson continued to stress a hard line in United States-Soviet relations. Harris, generally regarded as a populist, emphasized the need for the redistribution of the country's wealth and power by eliminating tax loopholes and breaking up industrial monopolies. Shapp and Shriver had no particular priorities; they agreed on the broad programs, but maintained that they were uniquely qualified to carry them out. Wallace separated himself from his Democratic rivals in the early days of the primary campaign. While the others talked about a greater government effort to expand social services, he pledged to eliminate "welfare ripoffs," endorsed public-works projects to provide jobs only as a last resort and for a limited period of time. Of all the Democratic candidates, Wallace alone supported constitutional amendments against abortion and busing, and opposed any form of federal gun-control legislation.

CARTER AND THE BLACKS

Several weeks before the pivotal Pennsylvania primary, Carter astounded and dismayed the black community, which had given him substantial support in the preceding 11 primaries. In an interview, published in the April 4, 1976, issue of the New York Daily News, his response to a question regarding his views on federally subsidized scattered housing in preference to concentrating such housing in certain metropolitan neighborhoods was that he saw "nothing wrong with ethnic purity being maintained;" that he "would not force racial integration of a neighborhood by governmental action," but "would not permit discrimination against a family moving into a neighborhood." There was widespread criticism of his remarks and repeated questions by reporters for clarification. Carter's stand on integrated
neighborhoods became even more confusing in the days ahead. He maintained, in an April 6 press conference in Indianapolis, that "I see nothing wrong with ethnic purity being maintained in Indianapolis. I have nothing against a community ... trying to maintain their ethnic purity of their neighborhoods" (Washington Post, April 8, 1976). And, on the very next day in Pittsburgh, perhaps in an effort to blunt the mounting criticism by Udall, Jackson, and blacks, he reversed himself by telling the press, "I don't stand behind any sort of connotation of ethnic purity. I don't want any community to maintain its ethnic purity. If someone from a different ethnic group wants to go into a neighborhood, I would fight for that person's right to do that." He then warned that his earlier remarks should not be interpreted as indicating an inclination toward racism. If this were so, said Carter, "I would resent that because it's certainly not true."

In a further effort to reassure his black supporters, Carter, who had received a telegram from the Congressional Black Caucus and National Urban League Director Vernon Jordan, conferred by telephone with several of his key black advisors. Among them was then Congressman Andrew Young, who, according to an aide, said he could not continue to support Carter if he persisted in using "that kind of language and terminology." Carter publicly apologized for his remarks and, for the first time, endorsed a then pending full-employment bill strongly supported by the Congressional Black Caucus, which he, alone, of all surviving Democratic candidates had failed to endorse (Washington Post, April 9, 1976).

RESULT

Carter's spectacular success in the primaries led to the collapse of the Democratic opposition. Henry Jackson, despite the expenditure of considerable sums of money, never was able to spark any enthusiasm. He won only in Massachusetts and New York by May, and "suspended" his campaign which, in fact, he never resumed. George Wallace, loser to Carter in Florida, his first serious political defeat in the South, withdrew in June and endorsed Carter. The campaign of populist Fred Harris never took hold, and Ellen McCormack, a militant anti-abortionist running in the primaries as a single issue candidate, never received more than 25 per cent of the vote in any one state. Morris Udall, whose highminded campaign impressed many, became a frequent runner-up in the primaries, but failed to win a single contest. California Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., a late entrant, ran suprisingly well in New Jersey and Maryland but his effort was too little and too late for an effective campaign. Terry Sanford, Sargeant Shriver, Milton Shapp, and Senator Birch Bayh all dropped out early in the primary campaign after failing to generate voter enthusiasm or support.

4Udall finished second in seven primaries and third in six others (Congressional Quarterly, April 22, 1977).
Republicans

TURN TO CONSERVATISM-ALIENATION FROM PARTY

The Republican presidential primary campaign, unusual in the sense that an incumbent was challenged for the nomination, lacked the drama of the many candidates vying for the Democratic nomination. As the contest unfolded, it was the consensus of seasoned political observers that President Gerald R. Ford, who had been regarded as a moderate, moved perceptively to the right under Ronald Reagan's attacks. Indeed, as the GOP nominating convention was about to open, Congressional Quarterly Weekly (August 14, 1976) observed: "This year's contest is between a conservative and another conservative," and predicted that the party platform would be a "conservative document heavy with criticism of an activist federal government."

In the wake of the Watergate scandal, many Republican moderates and liberals either resigned from the party or ceased to be active in it. The result was that the party machinery fell under the control of the conservatives, who generally supported positions out of tune with large segments of the population and tended to bring further defections by the liberal-moderates. "In the Republican Party," observed the National Review (September 17, 1976) "liberalism is virtually extinct."

The hard-line, rigidly conservative stance imposed on the party may well have undermined the people's willingness to identify as Republicans. Just before the GOP convention, a Gallup poll reported that only 22 per cent of voters considered themselves Republicans, down from 34 per cent in 1954, and that the party had alienated itself from various ethnic and special interest groups, despite the growing conservatism in recent years among ethnic voters in large metropolitan areas. Between elections, the Republican party made no serious effort to attract minority groups. As the election drew near, New York attorney Rita Hauser, a prominent Republican, observed that the GOP had the "look of country club Wasps from Texas and Southern California" (Time, August 23, 1976).

A CBS News survey of the delegates attending the Republican convention in Kansas City, which began on May 16, revealed that only 3 per cent were black, compared to 11 per cent at the Democratic convention (resulting from what some party officials felt was failure to recruit black voters on the assumption that the black vote was unobtainable); that only 31 per cent were women, compared to 35 per cent at the Democratic convention, and that more than half of the Republican delegates had incomes over $35,000, against one-third of the Democratic delegates. The same survey also revealed that a preponderance of the Republican delegates were Protestant. Observed CBS statistician Warren Mitofsky, who prepared the survey, "Even the Irish Republican delegates were 16 per cent Protestant and only 35 per cent Catholic" (Time, ibid.).

To be sure, not all moderates left the Republican ranks, and some of those who
remained made valiant efforts to broaden the party base. Michigan Governor William Milliken went to great lengths to appoint blacks, Hispanics, and representatives of other minority groups to state positions. Richard Rosenbaum, New York State GOP chairman and the first Jew ever to hold that position, created special commissions to draw blacks and other minorities into the party. Chuck Slocum, Minnesota’s Republican state chairman, created separate divisions within the party for women, blacks, and organized labor. But these efforts were the exception rather than the rule, and as the primary campaign proceeded, there appeared to be widespread disaffection with the “grand old party.”

Encouraged by early and persistent public-opinion polls which revealed that Ford was lagging far behind the frontrunning Democratic contenders, 20 conservative Republicans, under the leadership of Senator James L. Buckley (Cons.-Rep., N.Y.), issued a call on June 2, 1975, for an “open convention,” rather than the automatic nomination for Ford. But after a shaky start, Ford won five straight primary contests from Ronald Reagan. And although the latter, ignoring pleas to withdraw, made a strong comeback after an upset victory over Ford in North Carolina, Ford was nominated on the convention floor.

THE CAMPAIGN

For the first time in 16 years, the major party presidential candidates agreed to debate on television. Three 90-minute debates, which attracted significant audiences, proved to be the highlight of what many felt was a listless campaign. The debates were inconclusive, with neither candidate gaining a distinct advantage. But both benefited from the exposure: it gave insight into the personality of Carter, who had been unable, or unwilling, to take clearcut stands during the primaries and was seen by many as being “fuzzy” on the issues, and reinforced Ford’s image as a decent, imperturbable, and solid man.

Carter who, according to the polls, was off to a huge lead immediately after the convention, made several blunders which seriously eroded his support: a Playboy (November 1976) interview in which he said he had once lusted after women, his remarks on “ethnic purity,” and his failure to convey to the people where he stood on the issues. An October 15 Gallup poll reported a 16-point decline in his edge over Ford. In the closing days of the campaign, Ford took the offensive; he flatly predicted a healthy economy in the year ahead, promised a tax cut, stressed the openness of his administration, in sharp contrast to the “dictatorial” atmosphere under Richard Nixon, and portrayed Jimmy Carter as being deceptive, indecisive, and a neophyte in foreign affairs, which would have dangerous consequences for the country’s well-being.

Carter, throughout the campaign, depicted Ford as lacking the leadership talent to guide the country in the coming years, and made oblique references to Watergate
by frequent mention of the "Nixon-Ford years" in the White House. He placed heavy emphasis on the economic growth which would help finance expanded social programs. Above all, he promised to restore faith in government, and frequently implored the voters to "trust me."

Ford maintained that controlling inflation was more important than reducing unemployment, while Carter held the opposite to be the prime economic priority. Carter stressed than any new tax program should tax the rich more, the poor less, and not touch the middle class. Ford argued that the middle class needed relief more than the poor. Carter favored more governmental regulation of oil companies, while Ford believed they should have more latitude and be permitted to operate with minimum government interference. Carter differed sharply with Ford on health issues, urging a comprehensive, mandatory national health insurance system financed by general payroll taxes. Ford opposed such a program as too expensive and likely to reduce the quality of health care.

While both Carter and Ford were critical of the existing welfare system, Ford urged caution in implementing reforms and Carter promised significant changes. Both found abortion personally objectionable and advocated restricted use of federal money to pay for it; but while Ford favored a constitutional amendment giving states the option to outlaw abortions, Carter did not. Both candidates opposed compulsory busing to achieve school integration. Carter favored an increased federal contribution to public and secondary education, which Ford opposed as being too costly.

As the presidential candidates stumped the country, and exchanged barbs in the televised debates, support for both remained soft. Neither candidate appeared able to generate much enthusiasm, except among party loyalists. Special interest groups like farmers, Jews, and Catholics showed no marked preference for either. Both lacked "charisma," that elusive quality deemed so essential in an era of television campaigning.

Two weeks before the election, George Gallup reported an unusually high number of still undecided voters, as many as 34 million of the country's estimated 113 million registered voters (U.S. News and World Report, October 25, 1975). Americans were looking for a leader who, after Vietnam and Watergate, would bring normalcy to the country. Pollster Louis Harris said his surveys revealed that Americans wanted a president who could improve the quality of life, and that less than 20 per cent believed either candidate capable of doing so. Even among those who ostensibly had made a choice, there was an unusual amount of switching, triggered by news events, reactions to the television debates, and tactical errors made by the two candidates.

Both contenders, in early October, became vitriolic and shrill. Carter accused Ford of hiding from the news media by staying in the White House "even more than Richard Nixon in the depths of Watergate;" of having been "brainwashed" during a trip to Poland; of failing to "tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" concerning contributions to his campaigns while serving in the House of
Representatives—a charge refuted by an October 14 report of an investigation by the Watergate special prosecutor's office. The President, on his part, called Carter a "minor leaguer," who was "fuzzy" on the issues. Commenting on the recent rise by the candidates of acrimonious statements, Elie Abel, dean of the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, said the campaign had become one of "unmatched triviality and even vulgarities" (ibid.). This view was shared by the news media which retrospectively characterized the campaign as "vapid and egocentric," "issueless," "depressing," and "banal" (New York Times, December 1, 1976), and treated the candidates with a plague-on-both-your-houses impartiality (Time, December 15, 1976).

As for the American voters' involvement in the campaign, there was, of course, the human-interest aspect. For the first time in more than a century a man from the deep South, who before the primaries had been an obscure, regional personality, secured the Democratic party's presidential nomination. And an incumbent president came perilously close to losing his party's nomination; was, according to public opinion polls, far behind his Democratic challenger in the campaign, and rallied to within a hair's breadth of winning reelection. The U.S. News survey revealed that voters were concerned more with pocketbooks than with global issues. Runaway prices, the diminishing purchasing power of their paychecks, and high taxes were worrisome. To a lesser degree, but nonetheless of concern, were crime and what was perceived by some as the government's growing intrusion into their daily lives—its tendency to become more central to the human condition by involving itself in such matters as the busing of school children and attempts to save people from their own follies. Other reports spoke of the apparent cynicism about government's capacity to deliver on its promises (New York Times, October 31, 1976). There was, too, concern over United States foreign policy, in particular a fear of being outmaneuvered by the Russians.

Issues which in previous elections were either unspoken or muted dominated many congressional contests. Sex scandals involving prominent congressmen became a reason for questioning the sex life of candidates, which was debated in Congress. Personal finances was another morality issue, and the sources of campaign funds of congressional candidates frequently took precedence over where they stood on the economy, energy, and foreign policy.

THE VOTE

Presidential Election

By election eve, pollsters and pundits were in agreement that the contest was too close to predict. According to official figures, 81,551,984 Americans, more than ever before, went to the polls (Congressional Quarterly Weekly, March 19, 1977). On the surface, this statistic appears to refute predictions that apathy would keep many
voters from exercising their franchise. But the largest turnout constituted only some 53.5 per cent of the voting-age population, the lowest in nearly 30 years (U.S. News and World Report, December 15, 1977). While some commentators called the turnout “a record low” because of the low percentage of voter participation, others thought it was not so bad, since of the 150 million Americans of voting age, 105 million had registered and 81 million went to the polls.

Whatever the interpretations of the turnout, there appeared to be agreement that many of those who did not vote were disillusioned with the political process and politicians in general, disappointed in both candidates, or convinced that voting would not change things anyway—attitudes which, if maintained, could have serious consequences for the well-being of the democratic process in the years ahead.

Because of the closeness of the popular vote (Carter 50.1 per cent, Ford 48 per cent; Congressional Quarterly, March 19, 1977) and the electoral vote (297 against 241—the smallest plurality since the Wilson-Hughes contest in 1916), Carter’s victory was far from a personal triumph or an unmistakable mandate. In fact, there was some evidence to suggest that he rode the coattails of an unexpectedly heavy straight party-line vote, strengthened by the entire ticket in New York and Pennsylvania (Congressional Quarterly, December 16, 1976). He apparently succeeded in bringing together, at least for the 1976 elections, the various elements of the New Deal coalition. Carter garnered a total of 158 electoral votes in the once “solid South,” carrying every southern state except Virginia, and all border states except Oklahoma. He also captured substantial majorities among union and blue-collar workers, blacks, Jews, ethnics, and the poor.

According to the U.S. News and World Report (December 15, 1976) voter analysis, Carter won 82 per cent of the black, 54 per cent of the Catholic, 68 per cent of the Jewish, 61 per cent of the union, and 61 per cent of low-income vote. This show of support, some observers felt, developed not so much because of enchantment with Carter, but out of fear of four more years of a Republican administration (Newsweek, December 15, 1976). Geographically, Carter carried 15 per cent of the industrial northeast, 54 per cent of the South, and 53.5 per cent of the border states, losing only the Middle West and the West.


3A New York Times-CBS poll taken just before the election revealed that 42 per cent of respondents believed that “any president” could only be a “figurehead” (New York Times, December 7, 1976).

4Ford won 51 per cent of the white vote, to Carter’s 48 per cent. Carter received about 50 per cent of the white Protestant vote, based, in part, on his substantial support from evangelicals (Time, December 15, 1976).
Congressional and Local Elections

Despite the close presidential race, congressional and local election results suggest that the Republicans slipped badly at the grass roots. In the aggregate, Democrats surpassed Republicans by 12 per cent, and retained a better than two-to-one advantage in the House (Democrats, 292; Republicans, 143), an almost two-to-one advantage in the Senate (Democrats, 61; Republicans, 36), and a three-to-one advantage in governorships (Democrats, 37; Republicans, 12, independent, one) (Congressional Quarterly, March 19, 1977). For the first time in eight years, the White House and the Congress were controlled by the same party.

In a campaign which saw considerable media discussion on the involvement of fundamentalists and evangelicals in the political process, and the election to the presidency of a self-professed "born again" Southern Baptist, more Roman Catholics were elected to Congress than ever before in our history. Roman Catholic representation totaled 129, an increase of six (Christianity Today, December 3, 1976). The 80 United Methodists elected constituted the second largest religious denomination. Sixty-four members of the new Congress identified themselves as Episcopalian, a loss of two; 60 as Presbyterian, a loss of six; 55 as Baptists, a loss of one; 22 United Church of Christ, a loss of three. There were 27 Jews, the largest number ever, in Congress, a gain of three.

The 1976 campaign produced no significant changes in the number of women or blacks elected to national office. Altogether, 52 women, 8 more than 1974, ran for Congress. But although two new women (Barbara Ann Mikulsky [D, Md.] and Mary Rose Oaker [D., Ohio]) were successful candidates, and all 16 incumbents were reelected, there was in fact a net loss of one woman in Congress. Representatives Bella Abzug (D., N.Y.) and Patsy Mink (D., Hawaii) resigned seats generally considered "safe" to seek, unsuccessfully, nomination to the U.S. Senate. The only woman, and the first Jewish woman, to be nominated to the Senate by a major political party was Connecticut Secretary of State Gloria Schaffer (D.); she failed to unseat incumbent Republican Lowell Weiker.

Women made some gains on the state level. Dixie Lee Ray was elected governor in the state of Washington, joining fellow-Democrat Ella Grasso of Connecticut. There were 1,260 women candidates for state legislatures, of whom 685 were elected—an increase of over 10 per cent (U.S. News and World Report, November 15, 1976).

Black representation in the Congress remained the same, with all 17 incumbents

For reasons which remain obscure, there was an unusual turnover in the Senate, affecting both parties. Nine incumbents failed in their bids for reelection, and 18 new members (ten Democrats, eight Republicans) were elected to office. There was no ideological factor involved, since for each case where a liberal lost to a conservative, a conservative lost to a liberal (Congressional Quarterly, November 16, 1976).

In Maryland, three of eight representatives were women, the largest proportion of women of any state in the 95th Congress (Washington Post, November 4, 1976).
reelected. Despite significant black voter participation, all 26 blacks—14 of them major party candidates (12 Republicans, 2 Democrats)—seeking House seats for the first time were defeated, possibly suggesting that blacks gave preference to issues rather than race.

**Third Parties and Independents**

The presidential elections provided the electorate with many choices. While official election tabulations failed to record the precise number of presidential candidates, some 25 spokesmen for minor and sometimes obscure political parties or independent candidates (Eugene J. McCarthy did not run under any party label) notified the Federal Election Commission that they intended to post presidential and vice-presidential candidates for the 1976 elections (*U.S. News and World Report, June 12, 1976*).

These candidates represented a wide spectrum of political ideologies, ranging from the American Independent and American party of the right to the Communist Party, U.S.A. and the Socialist Labor party on the left. Roger L. McBride, the Libertarian party candidate who advocated the abolition of all government controls and regulations, appeared on the ballot in some 32 states, followed by Eugene McCarthy in 30 states, and Lester Maddox, segregationist and former governor of Georgia who ran as American Independent party candidate, in 19 states. The Socialist Labor party, headed by Peter Camejo, was on the ballot in 28 states, and Tom Anderson’s American party in 18 states. Gus Hall, perennial Communist Party, U.S.A. candidate, appeared on the ballot in 20 states (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, October 16, 1976).

According to the certified results for the 50 states and the District of Columbia, Eugene McCarthy, who tried to appeal to the nonvoter and hoped to emerge as a balance of power, polled more votes than any other contestant, except the major party candidates. Out of a total of 963,505 minority-party and write-in votes, McCarthy won 745,042, McBride 183,187, Maddox 170,673, and Anderson 153,009 (*New York Times, December 11, 1976*).

While these candidates in all received less than 2 per cent of the national vote, in some states they polled more than the difference between Ford and Carter, and conceivably affected the outcome for one of the major contenders. In Iowa, where Gerald Ford won by 12,776 votes the vote for Eugene McCarthy totaled 18,602. In Maine, Ford won by 3,688 and McCarthy polled 11,423 votes. In Ohio, Carter, in a close contest, had a 7,076 plurality, with McCarthy winning 58,292 votes and American Independent candidate Lester Maddox 16,057. In Oklahoma, won by Ford with a margin of 12,979 votes, McCarthy polled 14,040 votes. In Oregon, Ford narrowly won by 2,247 votes, while McCarthy recorded an impressive vote of 39,980 (*U.S. News and World Report, November 17, 1976*).
The Far Right

On the far right, the remnants of the George Wallace 1968 third-party campaign organization split into two opposing groups: the American party and the American Independent party (AIP), both with antisemitic overtones. The latter, meeting in Chicago in late August for its nominating convention, attracted a number of well-known conservatives formerly identified with the Republican party, who were hopeful of either securing the AIP nomination for Ronald Reagan or some other acceptable conservative. To their disappointment, Maddox won on the first ballot. His supporters, firmly in control of the convention apparatus, gave a standing ovation to Milwaukee attorney John Couture's overtly antisemitic keynote address, in which he alleged that "atheistic political Zionists" were "the most insidious, far-reaching, murderous force the world has ever known, which plotted two world wars, undermined countless governments, dictates the policies of numerous others, and has an assassin's bullet ready for any influential person who dares to oppose its machinations." He asked the convention not to be afraid "to proclaim to all the world that we will stand up to this evil, that we will resist this evil," a position in which, "I am confident we are supported by the overwhelmingly majority of our fellow Americans." (Washington Post, August 29, 1976).

The AIP party platform called for repeal of the federal income tax, and an end to American participation in the UN, the equal rights amendment, amnesty for Vietnam draft evaders, busing to achieve integration, and aid for Israel (Wall Street Journal, August 30, 1976). The delegates who controlled the convention were characterized by conservative columnist James Kilpatrick as "gun nuts, food nuts, single taxers, and anti-fluoridationists." In a postelection statement, Maddox pledged his efforts to form a united third party because, he said, "This country's future as a sovereign nation is in the greatest jeopardy we've ever experienced" (Spotlight, November 15, 1976).

The presidential candidate of the American party, which describes itself as "the only Christian-oriented party" in the country, was Tom Anderson, a longtime John Birch Society stalwart. Ideologically there was little difference between it and AIP, yet each was sharply critical of the other. Nominated as the party standard-bearer in June, Anderson, in an interview with Congressional Quarterly Weekly (October 16, 1976), expressed distrust of AIP, and characterized its membership as "mostly rabid racists that have latched on to Maddox." A spokesperson for the AIP told the same publication that to be a member of the American party, "you practically have to sign a loyalty oath that you are a white American, non-Catholic, almost John Birch Society oriented." The American party advocated an end to military or economic aid for Israel. Said the party platform: "The U.S. must pursue America's true interests in all parts of the world. In the Middle East, this requires nonintervention and noninvolvement. The United States must not orient its foreign policy primarily to conform to the interest of any foreign nation." After the election, the party gave every indication that it intended to remain active when, meeting in
Indianapolis on December 12, it reelected Anderson to a two-year term as its chairman.

The Conservative Caucus, a nascent third party representing what its founders called the New Right and led by Howard Phillips, a political conservative once designated by President Nixon to dismantle the federal antipoverty program, and by New Hampshire Governor Meldrin Thomson, failed to coalesce in time for the 1976 elections. It sought, through a grass-roots movement in each of the 435 congressional districts consisting of antibusing advocates, anti-ERA people, Right-to-Life groups and other conservative “issue activists,” to form an independent presidential ticket headed by either Ronald Reagan or George Wallace and to lay the groundwork for a future third party. (Wall Street Journal, May 29, 1975). Since the Conservative Caucus failed to secure either Reagan’s or Wallace’s participation, or the nomination of an acceptable American Independent party candidate, it took no part in the 1976 elections, but, in all probability, will remain active on the political scene.

Religious Factor in Presidential Race

In the early days of his drive for the presidency, Carter drew substantial support from what logically could be considered his natural constituency, the evangelical Protestant, not only in the so-called Bible Belt of the South, but throughout the United States.

Because of Carter’s success with both white and black Protestants, political commentators took note of a hitherto unidentified political force, described by the politically astute Catholic theologian Michael Novak as the “hidden religious majority.” Variously estimated as numbering between 30 and 50 millions, evangelical Protestants encompass Baptists, Methodists, Disciples of Christ, Seventh Day Adventists, and members of innumerable smaller sects. They were, as Novak noted, “the most understated demographic reality in the United States and a political prize worth cultivating” (Washington Post, September 27, 1976).

Recognizing Carter’s strength in a potential political bloc (early 1976 Gallup polls predicted that he would receive 75 per cent of the 12.5 million Baptist vote), Ford made a determined effort to retain what had traditionally been regarded as a

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11Phillips assumed that Wallace would seek the nomination of the Democratic party and Reagan that of the Republican party; that both would fail, and that both would join to form a new right ticket (Washington Post, April 9, 1975).

12At a three-day conference in Chicago in mid-December, attended by a number of prominent conservatives, the Conservative Caucus agreed to form a “shadow cabinet” and to “get it all together for the future” (New York Times, December 13, 1976). It announced in February 1977 that the “shadow cabinet” would be headed by National Review publisher William Rusher. Among its members were the well-known economist Henry Hazlitt, Representative Lawrence McDonald (D., Ga.), New Hampshire Governor Meldrim Thomson, and Representative Steven Symms (R., Idaho).
Republican constituency. To prevent an erosion of this support, he sought help from Richard Brannon, a Southern Baptist minister, who, operating from the White House communications office, facilitated the President's access to these groups. In a meeting with the influential National Religious Broadcasters, with its 1,200 religious radio-station members, Ford stressed his deep Christian commitment, that he read the Bible daily, and that he attempted "to follow the teachings of Jesus" (ibid.).

As the campaign entered its final months, Carter's early preponderant support among the evangelicals appeared to wane, not so much because of Ford's efforts to hold that significant segment of the electorate, but rather because of his own actions. No doubt, the widely-publicized November 1976 Playboy Magazine interview was an important factor in the erosion of support, because of the nature of the publication as well as the contents of the interview. Prominent evangelical clergymen questioned whether a true, born-again Christian would have, as Carter confessed in the interview, "committed adultery in my heart many times," and utilized what they considered to be foul language. Also, as the campaign proceeded, there was dissatisfaction among Carter's fellow-Protestants with his "liberal" positions on other issues and because they felt that, in his effort to convince Catholics and Jews that they had nothing to fear from a devout Baptist, he neglected them (Washington Post, September 27, 1976).

Whether or not Carter's religion was the determining factor in his election is a moot question for clergymen. Some argue that his Southern Baptist beliefs played no part at all. Others maintain that Carter's election signified nothing more than that his deep religious conviction was an important attribute in the post-Watergate era, when Americans were looking, above all else, for a candidate they could trust (U.S. News, April 11, 1977). It was a campaign that saw increased political awareness among Christian denominations, which in the past had little to do with secular affairs. Richard Mouw, philosophy professor at Calvin College and author of a recently published book, Biblical Politics (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1976), asserted that "Christians are turning to politics. Some are turning to the political right, but they are turning. Conservative Protestants are becoming politically aggressive."

Public interest in the religious affiliations of the candidates became an object of media interest. One respected daily went so far as to chronicle the religious affiliation and extent of religious commitment of every candidate for state office in Missouri (St. Louis Post Dispatch, October 29, 1976), and two well-known evangelical writers, James C. Hefley and Edward E. Plowman, published a comprehensive survey of professing Christians in official Washington (Washington: Christians in the Corridors of Power; Tyndale, Ill., 1975). Albert J. Menendez, a recognized authority on voting patterns of various groups, in response to a question put to him by the Chicago Tribune, predicted that evangelicals would, in all probability, "vote more consciously as a bloc in an attempt to increase their status as a group" (St. Louis Globe Democrat, October 23–24, 1976).
"GOD-CENTERED CHRISTIANS" FOR OFFICE

It was not surprising then that religion was a factor in congressional and local elections, as well as in the presidential race. On the other hand, there seemed to be a greater awareness by office seekers that significant numbers of "unorganized" conservative fundamentalists or evangelicals who, for the most part, had never articulated their stand on various social issues, might possibly be reached by well-targeted appeals (Milwaukee Sentinel, May 22, 1976). At the approach of the election year, a group of politically conservative ministers and businessmen quietly, almost unnoticed, began in earnest to fashion evangelical Christians into a significant political force with the immediate objective of electing "God-centered Christians" to political office.

It is difficult to say precisely when the movement began to solidify evangelicals for political action and concomitantly to elect Christians to office. As far back as October 1974 The Christian Freedom Foundation Monthly, Applied Christianity, concerned about what it said was "happening in American politics," suggested that the solution was to "get Evangelical men and women into politics." Said the publication, "We need Christian politicians in order to reclaim America from this Watergate era. We need God-directed men in Government." Political columnist Kevin Phillips, in an article captioned "The New Political Revivalism" (Independent American, April 14, 1976), observed that the "fundamentalist religious denominations had mushroomed over the past ten years," while the "liberal reform minded churches have been losing membership," and that these denominations were "coming out of the churches into the caucuses and out of the pews into the precincts."

While there had been sporadic efforts over the past decade by politically conservative evangelicals to become politically active, a major thrust, geared to the 1976 elections, began in 1974. In June of that year a Washington meeting organized by Rep. John Conlan (R., Ariz.) and others to formulate a plan to elect "the right kind of Christians," formed cadres for that purpose in every congressional district (Group Research Report, June 9, 1976). Also in 1974 Third Century Publishers, headquartered in Arlington, Va., was set up to publish books and other materials articulating conservative political and economic concepts based on Christian principles. A major effort was a paperback book, One Nation Under God, by Rus Walton, who asserted, among other things, that "the American system is the political expression of Christian ideals." Third Century also published and widely distributed The Spirit of '76: A Handbook for Winning Elections, which stressed the necessity for Christians to be politically involved.

Working closely with this publisher were two Washington organizations: the Christian Freedom Foundation, established in 1949 to elect conservative Christians to public office, and the Christian Embassy, founded in early 1976 for the purpose of evangelizing high government officials (Washington Post, February 27, 1976), as well as the Ohio-based Intercessors for America, some of whose members were on the boards of the Third Century Publishers and the Christian Freedom Foundation.
One project of Intercessors was to send letters to some 120,000 clergymen, urging the purchase of a pamphlet, *Your Five Duties as a Christian Citizen*, by Bill Bright, head of Campus Crusade for Christ International, which outlines how local precincts can be taken over to elect "godly" Christians to public office (*Newsweek*, September 9, 1976).

All these groups, which were national in scope, were linked through interlocking directorates, mutuality of interest, and an intent to develop a political force of Christians for the purpose of electing Christians to public office. They had some measure of success in stimulating local political activity by helping local groups to organize and giving them guidance and counsel. Typical of such local organizations were Concerned Christian Citizens in Indiana, Christians for Good Government in Ohio, California Christian Campaign Committee, and the Texas-based Support for Action, which urged support of "Christ-centered candidates" or candidates "who take a stand for Christ."

Four prominent religious leaders representing the major faiths—Rt. Rev. Paul Moore, Jr., bishop of the New York diocese of the Protestant Episcopal Church; Father Joseph O'Hare, editor-in-chief of *America*, the Jesuit publication; Dr. Arnold L. Olson, former president of the Evangelical Free Church of America, and Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum, national director of interreligious affairs of the American Jewish Committee—in a joint press conference on October 20 called upon President Ford and Jimmy Carter to "repudiate appeals to religious bigotry," as evident in the "vote Christian drives in a number of Congressional districts," and to "reject forcefully any campaign appeals based on the religion a candidate may profess" (American Jewish Committee, press release, October 20, 1976). In its April 1976 issue, *Sojourners*, a liberal evangelical monthly published by the Peoples Christian Coalition, whose investigative reporters Jim Wallis and Wes Michaelson did much to bring focus on this phenomenon, described the campaign to elect Christians as an "alarming political initiative by the evangelical right."

The degree of success of the evangelical Christian forces is inconclusive. In a postelection investigation, the *Los Angeles Times* (November 8, 1976) stated that there was, in fact, "a wave of Christian political activity to endorse and support particular candidates who were avowedly Christian," but concluded that "only a handful of so-called 'Christ-centered' candidates who were not incumbents won seats in the U.S. Congress." *Third Century Report* (December 15, 1976) was more positive in its conclusion that "the battle for 'God centered candidates' did not go too bad." It reported that of 58 known "born again Christians" who ran for Congress (no doubt there were more) "24 were elected or reelected to office. That's 39 per cent. Pretty good," and that there were a number of other such successful candidates for state and local offices.

Whatever the degree of success of the evangelical conservatives in 1976, which pollster George Gallup called "the year of the Evangelical," it seems likely that they will continue to work toward becoming a significant political force in the United States.
The Jews

As in the presidential election of 1972 and the congressional elections of 1974, many candidates for public office—certainly those with a Jewish constituency—based their strategies on the premise that there was indeed such a thing as “the Jewish vote,” and that it was important. Few, if any, candidates debated the question of aid and support for Israel, but rather argued about who had the deeper commitment to the state. In fact, every serious presidential contender—both Republican and Democrat—made forthright statements of support (Washington Letter, American Jewish Committee, April 1976), which provoked columnists Evans and Novak to write several critical pieces on the “powerful Jewish lobby.”

Emphasis on commitment to Israel and aid to Soviet Jewry to the exclusion of domestic issues by candidates seeking Jewish support was a source of irritation for many Jews. They, no less than other Americans, were concerned with the energy crisis, the issue of big government, the economic issues, and the viability of our democratic institutions.

During the early Democratic primaries, the major candidates were convinced that Senator Jackson, with his well-known record of support for “Jewish issues,” had the inside track for the pivotal “Jewish vote.” It followed that they would have to erode this support to win in the primaries. Thus, for example, several days before the important Massachusetts March 2 primary, some 250 supporters of Congressman Morris Udall inserted a full-page advertisement in the weekly Boston Jewish Advocate (February 26, 1976), quoting him as saying: “Our history, our tradition and our other values all argue for unshakable American support for Israel,” an obvious effort to make inroads into the Jackson block of Jewish voters. And shortly after these primaries, won by Jackson with the support of 37 per cent of the Jewish vote, with Udall a strong second (29 per cent), Carter, who won only 4 per cent of the Jewish vote, contacted a national Jewish leader to convince him of his strong pro-Israel attitude (Evans and Novak, New York Post, March 12, 1976).

The April 6 New York Democratic primary was won with ease by Jackson, who garnered 57 per cent of the New York City vote. But there was strong Jewish support for Udall in the affluent Manhattan districts and in Westchester and Nassau counties, where Jews reside in significant numbers (Louis Harris, ABC poll, April 8, 1976). In Pennsylvania, three weeks later, Jackson won 60 per cent of the Jewish vote; Morris Udall, received 23 per cent, and Carter was considerably behind with 14 per cent (New York Times/CBS News polls, April 29, 1976).

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13 In the 1972 election campaign, Nixon, in an all-out effort to win what election strategists perceived to be the crucial Jewish vote, was far more supportive of Israel than was Democrat George McGovern who, in fact, received almost twice as many Jewish votes as did Nixon. In Jews and American Politics, Stephen Isaacs labeled 1972 “as the year of the Jew in American politics,” maintaining that “never before had the Jewish community been subjected to such a barrage of campaign propaganda.”

After Carter's poor showing in the "Jewish" districts in the Maryland primaries, several Jews who held important posts in the Carter campaign organization met with leaders of the major national Jewish agencies in the New York offices of the American Jewish Committee (July 24, 1976) to find out why Jews were not supporting Carter, and what they could do to rectify the situation. Other major Democratic candidates, or their representatives, also had opportunities to meet with prominent national Jewish leaders. However, the American Jewish Committee Washington representative, Hyman Bookbinder, stated on national television that, in his opinion, the assumption of Jewish resistance to Carter was a "myth." Lack of support, he pointed out, must be ascribed to the fact that Carter was largely an unknown quantity to most Jews, as he was to other voters, and that he ran against such candidates as Henry Jackson (and indirectly Hubert H. Humphrey), who had a long record of identification with Jewish causes, and Udall, Harris, Shriver, and others, who appealed to the large number of Jewish Democrats sympathetic to liberal causes.

Aware of this situation, the Carter forces took some action. Thirty prominent Atlanta Jews signed a letter to dramatize Carter's concern for "Jewish issues," of which some 25,000 copies were mailed to Jewish voters in New Jersey and Ohio. A statement of his position on the Middle East was sent to every rabbi in these states. Carter also addressed a large meeting of Jews in Elizabeth, N.J., expressing his unwaivering support for Israel (Christian Science Monitor, June 21, 1976).

Direct appeals to the Jewish vote were significantly less pronounced in the Republican presidential primaries. Ronald Reagan sought Jewish support by means of private meetings with prominent Jews in New York and California, at which he expressed firm support for Israel (Newsweek, March 1, 1976), and in a public statement of early July, lauding the Israeli action freeing the hostages at Entebbe as "magnificent." The Ford campaign, sensing Jewish dissatisfaction with the Ford-Kissinger policy which sought to balance support for Israel with efforts to increase United States influence in the Arab world (Chicago Sun Times, May 3, 1976), made little effort to attract Jews. Norman Podhoretz, editor of Commentary, referring to the Ford campaign organization, observed: "They certainly seem to have turned their backs on the Jewish vote." Ford, however, did make one public appeal to Jewish voters during the primaries. Speaking at the American Jewish Committee's 70th anniversary dinner meeting in Washington on May 13, he strongly affirmed his administration's support for Israel. Given the choice between Ford and Reagan, Jewish Republicans tended to support the President, and in the primaries gave him

15California's Governor Brown won 69 per cent of the Jewish vote, Udall 14 per cent, and Carter 12 per cent.
16While views varied, the consensus among the leaders was that most Jews had difficulty determining Carter's stand on the major issues affecting them as Jews and as Americans.
17Today Show, NBC television network, August 6, 1976.
78 per cent of their vote, against 22 per cent for Reagan (New York Times/CBS News polls, April 22, 1976).

After the primaries, both Carter and Ford, aware that neither had fared well in attracting Jewish support, made conscious and determined efforts to appeal to Jewish sensibilities. Both the Ford administration and the Carter campaign organization created “Jewish desks” and sought opportunities for the candidates to appear before Jewish groups. There were appearances by Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger before the B’nai B’rith International Council on successive days; Kissinger assured the delegates that the friendship between the United States and Israel “has always been a touchstone of the validity of our foreign policy in general.” On September 9 Republican vice-presidential nominee Robert Dole, the principal speaker at the opening session of the 79th annual convention of Zionist Organization of America, promised that the Ford administration “will never jeopardize the security of Israel in search for peace, nor will it retreat one inch from its commitment to the security of Israel.” (New York Times, September 10, 1976). Also in September, 125 Jewish Republican leaders from 27 states were invited to Washington where they met with Ford campaign chairman James Baker and other strategists, and received well-stocked campaign kits containing various Ford speeches and pronouncements on Israel, Soviet Jewry, the Arab boycott, and other items for use in their own speeches before Jewish groups. Campaigning in New York City in October, Ford addressed an audience of some 3,000 hasidic and other Orthodox rabbis, and congregants of Conservative, Reform, and Sephardi congregations at the Center for Holocaust Studies of the Yeshiva of Flatbush. On that occasion, he acknowledged that “we must do better in terms of Soviet Jewish emigration,” promised that he would not “tolerate” another Arab oil embargo, and declared that “the PLO will not be a participant in any future conference on peace in the Middle East.”

Carter, too, made the requisite moves for the Jewish vote, Jewish communal leader Harriet Zimmerman was appointed national director of community affairs; Edward Sanders, president of the influential American Public Affairs Institute, and United Jewish Appeal president Paul Zuckerman joined the Carter staff as advisers (The Nation, December 11, 1976). Carter also appeared before the B’nai B’rith International Council and, like Ford, proclaimed his strong commitment to Israel. At the same time, he charged the administration with a disregard for human rights and responsibility for the sharp drop in emigration from the Soviet Union (Washington Post, September 12, 1976). He repeatedly emphasized his commitment to Israel in a series of interviews. According to the Hearst newspapers, he advocated that the United States provide Israel with “adequate military and economic aid” so that it could defend itself and preserve its existence as a Jewish state. In an interview with the New York Times, he suggested that he might consider a limited United States security guarantee to Israel, and urged, on a Meet the Press television program, that the United States “take a position ahead of time,” as a consequence of which a new Arab oil embargo would be considered “a declaration of economic war” (Alan C.
Brownfeld in *Middle East International*, October 1976). In an interview published in the *Atlanta Journal and Constitution* (September 9, 1976), he expressed deep respect for the contributions of the Jews to America's cultural, professional, and educational life.

Carter further pledged, in a September 14 telegram to the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews in Arlington, Va., support for "full religious and cultural opportunities for Soviet Jews," and their right to emigrate, declaring that he "would not hesitate to use trade pressures to effectuate that purpose."

The many feature articles in newspapers all over the country on the Jewish vote, its size and importance to each candidate, and the widely publicized appeals to Jewish voters evoked some critical comment. The *St. Louis Review*, a Roman Catholic diocesan publication, editorially declared that "with barely concealed zeal for appealing to the Jewish vote, the candidates have tried to outbid and outpromise each other about the military support that they will extend to Israel" (October 15, 1976). *The Christian Science Monitor*, in an October 13 editorial, observed that "Israel is getting the best of both worlds in the American election campaign" and that the "public would be better benefited by less politicking and more thoughtful, less partisan discussion of the American national interest in the Middle East. A *Washington Post* editorial (October 17, 1976) condemned what it called "vote buying," particularly by Carter, who was treating the issue of aid to Israel "as if he believed it to be an auction, with the votes of American Jews automatically going to the highest bidder."

**ARAB BOYCOTT**

The Arab boycott of Israel, initially regarded of concern only to Jews, was raised to a major campaign issue by an almost casual remark President Ford made during the second of the televised debates, on October 6. He said he was proud of his efforts against the Arab boycott, and then announced that, in view of the failure by Congress to pass legislation, he would order the Commerce Department to reveal the names of companies that have complied with the boycott. This remark caused confusion and consternation among administration officials on Capitol Hill. When, a day later, he directed the department to make available all "future reports" for public inspection, a department spokesman observed that such information had, in the past, been filed on "a confidential basis" and could not be made public.

The President's credibility with regard to his past opposition to the boycott was sharply attacked by Congressional Democrats, since Senator John Towers (R., Tex.), acting for the administration, was largely responsible for preventing the passage of the Export Administration Act to which antiboycott legislation was attached (*Christian Science Monitor*, October 8, 1976).

Throughout the remainder of the campaign, Carter pressed the attack and, in essence, repeated the charge that while the President was proclaiming opposition to the boycott, "he and his Administration officials did everything possible to block
anti-boycott legislation," and asserted that "Ford owed the American people the truth about these matters" (Los Angeles Times, October 9, 1976). As Time (November 8, 1976) observed, the issue of the Arab boycott during the campaign developed into a "brouhaha."

ANTISEMITISM

There were but few instances of antisemitism, or appeals to anti-Jewish bias, in the 1976 election campaigns; and these in the main involved congressional candidates and occurred only in the primaries. The Durham County Citizens Council ran advertisements in Greensboro, N.C., newspapers on March 13 and 14, which, alleged that "most of the money for [Senator Jackson's] campaign was contributed by Israeli sympathizers, which means that he would be obligated to lead us into war against the Arabs in case of another Arab-Israel War."

Connecticut Secretary of State Gloria Schaffer, seeking the Democratic nomination for the U.S. Senate, was denied endorsement by the Darien Democratic Town Committee because she was Jewish, and was presumed, therefore, to have a "biased viewpoint" on "the most difficult problems of the Middle East" (Stamford, Conn., Advocate, March 29, 1976).

In a bitterly contested primary contest for the Arizona Republican nomination for the U.S. Senate, Congressman Sam Steiger charged that supporters of Congressman John Conlan were trying to make an issue of the fact that Steiger was Jewish (Congressional Quarterly Weekly, September 11, 1976).

Several days before an August 3rd congressional Democratic primary in Missouri's second congressional district, candidate Robert Young's sister-in-law wrote to Catholic families of St. Monica Parish, urging that they support him because of his anti-abortion stand. She pointedly noted that his opponent, Jack Schramm, was a board member of the American Jewish Congress, an organization which she alleged was opposed to anti-abortion legislation (St. Louis Post Dispatch, September 22, 1976).

The Catholics

As the presidential primary campaign proceeded, there was some apprehension that the intensity of Roman Catholic feeling about the question of legal abortion might lead to interreligious discord. Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court, in two landmark decisions in January 1973, affirmed woman's constitutional right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, the Roman Catholic hierarchy led a vigorous

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18 As the 95th Congress considered a new watered-down anti-boycott bill, the Carter administration expressed concern that a tougher bill could undermine relations with the Arab states (U.S. News and World Report, April 25, 1977).

campaign, involving other religious groups, to overturn the decision by constitutional amendment. The issue became politicized when, early in January 1976, a plan by the Catholic bishops to establish anti-abortion cadres in each of the 432 congressional districts to mobilize public support against permissive abortion was put into operation.\(^20\)

While there were no explicit instructions to the cadres to translate Catholic concerns into political action, the notion was widespread that demands to legislate against permissive abortion was indeed becoming a political issue. The *Washington Post* (February 11, 1976) in a lead editorial rhetorically asked, "Would you believe abortion as a national political issue?" and observed that the notion was being expressed that "abortion is the issue in 1976 and that it is even some kind of 'litmus test' of various candidates' liberality and fitness to govern."\(^21\)

The issue became the sole plank on which Ellen McCormack, a politically inexperienced 49-year-old Merrick, L.I., housewife and a devout Roman Catholic, built a campaign for the Democratic nomination for the presidency. Although she steadfastly denied that her campaign was sanctioned or approved by the Church, or that abortion was a religious issue, she ran as the candidate of the Church-approved Pro Life Action Committee, and, in an aggressive campaign in 28 states, succeeded in focusing attention on the question of legalized abortion.

While the abortion issue became less important as the presidential campaign progressed, it did evoke strong feeling on the part of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, if not most of the laity. Carter campaign strategists were concerned that the bitterness of prominent Catholic clergymen over the Democratic party platform's failure to incorporate a plank for an anti-abortion amendment might make the wholesale defection of the traditionally Democratic Catholics a real possibility. In an editorial in the *St. Louis Review* (June 18, 1976), Father Edward O'Donnell angrily charged that "the Democratic Party doesn't want Catholics;" that it would not dare incorporate planks which offended Jews, blacks, and other people "whom the Democrats consider important." Later in the campaign, nationally syndicated columnist Patrick J. Buchanan made essentially the same charge, alleging that "over the last decade the Catholic Community has had its loyalty to the national Democrats rewarded with table scraps." Catholic writers Michael Novak and Andrew Greely complained that while Carter devoted considerable effort to winning over "recalcitrant Jews and liberals," he largely ignored Catholics (*The New Republic*, October 2, 1976).

As president of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Archbishop Joseph

\[^{20}\text{In "Abortion: A National Religious Battle" (\textit{Washington Post}, February 7, 1976), Clayton Fritchey alleged that the plan called for "mobilizing local political units to monitor the stand of all political candidates on abortion and related issues," and to "'infiltrate' political parties at various levels."}^{\text{21}}\text{\textit{America}}, the Jesuit weekly, editorially warned Catholics against making abortion the "litmus test" of acceptability of political candidates (\textit{Washington Post}, March 12, 1976).\]
L. Bernardin condemned the proposed Democratic party plank on abortion as "morally offensive in the extreme (New York Daily News, June 25, 1976). When adopted intact by the Democratic party convention, it evoked sharp protests from Cardinals Terence J. Cooke and John P. Cody, and Archbishop Gerety (New York Post, July 16, 1976). Rev. Robert Deming of the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception in Kansas City refused to deliver a scheduled benediction at the convention as a "matter of conscience," since he disagreed with the party's and Carter's statements on the issue" (St. Louis Globe-Democrat, July 16, 1976).

By contrast, President Ford and the Republican party, if not in total harmony with the official Catholic position on abortion, were closer to it than Carter and the Democrats. The President drew a standing ovation from the 100,000 Roman Catholics attending the 41st International Eucharist Congress when, without mentioning abortion, he said that he shared their concern over "increased irreverence for life" (Washington Post, August 9, 1976). After a September meeting with Ford in the White House, six prominent Roman Catholic clergymen told newsmen that they were "encouraged but not totally satisfied by his support of the proposed constitutional amendment.22

Carter, in fact, often said that he believed abortion was morally "wrong," but that he opposed a constitutional amendment and advocated instead government-sponsored programs which would minimize the need for abortions. Although he frequently was the target of "pro-life" groups at campaign rallies and meetings, he refused to condemn them, insisting that the issue was "legitimate." He also pledged that he would not change his position "to try to get their votes" (New York Times, September 10, 1976).

Apart from the abortion issue, there was some Catholic unease about the Carter candidacy for much the same reasons that his early candidacy troubled Jews. He was a Southern Baptist, a denomination with which neither Catholics nor Jews had much contact (The Catholic Key, May 30, 1976), and both groups were troubled by his born-again fundamentalism, cultural style, and his unfamiliarity with urban life (The New Republic, October 2, 1976; Congressional Quarterly Weekly, October 12, 1976). Yet after a "bad beginning," as Andrew Greely pointed out, Carter made a "rapid turn-around on the subject of Catholics" by going into the ethnic neighborhoods "to listen and learn," bringing prominent Catholics into major campaign-staff positions, and "doing his best to respond to the legitimate political fears of American Catholics" (New York Daily News, October 5, 1976).

The Blacks

Attempts to achieve black economic power through black political cohesion, initiated in 1972 in Gary, Ind., at a "black political convention," which was

22During the campaign Ford frequently spoke in favor of a constitutional amendment which would give the individual states the option on whether or not to outlaw permissive abortion.
reconvened in Little Rock, Ark., two years later, collapsed in 1976. Failure seemed inevitable when black elected officials, meeting in Washington in mid-December 1975, were unable to agree on a specific strategy for the 1976 presidential elections. Some urged support for various Democratic candidates, while others opted for an independent black candidate.

Meeting in Cincinnati in mid-March 1976, the National Black Political Assembly, the political mechanism developed by the two preceding conventions, could not find a candidate willing to run on a black party ticket in the forthcoming presidential elections. It also failed to form a black political party that might function as a viable political entity not only because of poor planning, execution, and attendance, and ideological factionalism, but because it ignored the reality of black political life. Overwhelmingly, black elected officials, who could have provided the requisite expertise and prestige to such a party, are closely tied to the Democratic party. It was party support that made their political careers possible, and they apparently were not willing to jeopardize future success by defecting (Baltimore Evening Sun, April 4, 1976). Lacking leadership, resources, and grass-roots commitment, the Black Political Assembly became a requiem for a black third party, at least for 1976.

In both the presidential primary contests and the election, blacks overwhelmingly supported Jimmy Carter, a fact attributed to his sympathetic response, as governor of Georgia, to black needs and to his Baptist faith, with which many blacks could identify. As Benjamin Hooks, NAACP executive director-designate noted, "Black folks intuitively felt a certain kinship with Carter" (Time, November 22, 1976).

Immediately after the election, political commentators generally conceded that the president-elect owed a huge debt to blacks. Political analyst Richard Scammon, however, asserted that the black contribution to Carter's victory was "exaggerated," since many more whites than blacks voted for Carter, and that while he would have lost the election without the black vote, he would also have lost without the white (Time, November 22, 1976). Columnist Patrick J. Buchanan, relying on the Harris poll estimate of an 82 per cent pro-Carter vote, concluded that Carter's victory resulted from his "raising the Democratic share of the white vote from 32 per cent in 1972 to 48 per cent in 1976 (New York Times, April 5, 1977).


Estimates varied from 91 per cent, claimed by the Washington Joint Center for Political Studies, to 87.3 per cent and 82 per cent, found by pollsters Harris and Gallup, respectively. According to the Joint Centers analysis, blacks provided Carter with the margin of victory in 13 states (Focus, November 1976).
Ethnics

As in past campaigns, presidential candidates courted the various ethnic groups. They concentrated particularly on winning the support of America's 6.2 million Spanish-speaking citizens. All candidates campaigned extensively in the Southwest and the West, where Mexican Americans constitute more than 16 per cent of the population. Candidates Carter, Brown, and Udall at various times met with different Chicano leaders, and both Ford and Reagan had staff personnel assigned to keep close contact with Spanish-speaking groups (Christian Science Monitor, June 9, 1976). Carter, who is fluent in Spanish, used radio and television spots to speak in their own language to Hispanic voters in the 17 states where they are most heavily concentrated (U.S. News and World Report, October 18, 1976).

Carter knew the importance of the ethnic vote to the Democratic party in the past. He also knew that it would not be easily won, and therefore made a serious effort to overcome the problem. He appointed Joseph Califano, a distinguished Italian American, to a key campaign position; promised Italian-American leaders that he would attempt to rearrange his campaign schedule to be able to attend a dinner honoring Rep. Peter Rodino and U.S. District Judge John Sirica, both Italian, and created an "ethnic desk," staffed by Terry Sunday, a former administrative assistant of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and Sister Victoria Mongiardo of the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs. When Carter aide Jody Powell announced plans for the ethnic desk, he said it would be similar to others "previously established for blacks, Hispanic Americans, Jews and women," and would give the Carter campaign "greater appreciation for the interests and concerns of southern and Eastern European ethnics all across the country" (Washington Post, August 22, 1976).

Ford, whose policy of détente with the Soviet Union did not permit the exploitation of the emotional appeal of anti-Communism among white ethnics, listened to the urging of ethnic specialists in the GOP and, from the beginning, made heavy

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25 The Voting Right Act of 1975 sought to overcome some of the difficulties experienced by Chicanos in understanding election procedures, and mandated 27 states and more than 400 counties to conduct bilingual elections. A Southwest Voter Registration Education Project was initiated to facilitate Mexican American participation in the November elections, and Chicano groups were involved in the dissemination of Spanish and English materials urging them to vote (Christian Science Monitor, June 19, 1976).

26 When Carter and Ford refused to address the Forum of National Hispanic Organizations, Hispanic leaders accused both of ignoring them and the issues which concerned them. Spokesmen for the group reportedly considered it an insult that the President did no more than invite several of them to the White House to witness the signing of a proclamation designating Hispanic Heritage Week. They were angry at Carter for appointing an Ecuadorian, rather than a Chicano, Puerto Rican, or Cuban, to direct his Hispanic campaign (Houston Post, September 11, 1976).

27 Special-interest desks were also established for American Indians and Asian Americans (U.S. News and World Report, October 18, 1976).
use of the foreign-language media and "the social structure" in the ethnic communi-
ties (Congressional Quarterly Weekly, September 11, 1976). An "ethnic problem" arose for him as a result of an ill-informed comment in the second television debate that "there is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe." The remark astounded and deeply offended Polish Americans and others of East European origin at a point in the campaign when, according to Time (October 25, 1976), the "ethnics had been moving into the Republican column." After some delay in deciding how best to mollify the offended voters, Ford summoned 18 American ethnic leaders to the White House and publicly admitted to them that his statement was erroneous. He used the occasion to sign into law a bill granting medical benefits to Poles and Czechs in the United States, who had fought for the Allies in World Wars I and II.

Overall, both Ford and Carter avidly sought the white ethnic vote. The Georgian, besides creating special "desks" for almost every conceivable racial and religious group, extensively campaigned in Italian, Irish, and Polish neighborhoods. The President sought to win the support of these groups through a single umbrella organization, "People for Ford." At the same time, he invited what U.S. News and World Report (October 18, 1976) characterized as "a seemingly endless procession of ethnic leaders" to the Rose garden "to be honored by the President for one accomplishment or another."

Milton Ellerin
The United States, Israel, and the Middle East

The period under review (1976 and early 1977) was marked by a sense of anticipation and a jockeying for position by the countries of the Middle East in preparation for the new major United States peace initiative expected in 1977, no matter whether a Republican or a Democrat was elected President.

While reiterating Israel's readiness to go to Geneva to seek an overall peace agreement, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's cabinet had agreed in February 1976 to cooperate with the United States in sounding out Egypt, Syria, and Jordan about bilateral negotiations to "end the state of war." But the United States was unable during the year to make headway with any of the Arab states to achieve even this more limited objective. Consequently, there was a growing consensus in the United States and the Middle East that the series of step-by-step arrangements, which had culminated in the second Egyptian-Israel Sinai agreement in September 1975, had run its course, and that if stalemate and stagnation were to be avoided, a new effort would have to be made to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict within the framework of the Geneva peace conference.

Because of the crucial role the new administration in Washington was expected to play, Israel and the Arab states subjected to microscopic examination and analysis the statements and actions of the Ford administration and Jimmy Carter, the successful Democratic contender, for clues to any shifts in United States strategy or tactics regarding the basic issues of the nature of peace, the extent of territorial adjustments and types of security arrangements, and the place of the Palestinians in the peace settlement. The level of economic aid and military sales to Israel and the Arab states, policy toward pending congressional measures to curb the Arab boycott, and actions at the United Nations were all scrutinized as barometers of firmness or lessening of United States support for Israel.

Lebanese Conflict

Developments in the Middle East during 1976 provided ample evidence of the complexity of the problems facing United States policy-makers. Probably the most tragic and tangled of all was the devastating civil war in Lebanon, which in the two years since its outbreak in April 1975 had taken some 60,000 lives and left three times as many wounded, mainly civilians. On the clash of religious, tribal, economic, and ideological interests in Lebanese society were superimposed the rivalries of the radical and conservative Arab states, and these in turn found allies and adversaries among the various Palestinian militant groups. The outcome of this struggle for power was of deep concern to Israel, for Lebanon was the only Arab neighbor with whom it had enjoyed a relatively tranquil frontier in most years since 1949. Apart
from a natural sympathy for the Lebanese Christians, who represented the only other non-Muslim dominated society in the Arab world besides Israel itself, Israel was apprehensive about the prospect of Lebanon aligning itself with the militant Arab confrontation states, and was adamantly opposed to the renewed use of southern Lebanon as a base for Palestinian terrorist raids into Israel.

The Ford administration shared these concerns, but its response was far less decisive than that of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who, in 1958, ordered American Marines to land on the beaches of Beirut in response to an appeal by the Christian-controlled government to save it from its Nasserist Muslim opponents, who, Eisenhower believed, were spearheading a Communist takeover. During the current crisis, following in the wake of the Vietnam war, Washington turned a deaf ear to similar Christian appeals, and ruled out any direct American military involvement to restore peace in Lebanon. The United States confined its role to behind-the-scenes efforts at mediation to prevent the escalation of the conflict into a full-scale Arab-Israel war.

In the early months of the fighting, the United States issued periodic statements expressing its opposition to any outside intervention in the Lebanese conflict. But as it became increasingly apparent that the Lebanese lacked the will or capability to end their fratricidal strife, and when French domestic opposition moved Paris to reconsider its offer to intervene again in its former mandate, the United States acquiesced in limited Syrian intervention. Within the tangled web of shifting Middle East alignments, this course had emerged as the lesser evil.

ROLE OF SYRIA

Since Soviet-armed Syria had long been supporting Palestinian and Lebanese Muslim elements, it came as a surprise when President Hafez al-Assad shifted sides in January 1976 and sent in several thousand members of Saiqa, the Syrian-officered Palestinian group, to help the beleaguered Christians fight against radical Palestinian and Muslim groups supported by Libya and Iraq. When some of the Saiqa Palestinians defected, larger contingents of regular Syrian troops were gradually sent into Lebanon. Besides restoring the military balance that had been turning against the Christians, Syria in February tried to get the diverse Lebanese factions to accept a compromise political formula, which would have met some of the demands of the Moslem majority for a greater share of political and economic power. At the same time, it would have preserved the basic structure of the Lebanese confessional system and the rights of the Christian communities. When the compromise was rejected by the Lebanese leftists and Palestinian extremists, Damascus moved more troops into Lebanon.
U.S. AND ISRAELI REACTIONS

On April 19 White House press secretary Ron Nessen declared that the Syrians were playing "a constructive role" in Lebanon, and indicated that the United States was only opposed to intervention that could lead to a wider Middle East war. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger had told a Senate committee a week earlier that the United States was in daily contact with Israel, and that both countries had concluded that Syrian actions "up till now" did not represent a threat to Israel. He conceded, however, that Syria was "getting close to the borderline" of Israeli tolerance, and praised Israel for its "statesmanlike and constructive" approach to the crisis.

The growing Syrian influence in Lebanon posed a dilemma for Israel. On the one hand, Israel was pleased to see the militant Palestinians curbed and their radical Muslim allies weakened in Lebanon, and, at the same time, Syria attacked by such disparate Arab governments as Egypt and Libya. On the other hand, Israel was worried over the long-term effect of Syrian domination of Lebanon, especially since Syria had never formally renounced the goal of reestablishing a greater Syrian entity including not only Lebanon but also Palestine, which, the Syrians continued to remind the world, had been carved out of southern Syria. Wishing to avoid a confrontation with the United States, the Israel government limited its official response to warnings to Syria not to cross what was popularly referred to as "the red line." While this was generally interpreted as the area south of the Litani River, the Israelis indicated that they were concerned not only with the geographical deployment of the Syrians, but also with their actions and intentions.

In the short run, however, Syria and Israel had a common interest in preventing Lebanon from being taken over by an Iraqi-type radical regime, or allowing the Palestinians to draw Israel and Syria into an unwanted war. Israel limited its direct involvement to providing arms and logistical support to embattled Christian villages in the border region and establishing personal contacts with Christian and some Moslem villagers along the border through the "Good Fence," offering them medical care, supplies, and even employment opportunities in Israel. (See also chapter on Lebanon in the review of Israel in this volume.)

Syria's agreement, at the end of May, to renew the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights without any political conditions was viewed by Washington as a further sign of Syrian moderation. While Israel also welcomed the move, it was seen primarily as evidence of Syria's preoccupation with the Lebanese crisis. (UNDOF was again renewed in November.)

Israel did not react when Syria escalated its direct military intervention in June. There were nearly 30,000 troops under Syrian command by October, when the Arab League, after numerous unsuccessful mediation attempts, adopted a Saudi formula under which the Syrians were in effect recognized as a peace-keeping rather than an occupying force.
In the midst of the fighting in May, Elias Sarkis, a Maronite Christian lawyer and former governor of Lebanon's Central Bank, was elected President of Lebanon with Syrian backing. His inauguration on September 23 prompted the State Department to issue a statement outlining United States policy. It called for the implementation of the February compromise proposal as a basis for preserving the country's "independence, territorial integrity and national unity." The State Department viewed solutions based on the partition of Lebanon along religious lines—as advocated by some of the more militant Christian groups—"invitations to further strife and instability," since the states so created "would not be viable and would invite external intervention." It called for the establishment of security forces loyal to the Lebanese government, and offered American economic help for the reconstruction of the country, beginning with an initial appropriation of $20 million.

The proposed solution, the State Department declared, would require that the Palestinians in Lebanon agree to "live in peace with their Lebanese hosts and neighbors, without challenging the authority of a central Lebanese administration." The statement pointedly noted that an end to the Lebanese fighting would create conditions more conducive to resumption of the search for "a negotiated settlement of the broader Middle East question, which would take into account the concerns of the states of the area for their security and territorial integrity, as well as the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people."

There was concern in Israel that the United States was beginning to waver in its refusal to deal with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) after Secretary Kissinger sent a message to PLO in Beirut expressing to the "Palestinian leadership" his "appreciation for the assistance" the organization provided in arranging the evacuation of Americans from West Beirut and in removing the bodies of U.S. Ambassador Francis E. Meloy, Jr. and his economic counselor, who had been kidnapped and murdered on June 16 as they were on their way to meet President-elect Sarkis. While the State Department denied that this reflected any change in the United States political stance toward PLO, President Ford included it among those whom he congratulated on July 27 for making possible a second evacuation of Americans from Beirut by a United States Navy vessel.

If the United States saw its Sixth Fleet reduced from its 1958 peace-keeping role to one of evacuating American civilians in 1976, the Soviet Union was in an even worse relative position. Moscow was surprised and embarrassed when, in June, Syrian tank columns rolled into Lebanon only hours before Soviet Prime Minister
Aleksei N. Kosygin arrived in Damascus on an official state visit. By this *fait accompli* Assad demonstrated his independence of his Soviet mentors. The Kremlin allowed several hundred Palestinian students to demonstrate in front of the Syrian embassy in Moscow, but was generally restrained in its criticism of the Syrian action. On August 27 a *Pravda* commentary appealed to Syria to withdraw its forces from Lebanon, and cooperate once again with "its natural allies in the anti-imperialist struggle—the Palestinian resistance movement" and with the Lebanese leftists. Moscow was apparently also becoming exasperated with its unmanageable "allies" among the Palestinians, and in mid-September began to criticize "ultra-left elements" in Lebanon for rejecting all peace proposals.

The Soviet Union could ill afford a continuation of the Lebanese war, which saw an increasingly entrenched Syria, backed by conservative Saudi Arabia, routing the leftists. Besides, the Kremlin was eager to patch up its quarrel with Syria in view of the marked deterioration of the Soviet position in Egypt. The Soviet Union had been piqued by Sadat's moves to turn increasingly to the capitalist West to restore his tottering economy, and by his decision to rely exclusively on American mediation in reaching the second Sinai agreement, rather than on the Geneva peace conference, in which the Soviet Union would have a role as co-chairman.

**Sadat Abrogates Soviet-Egyptian Pact**

On March 14, 1976, President Sadat suddenly asked the Egyptian People's Assembly to abrogate immediately the 15-year Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation concluded in 1971 (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], pp. 161–63). The reasons for the move, according to Sadat, were that the Soviets refused to supply needed spare parts for Egypt's military arsenal and were unsympathetic to Egyptian requests that its vast outstanding debt be rescheduled. The abrogation of the treaty was followed by Egyptian orders to the Russians to close the refueling and refitting depots they maintained at Alexandria. The last five Soviet warships left Egypt on April 15.

**U.S. Transport Planes for Egypt**

Some observers noted that Sadat's actions were well timed to impress the United States of his independence of Moscow, and to lend credence to his pending request for American and West European arms. Congress finally approved the shipment of six C-130 Hercules military transport planes to Egypt, after lengthy debate and only on assurance by Kissinger on April 2 that no other supplies would be sent during 1976. But shortly thereafter, on May 8, President Ford suggested that the United States begin to "think seriously about providing defensive arms for Egypt," arguing that Egypt had "changed very dramatically from its dependence on Soviet Russia to a willingness to work with us and also to negotiate a settlement with the Israelis in Sinai."
There were those who questioned how reliable an ally Sadat was, since he abrogated a long-term treaty on a moment's notice despite the year's advance notice required. They were also skeptical about the completeness of the Egyptian-Soviet break, for they recalled that Sadat had dramatically ousted the Soviet advisers from Egypt in 1972, while secretly continuing to receive the massive Soviet weapons that enabled Egypt to launch the October 1973 surprise attack on Israel.

Indeed, neither Moscow nor Cairo wanted a complete rupture in relations. On April 28 they signed an $802 million one-year trade agreement, maintaining the Soviet Union as Egypt's largest commercial trading partner. Western intelligence sources reported that Egypt also continued to receive some Soviet military supplies either directly or, with Moscow's agreement, from Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and North Korea. The Russians may have been prompted to resume shipment after the People's Republic of China warmly received Egyptian Vice President Husni Mubarak in April, and an agreement was reportedly concluded in Peking to provide Egypt with airplane engines and spare parts that could be used in some Soviet-built equipment. Sadat, himself, confirmed on February 27, 1977, that the Soviet Union would soon return 50 of 150 Mig-21 fighter planes, which, he said, he had sent to that country for refurbishing. He repeated his request for "defensive weapons" from the United States.

**Arms for Jordan**

During 1976 the Russians unsuccessfully tried to court pro-Western King Hussein of Jordan by reportedly offering to sell him Mig-23s, T-62 tanks, and an air-defense system. Hussein went to the Soviet Union in June, after the visit to Amman of a high-level Soviet military delegation. What prompted Hussein's first visit in a decade to Moscow was his pique at the failure to obtain the Hawk missile system and related arms he had hoped to get from the United States. Under a compromise reached with Congress in 1975, the Ford administration agreed to a $300 million package consisting primarily of 14 Hawk missile batteries on condition that they be stationary and thus not usable for an attack against Israel. The Saudis, who had agreed to underwrite the cost of the Jordanian defense system, balked when presented with a bill of $800 million for a more extensive and sophisticated arms package. The Americans expressed displeasure over Hussein's approach to the Russians for weapons, and the Saudis made it clear that they would not pay to increase Soviet influence in the region. Consequently, the Soviet-Jordanian arms deal fell through, but Hussein's ploy succeeded in getting the Saudis to finance a modified package of $540 million in United States arms.

**Growing Saudi Influence**

The Saudis demonstrated a far more assertive role in Arab and regional affairs than ever before. They had been an important source of financial assistance to the
Arab "confrontation" states of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan since 1976, and first began to flex their economic muscle on the international scene after the 1973 war. But it was in 1976 that the new Saudi regime under King Khalid undertook major political initiatives to end the divisions within the Arab world, to counter radical and pro-Soviet trends in the area, and to forge a united front against Israel. They were supported in their efforts by Sabah al Salem al Sabah, the emir of Kuwait.

The first attempt, in May 1976, to bring Egyptian and Syrian officials to Riyadh for a reconciliation conference was canceled at the last moment, in view of the fact that Damascus continued to blast the Egyptians for having betrayed Arab solidarity by concluding the Sinai accord with Israel, and Cairo, in turn, castigated the Syrians for invading Lebanon and "liquidating the Palestinian resistance." The Saudis used the threat of withholding current economic aid and the promise of additional support to bring the Egyptian and Syrian prime ministers to Riyadh in June. But mutual recriminations continued until October 18, when King Khalid summoned Sadat, Assad, Sarkis, and PLO leader Yasir Arafat to a summit meeting in Riyadh. In view of the impending American elections, the Saudis insisted that only Israel would benefit from a continuation of the Lebanese civil war. A common Arab stand, they maintained, was essential in the forthcoming political struggle to achieve a settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict on terms favorable to the Arabs.

**Arab Summits**

The Riyadh conference decisions were ratified by a plenary Arab League summit in Cairo on October 25-26. In effect, the Syrian army in Lebanon was legitimized as an Arab peace-keeping force, the Egyptian-Syrian feud over Sinai II was ended, and Arafat, whose forces had been battered but not destroyed in the Lebanese fighting, was reportedly urged by the others to suspend the military activities of PLO and concentrate on obtaining for it a political role in the forthcoming negotiations. The only opposition to this approach came from the "rejectionist" Iraqis and Libyans, who wanted no negotiations with Israel, and from militant Palestinian groups both within and outside the loose PLO umbrella organization, who insisted on maintaining armed struggle until the PLO Covenant's goal of Israel's total dissolution was achieved.

**Egyptian-Syrian Reconciliation**

In a typical illustration of how quickly expressions of fraternal love can replace fratricidal strife in the Arab world, Egypt and Syria announced on December 21 that they would set up a "unified political command" to "develop and strengthen steps" toward an eventual union of the two countries. After three days of talks, Assad and Sadat said that joint committees would work out detailed programs for unification of foreign policy, defense, and economic and administrative affairs. The careful planning was intended to avoid the fate of the hasty 1958 Syrian-Egyptian merger,
which ended abruptly with Syria's secession three years later. A looser Federation of Arab Republics, formed in 1971 by Egypt, Syria, and Libya, had long been inactive, and Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi made it clear that there was no intention to bring radical Libya into the new group.

**Sudanese-Egyptian-Saudi Alliance**

Indeed, Egypt and Libya had several times been on the brink of war, with Sadat calling Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi a "madman" who instigated riots and assassination plots against Sadat and permitted himself to be used as a tool of Soviet policy to subvert Egypt and several of its African neighbors. Qaddafi, in turn, accused Sadat of trying to engineer his overthrow, a charge repeated by the Soviet Union.

Clearly, the Saudi rulers were eager to counter the ever closer Libyan-Soviet alliance marked by massive Soviet arms shipments to Libya and Libyan provision of naval facilities to the Russian fleet. King Khalid served as the matchmaker for a mutual defense agreement between Sadat and Sudanese President Gaafar Nimeiry, concluded in mid-July in Jidda. Saudi Arabia pledged to cooperate with Egypt and the Sudan in all areas, and affirmed its solidarity "with the gallant Sudanese people in defeating aggression"—an allusion to the reported Libyan backing of an unsuccessful coup two weeks earlier against Nimeiry, as he was returning from an official visit to the United States. The Saudis had played a leading behind-the-scenes role in encouraging the Sudanese-American rapprochement. In February 1977 the Sudan joined the fledging Egyptian-Syrian joint political command. The establishment in March 1976 of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and the People's Republic of South Yemen was viewed as another example of the Saudis' successful use of their wealth and influence to wean yet another once radical Marxist regime away from dependence on the Soviet Union.

**U.S. Arms to Saudi Arabia**

While the United States and Israel agreed that it was useful to diminish Soviet influence in the Middle East, they were to differ sharply on the potential effect of large-scale United States arms sales to Saudi Arabia on Middle East peace and stability. The Ford administration saw them as a way of supporting an important pro-Western influence in the Arab world and of recycling petrodollars back to the United States. Israel and its supporters in Congress made the point that an evaluation of the Arab-Israel military balance should be based not only on the military forces of Israel's immediate neighbors. In view of past instances when squabbling Arab states quickly joined together to fight against Israel and in view of Saudi Arabia's increasingly important role as a financer of arms supplies to the Arab confrontation states, Israel had to assume that arms sold to Saudi Arabia and other, more distant Arab states might be used in any future Arab-Israel conflict. Member
of Keneset Aharon Yariv, former head of Israeli intelligence, told a Washington audience on May 3, 1976, that "according to Arab sources, the 1975 defense budgets of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Libya alone amounted to $14 billion." Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D., N.Y.), on September 8, presented to Congress a list of planned United States military sales to Saudi Arabia, totaling over $7.5 billion for the year. This figure included construction of facilities and training as well as military hardware.

**CONTROVERSY OVER MAVERICK MISSILES**

A protracted dispute developed between the Ford administration and Congress specifically over the supply of sophisticated Sidewinder air-to-air and Maverick television-guided air-to-surface missiles to Saudi Arabia. Congress had not opposed an initial sale of 1,000 Mavericks in February 1976. But objections were raised when it learned in August that the administration planned to sell an additional 2,000 Sidewinders and 1,500 Mavericks, and that the 110 F-5 jet fighters for Saudi Arabia would be specially modified to handle the highly sophisticated missiles. Seeking to avoid a battle with Congress, President Ford consulted with Senators Jacob K. Javits (R., N.Y.), Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.) and Hubert H. Humphrey (D., Minn.) and, as a result, the number of missiles in the proposed sale was reduced to 650 Mavericks and 850 Sidewinders. Nevertheless, Rosenthal and 14 colleagues introduced a House resolution against the sale under the provisions of a recent law giving Congress the authority by concurrent resolution to veto any foreign arms sale over $25 million.

Democratic presidential candidate Jimmy Carter endorsed the congressional move. He told a meeting of Jewish leaders in Boston on September 30, 1976, that the proposed legislation to block the missiles sale to Saudi Arabia "reflects the responsible view that [this] sale of these missiles cannot improve the chances for peace in the region." Since these missiles could also be used offensively, Carter charged, there was reason "to fear that we will increase the chance of conflict. No Administration which was sensitive to the climate in the Middle East would let the sale go forward . . . We should not simply sell weapons to get oil. . . ." Two weeks earlier, at a B'nai B'rith convention in Washington, Carter criticized the Ford administration for having allowed "virtually unlimited sales of U.S. arms to countries around the world—a policy as cynical as it is dangerous."

In the Senate the issue focused on the Mavericks, a particular threat to Israel, since they could attack tanks, gun positions, and other ground targets with pinpoint accuracy. Case, arguing that the additional Mavericks were "unnecessary in terms of Saudi defensive needs" and a "potentially destabilizing factor" in the Arab-Israeli balance of power, succeeded in getting an eight to six vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 24 to block the sale. Reflecting the Ford administration's view, Senator George McGovern (D., S. Dak.), chairman of the Committee's Middle East subcommittee, decried the Committee's action as "a
political mistake" that would hurt United States ability to act as an honest broker in the Middle East. He declared that "to Saudi Arabia—a country which is friendly to the United States and which is our largest single foreign oil supplier—this sale is a test of our friendship and, more important, a test of the reliability of the United States as the mainstay of Saudi security."

A week later Secretary Kissinger went to the Committee and succeeded in changing the views of two Senators. Although no new formal vote was taken, the Committee let the disapproval resolution die. The Rosenthal resolution suffered a similar fate in the House. Kissinger succeeded where McGovern had failed. He convinced a majority that singling out for rejection the $30 million missile sale while approving some $6 billion in arms sale to 14 other countries would deeply offend the Saudis and affect "our basic relationships with Saudi Arabia and the prospect of stability and moderation in the Middle East." He further noted the Saudis' role as a "moderating force" on world oil prices. Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller and other administration officials were called in to reinforce Kissinger's argument that the foreign-policy consequences of disallowing the sale greatly outweighed "the technical military issues involved." Thus was illustrated once again the potential for disagreement between the United States, which viewed the Arab states from a global geopolitical and economic perspective, and Israel, whose primary concern was for the regional Arab-Israel military balance.

**Saudi Influence on OPEC Prices**

At the OPEC conference in Qatar in mid-December 1976, Saudi Arabia, joined by the United Arab Emirates, rejected the two-step 15 per cent increase in world crude-oil prices (10 per cent on January 1, 1977, and 5 per cent on July 1) advocated by the OPEC majority. To help keep world prices down, Saudi Arabia indicated that it would increase its own production. At a press conference on December 17 the Saudi Minister of Petroleum Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani explained that his country believed an increase of more than 5 per cent would be "harmful to the world economy," adding that the recovery had slowed since the beginning of the year and "there are also some forecasts that we might have a recession again."

In response to charges that Saudi Arabia was breaking OPEC unity, Yamani declared that his country was merely doing openly what others had long been doing under the table. Iraq, he charged, had been dumping oil on the market "at a very low price," thereby increasing its production in 1975 by 30 per cent, while production in Saudi Arabia had dropped from 8.5 million to 5.6 million barrels a day because it had maintained the official price. (Baghdad's action demonstrated that even so radical and uncompromisingly anti-Israel a state as Iraq could place its own national self-interest above third-world or pan-Arab solidarity.)

Sheikh Yamani's remark during the conference that "We expect the West to appreciate what we did and especially the United States," was seen by many commentators as a warning to the United States to be more responsive to the Arab cause
in the Middle East conflict. But Yamani refrained from explicitly linking Saudi oil prices to progress in peace talks, and flatly stated that there had been "no commitments" from the United States before the Saudi decision. On the other hand, Saudi Ambassador to the United States Ali A. Alireza, after noting his country's "sense of responsibility and leadership," said he wanted to emphasize that "the positive need for all parties to get on now with achieving a just and durable settlement in the Middle East" was as important as the economic aspect. He declared this to be "the greatest achievable opportunity" in the "period immediately ahead." State Department spokesman Robert L. Funseth reiterated the official United States position that "each problem stands on its own," that there "is not any linkage" between oil prices and peace in the area.

President Ford praised Saudi Arabia for its sense of "international responsibility," and castigated the other OPEC members for their "irresponsible" price increase, which could have "destructive consequences." In December President-elect Jimmy Carter announced that he, too, intended to send messages of appreciation to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, an indication that despite some of his strident campaign rhetoric, the new administration shared its predecessor's interest in maintaining and developing the increasingly important Saudi-American connection.

At the beginning of July 1977 Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates agreed to raise their prices another 5 per cent, after the other nine OPEC members had agreed to forego the increase they had scheduled to implement on July 1, thus again achieving unity of price. The adjustments were made for economic reasons. Increased Saudi production had failed to force the Iranians to cut their prices, while a current glut of crude oil on the world market convinced the OPEC majority, including Iran, that yet another price increase would not hold.

The Saudis were careful to make it clear that their oil-price increase was not intended as an anti-American move. Toward the end of June Crown Prince Fahd repeated his assurance that Saudi Arabia would not impose an oil embargo against the United States, and urged the Arab countries to cooperate with President Carter in efforts toward a Middle East peace settlement. The Saudis were anxious not to antagonize Carter, who had been most outspoken during his campaign on the use of oil as a political weapon (see below).

**United States Aid to Israel**

The Ford administration countered by repeatedly stressing its record of aid to Israel. In an August article in *Family Week*, a syndicated Sunday supplement, Ford asserted that "our support of Israel is unchanged and unfailing," and cited as evidence that he requested "in the past two fiscal years over $4.3 billion in military and economic assistance for Israel. This is more than 40 per cent of all U.S. aid to Israel since its birth in 1948." Republican vice-presidential candidate Robert J. Dole, addressing the Zionist Organization of America in New York in
mid-September, repeated these figures as indication of the Ford administration’s commitment to Israel, and accused Carter of “colossal hypocrisy” in omitting reference to “the country to which President Ford has made the largest volume of sales—Israel—while at the same time moralizing ad nauseam about the evils of selling arms.” (In fact, Saudi Arabia and Iran each received larger volumes of arms sales than did Israel). Dole further charged that Carter’s proposed defense cuts would make impossible the kind of rapid and massive United States arms resupply to Israel in the Yom Kippur war.

During their national television debate on foreign policy on October 6, Ford and Carter each tried to use aid figures to demonstrate that his party’s policies were more supportive of Israel. Ford now claimed that since he had assumed office in August 1974, he had provided 45 per cent of the total United States economic and military aid to Israel. “So the Ford Administration,” he stated, “has done a good job in helping our good ally Israel, and we’re dedicated to the survival and security of Israel.” Carter’s response was that the Ford administration was selling much more in weapons to the Arabs, including $7.5 billion to Saudi Arabia in the current year alone. He said that during the last Democratic administration some 75 per cent of all United States weapons supplied to the Middle East were sent to Israel. Now, 60 per cent were going to the Arab states, and this did not include the high percentage going to Iran. “This,” Carter concluded, “is a deviation from idealism; it’s a deviation from a commitment to our major ally in the Middle East, which is Israel.”

It is noteworthy that in the rhetoric of the debate both candidates referred to Israel as an “ally,” although, in fact, there is no formal mutual United States-Israel defense treaty of the kind that commits the United States to the European NATO members or Japan.

Several days after the debate, President Ford authorized the sale to Israel of some previously withheld military equipment, including concussion bombs and sophisticated electronic equipment to increase Israel’s capacity for night vision, and to counter the Arabs’ new missiles and tanks. White House press secretary Ron Nessen rejected as “unworthy of an answer” a question suggesting that the approval had been timed to gain Jewish votes in the elections, which were only three weeks away. At a White House meeting with the President, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon expressed Israel’s appreciation for the new supplies.

ISRAEL AVOIDS PARTISANSHIP IN CAMPAIGN

The Israel government was careful, however, to avoid the impression of taking sides in the American election campaign. After Allon’s meeting with Democratic party chairman Robert Strauss, it was announced that the former “appreciatively stressed the fact that Israel enjoys the support of the two parties.” An official communique issued after the October 10 meeting of the Israel cabinet said that Prime Minister Rabin had noted in a reference to the Ford-Carter foreign policy
debate that "the support given to Israel by both of the candidates and by their respective parties is indicative of the level of American commitment to us."

CONTROVERSY OVER AID LEVEL

Aid to Israel continued to receive bipartisan backing; but it was congressional pressure on a reluctant administration that was responsible for raising the total amount to the figure for which Ford was to claim credit. A big fight had developed over funding for the transitional quarter (July 1-September 30) resulting from the government's decision to change over to a fiscal year beginning on October 1. In March Congress had authorized and the Senate had appropriated an additional $550 million in military and economic aid for Israel, as well as a total of $212 in economic aid for Egypt, Syria and Jordan, for the transitional quarter.

On April 6 President Ford told Congress that his administration's regular budget requests for fiscal 1976 (AJYB, 1977 [Vol. 77], pp. 88-89) and fiscal 1977 "provide sufficient levels to meet that nation's [Israel's] needs," and threatened to veto the aid bill if Congress exceeded the limits recommended by his budget advisers. Israel's supporters on the Hill, however, pointed out that the administration request for assistance to Israel in fiscal 1977 was some $500 million below the $2.3 billion originally requested by Ford for 1976, and that economically hard-pressed Israel needed the money to pay for weapons already authorized.

PRESIDENTIAL VETO

On May 7 the President vetoed the authorization bill, citing as the main reason the inclusion of various congressional limitations on arms sales which, the President said, interfered with his "constitutional responsibilities for conducting foreign affairs" and would "seriously inhibit" his ability to implement "a coherent and consistent policy." In a communication to Congressman William S. Broomfield (R., Mich.), Ford denied that the veto was based on the amount of aid included for Israel. "Nothing," Ford asserted, "could be further from the truth. Our relations with the Arab states will not be pursued in my Administration at the expense of our special relationship with Israel." After meetings with Senate and House leaders, Ford finally agreed to a compromise figure of $275 million in transitional quarter aid for Israel, $200 million of which was in military credits (half as a grant and half as a loan), and $75 million in economic security support assistance. Egypt was to receive an additional $100 million in economic aid, Jordan $60 million, and Syria $15 million.

MIDDLE EAST AID FOR FISCAL 1977

the Senate was by a vote of 56 to 24, and in the House the bill was passed by a vote of 216 to 155. (Attempts to cut the aid to Israel had been rejected by far larger majorities.) The bill, which President Ford promptly signed into law, provided a total of $1.75 billion for Israel, including $1 billion in military credits (half to be forgiven), $735 million in economic security support assistance, and $15 million to help Israel resettle Soviet refugees. Egypt was to receive $700 million in economic aid, Syria $80 million, and Jordan a total of $200 million, about two-thirds in military grants and credits and the rest in economic aid.

Shortly before leaving office, President Ford, on January 17, 1977, recommended to Congress a $1.5 billion aid program to Israel (two-thirds military, one-third economic) in fiscal 1978. The Carter administration increased the economic aid by $285 million, to $785 million. Congress accepted the higher figure, and the authorization bill, providing $1.785 billion for Israel and over $1 billion for Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, was signed into law by President Carter on August 6, 1977.

**Arms Dispute Under Carter Administration**

It would be wrong, however, to conclude from this increase that Israel's aid requests encountered no difficulties under the new administration. On the contrary, the Carter administration decided not to sell to Israel any concussion bombs beyond the original quantity agreed to by President Ford. Moreover, despite promises reportedly made by Kissinger, Carter in February vetoed the impending sale of Israeli-built Kfir jets to Ecuador, for which Washington's approval was required because the planes had some American components. The Israelis had been counting on the $150 million deal, and others they expected to follow, as a means of earning much-needed foreign currency and helping the Israeli domestic aircraft manufacturing industry to become economically viable.

Difficulties also arose in the early months of the Carter administration when a proposed new arms-transfer policy would have excluded Israel from the category of nations, such as the NATO members, with whom the United States was prepared to enter into coproduction agreements for advanced weaponry. Israel was particularly interested in coproduction rights for the F-16 combat jet, not for export but for use by the Israel air force. Because of the plane's high cost, the Israelis said they could only afford it if some of the parts were produced locally.

**CARTER REASSURES ISRAEL**

After Senator Humphrey and other congressional supporters of Israel raised the issue with the President, Carter, on May 12, sent Humphrey a letter reaffirming "our special security relationship with Israel," recognizing "the special responsibilities" the United States had "to do everything necessary to ensure Israel's security," and pledging that his administration's policy of restraint in arms sales "shall not impair Israel's deterrent strength nor undermine the military balance in the Middle East."
Carter confirmed the special relationship with Israel at a press conference the same day. It was, he declared, "absolutely crucial that no one in our country or around the world ever doubt that our number one commitment in the Middle East is to protect the right of Israel to exist" permanently and in peace, and added that even the Arab leaders with whom he had met had not objected to that "special commitment of ours to the protection of the integrity of Israel." This commitment included coproduction or the sale of advanced weapons to Israel.

But although Israel was thus in principle restored to the category of favored states regarding coproduction arrangements, each specific item, such as the F-16, would still require special approval by Washington. In his letter to Humphrey, Carter alluded to some of the constraints on the administration when he said that the inclusion of specific exceptions for Israel in the proposed legislation would have "very unfortunate consequences" in that it would "jeopardize the delicate role we have in the Middle East as a firm friend of Israel and yet the honest broker between Israel and the Arabs with whom we also hope to have better relations in the future." This American role, he maintained, "is essential to achieving peace in the Middle East." An explicit exception status for Israel, he felt, would lead other countries to ask for the same status and thus risk "taking the guts out of [his] arms-restraint policy."

The Election Campaign

During the presidential primaries, countless speeches were made in which the major contenders for both the Democratic and Republican nomination proclaimed their steadfast support for Israel (for a summary of statements by Democratic candidates see April 21, 1976 issue of Near East Report, and by Republican contenders, its issue of April 28, 1976). This review will concentrate on the views of the successful Democratic contender, Jimmy Carter, and on those of President Ford and his administration (see also "Intergroup Relations and the 1976 Elections" in this volume).

"RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIANS"

On a Meet the Press television program, on January 11, 1976, Carter was asked to comment on a New York Times report that he favored the establishment of a "permanent home for Palestinians" as part of any Middle East settlement. Carter said that this was an accurate but only partial statement of his views. He affirmed that, in keeping with the responsibility of the United States, "its basic foreign policy has to be to support the nation of Israel, its right to exist, its right to exist in peace." However, "when we get down to the last stages of solving the Middle East question," which he hoped to achieve in the future,

. the recognition of the Palestinians as an entity, with a right to have their own nation, to choose their own government, to exist in a territory, possibly on the
West Bank and possibly the East bank of the Jordan, is an integral part of that ultimate solution.

Carter was asked whether he thought that, in the foreseeable future, there would be a break between the United States and Israel on the question of a permanent home for the Palestinians. He replied that talks with Rabin, Golda Meir, Abba Eban, and other Israeli leaders several years ago led him to believe that as soon as the Palestinians and their recognized leaders accepted the fact that "Israel must stay there and stay there in peace," then the United States and Israel would be in harmony in "recognizing the Palestinians in their right to exist and to exist as a separate people."

This comment, although nationally televised, aroused so little notice in the Jewish community or the general press that when President Carter made a far less explicit reference to the need for a "homeland" for "the Palestinian refugees" in response to a question at a town meeting in Clinton, Mass., in March 1977, it was reported as a startling position enunciated for the first time. The most likely explanation for the lack of excitement over the initial statement was that in January 1976 Carter was only one of several Democratic candidates interviewed, and not many people seriously regarded him as the possible next president.

On the same program, Carter was also asked whether he thought the United States should support UN efforts to recognize the PLO as the Palestinian government-in-exile. He replied that he would not recognize the organization, nor its leaders, "under any circumstances diplomatically, until they recognize the right of Israel to exist in peace in their present location in the Middle East." He added that "ultimately Israel might have to withdraw from some of the boundaries toward their 1967 boundaries." However, if he were the premier of Israel, Carter said, he would not cede certain things, such as control of the Golan Heights to the Syrians, or control of the Jewish and Christian places of worship in Jerusalem. But, he repeated, recognition of the Palestinians "as an entity and as a nation will be an integral part of the future Middle East settlement."

As the campaign progressed, Carter's statements became increasingly explicit and detailed in their support for Israel, and considerably briefer and vaguer with regard to the Palestinian aspect of a settlement.

COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL

In a major speech on Middle East policy to a group of Jewish leaders in New York on April 1, 1976, Carter stressed how much Israel had always meant to him "personally and spiritually," and expressed his firm belief that "the Jewish people are entitled to one place on this earth where they can have their own state, one given to them from the time immemorial." The United States, he said, could bring peace to the Middle East only through a "policy which is moral, decent, fair and consistent —and which reflects the basic ideals of our people." He charged the Nixon and Ford administrations with failure to do this, citing as evidence a 1975 speech by Kissinger,
which declared all the following concerns to be of equal importance to the United States: “The survival and security of Israel; the maintenance of good relations with 140 million Arabs; the steady supply of crude oil to ourselves and our allies; the avoidance of another Arab-Israel war; and the avoidance of a major power confrontation over the area.”

Carter questioned the possibility of achieving these goals simultaneously, and said he would not rate the survival of Israel as no more important than the supply of oil, or risk “sacrificing a progressive, advanced democratic nation which is our friend” to maintain good relations with the Arabs. To equate all these admittedly important goals, he charged, was an example of “the amoral arithmetic of balance of power politics.” The United States should make it clear to the world that “the survival of Israel is a significant moral principle for the people of the United States.” Emphasizing that lasting peace “must be based on the absolute assurance of Israel’s survival and security,” he pledged: “as long as I am President, the American people will never sacrifice the security or survival of Israel for barrels of oil.”

Carter then called for face-to-face Arab-Israeli negotiations that would focus on “the elements of an eventual settlement instead of the more immediate issues.” By “raising our sights,” he held, “we can focus our discussion on what peace would really be like. We could then work through stages to its implementation.” There were some, he declared, who said that peace would only come if Israel withdrew from all territories gained in the 1967 conflict, but failed to define what Israel would get in return. “It is not the details of line-drawing on a map which is the critical question,” he asserted. “Arab recognition of the right of Israel to exist is the key ingredient to peace.” Carter further maintained that, in his view, a firm commitment to Israel would not interfere with the United States’ capacity to help mediate the conflict or improve the links of trade and friendship with the Arab states. “The process of peace will be best served if these relations deepen—but not at the expense of Israel, and not as a result of oil blackmail.” He supported economic aid to Egypt as an investment in peace, but thought it unwise “at this time to supply strike weapons to Egypt.”

As for “the status of the Palestinians,” Carter simply listed it as one of the difficult and emotional issues to be resolved in face-to-face negotiations. While he recognized that within “the complexities of the Palestinian problem there is a humanitarian core which has been neglected far too long,” he emphasized that sympathy for the plight of the many refugees, living in “makeshift and crowded camps” and “denied a sense of hope for the future,” should “not lead us to recognize the existence of brutal terrorists who masquerade as their representatives in the world forum.”

CRITICISM OF KISSINGER POLICY

Carter expressed strong disagreement with Kissinger’s diplomatic style. He deplored the “far too many secret undertakings, covert assurances, contradictory promises, and diplomatic sleights of hand,” which aroused suspicions among the
parties in the Middle East and resulted in failure in negotiations. Public understanding and support, he added, were as vital to successful foreign policies as to domestic policies. Therefore American Middle East policy "should be shaped with the knowledge of the Congress, from the outset, on a bipartisan basis. It should emerge from broad and well-informed public debate."

Although Carter decried the resort to amoral balance of power politics, in the same speech he in fact invoked essentially the same balance of power arguments as did the Ford administration in urging progress toward peace. Unless there was peace in the area, he declared, "it is almost inevitable that the Arab nations will become more radicalized, more militant, and more susceptible to Soviet reentry, both politically and militarily. The cumulative effect would be that Israel would eventually be confronted with even a greater threat."

The April 1, 1976, speech foreshadowed much of the style and substance of the Carter policy. As Israel was to discover early in the new administration, Carter's constant reiteration, before and after the election, that Israel was the "number one commitment" of the United States in the Middle East was no safeguard against policy disagreements between the two countries. Indeed, the new administration tried simultaneously to pursue the same four other American goals in the Middle East that Kissinger had outlined. How could this be reconciled with the higher moral priority Carter in principle assigned to Israel over other United States interests? Easily enough, if one argued that American success in achieving those other goals would help bring peace and thus in the long run save Israel from the even greater threat that would otherwise menace her, as Carter had already indicated in that speech.

KISSINGER RESPONSE

During the campaign the Ford administration, too, sought out Jewish audiences to declare its support for Israel. In a talk to the American Jewish Congress in Washington on April 4, Kissinger, in apparent rebuttal to the charge that his policy was "amoral," stressed "the moral foundation of our foreign policy." He declared that "morality without pragmatic action is empty, just as pragmatism without moral direction is a rudderless ship." He insisted that American foreign policy was not simply opportunistic but was driven by a vision of a world of justice.

In an implicit counterattack on Carter, Kissinger warned that "if policy becomes excessively moralistic, it can turn quixotic or dangerous. A presumed monopoly on virtue can make impossible any solution or negotiation." As an example of such dangerously misguided moral arguments, he noted that the United States was isolationist in the 1930's "to preserve our purity and register our distaste for the balance of power." He did not have to remind his Jewish audience that the rise of Nazism and the Holocaust might have been prevented, had the United States taken a more positive role in European affairs in the interwar period.
ASSURANCES TO ISRAEL

Turning to the Middle East, Kissinger asserted that "the survival and security of Israel are unequivocal and permanent moral commitments of the United States." He acknowledged that Israel took many risks in trading buffer territory for intangible pledges, but that the steps in the process were realistic and carefully thought out. Alluding to suspicions uttered with regard to his policy and tactics, Kissinger declared:

We will never abandon Israel—either by failing to provide crucial assistance, or by misconceived or separate negotiations, or by irresolution when challenged to meet our own responsibility to maintain the global balance of power.

Israel's existence, he continued, "represents the commitment of all free peoples;" consequently its "fate is inseparable from the future of human dignity." Abandonment of a friend like Israel, Kissinger argued, would shake confidence in the United States in every part of the world, a situation that would "tempt adversaries, confuse allies, and undermine security in the world, ultimately to the grave peril of our country." Therefore, "moral ideals and practical interests thus come together." Summing up the special nature of the American-Israeli relationship, he said, "our guarantees rest not so much in any formal agreements or reassurances endlessly repeated but in the deeper ties of emotion and morality, history and principle, that can never be sundered."

FORD REAFFIRMS U.S.-ISRAEL TIES

The special relationship between the United States and Israel was also emphasized by Ford in an address to the American Jewish Committee on May 13. He spoke of "this nation's traditional and special relationship to a kindred nation in the Middle East—the State of Israel," based on their joint dedication to the basic principles of self-government, which "distinguish these two nations from most of the other nations in today's world." Therefore his "commitment to the security and future of Israel is based upon basic morality as well as enlightened self-interest. Our role in supporting Israel honors our own heritage."

Although, as Ford conceded, the United States and Israel may at times differ on the means to achieve mutual goals, "there has not and will not be any erosion of the fundamental American-Israeli friendship." He pledged that the United States would remain "the ultimate guarantor of Israel's freedom;" that "we will remain steadfast in our dedication to peace and to the survival of Israel."

Citing his recommendation to Congress for more than $4 billion aid, mostly military, to Israel as evidence of his commitment to its security, Ford asserted that his dedication to that state went beyond its military needs "to a far, far higher priority—the need for peace." Like Kissinger, he pointed out that territorial concessions by Israel in the Sinai II agreement had been necessary for the attainment of peace, although they were made in return for basically intangible political measures.
And Ford made it quite clear that he expected more moves of this kind from Israel, declaring that the peace process "must continue without one-sided concessions, but with steady progress. Stalemate, stagnation create unacceptable risks of further conflict." He pledged that the United States would continue to work for a just and lasting peace, but that "in the final analysis it is the parties to the dispute who must make peace a reality." Both Kissinger and Ford made it clear that "there will be no imposed solution" in the Middle East.

REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC PLATFORMS

The Republican party platform, adopted in mid-August, reiterated the "fundamental and enduring commitment" to Israel and pledged "decisive support" politically, economically and with military aid." However, it went further than the President or Kissinger in that it specified: "Peace in the Middle East now requires face-to-face, direct negotiations between the states involved with recognition of safe, secure and defensible borders for Israel." This was the strongest pro-Israel plank the party had adopted. It omitted any mention of the Palestinian problem.

The more demonstratively pro-Israel rhetoric may have been prompted by the equally strong wording of the platform adopted by the Democratic party in July. It stated:

We will avoid efforts to impose on the region an externally devised formula for settlement, and will provide support for initiatives toward settlement, based on direct face-to-face negotiation between the parties and normalization of relations and a full peace within secure and defensible boundaries.

The Democrats pledged to continue "our consistent support of Israel"—an implied dig at the Republicans for having withheld aid during the previous year's reassessment—including sufficient economic and military aid to maintain Israel's deterrent strength, and to maintain adequate United States forces in the Mediterranean "to deter military intervention by the Soviet Union,"—apparently inserted as a response to Republican charges that the Democrats would institute defense cuts which would weaken the Sixth Fleet. There was no reference to a Palestinian homeland, but a statement recognizing that the solution to "the problems of Arab and Jewish refugees must be among the factors taken into account" in a peace settlement. In an implicit attack on the PLO, the statement asserted that such problems cannot be solved "by recognition of terrorist groups which refuse to acknowledge their adversary's right to exist, or groups which have no legitimate claim to represent the people for whom they purport to be speaking."

STATUS OF JERUSALEM

With regard to Jerusalem, the Democratic platform said it recognized and supported "the established status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel," and underscored
this stand by declaring, "the U.S. Embassy should be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem." The Republican platform was silent on this issue. As House minority leader, Ford had publicly made a similar recommendation, but failed to act on it during his presidency, accepting the State Department view that such a move in advance of a comprehensive peace settlement would be regarded by the Arabs as a hostile act.

Jimmy Carter soon began to voice similar hesitation. At a press conference in Houston on July 1, he expressed the fear that the platform recommendation might alienate some Arab states. While conceding that he had publicly stated he would consider such a move, he said, "I want to understand the consequences of it after I am thoroughly briefed." (As of August 1977 President Carter had given no indication that he planned to act on the matter. The United States embassy remained in Tel Aviv.)

RESPONSE TO OIL EMBARGO

Reaction to a possible resumption of an Arab oil embargo was another area in which candidate Carter took a tougher public stand than did President Ford. On CBS's Face the Nation, on November 30, 1975, Carter first announced that while he ruled out United States military intervention, he would consider a new Arab oil embargo "not a military, but an economic declaration of war, and that we would respond instantly and without further debate in a similar fashion, that we would not ship them any food, no weapons, no spare parts for weapons, no oil drilling rigs, no oil pipes." His intention, he said, was not to be belligerent, but to prevent another embargo. On NBC's Meet the Press, on July 11, 1976, he repeated that this warning was the "best way to prevent another attempt at blackmail." Asked to comment, President Ford said that his administration through its "diplomatic successes" had managed to avoid the possibility of a Middle East war, and thereby the possibility of an oil embargo. The way to avoid both, he said, was to "have the trust of the Arab nations as well as Israel."

During their televised foreign policy debate, on October 6, Carter again repeated his threat to treat another Arab oil embargo as an economic declaration of war. He accused the Nixon and Ford administrations of yielding to Arab economic pressure, and criticized them for failing to develop an effective energy policy. He maintained that his explicitly clear advance warning to the Saudis and other Arab oil producers would induce them to "refrain from pushing us to our knees as they did in 1973 with their previous embargo."

Ford and Carter traded other charges concerning each other's Middle East policy. Noting that Carter had advocated unpublicized meetings with the Soviet Union to help find a solution in the area, Ford said he presumed this was for the purpose of imposing a settlement on Israel and the Arabs. Carter, in turn, accused the Ford administration of having "almost brought Israel to their knees" by the so-called reassessment of 1975 and of having "tried to make Israel the scapegoat for the
problems in the Middle East," which "put a cloud on the total commitment that our people feel towards the Israelis." On other occasions during the campaign Carter pledged never to use American aid to Israel "in a carrot and stick" manner to force concessions from that state.

FORD CITES RABIN

In response to Carter's charges that the Ford administration lacked foreign affairs leadership, had been "outtraded" by the Soviet Union in détente diplomacy, and had damaged bilateral relations with our friends and allies, President Ford three times during the debate cited Prime Minister Rabin as authoritative support for the views that the Soviet Union was now weaker in the Middle East than it had been in many years; that the United States was "at a peak in its influence and power" in the area, and that American-Israeli relations "were never better." Ford pointed to the Sinai II accord as a major foreign-policy achievement, and noted that not a single Israeli or Egyptian soldier had been killed since its signing. Ford also mentioned the fact that he had submitted to Congress every single document related to the Sinai agreement as proof of "what we've done to avoid secrecy in the Ford administration."

Arab Boycott

One of the sharpest exchanges between the candidates was over the Ford administration's record on the Arab boycott. Carter maintained Ford had yielded to Arab pressure in permitting the boycott of "American businesses who trade with Israel, or who have American Jews owning or taking part in the management of American companies." In fact, Ford's "own Secretary of Commerce had to be subpoenaed by the Congress to reveal the names of businesses who were subject to this boycott." To emphasize the point, he repeated: "They didn't volunteer the information. They had to be subpoenaed.

RECORD OF PAST ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

The controversy began over the information contained in the forms filed with the Commerce Department by firms which had received Arab boycott requests. The issue arose in 1965, when Congress passed an amendment to the Export Control Act (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], pp. 270–72), opposing "restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries against other countries friendly to the United States." While American firms were "encouraged and requested" to refuse compliance with boycott-related requests, they were not forbidden by law from doing so. They were, however, required to notify the Commerce Department of all boycott requests, of which Congress was to be informed quarterly. The Export Administration Act of 1969 had identical provisions.
A House commerce subcommittee investigating the extent of the boycott accused the Commerce Department in 1975 of having "winked" at exporters by stating on its official forms that they were not prohibited from complying with the boycott. For the first decade of enforcement, too, the Commerce Department form did not even require exporters to indicate what action they had taken in response to boycott inquiries. Following persistent congressional inquiries and a February 1975 statement by President Ford condemning Arab discriminatory acts against American firms on religious or ethnic grounds, the Commerce Department finally amended the regulations and issued new forms late in the year. American exporters and related service companies were henceforth prohibited from responding to boycott requests that sought to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. A company was now also required to report what action it had taken on other boycott inquiries, as, for example, about its economic relations with Israel. But here compliance was not illegal.

The Commerce Department agreed to keep the individual responses confidential, and provided Congress only with quarterly statistical summaries. Former Commerce Secretary Rogers Morton refused to make these responses available to the House subcommittee for its investigation of the extent of the boycott until it was about to cite him in contempt of Congress. He finally turned over the files when the committee agreed to keep the names of the individual firms involved confidential.

CARTER'S STAND

When, during the television debate, a reporter asked Carter whether he would agree to "closing our eyes a little bit" to the Arab boycott against Israel if this meant gaining influence among the Arabs, he replied, as often before during the campaign, that he considered the boycott against American firms or American Jews "an absolute disgrace," and elaborated:

This is the first time that I remember in the history of our country when we've let a foreign country circumvent or change our Bill of Rights. I'll do everything I can as President to stop the boycott of American businesses by the Arab countries. It's not a matter of diplomacy or trade with me. It's a matter of morality.

When this writer asked Carter at the April 1 meeting with Jewish leaders about the fear voiced by Ford administration officials and oil company executives that the Arabs would retaliate by diverting their business to other countries, he responded that for him this was a matter of basic principle: that if, as a result, "we lost a few billion dollars in business," well then "I say good riddance." During the debate Carter maintained that the Arabs would back down on the boycott "when we have a strong President who will protect the integrity of our country, the commitment of our Constitution and Bill of Rights and protect people in this country who happen to be Jews," and immediately went on to point out that "it may later be Catholics; it may later be Baptists who are threatened by some foreign country."
strongly criticized the Ford administration for having blocked "legislation that would have revealed by law every instance of the boycott," which, he asserted, "would have prevented the boycott from continuing."

**FORD'S RESPONSE**

President Ford called Carter's assertions "inaccurate." Although Arab boycott action affecting Americans had begun in 1952, Ford said, in November 1975 "I was the first President to order the executive branch to take affirmative action... to make certain that no American businessman or business organization should discriminate against Jews because of an Arab boycott." He was, he said, "very proud" that his was the first administration to take antitrust action against American companies that allegedly cooperated with the Arab boycott. (The Justice Department, in January 1976, filed an antitrust suit against the Bechtel Corporation, one of the largest American heavy construction companies, charging that by refusing to deal with blacklisted American firms in its multimillion-dollar projects in Arab countries, it and its subsidiaries had participated in a "combination and conspiracy which resulted in an unreasonable restraint of... interstate and foreign trade," in violation of the Sherman Act.) There was, too, the fact that earlier in the week he signed a tax bill with an amendment to "prevent companies from taking a tax deduction if they have in any way whatsoever cooperated with the Arab boycott." Ford claimed that his administration had tried the previous week to convince Congress to amend the pending legislation to renew the Export Administration Act so that "strong and effective action" could be taken against those who participate or cooperate with the Arab boycott." Because Congress failed to act before adjourning, he declared, he would take executive action and instruct the Commerce Department to "disclose those companies that have participated in the Arab boycott."

**REBUTTAL BY BOYCOTT-BILL SPONSORS**

The new regulations, issued the following day, only provided for public disclosure of boycott report forms to be filed in the future; evidence of past compliance would continue to remain confidential. But this was not the only point on which President Ford's statement deviated from the facts. The sponsors of the legislation were quick to voice their outrage. Senator William Proxmire (D., Wis.), floor manager of the Export Administration Act, told a Capitol Hill press conference on October 7 that the President "seriously misled the American people last night" by claiming that he had supported stronger legislation against the boycott. In fact, Proxmire said, "it was Congress that took the initiative" and it was the Ford administration that "blocked us every step of the way." Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III (D., Ill.), sponsor of the legislation in the Senate, said this proved again that "Candidate Ford did not know President Ford's policies," and Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (D., N.J.),
its cosponsor, demanded that the President correct his "absolutely erroneous" statement. Representative Jonathan B. Bingham (D., N.J.), one of the House sponsors of antiboycott legislation, called Ford’s remark "an outrageous deception," and added that his order to release the names of companies complying with the boycott, coming a full ten years after Congress established reporting procedures, "only further dramatizes this Administration’s foot-dragging and resistance to effective anti-boycott measures."

While the vigor with which the Democratic sponsors lashed out at the Republican President reflected a certain element of partisan politics, especially since the initial weak law and ineffective regulations were adopted in 1965 under a Democratic President, the fact remained that the Ford administration indeed resisted the latest Congressional efforts to tighten the law. High administration officials repeatedly testified on the adverse effects of tough legislation on the United States’ capacity to act as a mediator in the Middle East and on the United States economy, arguing for "quiet diplomacy" to overcome the problems.

CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT OF BOYCOTT LAW

The measures to tighten the antiboycott legislation received substantial Republican as well as Democratic support in Congress. At the end of August 1976 the Senate, by a vote of 65 to 13, passed the Export Administration Act, including the Stevenson-Williams amendment, which would require full public disclosure of all boycott demands against American citizens and companies, as well as of their actions to comply with or resist these demands; prohibit American firms from discriminating against other American firms in order to carry out the political objectives of a foreign power (this in effect would outlaw “tertiary” boycotts of the kind Bechtel was accused of engaging in), and prohibit American firms from discriminating against other citizens or firms on the basis of race or religion.

In mid-September the Export Administration Act was passed by the House by a vote of 318 to 63. This version had an even tougher antiboycott amendment, proposed by Bingham and Rosenthal, which would also have outlawed compliance by American firms with Arab attempts to enforce the "secondary" boycott, i.e., to prevent American firms from dealing with Israel. Senator John Tower (R., Tex.), who was generally believed to be acting on behalf of the Ford administration, delayed naming Senators to a joint conference committee. Only hours before adjournment, the administration offered a compromise formula which fell short of the Senate version, and would have only slightly improved the existing weak law. This was unacceptable to the bill’s sponsors, and Congress adjourned without passing a new law to replace the Export Administration Act that expired on September 30. (Ford kept the law’s reporting requirements in effect through executive action, relying on his authority under an older trading-with-the-enemy act that remained in force.)
ANTIBOYCOTT PROVISION IN TAX LAW

However, the Tax Reform Act, passed by Congress at the end of September, did incorporate an antiboycott amendment originally proposed by Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D., Conn.) and adopted by the Senate in July by a vote of 86 to 1, despite an intensive campaign against it by Mobil and other companies with heavy involvement in Saudi Arabia. Under the amendment, as modified by a House-Senate conference committee, foreign tax credit, tax deferral of foreign-source income, and Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) benefits would be denied to a firm on any transaction involving boycott compliance. The law required companies to report boycott-related business under penalty of fines and imprisonment of company officers. The Internal Revenue Service was charged with elaborating regulations and procedures for determining what per cent of a company's earning were boycott-tainted.

In sponsoring the amendment, Ribicoff argued that "there can be no justification for offering companies tax benefits that cost the American taxpayers as much as $1 billion a year" and, at the same time, serve as incentive to comply with the Arab boycott. The day after President Ford took credit for the antiboycott amendment, Ribicoff issued a statement declaring that he was "amazed at the misrepresentation of the Administration's position on this and other boycott legislation. The truth is that the President's entire Administration fought to kill the antiboycott section in the tax bill."

Ford reluctantly signed the bill into law, because vetoing it was not a practical alternative in view of the overriding importance of having the tax bill enacted.

POSITION OF CARTER ADMINISTRATION

In view of Carter's campaign promise, one might have assumed that antiboycott legislation reintroduced in the new Congress would receive full administration support. However here, too, the campaign pledges were soon to be tempered by a caution to weigh "carefully the risks to our important political and economic interests in the Middle East," as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance expressed it. "The search for peace," he told the Senate banking international finance subcommittee on February 28, 1977, "will be affected by the manner in which Congress deals with this issue." The language in neither of two pending Senate bills was acceptable to the administration, Vance said.

When Senator Stevenson, who was chairman of the Senate subcommittee, asked whether the pending bills would adversely affect chances for peace, Vance replied, "they would not be helpful, and indeed might be harmful." To Stevenson's question whether the legislation would have an adverse effect on oil prices, he replied: "No one can predict for the future, but it would not be helpful." The administration was also concerned to maintain "good bilateral relations" with the Arab countries because of the rapidly growing volume of trade. Between 1974 and 1976 United
States exports to the Arab world more than doubled, from $3.3 billion to $7 billion, while imports nearly quadrupled, from $3.9 billion to $12.9 billion, largely as a result of increased oil prices.

Nevertheless, Vance insisted that the administration remained true to its principles: "Refusals by American firms to deal with any friendly foreign country . . . [for reasons] related to the boycott should be prohibited. So in general should refusals to deal with other U.S. firms." The problem arose in applying the principle to specific cases and in judging the intent of a company that decided not to deal with a certain country or company. He suggested that the State Department and Congress work together to draft appropriate language, including certain exemptions. Although these were far apart in what they considered appropriate language, the Carter administration's readiness to work out a mutually acceptable bill was "an enormous advance over the preceding administration," according to Congressman Bingham, cosponsor of the House bill, which was even tougher than the Senate bills Vance called unacceptable.

While the Carter administration was seeking to solve the dilemma of protecting American firms from the Arab boycott without damaging American interests in the Middle East, a potential confrontation was also shaping up between the Jewish community, which opposed the boycott on moral grounds, and the business community, which was becoming increasingly alarmed over the effects of tough boycott legislation. There was the impact on actual or potential business in the Middle East, and the onus of unfavorable domestic publicity violations of the law would bring. Firms with little or no business in the Middle East were also concerned that the legislation would increase governmental bureaucracy and burden them with onerous paper work.

ROUNDTABLE TALKS

Representatives of some Jewish organizations and the business community began to clash in 1976 in testimony before congressional committees and in occasional newspaper advertisements. As both sides were girding for an intensified struggle over the antiboycott legislation to be introduced in the new Congress, Irving S. Shapiro suggested that business community and Jewish organizational leaders meet to try to work out a set of principles agreeable to both sides. Shapiro was acutely aware of the dilemma because he was one of the most prominent Jews in American business, as chairman of E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Company and of the Business Roundtable comprising the chief executive officers of 170 of the largest American corporations. Shapiro approached the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith (ADL), whose national chairman Burton M. Joseph was also president of a Minneapolis grain concern, and in January 1977 a series of meetings began between it and key leaders of the Business Roundtable.

The administration was naturally deeply interested in the negotiations, for a successful outcome would solve its own dilemma. On February 9 President Carter publicly revealed that the talks were under way, and said he would support the
principles agreed to between the participants. Carter's endorsement thus gave official sanction and enhanced significance to the private initiative.

On March 3 the two groups jointly announced a set of principles that had been agreed to by the ADL team and the large majority of the Roundtable's executive committee. Rawleigh Warner, chairman of Mobil which had led the campaign against the boycott legislation, was opposed, and several others had reservations. The statement listed a number of exceptions to the prohibitions in the proposed law, the most controversial point in the negotiations. One concerned "unilateral selection," the right of an Arab buyer, for example, to specify by name the brand of tires to be placed on the trucks ordered from an American company. Another dealt with the extent to which an American firm operating in an Arab country could comply with "local law," if such compliance was in conflict with American law.

When it came to translating the general principles into specific legislative language, however, it became apparent that the Jewish community and the business leaders were still far apart in their thinking. Indicative was the March 8 testimony by Alfred H. Moses, chairman of the American Jewish Committee domestic affairs commission, on behalf of the Committee, ADL, and the American Jewish Congress, before the House international relations committee. He took a narrow view with regard to the scope of permissible exceptions under the principles of unilateral selection and compliance with local law, and suggested a broad definition of what constituted a United States company's "subsidiary," so that even one that operated overseas and had some foreign participation in ownership or management would be required to comply with American antiboycott law.

The carefully constructed and ambiguously worded Roundtable-ADL agreement now began to fall apart. Some members of the Roundtable urged an intensive lobbying campaign against the legislation. One major salvo was a two-page advertisement by Dresser Industries in the _Wall Street Journal_ of April 14, 1977, which asserted in a banner headline: "500,000 American jobs hang in the balance as Congress considers more boycott legislation." There were some who argued that since a clash with the business community was inevitable, the Jewish community should mobilize its grassroots strength to press for the toughest possible antiboycott legislation. On April 20 the House passed the Export Administration Act, including fairly strong antiboycott provisions, by a vote of 364 to 43. Congressman Clement J. Zablocki (D., Wis.), chairman of the international relations committee, supported the legislation and dismissed the allegations in the Dresser ad as "sheer nonsense and the worst sort of scare tactics."

Neither the Jewish community nor the business leadership wanted an all-out confrontation. And the President was particularly reluctant to have to choose between the two. With active White House encouragement, talks were resumed between the Roundtable and the organized Jewish community, with American Jewish Committee and American Jewish Congress representatives formally coopted into the process initiated by ADL. The representatives of the three organizations consulted with, and obtained the agreement of, the broadly based National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council of which they were members. On the
business side, the final hurdle to approval of a new compromise was to get the support of Exxon, the oil company with the largest stake in the Arab world. After Secretary Vance made a personal appeal to Exxon chairman Clifton C. Garvin, Jr., urging approval of the compromise as a way to help peace efforts in the Middle East, the company's board agreed to support the bill, and the other 41 members of the Roundtable's executive committee then concurred.

The compromise was achieved after both sides had agreed to leave certain provisions vague, retaining the right to make their respective submissions to the Commerce Department as to what the regulations to enforce the law should stipulate.

On May 3 Carter announced the agreement, commending "its reasonable balance between the need for stringent control over the undesirable impact on America of foreign boycotts and the need to allow the continuation of American business relations with countries engaging in such boycotts." Two days later the agreed language was incorporated by amendment; the bill passed the Senate by a vote of 90 to one. It was essentially this Senate version that prevailed in the House-Senate conference, and was then passed by both Houses and finally signed into law by President Carter on June 22, 1977.

**Provisions of New Antiboycott Law**

Although the law is stated in general terms, it was intended to deal primarily with the Arab boycott of Israel. It directs the President to issue rules and regulations "prohibiting" American individuals and corporate entities from taking any action "with intent to comply with, further or support any boycott" imposed by a foreign country against a country that is friendly to the United States. The following are among activities prohibited under the law:

- refusing to do business with any firm or person at the request of a boycotting country;
- refusing to employ any American because of his or her race, religion, sex, or national origin;
- furnishing information to a foreign country or company on the race, religion, sex, or national origin of a United States citizen;
- furnishing information on the business relationships of a United States company with boycotted nations or blacklisted companies;
- furnishing information on whether any person made contributions to, or is otherwise associated with, any charitable or fraternal organization which supports a boycotted country;*

*This provision was to deal with matters like the letter sent in 1975 by the commissioner general of the Central Office for the Boycott of Israel in Damascus to the Bulova Watch Company, demanding as condition for removing the company from the boycott blacklist a "document" stating that no owner or board member of the company would join "any organizations, committees or societies working for the interests of Israel or Zionism whether they are situated inside or outside Israel."
• paying or honoring a letter of credit that contains illegal boycott-related conditions.

As had been required since October 1976 by Ford's executive order, the law stipulates that a person receiving requests for boycott-related information or compliance with boycott conditions must report that fact, together with a statement of whether he has complied or intends to comply, to the Secretary of Commerce. This information, except for purely commercial details, will be made available for public inspection.

The law also provides for preemption of all state laws on compliance with foreign boycotts. Several states had passed antiboycott statutes of varying degrees of severity. This led to complaints, which, however, were not substantiated by evidence, that businesses in the affected states were at a disadvantage in competing with companies in states that did not have such laws.

To be considered unlawful under the new federal law, actions must be in the interstate or foreign commerce of the United States, and must be taken, or knowingly agreed to be taken, with intent to comply with, further, or support an unsanctioned foreign boycott. (This was one of the provisions included upon insistence by the Business Roundtable.)

The new law also provides for special exceptions to allow United States companies to follow certain normal commercial practices and, in certain cases, to comply with the local laws of the countries in which they are resident. The exceptions would allow:

• complying, or agreeing to comply, with requirements
  (1) prohibiting imports from the boycotted country, or
  (2) prohibiting the shipment of goods on a carrier operated by the boycotted country, or by a route other than that prescribed by the buyer;

(These exceptions were intended to make it clear that Congress was not attempting to legislate on the primary boycott, i.e., the refusal of the Arab states to deal directly with Israel.)

• complying, or agreeing to comply, with a nation's import and shipping document requirements, except that, within one year after the enactment of the law, information about a product's country of origin may not be stated in negative or blacklisting terms;

(This exception prohibits the use of "negative certificates of origin" like "not made in Israel," but would permit positive certificates, like "made in U.S.A.")

• complying, or agreeing to comply, in the normal course of business with the "unilateral and specific" selection by a boycotting country, company of carriers, insurers, or suppliers of services or specific goods, which are normally identifiable by source when imported;

(For example, Saudi Arabia could specify the brand of tires on tractors it imported but could not specify that the steel used in the manufacture of the tractor had to be bought from a specific steel company.)
in the case of a United States person or firm resident in a foreign country, complying, or agreeing to comply, with the laws, including import laws, of that country, but only insofar as his activities in that country and the import of identifiable products for his own use in that country are concerned. (This reduced the instances in which a U.S. person resident in a boycotting country would face the dilemma of having to violate local laws in order to obey United States laws.)

The phrase "for his own use" was intentionally left for the Commerce Department's rules and regulations to define, an example of how much remains to be clarified by those rules. Similarly, while the law stipulates that the term "United States person" applies to "any foreign subsidiary or affiliate of any domestic concern which is controlled in fact by such domestic concern," it leaves the determination of what is meant by "controlled in fact" to the regulations. According to the provisions of the law, the final Commerce Department rules should take effect no later than mid-January 1978. A grace period through December 31, 1978, is provided for agreements in effect before May 16, 1977, with a one-year extension available in cases where good-faith efforts to comply are being made.

The new law's effectiveness in counteracting the Arab boycott will depend in part on whether the Commerce Department's regulations lean toward the interpretation submitted by the business community, or that submitted by the Jewish organizations. It will also depend on the vigor with which the Carter administration enforces the law, and its ability to convince other countries to adopt similar legislation.
TWO YEARS AFTER the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereafter called Helsinki accord) was signed by the 35 participating states in Helsinki, Finland, preparations were under way for a follow-up conference in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, to review progress in implementing the provisions of the accord, and to decide on the need for further measures. In the intervening period "monitoring" activities, both official and unofficial, were undertaken in various of the participating countries.

In the United States, a commission was established by Congress (see below) and many nongovernmental groups in this country and elsewhere in the West gathered information, requests, and suggestions, particularly with respect to human rights, which were forwarded to their own governments and other signatory states. In the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, a small number of courageous dissidents established "watch" groups which gathered information to alert world opinion to violations, and demanded their rights on the basis of the provisions of the accord. As the conference drew near, compliance reports were drawn up, especially in the United States and the Soviet Union, and strategies, both offensive (to expose the shortcomings of others) and defensive (each on its compliance record) were planned.

Helsinki Accord

ORIGIN

As early as 1954, the Soviet Union initiated, and thereafter periodically repeated, a proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It was moved by two considerations. Since World War II had ended without a peace treaty—mainly because of the problem of a divided Germany—it wanted to use the conference as a vehicle to obtain formal recognition by the Western Powers of its post-World War II frontiers. It also hoped to get from them, chiefly from the United States, various benefits in the economic, scientific, and technological areas. The NATO allies, which had long resisted the proposal, finally agreed to participate in such a conference after the Soviet Union had taken several steps toward easing relations with them, such as the 1971 Four Power Agreement on Berlin and the first stage of the United States-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I).

Having long cherished the hope of separating Western Europe from the United States, the Soviet Union at first sought to exclude United States participation in the conference, but soon yielded to the insistence of the West European states. The
United States, itself reluctant to take part, joined the West European states to avoid intra-NATO dissension. Though its initial participation was passive, it gradually became more deeply involved, and eventually was a leading protagonist of the human rights aspects of the accord. These were introduced by the West European states which, from the outset, had made their inclusion a condition for dealing with the frontier and other issues of major concern to the Warsaw Pact states. The latter reluctantly agreed.

It took some three years to complete the accord: seven months of negotiations in Helsinki, beginning September 1972, to reach agreement on "Final Recommendations," their adoption in Helsinki in July 1973, nearly two years of further negotiation in Geneva (September 1973 to July 1975) to produce the Final Act, and a summit-level ceremonial signing, on August 1, 1975, by the heads of the 35 participating states, including all European states, both Communist (except Albania) and non-Communist, and the United States and Canada. Several nonparticipating Mediterranean states—Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia—were permitted to attend as observers and make statements, but not to sign the accord.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The accord consisted of four main parts, popularly labeled "baskets": the first, on security in Europe, included a 10-point "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States" (hereafter cited as the Guiding Principles) and a "Document on Confidence Building Measures," the second dealt with cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology, and the environment, the third with "Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields," and the fourth with follow-up activities.

All participants agreed that the accord was not a legally binding document, however high its moral and political standing. This was made explicit in statements for the record and in the wording, as, for example, the use of the term "guiding" rather than "governing" principles and a general avoidance of language of obligation. However, if extensively cited at high levels over time, the accord could achieve the status of a source of customary international law.

Though provisions with human rights implications were to be found in many parts of the accord, the explicitly identified human rights provisions were contained in the seventh Guiding Principle and in Basket 3, the latter comprising four separate sections dealing with human contacts, information, cultural cooperation, and educational cooperation. The following is a brief description of the Guiding Principles, particularly principle 7, and Basket 3.

Except for principle 3, on frontiers, and principle 7, on human rights, the Guiding Principles essentially restated, with some modifications, the UN General Assembly's

1For an analysis see Harold S. Russel, "The Helsinki Declaration: Broddingnag or Lilliput?" American Journal of International Law, June 1976, pp. 242–76.
1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States: (1) sovereign equality and the rights inherent in sovereignty, (2) elimination of the threat, or use, of force, (4) territorial integrity of states, (5) peaceful settlement of disputes, (6) nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states, (8) equal rights and self-determination of peoples, (9) cooperation among states, and (10) fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.

The product of compromise of conflicting interests and concerns, the Guiding Principles are replete with formulations that lend themselves to contradictory purposes. The provision of one principle may be negated by another, or by a qualification or limitation within the principle, or, in some instances, simply by an oblique reference to other international documents or sources, such as the Covenants on Human Rights, the UN Charter, or “the generally recognized principles and rules of international law.”

The Soviet Union was the main advocate of principles 3 and 6. In principle 3, the signatories undertook to “regard as inviolable all one another’s frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe,” which “they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting.” In principle 6, they undertook to “refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating state, regardless of their mutual relations.”

The wording of principle 3 was, in fact, a considerably watered-down version of that originally sought by the Soviet Union on the recognition of its territorial acquisitions. Even so, it so troubled the Federal Republic of Germany, which wished to keep open the possibility of reunification with East Germany, and persons of Baltic background residing in the United States and elsewhere in the West, that countervailing provisions had to be included. One was the provision stating that “frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement,” which was inserted into principle 1, on the Soviet objection to including it in the inviolability of frontiers principle (because it might reduce the impact of that principle). Also intended to reassure the opponents of principle 3 was the inclusion of principle 8 on self-determination of peoples, by which the participating states undertook to “respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination,” and which affirmed that “all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.” Other reassurances of the same kind were contained in

2The Soviet Union opposed inclusion of this principle in the accord on the ground that it applied only to colonial peoples and not to developed countries. To reassure it, as well as Canada and Yugoslavia which feared its impact on their multinational societies, protective wording was added to assure the conformity of the principle with “the purposes and principles” of the UN Charter and “with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of states.”
principle 2, which precluded a participating state from using force to induce another "to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights;" in principle 4, on "territorial integrity of states," which provided that no forcible occupation or acquisition of territory of another participating state "will be recognized as legal;" and in the Preamble to the Guiding Principles, which gave these countervailing principles equal standing with principle 3 by declaring the participating states' "determination to respect and to put each into practice" and affirming that "all are of primary significance."

Principle 6, on nonintervention, presented some of the participating states, Eastern as well as Western, with a dilemma. On the one hand, they desired a strong formulation of the principle to undercut the Brezhnev doctrine, which claimed for the Socialist states the right to intervene forcibly to protect socialist gains in sister Socialist states (e.g., Czechoslovakia in 1968); on the other hand, they did not want to give the Soviet Union and its satellites a basis for rejecting criticism of their Basket 3 violations. In the Western view, the present wording achieved both purposes: it negated the Brezhnev doctrine and, at the same time, safeguarded basket 3, in that the term "intervention" in the principle could be held to refer to the use of coercive means, not to mere criticism. However, the Warsaw Pact nations have felt free to offer their own interpretation.

Principle 7

In principle 7, the signatories affirmed that they "will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief for all, without distinction of race, sex, language, or religion. They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person. . . ." Unlike the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, principle 7 did not spell out these rights and freedoms. But it did so with regard to freedom of conscience and religion, namely, "the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience." Many in the West, correctly, welcomed this particularization, though ironically, its inclusion stemmed from the Soviet wish to have the title of the principle contain wording from Article 18 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which included an escape clause allowing the freedom to be limited for reasons of "public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others." The Soviet Union, however, failed in its effort to get this clause included in the body of the principle.

Another significant feature of principle 7 was the reference, in its second

1The Soviet Union accepted this provision because it could be interpreted to apply only to the future; but the Western delegates read it to apply also to the past.
paragraph, to the Western philosophical concept that all human rights and freedoms "derive from the inherent dignity of the human person," which is contrary to the Marxist notion that they are but a grant of the state and could be withdrawn as circumstances required.

In the fourth paragraph, the participating states expressed the intention to respect the right of their national minorities to "equality before the law," and to "afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms." It did not, like other international agreements, specify the types embraced within the term "national minorities" (e.g., ethnic, religious, linguistic). Nor did it specify, as did article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the rights and freedoms to which they were entitled, namely: "the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion or to use their own language."

In the seventh paragraph, the signatories "confirmed the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties," a provision with great significance in relation to authoritarian states, notably the Soviet Union, where rules and regulations were often unpublished and inaccessible to the public, and where few dissenters daring to claim their rights escaped unscathed.

The eighth and last paragraph of principle 7 expressed the will of the signatories to "act in conformity with... the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and to "fulfill their obligations as set forth in the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound." The significance of this provision lay in its incorporation of the far-reaching obligations of these two basic international documents, including Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, setting forth the rights of minorities, and Article 12(2) of that document, providing that "[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his own."

Basket 3

The provisions of Basket 3 did not entail any recognition of "rights," but only expressed the participating states' intention to behave toward certain groups of their own citizens in a "humanitarian" manner, in matters of movement, information, education and culture, and to grant citizens and institutions of other signatories, on a discretionary and reciprocal basis, various privileges and facilities in these matters.

The preamble to Basket 3 expressed the desire of the signatories to help strengthen peace and understanding, and the "spiritual enrichment of the human personality," through "increased cultural and educational exchanges, broader dissemination of information, contacts between people, and the solution of humanitarian problems."

The "human contacts" section specified as the signatories' overall "aim" to "facilitate freer movement and contacts, individually and collectively, whether privately or officially, among persons, institutions, and organizations of the participating states, and to contribute to the solution of the humanitarian problems that may arise in that connection." This "aim," besides not being formulated in "rights"
terms, was qualified by escape clauses of various kinds, such as references to measures the states "consider appropriate," or to subsequent "agreements or arrangements, among themselves, as may be needed. . . ." While, taken together, the clauses to facilitate the emigration or travel of persons were of great importance, they by no means promised to allow "everyone," "to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country," as guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The participating states promised to process applications for family visits, "without distinction as to country of origin or destination," to issue travel documents for the purpose "within reasonable time limits," and to establish "acceptable" fee levels for them. They undertook to deal with applications for family reunification "in a positive and humanitarian spirit" and "expeditiously," to lower fees, "where necessary," to a moderate level, and to reconsider denied applications "at reasonably short intervals." On Western insistence, to cover the Soviet practice of penalizing individuals (and their relatives) who sought to rejoin their families, they promised that presentation of an application "will not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or of members of his family." They expressed similar intentions with regard to their citizens' travel for personal or professional reasons, and promised to ease regulations affecting movement within their borders for citizens of other signatories, "with due regard to security requirements" (the latter being a wide-open and easily abused qualification).

Another promise, also circumscribed by qualifications, was the provision "confirming" that "religious faiths, institutions and organizations, practicing within the constitutional framework of the participating states, and their representatives can, in the field of their activities, have contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information." The qualifications (evidently required by the Soviet Union) were that the contacts, meetings, and exchanges be limited to religious faiths, etc. "practicing within the constitutional framework" of the state—a vague criterion—and to matters "in the field of their activities," an equally vague limitation presumably intended to exclude involvement in "secular" political or civic questions, in contrast to matters of theology or ritual.

Other provisions expressed the signatories' intention to promote tourism, contacts and exchanges among young people, and to further contacts among their respective governmental institutions and nongovernmental organizations, through "meetings as well as travel by delegations, groups and individuals."

Also in basket 3, the signatories undertook "to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds," to promote access to each other's cultural achievements, and to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and experience, and contacts, among their respective educational organizations, institutions, and individuals. In each case various means to carry out the undertakings were specified.

In the area of information (including all the media of communication), for example, there would be an exchange of lecturers; dissemination of each others' newspapers, books, and periodicals, and cooperation among their respective press agencies,
publishing houses, and organizations. There would also be improvement of the working conditions of their respective foreign correspondents, to be sought through sympathetic and expeditious consideration to their visa applications and of multiple entry-and-exit visas for specified periods; eased news transmission, and nonexpulsion or penalization of journalists engaged "in legitimate pursuit of their professional activity."

With regard to culture, the participating states would disseminate each other's literary and artistic works; encourage contacts among their respective writers, creative artists, and others engaged in cultural activities; consider the creation of a European "bank of cultural data," and promote wider use of the mass media for mutual understanding of cultures.

In the area of education, they were to promote access of students, teachers, and scholars to one another's educational, scientific, and cultural institutions; mutual recognition of academic degrees; exchange of scientific documents; joint scientific and research teams; international scientific conferences, and study of each other's languages and civilizations.

Both the culture and education sections contained parallel undertakings with regard to "national minorities and regional cultures," by which the signatories, "recognizing the contribution that national minorities or regional cultures can make to cooperation among them in various fields of culture [or education], intend, when such minorities or cultures exist within their territory, to facilitate this contribution, taking into account the legitimate interests of their members."

Provisions on Follow-up

The accord closed with a resolve to implement its provisions unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally—the last to include meetings within the framework of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, UNESCO, and other existing international organizations. The signatories agreed to exchange views on such implementation and on ways to advance détente—beginning with a preparatory meeting in Belgrade in 1977, at which time the agenda, rules of procedures and arrangements for further meetings would be decided.

Initial U.S. Attitudes

Even before the Helsinki accord was signed, questions had been raised in the United States and Western Europe about its real value, including, on the one hand, the relative benefits accruing from it—and from détente generally—to the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and on the other, to the United States and the West. It was charged that the Soviet Union stood to benefit from achieving its long-standing strategic aim of Western legitimization of its World War II territorial acquisitions, in exchange for nonbinding and qualified human-rights undertakings; that it never intended to comply with the human rights provisions, as was indicated, for example,
by what Leonid Brezhnev told a delegation of United States Congressmen on August 14, 1975, when the ink had barely dried on the accord. He had differentiated between its nonbinding provisions, presumably including those on human rights, whose implementation was contingent on further negotiation and agreement, and the principles on frontiers and noninterference, which were fundamental and immediately binding.

Skepticism was so widespread in the United States that President Gerald R. Ford felt obliged to reassure critics that he had not been deceived, and to state in his formal address at the Helsinki meeting that "the American people, like the people of Europe, know well that mere assertions of good will, passing changes in the political mood of governments, laudable declarations of principle, are not enough.

Our people will be watching and measuring our progress. They will ask how these noble sentiments are being translated into action..." A week earlier, before leaving for Helsinki, he had emphasized that the accord was not a treaty, and therefore not legally binding, but only a political and moral undertaking; that while the United States was not committing itself "beyond what we are already committed to by our own moral and legal standards," the document was "a public commitment by the leaders of the more closed and controlled countries to a greater measure of freedom and movement for individuals, information and ideas" and "established a yardstick by which the world can measure how well they live up to these stated intentions."

Continued Ford:

The fact that these very different governments can agree, even on paper, to such principles as greater human contacts and exchanges, improved conditions for journalists, a freer flow of information and publications, seems to me a development worthy of positive and public encouragement by the United States. If it all fails, Europe will be no worse off than now. If even a part of it succeeds, the lot of people of Eastern Europe will be that much better.

Once the accord was signed, the Ford administration and Congress began to make use of the human rights provisions in its dealings with the Soviet Union. When in February 1976, for example, the International Olympic Committee, in response to Soviet bloc charges that it engaged in "subversive propaganda," excluded Radio Free Europe from official coverage of the 1976 Winter Olympics, Secretary Kissinger objected that the action was "contrary to the intent and spirit" of the accord. Or, in June, 52 Congressmen urged Secretary Kissinger to publicly denounce a new Soviet tax on parcels sent to Jews and others in the Soviet Union as violating the Helsinki spirit, which seeks to "bring about freer international communication between people and nations as well as to develop closer personal and economic ties."

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*Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1976, pp. 304-08.

*News Release, Department of State, July 25, 1975.
Carter Human Rights Policy and Reactions

The Carter administration, from the outset, assigned the Helsinki accord a higher priority in its overall foreign policy scheme than had its predecessor. In a succession of both formal pronouncements and informal comments, the President and his spokesmen cited it in protest against Soviet and other East European harassment of dissidents.

The highlighting began on the heels of the inauguration with Carter's receipt of a letter from Andrei Sakharov, dated January 21, 1977. It called on the President to seek the implementation of the Helsinki promises and to raise his voice in defense of the victims of repression in Eastern Europe. In his reply of February 5, Carter affirmed the centrality of human rights in his administration's policy, and promised to use "our good offices to seek the release of prisoners of conscience" and to "continue our efforts to shape a world responsive to human aspirations in which nations of differing cultures and histories can live side by side in peace and justice."

Two days later, the State Department charged Helsinki violations in connection with the harassment of a leading Soviet human-rights activist, stating:

We are watching with concern the treatment of Aleksandr Ginzburg and we have made the Soviet Union aware of our feeling. Wherever it may occur, the harassment of individuals who are pursuing the principles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or who are working for the implementation of the Final Act of the Helsinki conference is a matter of concern to all Americans.

Underscoring this concern, Carter, on March 1, received Vladimir Bukovsky, a dissident freed after 12 years in a Soviet prison camp in exchange for Luis Corvalan, an imprisoned Chilean Communist leader (see review of Soviet Union in this volume).

In his March 17 address to the UN General Assembly, Carter dwelled particularly on the Soviet contention that foreign criticism of its human-rights policies constituted interference in its internal affairs and therefore violated the accord. He asserted that since the UN Charter pledged all members to respect human rights, none "can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business," nor can any avoid responsibility to stand up against unwarranted deprivation of freedom "anywhere in the world." In his view, the "solemn commitments" of the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Accords and many other international instruments must be taken just as seriously as commercial or security agreements."

In testimony before the U.S. Helsinki Commission (see below), Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, too, spoke of the seriousness with which the administration viewed the accord:

The free flow of people and ideas is as important to long-term security and cooperation as, for example, advance notification of major military maneuvers; the humanitarian pledges at Helsinki are as important as, say, the promises of
greater commercial cooperation. . . The United States will not back down with respect to its position on human rights."

Congress, too, issued periodic calls for implementation of the Helsinki principles. Thus on March 3, 1977, the Senate approved by a vote of 91-0 a resolution which, in criticizing harassment of Jews and others seeking to emigrate from the Soviet Union, stressed "the sustained interest of the American people regarding adherence to the Helsinki Declaration, including the pledge to facilitate freer movement of people, expedite the reunification of families and uphold the general freedom to leave one's country."

In responding to charges that his human-rights pronouncements were raising unrealistic hopes among East European dissidents that the United States would intervene militarily on their behalf, both to disabuse the dissidents and to reassure their governments, was reported to have said: "I can't go in with armed forces and try to change the internal mechanisms of the Soviet Government." To the argument that his human-rights policies were prejudicing economic and military relationships with the Soviet Union, the President and his spokesmen emphasized their rejection of "linkage," stating on one occasion that, "for our own part, we will not allow this open and healthy debate [on human rights] to stand in the way of our strong and publicly expressed desire to negotiate seriously and in good faith to reduce the burden of the arms race on the American and Soviet people and to reduce the threat of nuclear destruction." When questioned on the matter, Secretary Vance, too, responded that, "No, there is no linkage. I think each of these subjects (i.e., human rights and economic and military relations) is an important subject and each should be discussed on its own footing." However, Soviet spokesmen did not share this viewpoint, at least publicly.

Carter also made a special point of assuring the Soviet leaders, as well as his own domestic critics, of his policy, that he had no intention to single out and to target his human rights campaign to the Soviet Union. As he put it on one occasion, "[t]here are no hidden meanings in our commitment to human rights. . . . Our policy is exactly what it appears to be: the positive and sincere expression of our deepest beliefs as a people. It's addressed not to any particular people or area of the world but to all countries equally; yes, including our own country. And it's specifically not designed to heat up the arms race or bring back the cold war."

Responding to criticism that the United States, itself, was guilty of violating the accord, Carter announced at Clinton, Massachusetts on March 16, 1977:

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I've removed the restriction on American travel overseas. I believe that an American citizen ought to be able to go wherever that person wants to go without the government telling him. We're going to try to open our borders for a change so visitors can come to our country. They may not be popular people, but I think our system of government is strong enough to have someone come into the nation and make a speech at Yale, or Harvard or here in your own town, with whom you may not agree.\textsuperscript{11}

CRITICS AND SUPPORTERS

The Soviet Union's sharp reaction to Carter's Helsinki (and general human rights) activism appeared to produce a cooling in the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations. As a result, many American (and other) observers expressed doubts about the efficacy of publicized government-to-government criticism, in contrast to quiet diplomacy. Some charged the administration of once again stoking the cold war, and others criticized it for unrealistically seeking results from mere rhetoric.

In an article in \textit{Newsweek} (June 22, 1977), Roy Medvedev, exiled Soviet historian, maintained that Kissinger's quiet diplomacy and efforts not to offend the Soviet Union achieved much more for Soviet dissidents than did Carter. Kissinger (in a talk at Georgetown University, April 5, 1977) noted that while human rights are "clearly a legitimate subject of international discourse and an object of international legal standards," United States efforts "must be related to the full mosaic of our policy goals—to give it a place and meaning in terms of everything else we do in foreign affairs."

The Chicago \textit{Sun-Times} (June 13, 1977), noting the Soviet crackdown on dissidents, called for an examination of the premises and consequences of the Carter policy, observing, "Sentiments do not constitute policy, and our dreams have all too often—and all too recently [alluding to Vietnam]—become other people's nightmares." Other observers blamed the human rights campaign for the decline in Soviet Jewish emigration; for the rise in Soviet-inspired antisemitism; for the stalemate in United States-Soviet arms control negotiations. They argued that human rights stood to benefit more from arms agreements which would reduce tensions than from direct attacks on Soviet practices; that, indeed, they tended to suffer as a result of

\textsuperscript{11}Department of State Bulletin, April 11, 1977, p. 334. Under existing law, members of these and other proscribed organizations were automatically denied entry, except on recommendation of the State Department. Waivers were routinely granted to Russian invitees of American organizations, except for representatives of Soviet labor organizations. The admission of representatives of Communist labor unions had been traditionally opposed by AFL-CIO on the ground that these groups were instruments of government, and not independent. In August 1977 Congress passed a law reversing the practice: members of proscribed organizations were to be granted visas automatically in the absence of a specific finding by the Justice Department that admission would endanger U.S. security.
such attacks which were bound to give rise to suspicion and hostility between the two nations.1

On the other hand, the administration's human rights policy had many supporters in the U.S., among them New York Times columnist William Safire, who held (June 16, 1977) that,

... in the long run, the quiet diplomacy of pragmatism neither works nor is good. For a free society to join a conspiracy of silence in return for assurances that a tyranny is providing tidbits of freedom is to throw away our most effective ideological weapon. ... [As the Soviet dissenters know] publicity has an effect on world opinion and ultimately will have a moderating effect on Soviet repressive practices. The Soviets demand that we keep the truth about freedom in cold-storage, and it is a pity that so many of our opinion-makers are adding to the pressure on the new President at such a crucial moment.

And Anthony Lewis, also of the New York Times (August 2, 1976), held that while Soviet failure to live up to the Helsinki accord must not affect arms limitation talks, the Soviet Union should be persistently pressured to fulfill its commitments.

In Western Europe, too, opinion was divided. Some expressed concern over what was called the "unrealistic" United States human rights policy. West German politicians feared it would undermine opportunities for ethnic German emigration from Communist countries, pointing out that in the last two years quiet diplomacy helped many tens of thousands to emigrate to West Germany and millions of others to visit. They further asserted that United States-Soviet détente made possible increased East-West communication through radio, television, sports, the arts, and the press. In all these areas, they held, Carter's pressures brought a slow-down.13 West Germany's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, visiting Canada, persuaded Prime Minister Pierre-Elliot Trudeau to join him in expressing concern that "the emphasis on human rights could take East-West relations back to the time of the cold war."

On the other hand, there were those who favored the Carter thrust. British Foreign Minister David Owen and other spokesmen, for example, publicly affirmed their government's intention to make human rights a basic element of its foreign policy, and informed the Russians of the importance Britain attached to Helsinki.14

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Monitoring Compliance With Accord

UNITED STATES

It was already during the Ford administration that Congress, on June 3, 1976, established a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to keep track of compliance with the accord "with particular regard to the provisions relating to Cooperation in Humanitarian fields," and to "monitor and encourage the development of programs and activities of the United States Government and private organizations with a view toward taking advantage of the provisions of the Final Act to expand East-West economic cooperation and a greater interchange of peoples and ideas between East and West." The 15-member bipartisan Commission, consisting of six members each from the Senate and House, and one each from the State, Justice, and Commerce Departments, was mandated to receive semi-annual compliance reports from the President as well as to gather facts through field missions, public hearings, receipt of petitions and complaints, and in other ways—and to make recommendations.

It was inevitable that this monitoring and, of course, the documents received and published by the Commission should be largely devoted to conditions in the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries. As the Commission's 1977 report to Congress explained, this was so because, in contrast to West European practices which largely corresponded to Helsinki standards and to those of the neutral and nonaligned participating states where relatively minor changes were required to bring them up to these standards, "the most difficult adjustments are required, in contrast, of the seven Warsaw Pact signatories. Theirs are the more sweeping restrictions—varying from nation to nation—on freedom of movement for their citizens, dissemination of information, facilities for contact with foreigners and circulation of ideas from abroad."¹⁶

In November 1976 a study mission, mandated by the Commission to visit 18 European countries,¹⁷ reported unanimity among experts it had consulted, that the Helsinki provisions have "already been more productive than Western signatories anticipated at the time of the signing 15 months ago, and their potential for improving East-West relations over the long-term is far more significant than their initial impact." This was so because, despite the limited compliance, the accord provided a framework for pursuing bilateral East-West discussion on "topics previously not admitted, or only grudgingly, to the diplomatic agenda." According to the mission's report, the accord thus far also had a deterrent effect on the Communist

¹⁷The mission charged that, contrary "to the very spirit of Helsinki," it was not admitted to the Warsaw Pact countries.
governments' behavior toward their own citizens. These findings were more or less corroborated in the first presidential report to the Commission, submitted by Gerald Ford in December 1976. It noted some progress in East European compliance regarding cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology, and the environment, and in initial steps in confidence-building, but only "limited and uneven" advances in the human rights and humanitarian fields.

In the public hearings conducted by the Commission during the first half of 1977, witnesses included, besides United States officials, former political prisoners and members of human rights groups in Eastern Europe, including those monitoring Helsinki (see also below), as well as spokesmen for religious, civic, business, professional, and other groups. Nearly all the witnesses charged the authorities concerned with contravening the Helsinki provisions. Among the organizations that appeared before the Commission was the National Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry, which, some weeks earlier, had held its own public hearings on human rights issues in the Soviet Union, at which witnesses presented case material on Soviet citizens sacked from jobs, incarcerated in mental hospitals, refused opportunities for higher education, exiled to labor camps, and subjected to intimidation and discrimination for attempting to observe religious rituals or to emigrate.

Most dramatic of the Soviet émigré witnesses, several of whom described the work of the Helsinki "watch" groups in the Soviet Union, was Vladimir Bukovsky, who, in his testimony on February 23, 1977, called for admittance of observers to Soviet political camps, prisons, psychiatric hospitals, and political trials, and free contacts between the Helsinki watch groups in the West and in the Soviet Union (see below); recommended that economic ties with the Soviet Union be made dependent on observance of human-rights agreements, issued a "very serious warning" to Western governments and public opinion to have patience despite "some attempts which have brought no results," and urged a "firm, relentless and constant stand by the West [which] will force the Soviet Union to recognize political realities" and to agree to "a détente with a human face."

Surveys of one kind or another were conducted and reports prepared also by a wide variety of American nongovernmental associations, among them the National Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry, the Joint Baltic Committee, the Lithuanian American Council, and other associations of persons of East European descent, and organizations like Freedom House and the American Society of International Law. The principal Jewish organization engaged in monitoring was the

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19 News Releases, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
National Conference on Soviet Jewry, which closely cooperated with the World Conference on Soviet Jewry in gathering information and giving testimony on violations of the human rights of Soviet Jews (see below for World Conference report).

EASTERN EUROPE

In the Soviet Union and the other East European countries, monitoring or "watch" groups were created by remarkably courageous human rights activists.

Soviet Union

The first watch group, formed in Moscow on May 12, 1976, was the "Public Group for Furthering the Implementation of the Helsinki Agreement in the USSR," which inspired, and served as model for, others elsewhere in the Soviet Union and its satellites. Among its members were Yuri Orlov, who served as chairman, Elena Bonner-Sakharova (wife of Andrei Sakharov), Aleksandr Ginzburg, Pyotor Grigorenko, Anatoli Marchenko, Vitali Rubin, Vladimir Slepak, and Anatoli Scharansky—all soon to be victims of the Soviet campaign of intensified repression instituted in reaction to President Carter's human rights campaign.

The group's announced purpose was to inform the heads of the signatory states of Helsinki violations, based on written complaints from Soviet citizens concerning such "flagrant acts of inhumanity" as taking children from the custody of religious parents wishing to rear them in their own faith; compulsory psychiatric treatment for the purpose of altering a person's thought, conscience, religion, or belief; dramatic instances of separation of families, and brutal treatment of prisoners of conscience. Similar groups were formed in the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Georgia.

Also functioning as a kind of watch group was the Soviet branch of Amnesty International, headed by Valentin Turchin, which focused on the problem of political prisoners.

The authorities reacted to the monitoring with arrests and incarcerations in prisons and psychiatric hospitals, castigation in the press, and other harassments. By the time the Belgrade Conference opened, in mid-June 1977, the watch groups had been largely silenced. Nevertheless, the Moscow group managed, during its brief existence, to prepare a series of impressive reports containing detailed evidence of human rights violations, which it distributed to the embassies of the Helsinki signatories, and which reached wide audiences outside the country. Commenting

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on the situation as a whole (report of February 27, 1977), the group held that events had confirmed its prediction that the authorities had no intention of fulfilling their international human-rights obligations. It, nevertheless believed that the accord "would be accepted by more and more people as a juridical basis for the fight for human rights." It saw Moscow's repression of human-rights advocates as intended "to make evident to the whole world its disdain for the voices raised in the West criticizing its actions, to demonstrate its toughness, and to discourage world public opinion from responding to appeals for support issued in the U.S.S.R."

An earlier, June 18, 1976, report described conditions of political prisoners, citing the names of 87 prisoners who had furnished the information. Other reports of the Soviet watch groups dealt with religious persecution of Pentecostals (including its members' efforts to emigrate); Ukrainian prisoners of conscience; harassment of watch group members; situation of the Meskhi (a Georgian tribe on the Turkish frontier deported in 1944 to Central Asia and not permitted to return to Georgia); the disruption (on January 10, 1977) of the International Symposium on Jewish Culture; appeal for an international monitoring commission to verify facts on alleged Helsinki violations, and the creation (in January 1977) of a working commission to investigate the misuse of psychiatry.

In cracking down on the Moscow group, the authorities, according to the Tass news agency, charged its members with attempting to influence the international public to doubt the sincerity of Soviet efforts to "implement the international obligations it assumed," and to "undermine détente." But the real reason for the crackdown was to signal President Carter to stay out of Soviet "internal affairs," and to warn the dissidents that they had nothing to gain from looking to the United States for moral support.

Other States

In Czechoslovakia, the accord helped inspire the establishment of the movement represented by Charter 77, a human rights manifesto issued in Prague on January 1, 1977, over the signatures of several hundred individuals from all walks of life. To stay within the law, which required that all organizations be approved by the Ministry of Interior and recognized by the National Front, the manifesto specified that the movement "is not an organization; it has no statutes, no permanent organs or registered membership," and "is not intended to be a basis for opposition political activity;" that it simply is "a free and informal and open association of people of various convictions, religions, and professions, linked by the desire to work individually and collectively for human and civil rights in Czechoslovakia and the world." After pointing to the fact that Czechoslovakia had ratified the UN Covenants on Human Rights and signed the Helsinki accord, the manifesto presented a detailed

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account of the regime's violation of the rights enumerated in these documents, which "in our country exist only on paper."

The authorities moved quickly to destroy the movement, with the police interrogating most of the signers of the manifesto and arresting the more prominent ones, and the press attacking the document as "anti-state and antisocialist," concocted "on order from anti-Communist and Zionist centers."\(^{26}\)

The crackdown evoked a wave of protests from the West, including West European Communist parties. The U.S. State Department, on January 26, 1977, publicly reminded the Czech government that "all signatories of the Helsinki Final Act [Czechoslovakia among them] are pledged to promote, respect and observe human rights and fundamental freedoms for all," and that the United States "must strongly deplore the violations of such rights and freedoms wherever they occur" (New York Times, January 27, 1977).

The Czech government responded to criticism by the United States with the usual charge that it was interfering in its internal affairs, and with the claim that its own Helsinki implementation was superior to that of the United States, since it had translated many more American books and shown many more films than the United States had of Czech books and films (New York Times, February 11, 1977).

On June 25, 1976, Poland was swept by a wave of strikes and demonstrations after an announcement of a substantial rise in food prices. Though the price rises were withdrawn, the authorities instituted a program of repressions against the workers and demonstrators, with arrests, imprisonments, and dismissals. Three months later, a Committee for the Defense of the Workers was established with the declared aim of providing legal, financial, and medical aid to the victims of the repression; publicizing official misdeeds; seeking parliamentary inquiry into police brutality, and obtaining the release of innocent prisoners.\(^{27}\)

Monitoring activity and protests against human rights violations were also carried on in the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. They were met with varying forms and degrees of governmental repressive measures.

WESTERN EUROPE

Nongovernmental monitoring, largely focused on Eastern Europe, was carried on in Western Europe, among others by Amnesty International, the World Council of Churches, Association Européenne Vrai Détente (Paris), East-West Institute and John F. Kennedy Institute (Netherlands); European Cooperation Research Group, Foreign Affairs Research Institute, and Institute of Jewish Affairs (London); German Federal Institute for Eastern Europe and International Studies (Cologne, W. Germany), and North Atlantic Assembly (Brussels).

\(^{26}\)Rude Pravo, January 12, 1977; see also article on Czechoslovakia in this volume.

Various intergovernmental agencies, too, undertook projects related to the accord, among them the Council of Europe, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, UNESCO, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, and the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation.  

**Balance Sheet and Agenda for Belgrade**

In the weeks preceding Belgrade, Western strategists were weighing which human rights issues to press at the conference, and how vigorously. To take too far-reaching and hard a line could precipitate a counterproductive shouting-match with the Soviet and satellite delegations; to eschew controversial issues for the sake of short-term harmony, of détente, could diminish the accord's significance and disappoint the hopes placed in it, especially by groups deprived of their rights. The French, Italian, and West German governments were reported to favor a "soft" approach and the Dutch and British a tougher one. The United States (which under Secretary Kissinger had viewed Helsinki as a diversion from the main business of détente) was determined to have a genuine review of facts, but to avoid serious confrontation with the Soviet Union.

**PRESIDENT'S REPORT**

In June 1977, on the eve of Belgrade, appeared President Carter's semiannual report to the U.S. Helsinki Commission, which reviewed the status of implementation of the three substantive baskets of the accord, particularly in Eastern Europe, and reiterated the United States view that Helsinki implementation was a matter of "legitimate concern" for all signatories, that therefore America's interest in human rights "does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of other states."

Providing a detailed account of the activities and findings of the Soviet watch groups and the harassments of its members, the report asserted that the Eastern European countries have retained "their fundamentally restrictive policies intact," although, with the approach of Belgrade, minor concessions have been offered. In contrast, though the United States believed its own compliance record to be generally excellent, it was reviewing certain of its practices to determine if improvements were required—for example, in the matter of travel between the United States and Communist countries (see above).

In the area of human contacts, the report continued, Eastern European countries had not fundamentally altered their policies. The Soviet Union, and, to a somewhat

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lesser extent elsewhere in the region, family reunification was considered "the sole legitimate reason for emigration," but in this connection, too, applications were often arbitrarily refused on such grounds as possession of state secrets or hardship for other family members.

Soviet disapproval of religious contacts, particularly between Soviet and Western Jews, continued. In December, seven American scholars, invited to a Jewish cultural symposium in Moscow, were refused entry by the authorities, who called the meeting a "political demonstration" and later arrested 13 of its organizers. In a show of tolerance, however, a New York interfaith organization was permitted in April (after two years of negotiations) to ship 10,000 copies of the Pentateuch to the USSR as a gift to the Jewish community. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe there was less repression in regard to religious contacts. The report noted that, for the first time in 15 years, Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, and Rumanian Jewish delegates were permitted to attend the annual meeting of the European Council of Jewish Communities.

In the field of information, the report called misleading the East European governments' claim that they were more liberal in making available Western books and films than were the Western countries with regard to similar East European material. Eastern Europe's state-controlled cultural situation, the report held, was not comparable to that in the West, where individuals were free to choose—as indeed the Helsinki accord advocated. Besides, the number and range of Western books and films in Eastern Europe was limited, was subject to censorship and political selection, and was oriented to scientific and technical rather than to historical and socio-economic topics. As to working conditions of journalists, they had generally deteriorated in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, primarily "because of the sensitivity of Communist governments to Western reporting of their human rights violations," including the journalists' contacts with dissidents.

However, the report pointed to some positive developments in regard to the press, such as the opening of a United Press International Office in Leningrad in exchange for the opening of a Tass office in San Francisco, and Yugoslavia's sponsorship in April 1977 in Belgrade, of a journalists' conference on the role of the press in the implementation of the accord, including the question of journalists' working conditions.

It also found "notable progress" in East-West cooperation and exchange in matters of culture and education, though contacts among individuals working in these fields continued to be barred in some East European countries for "fear of ideological contamination."

U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION REPORT

The Helsinki Commission issued its own comprehensive two-year report on August 5, 1977. As explained in the introduction, it concentrated, aside from aspects of the United States record, on the seven Warsaw Pact signatories because their
practices regarding Basket 3 of the accord—their citizens’ freedom of movement, dissemination of information, facilities for contacts with foreigners, and circulation of ideas from abroad—required the most sweeping improvements to bring them up to Helsinki standards. It emphasized, however, the need to be aware of considerable differences among these states in the degree and form of repression, ranging from Hungary at the liberal end of the spectrum to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia near the other end, and, at the far end, to the Soviet Union, which outstripped all the others in violations of Helsinki human rights standards. It found serious violations in the areas of religious liberty and the cultural rights of minorities, with repression being most severe in the Soviet Union. It pointed specifically to the Soviet Union’s attempt to Russify the Baltic states, its denial to the Crimean Tatars and Meshketians of the right to return to their ancestral homelands from which they were deported during World War II, and its official policy of blocking the cultural renaissance of its Jewish community.

By contrast, the Western states were substantially in compliance, while the neutral and nonaligned states needed to institute (with regard to Basket 3) relatively minor changes.

Overall, the Commission stated, it continued to believe in the constructive potential of the accord, even though the two-year record fell far short of its high promise, especially in matters of human rights. But then, “Two years is a relatively short time in which to alter the long-standing practices of sovereign nations, either in regard to one another or to their citizenries.” According to the report, a major shortcoming of the accord, was its failure to specify priorities and define actions to be taken: “What it lacks—and what the Commission recommends the signatories undertake to provide—is an agenda for implementation.”

The Commission recommended that the Helsinki signatories, at Belgrade or independent of it, undertake unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral commitments to carry out, according to a timetable, a program of specific actions intended to bring their practices up to accord standards. For example, at Belgrade, each signatory might issue formal declarations of intent to carry out implementation programs in particular areas unilaterally or reciprocally. These declarations might be compiled and made public by the conference, and in this manner become a kind of calendar of compliance, as well as the agenda for the next conference.

With respect to human rights, the Commission recommended that the highest priority at Belgrade be given to establishing the precedent that “sovereign states can soberly discuss each others’ compliance with a code of domestic conduct all have agreed—as a principle of their mutual relations—to respect.” This should be done by a “thorough, straight-forward and nonpolemical exchange of views on how the human rights code has been implemented.” The conference should review specific cases of human-rights violations, among them the imprisonment of nine members of the Soviet watch-groups, job dismissals, and other forms of isolation imposed on the hundreds of signers of Charter 77, and persecution of the Rumanian writer Paul Goma, all of which had been brought to the Commission’s attention.
Regarding human contacts, the Commission recommended that the signatories publish all regulations for travel, reduce paperwork entailed in filing travel applications, formalize in writing within definite time limits responses to them, reduce fees to a nominal level, and insure judicial review of denials of such applications. Also, to establish a common standard, the signatories should conduct a joint study of existing definitions of "national security," a frequent ground for restricting travel.

The Commission also made recommendations with regard to information and cultural and educational exchange.

As for the United States, the Commission recommended that it ratify the Covenants on Human Rights, for until it did so, it would be at a disadvantage in urging others to respect the Helsinki accord, which called on the signatories to respect international agreements by which they were bound, among them the Covenants.

Finally, the report dealt with the question of linkage between economics and human rights. Without taking any position in the matter, the Commission cited the considerable opposition in the American business and academic communities to the Jackson-Vanik amendment (AJYB, [1974-75] pp. 199-234) as inappropriate and unworkable. However, it also reported Vladimir Bukovsky's testimony before it that the amendment had had a profound effect in the Soviet Union and was a "tremendous moral victory for the United States."

WORLD CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY REPORT

Looking toward Belgrade, the World Conference on Soviet Jewry, which coordinated Jewish activity, prepared a comprehensive accounting of compliance, focused on the Soviet Union, for presentation to the Western delegations. A draft, entitled "Soviet Jewry and the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act," was unofficially distributed on the eve of the preparatory segment of the Belgrade Conference in mid-June 1977. The final version was to be released to the public in time for the opening on October 4 of the actual conference. It comprised four main parts, i.e., human contacts, information, religion, and culture, and a number of annexes containing supportive evidentiary material citing names and specific incidents. The annexes consisted, among others, of lists of names of Jews refused exit visas and official reasons for the refusal; Jewish visa applicants dismissed from jobs; Jewish "prisoners of conscience," and antisemitic books published in the USSR since 1975.

In the section on family reunification, the document charged restrictive policy incompatible with the accord, with visa applications being frequently rejected on grounds of "national security" and "public order." While these were justified grounds for limiting freedoms under the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, they were applied, according to the document, in a most arbitrary manner. For there

Excerpts quoted are taken from the draft.
was no law indicating which jobs were considered security-sensitive, and the authorities regularly labeled as security risks persons whose jobs never brought them into contact with any state secret or with classified scientific knowledge.

Also, in contravention of the Helsinki accord, visa applications were held up for unreasonable periods of time and fees, though lowered somewhat, were still inordinate and in some instances, extremely onerous. And, though the accord promised that family reunification applications would "not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or members of his family," numerous devices were used to deprive them of their rights, among them job dismissal and demotion, university expulsion, military conscription, deprivation of apartments, and arrest on trumped-up charges of "parasitism" and "hooliganism."

As evidence of noncompliance, the report cited the decline in Jewish emigration from 34,700 in 1973 and 20,500 in 1974 to 13–14,000 per year in the subsequent years. In view of the large number of visa refusals and the continuing harassment of applicants, the falsity of the Soviet argument that the decline reflected disillusionment with Israel was evident.

It also pointed out that of late authorities applied the family reunification concept perversely, contending, for example, that to allow some family members to leave while others stayed behind, contributed to family separation, thereby cynically ignoring the object of reunification: which was "to enable people to unite and live with those members of the family whom they freely chose."

The Soviet authorities, according to the document, denied other forms of "human contact" promised by the accord through "measures of general application," which, however, affected Jews particularly seriously, "giving rise to the suspicion that they were introduced in an effort "to isolate the Jewish community in general, and 'activists' in particular, from any contact with the outside world."

Similarly, obstacles were placed in the way of the freer and wider dissemination of information, as indicated by the impossibility of sending by mail information on Jewish matters, however apolitical, to Jews in the USSR. Thus, stated the report, "religious literature is placed on a par with pornography and political subversion," and "'Zionist writings' in current Soviet terminology cover everything related to Jewish history, literature, Hebrew and Jewish culture at large, and they are all equally condemned." The Jewish religion "has been discriminated against in so many respects, thus making it an underprivileged religion among all recognized religions."

The document cited the fact that, "unlike most other 'recognized' denominations, the Jewish community had no all-Soviet or regional organization; its representatives were almost never permitted to have contacts or meetings among themselves, and were unable to maintain links with international Jewish organizations. No Jewish religious literature has been allowed to be published since 1928, nor was the community permitted to have a religious periodical or bulletin of its own. Soviet official sources, themselves, admit to a decrease of synagogues from 1,103 in 1926 to 92 in 1976 (Jewish organizations abroad were able to substantiate only 57). In 1977
Moscow, with 251,000 Jews, had only two, and there were no synagogues at all in Kharkov, with 75,000 Jews, and 36 other cities with over 10,000 to 5,000 Jews each. There was only one Rabbi known in the Soviet Union, and no Jewish cemeteries, the report stated.

While the Soviet Union had a poor record in extending to its national minorities generally, "the Jewish national is the most disadvantaged one." There was "no Jewish school, nor official facilities for learning Hebrew or Yiddish." The availability in any language of "books on Jewish history, tradition, literature, art, or on Jewish communities in other countries," the document pointed out, "is entirely a reflection of Soviet policy and in no way indicates a lack of creativity." But, continued the report, "possibly the worst feature" is that, in the generally prevailing atheistic and antireligious propaganda, "Judaism is singled out for special treatment;" that "the anti-Judaic campaign is made all the worse" because Jewish religion is "interchanged at will with Jewish nationalism and Zionism." This and outright antisemitic propaganda, the document charged, was being spread by the Soviet authorities in violation of the "spirit of Helsinki" and of the express prohibition in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights against "any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred."

The final version of the report included a section on the Begun and Scharansky cases, as well as several specific proposals to the participating states for inclusion in the final declaration and resolutions of the Belgrade conference. One proposal (based on the failure of East European states to implement the principle 7 recognition of the individual's "right to know and act upon his rights and duties") was that the signatories agree to recommend that each state publish and make available to all others a compilation of all its laws and decrees applicable to the Helsinki Basket 3 provisions, including those invoked to justify restriction of, or derogation from, those provisions. A second and third proposal recommended that they spell out more specifically means and rules for implementing the Helsinki provisions on religious contacts and family reunification, and, with regard to the latter, publish a schedule for declassification of security-related occupations. A fourth proposal contained suggestions for measures to be taken by each state to enable its national minorities to perpetuate and promote their cultures.

At Belgrade

The first of the two stages of the review conference, called for by the Helsinki accord, opened as scheduled in Belgrade in mid-June 1977. It was to decide the agenda, dates, duration, and procedures of the second, substantive stage which, hopefully, was to begin some time in the fall. At the meeting, the main issue in contention was how seriously to review compliance with the human rights and humanitarian provisions, with the Communist states (who correctly anticipated that the brunt would be borne by them) striving to limit by various procedural means the depth and scope of the review. Among others, they advocated a short conference,
a fixed closing date, combined discussion of human rights with other substantive
issues, and focus on the future projects rather than on review of past compliance.
Other issues were whether to have a "concluding document" and what it should say,
and whether there should be future meetings and other follow-up.

After some seven weeks of haggling and deadlock, the preparatory stage of
Belgrade ended on August 5 with a decision to begin the main meeting on October
4, on the basis of a series of compromises. Though the target closing date would be
in the latter part of December, the conference, it was decided, would not adjourn
without adopting a "concluding document" and setting "the date and place of the
next similar meeting" (thus assuring continuation of the Helsinki process beyond
Belgrade).

The cut-off date issue was resolved in an obviously ambiguous way, and doubtless
would be the subject of future wrangling, as would the decision to separate the
review of implementation from the discussion of new proposals. No decision was
made on the shape and content of the final document (about which the Western
participants were to caucus, as also on tactics generally at Belgrade II). The United
States Helsinki Commission anticipated Belgrade to be "a workable forum for the
application of pressure to improve implementation" and to "keep CSCE issues at
the center of world attention."

**Summing Up**

The question of the real significance of the Helsinki accord—whether it helped
or hurt Jews and others in Eastern Europe, or was simply a time-consuming,
fruitless rhetorical exercise—was not a simple one. This was particularly so in light
of the crackdown on dissenter, the slowing of Jewish and other emigration from
the Soviet Union, and the partial return of the pre-Helsinki East-West atmosphere
of suspicion and recrimination. Some experts argued that, in the long run, the
prospect for improved human rights in the Soviet Union was better in an atmosphere
marked by reduction of international tensions associated with arms control and
commercial agreements than in one of direct pressures "which threaten to under-
mine the system's monopoly of political authority." They believed "that easing of
repression is more likely to result from evolutionary forces within the society under
prolonged conditions of reduced international tension than from external demands
for change and the siege mentality they would reinforce."

Other analysts argued that unless backed by tangible means—whether of carrot

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10 A key question was whether and how to take up individual human rights cases. Most West
European delegations opposed considering them in plenary, preferring to reserve the citing of
names and specific incidents for documenting general charges challenged by Soviet bloc

11 Memorandum to CSCE Commissioners, August 11, 1977.

12 Many of the same experts, however, did endorse limited "external pressures" in areas like
family reunification.
or stick—the promise of the accord (or other international human rights agreements) was bound to remain in the realm of rhetoric; that only such tangible measures as the granting or revoking of military or economic assistance, or credit or trading privileges, could influence the human rights policies of other countries, and that even these measures might not avail in many cases, either because the target—the Soviet Union, for example—was not sufficiently dependent on such assistance, or too powerful or proud to be moved by them. They, like the Helsinki Commission report, pointed out that the grand promises of the accord were not backed up by a program and timetable for implementation. Still others held that human rights goals, however laudable, should not be allowed to intrude on the more urgent need for East-West agreement in the area of nuclear and conventional weapons on which world peace and mankind's survival depended.

Responding to these pessimistic appraisals and cautious, administration spokesmen, the Helsinki Commission, and nongovernmental observers emphasized the need for patience and for a long-term perspective. The more hopeful observers also noted that, though for the Soviet Union's own reasons (e.g., legitimation of frontiers), the accord had been strongly emphasized and its text officially publicized throughout Eastern Europe, even more than in the West. However they tried, therefore, the Communist authorities would not be able totally to erase or offset its impact at home. Though they succeeded in containing overt human rights activity, the consciousness persisted, waiting to be released. These observers placed greater emphasis than the "realists" on the impact of human rights rhetoric and symbols, on the effects of intergovernmental debating, negotiating and drafting processes, the plethora of monitoring, and educational activity centered on the accord. Helsinki (even more than the UN's human rights agreements), they pointed out, made human rights a legitimate and vital item on the diplomatic agenda, even though it was merely a political document and noncompliance did not constitute a breach of international law.33

However one saw the future of Helsinki, much credit for the extraordinary response it thus far evoked belonged to the Soviet and other East European human rights activists, including the leaders and participants in the Jewish emigration movement, who were among the first to perceive its potential—and who were supported in their causes by Jewish and other ethnic and religious groups, as well as by scientific, labor, professional, and other nongovernmental associations in the Western world.

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33An important reason for this impact was that participation in the Helsinki process was limited to Europe (plus Canada and the United States), where the Soviet Union lacked the numerical advantage it enjoyed in the UN by virtue of its alliances and relationships with the Arab, African, and other Third-World states with their own political and ideological agendas.