Review of the Year

UNITED STATES
OTHER COUNTRIES
Civic and Political

Intergroup Relations

"The most important issue in the 1980 election is not inflation or foreign policy or unemployment," wrote New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis as the election swung into high gear, "it is the role of religion in American politics." Lewis' comment underlined the extraordinary degree to which religious and moral issues dominated events in 1980, events also shaped by the continuing decline in the economy, the erosion of American prestige at home and abroad, and the growth of social and political conservatism reflected in the rise of the "New Right."

The New Right

As the 1980 national primaries got underway, the media and several new books (including Richard Viguerie's The New Right, Michael Miles' The Odyssey of the American Right, and Alan Crawford's Thunder on the Right) began to publicize the activities of the New Right, a loose grouping including such organizations as Paul Weyrich's Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, Terry Dolan's National Conservative Political Action Committee, and Howard Phillips' Conservative Caucus. The basic assumptions of the New Right were that the existing party system did not work; that the federal government was too distant from the people; and that a new, conservative coalition made up of Democrats, Republicans, and independents was needed to displace the existing governmental elite and restore fiscal responsibility, military preparedness, and a more family-church-neighborhood oriented culture. The leaders of the New Right sought to make common cause with "single issue" groups, including those seeking tax reform and those opposed to the equal rights amendment, abortion, and gun control.

The Christian New Right

Closely allied to the secular New Right was the Christian New Right, made up of a number of groups including Christian Voice, Religious Round Table, Moral Majority, and a dozen or more Protestant ministers whose skillful use of television
made them national figures. The Christian New Right focused on what it called moral- or family-oriented issues—the equal rights amendment, abortion, pornography, and homosexual rights. It supported the restoration of Bible-reading and prayer in the public schools, and opposed any government interference in Christian private schools. In addition, moves were underway to reintroduce the biblical account of creation into the school curriculum as a theory on a par with Darwinian views.

Reverend Jerry Falwell, the director of Moral Majority, emerged as the most successful exponent of evangelical, right-wing politics. His "Old-Time Gospel Hour," a television program, was said to raise one million dollars a week from 18 million viewers.

**Reaction to the New Right**

In April the Christian New Right showed its strength in a "Washington for Jesus" rally, which was attended by almost 200,000 people. Prior to the event, some 20 religious organizations with representatives in Washington had accused the rally's sponsors of trying to "Christianize the government." At a national workshop on Christian-Jewish relations, Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum, director of the American Jewish Committee's interreligious affairs department, declared: "The notion that Washington must become Christianized could become as great a danger to America as the Ayatollah has become in Iran."

Pressures from the New Right wing of evangelical Protestantism coincided with Roman Catholic efforts to limit, if not completely ban, abortion. On June 30 the supreme court, in a 5 to 4 vote, ruled that Congress could refuse to finance abortions for poor women, even when the procedure was deemed medically necessary. Five days before the Massachusetts Democratic primary in September, Humberto Cardinal Medeiros of Boston issued a pastoral letter condemning politicians "who make abortions possible." This extraordinary intervention in the campaign was seen as being aimed at two liberal Democratic candidates for Congress who favored letting women make their choice on abortion, and who supported government funds for poor women seeking such assistance.

A report prepared by Milton Ellerin and Alisa Kesten of the American Jewish Committee noted that there was little relationship between the New Right and the so-called Old or Radical Right of the late 1950's and early 1960's, which in turn had little in common with traditional political conservatism. As the *New Republic* pointed out, the New Right was less worried about an internal Communist conspiracy, functioned more pragmatically and realistically within the political system, and viewed the "elitist, Eastern, liberal establishment" as "the enemy." There were no known antisemites identified with the New Right. Many on the New Right, in fact, admired Israel as an embattled small nation, and as a bulwark of Western democracy in the Middle East. Evangelical Protestants saw the rise of the State of Israel as part of God's plan for the salvation of mankind. In April Moral Majority head
Jerry Falwell arranged for evangelical leaders, including the president of the Southern Baptist Conference, to meet with Prime Minister Begin while he was in Washington. This contrasted sharply with the position of the National Council of Churches—the liberal confederation of mainline Christian denominations which worked closely with Jewish groups on social issues—whose governing board in November unanimously approved a policy statement endorsing the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in Middle East peace negotiations.

Except for efforts to reinstitute prayer in the public schools, the New Right, then, posed no special problems for Jews as Jews. Yet it worried most Jews, nonetheless, since they tended to oppose censorship of school textbooks, and supported liberal abortion laws, more flexible immigration policies, the equal rights amendment, gun control, and other legislation opposed by the New Right. A number of Jewish groups began publicly to attack the New Right. Jerome L. Levingrad, executive director of the Jewish War Veterans, warned that ultra-conservative evangelical groups, and not the Nazis or Ku Klux Klan, posed the greatest threat to the American Jewish community.

The anxiety of many Jews about the New Right was confirmed when the media reported in September that Reverend Bailey Smith, president of the 13.4 million-member Southern Baptist Convention, had declared that “God almighty does not hear the prayer of a Jew.” Amid the public controversy that ensued, Smith denied that his remarks were antisemitic. “I am pro-Jew,” he said. “I believe they are God's special people, but without Jesus Christ they are lost. . . . Jews have an argument with me because they have an argument with the New Testament.” Smith’s comments were sharply criticized by a number of Jewish and Christian leaders, including several from his own Baptist denomination. James Dunn, director of the Dallas-based Christian Life Commission of Texas Baptists, stated: “It’s sort of the ultimate antisemitic remark.” Jerry Falwell met with Rabbi Tanenbaum and released a statement on October 10 saying that it grieved him to have been quoted as agreeing with Smith. “God,” Falwell declared, “is a respecter of all persons.” Rejecting the view that America should be a “Christian republic,” Falwell stated, “America is a pluralistic republic.”

The negative reaction to Smith’s stark assertion of fundamentalist theology highlighted the wide diversity of views that existed within evangelical Protestantism. It also produced cracks in the Christian New Right. Thus, television evangelists Pat Robertson of the Christian Broadcasting Network and Jim Bakker of the syndicated PTL Club severed their ties with New Right political groups. A Gallup poll conducted in August made it clear that there was no monolithic evangelical Protestant voting bloc.

The Presidential Campaign

The impact of Moral Majority was felt in a number of primaries; it helped defeat moderately conservative congressman John Buchanan in Alabama, and provided
the margin of victory in that state for a Republican seeking the U.S. senatorial
nomination. In a number of Senate races, the New Right made an all-out effort to
defeat liberal incumbents.

The GOP in 1980 was a political party genuinely hospitable to New Right
Christians. Several hundred delegates to the Republican national convention in
Detroit came from the political evangelical movement. They threw their support
behind the candidacy of Ronald Reagan and helped shape the Republican platform
—a platform that sought to protect the “right to life” of unborn children, that made
respect for “traditional family values” a prime qualification for nominees to the
federal bench, and that advocated tuition tax credits for parents of private and
parochial school children. In contrast, the Democratic platform affirmed the earlier
supreme court ruling which effectively upheld abortion as the law of the land and
opposed any effort to overturn it by means of a constitutional amendment. The GOP
called for reduced federal spending, while the Democratic platform urged against
cuts in funding for “basic human needs.”

Ronald Reagan gave his blessing to evangelical politics in addressing a conference
of conservative church leaders from 41 states in Dallas—the same conference at
which Bailey Smith made his startling statement about Jews. Reagan told the
evangelical leaders that they had a duty to get involved in politics. In response to
a question at a news conference, Reagan questioned the theory of evolution. He
affirmed his faith in the Bible, indicating “that all the complex and horrendous
questions confronting us at home and worldwide have their answer in that single
book.” Jerry Falwell exulted at the rally, “This is our day. The liberals have blown
it.” Texas evangelist James Robison warned, “Not voting is a sin against almighty
God.”

Troubled though they were by the growth of the New Right, traditionally liberal
Democratic Jewish voters found themselves increasingly unhappy with President
Carter, especially following an anti-Israel vote at the United Nations on March 1,
which was joined in by the U.S. but later disavowed by the president. Jimmy Carter
was not helped by the continuing public discussion of the pro-Arab activities of his
brother Billy. In July Billy Carter consented to register as a foreign agent of the
Libyan government, rather than face a justice department suit following his ac-
nowledgment that he had accepted $220,000 from the radical Arab regime. Several
Jewish organizations called for a full disclosure of Billy Carter’s efforts to exploit
his relationship to the White House on behalf of his Arab clients.

Jewish dissatisfaction with President Carter was reflected in balloting by Jews in
primaries in New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Florida. In the New York
primary, Jewish districts gave Carter’s opponent, Senator Ted Kennedy, 78 per cent
of the vote. Carter seemed unable to still Jewish anger, despite several meetings with
Jewish groups.

During the campaign Carter sought to place Reagan on the defensive by focusing
on a number of religious and social issues embodied in the GOP party platform. The
president promised the National Association of Women Judges that “potential
judges will not be subjected to tests of religion, gender, race, or personal beliefs on
someone's list of so-called right issues." On October 9 Carter broke his silence on the Moral Majority, stating in an interview that the organization had put forth a "narrow definition of what a Christian is." In Florida on October 21 Carter flatly declared that the nation "was not founded just on the Christian religion." As Carter lashed out at Reagan and his Christian New Right supporters, his rhetoric grew more harsh. On October 6 he suggested that a Reagan victory could mean the separation of "black from white, Jew from Christian, North from South, rural from urban." Carter's stridency seemed to backfire, however, particularly since Reagan, as the campaign progressed, backed away somewhat from the ultra-conservative positions of the GOP platform and the more zealous activities of the Christian New Right.

The Election

In the Reagan landslide in November the GOP candidate made sizeable gains among Jewish voters. A CBS-New York Times poll showed that Carter carried only 45 per cent of the Jewish vote, a sharp decline from the 68 per cent he had received four years earlier. Reagan received 39 per cent, Anderson 14 per cent, and the remainder was scattered among minor candidates. Reagan captured New York and every other state with a large Jewish population. In a number of areas in Brooklyn with heavy concentrations of Orthodox Jews, Reagan won overwhelmingly. Jewish men favored Reagan over Carter; it was the women's majority for Carter that gave him his Jewish plurality.

In 1980, for the first time since 1928, most Jews did not vote for the Democratic candidate. The Jewish Democratic vote probably declined more when compared to 1976 than that of any other group in the normal Democratic constituency. According to the CBS-New York Times data, Roman Catholic voters went for Reagan 51 per cent to 40 per cent. Only blacks, with 82 per cent for Carter, remained about where they were four years earlier.

The results of the election revived discussion of whether Jews were moving to the right politically. Veteran political analyst Milton Himmelfarb noted in a symposium that the figures on the decline in the Jewish vote for the Democratic presidential candidate were deceiving. The low proportion for Carter was counterbalanced, he said, by the defection to third party candidate Anderson. In local races the Jewish Republican vote increased, but not significantly. There was a strong show of support for liberal Democratic congressional incumbents in Los Angeles. Many New York Jews who voted for Reagan supported liberal Elizabeth Holtzman against conservative Alfonse D'Amato in the Senate race.

In the 97th Congress, which was to reconvene in January 1981, there would be one less Jewish senator. However, the number of Jewish representatives jumped to a record 28. (Among the victors was Barney Frank, who was thought to be one of the targets of Cardinal Medeiros' letter.) The 97th Congress would include 119 Roman Catholics in the House and 17 in the Senate, an increase of 7 over 1978.
The Election Aftermath

In the wake of the election many Jews were deeply concerned about the defeat of a number of veteran liberal senators, some of whom were staunch supporters of Israel—Birch Bayh of Indiana, Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin, John Culver of Iowa, George McGovern of South Dakota, and Frank Church of Idaho. Earlier, death had taken Senator Hubert Humphrey. Senator Jacob Javits was defeated in the Republican primary in New York and again in his race on the Liberal party ticket. Most of these senators had been targeted for defeat by the National Conservative Political Action Committee and the Christian New Right for their liberal stands. Senator Church acknowledged that his narrow loss was due to a pre-election blitz by these conservative elements. Senator Bayh angrily characterized his defeat as “in the tradition of Nazi Germany.” Several New Right targets, however, survived the onslaught against them.

Republican control of the Senate and added Republican strength in the House were seen by the New Right as strengthening their position. Gary Jarmin, political director of Christian Voice, said the election “points to the beginning of a new era.” Jerry Falwell called the results “the greatest day for the cause of conservatism and American morality in my adult life.” While not taking direct credit for the GOP victory, Falwell declared that Moral Majority had arranged to register four million voters and had stimulated another ten million to vote. Flushed with victory, John Dolan, head of the National Conservative Political Action Committee, announced that his organization had targeted for defeat 20 of 33 senators up for election in 1982. Paul Weyrich, a founder of Conservative Caucus, warned Vice President Elect George Bush, who was seen as being more liberal than Reagan, that he had better “get with the new tidal wave which has swept the country.”

There were indications that traditional conservatives were worried about the activities of the New Right. Shortly after the election, some 30 such individuals held a private meeting to discuss the current political situation. Senator Strom Thurmond (R., S.C.), who was to head the Senate judiciary committee in the 97th Congress, indicated that he did not favor the GOP plank that called for appointing anti-abortion judges. A feeling seemed to be growing among the victors that advocating and governing were somewhat different things, and that a need existed to bring the American people together.

The head of the American Civil Liberties Union declared in November that the rise of fundamentalist groups in the political process represented an “exceptional threat” to civil liberties. The organization took out full page ads in the New York Times and other publications seeking funding to meet this “threat.” The American Library Association declared on December 10 that complaints about specific books in public libraries had increased five-fold since Reagan’s election, and that many of the complainants were identified with Moral Majority.

In one of the sharpest reactions in the Jewish community, Rabbi Alexander Schindler, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, told the
organization's board of directors in November that the rise of right-wing fundamentalism had been accompanied by the most serious growth of antisemitism in America since the outbreak of World War II. While Schindler did not accuse Jerry Falwell and others of deliberately inciting antisemitism, he described their preachments as having an inevitable antisemitic effect. In response, Falwell noted that he had received an award from Prime Minister Begin at a Zionist affair in New York held shortly after the election. Schindler's comment was criticized publicly by an American Jewish Congress official, as well as by Anti-Defamation League head Nathan Perlmutter, who said that looking at evangelical Protestants as a monolithic group was as simplistic as viewing Jews and Catholics in the same way.

After the election, the American Jewish Committee continued its efforts to improve relations with evangelicals by joining with Christianity Today in sponsoring a major conference of Jewish and evangelical leaders. At the request of Bailey Smith, Anti-Defamation League officials met with him, following which Smith issued a statement saying that Baptists "abhor, condemn, and reject antisemitism." While Smith refused to retract his comment about God not listening to the prayers of Jews, the ADL said that it was satisfied that Smith "had no antisemitic intent."

**Extremism**

The election took shape against the background of reports of an increase in extremist activity. Irwin Suall, head of the Anti-Defamation League's fact-finding department, predicted that there would be an increase in violence as the Ku Klux Klan stepped up its activities. He noted that the Klan had grown from a low of 6,500 members in 1975 to an estimated 10,000 members in four major Klan organizations in 1980. Klan adherents were heartened by a verdict handed down by a Greensboro jury on November 17, which found four Klansmen and two neo-Nazis not guilty in the fatal shooting of five leftists at a "Death to the Klan" rally. An all-white jury also acquitted two of three Klansmen of charges that they had shot and wounded four black women; the third was given a light sentence.

Some extremist activity during the year took a political form. In the May 6 primary in North Carolina, Harold Covington, an avowed Nazi, received 43 per cent of the vote, narrowly losing his bid for the Republican nomination for state attorney general. In California Klan chairman Tom Metzger won the Democratic party's nomination for Congress in San Diego county, while Gerald Carlson, a former Nazi, Klansman, and John Birch Society member, used a "White Power Hotline" to win the Republican nomination in the 15th congressional district in Dearborn, a suburb of Detroit. In the election, however, both men were opposed by their party organizations and were overwhelmingly defeated.

As the year drew to a close, a justice department study concluded that federal agencies had to cooperate on a closer basis to combat Klan violence. The study noted that one Klan faction, the Invisible Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, "bears watching" as a potential serious threat.
Antisemitism

There was a considerable increase in reported antisemitic incidents throughout the United States in 1980—377 cases of assault against property and 112 attacks against individual Jews or institutions. Almost 65 per cent of the incidents occurred in five Northeastern states—New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. The largest number, 120, was reported in New York State, including 69 in New York City and 39 in Nassau and Suffolk counties on Long Island.

The year also witnessed an attempt to utilize public relations techniques to convince Americans that the Holocaust was a "hoax." Thus, the Institute for Historical Review held a three-day seminar at Northrup University in Inglewood, California, at which a number of "scholars" presented their views. The papers were later embodied in *The Journal of Historical Review*, which was widely distributed to historians throughout the United States. The publication and mailings were believed to be funded by the openly antisemitic Liberty Lobby.

These activities, coming on the heels of the sharp black-Jewish confrontation of the year before, a widely publicized bombing of a synagogue in Paris, and continued anti-Israel actions at the United Nations, further deepened the anxiety of American Jews. After cataloguing what he described as an alarming series of threats to the safety and security of Jews at home and abroad, Murray Zuckoff, head of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, argued that these developments required "more than an occasional statement of rebuke." He called for "a massive and concerted campaign to mobilize public opinion against threatening groups and additional efforts of law enforcement agencies to ferret out and prosecute those responsible for antisemitic actions and programs." The New York chapter of the American Jewish Committee, pointing to evidence of increased anti-Jewish harassment and vandalism in New York State, particularly in Nassau and Suffolk counties, called upon Governor Hugh Carey to mount a program of counter-action that would serve as "an effective middle ground" between overemphasis and doing nothing.

Despite these indications of uneasiness and even fear among some Jews, public opinion surveys provided evidence that American attitudes toward Jews continued to remain positive. A national television poll conducted by the Yankelovich, Skelly, and White organization in December 1979 showed that Jews were at the bottom of a list of groups held to be too powerful. A Gallup poll commissioned by the American Jewish Committee less than a month before the national election confirmed the Yankelovich findings. Only 8 per cent of the respondents named Jews, and 4 per cent Zionists, as having too much political influence, while 45 per cent listed labor unions, and 42 per cent corporations. As in earlier surveys, close to 50 per cent of the public disagreed with the view that Jews were more loyal to Israel than to the U.S.; 29 per cent agreed and 25 per cent had no opinion.
Church-State Relations

The Christian New Right continued its efforts to restore some form of prayer in the public schools. In February Massachusetts joined nine other states in requiring either spoken prayer or silent meditation. The Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts immediately filed suit challenging the state law. In the meantime the House judiciary committee and its subcommittee on courts, civil liberties, and the administration of justice held hearings in August on the amendment introduced by Senator Jesse Helms (R., N.C.) and passed the previous year in the Senate, to remove federal court jurisdiction over state laws relating to “voluntary prayers in public schools or in public buildings.” The measure had the strong support of Moral Majority and similar groups, and was opposed by a number of liberal Protestant and Jewish groups. Alvin Gray, testifying as a spokesman for the American Jewish Congress and the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, declared: “We believe firmly that any impairment of the authority of the courts to redress constitutional violations would imperil our system of law and impede progress toward unity and common purpose in our society.”

During the year the supreme court issued rulings that were generally consistent with its earlier church-state positions. In November the Court barred a group of students from holding regular prayer sessions in a public school near Albany, N.Y., and invalidated a 1978 Kentucky law requiring that a copy of the Ten Commandments be placed on a wall of every classroom in the state. It did, however, refuse to hear an appeal of a lower court ruling permitting students to sing Christmas carols in public school holiday programs in Sioux Falls, South Dakota.

Blacks and Jews

The fears that had developed the previous year that the Andrew Young episode would be a continuing source of black-Jewish tensions and growing black antisemitism receded somewhat as attention shifted among blacks to “bread and butter” issues in the slums, and to the success of the New Right and conservative trends generally. Data Black, a polling firm founded by Kenneth C. Clark, released a poll showing that Jews tied with Hispanics as the most favorably perceived group by blacks. Only 11 per cent of blacks manifested negative feelings toward Jews, according to this poll. A majority, however, felt that Israel should agree to a homeland for the Palestinians, while a plurality maintained that the U.S. should recognize the PLO. These findings led William Raspberry, a black columnist, to argue that the black-Jewish rift of the year before had been overblown and was “nothing more than a difference of opinion on specific policy issues.”

Friction between blacks and Jews continued, however, as the Arab nations sought to broaden their contacts among blacks. Groups such as the National Black Pastors Conference and various black businessmen were encouraged to visit Arab countries. The government of Kuwait donated $100,000 to the Martin Luther King Center for
Social Change in Atlanta. Reverend Jesse Jackson, head of PUSH, likened the plight of the Palestinians to that of Afro-Americans, and urged Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to invite him to discuss "mutual development." Black-Jewish tension was exacerbated briefly by a statement by Moshe Dayan that the U.S. army was weakened by the high proportion of blacks "who have a lower education and intelligence." Black columnist Carl Rowan called the statement "outrageous," a position seconded by Maynard Wishner, president of the American Jewish Committee. Dayan later apologized, indicating that what he meant to say was that it was difficult to build a first-class fighting force made up of poor volunteers.

Jewish opposition to quota programs for relieving the problems of blacks, spearheaded chiefly by the Anti-Defamation League, continued, although specific court cases were not as heavily publicized as was the 1979 Bakke case. The League expressed its "distress" at a federal court order mandating 50-50 racial quotas in the hiring of new police officers in New York City, and charged the Small Business Administration with religious discrimination when it refused to designate the Haredim as a "socially and economically disadvantaged group."

As 1980 drew to a close, blacks and civil rights groups generally found themselves on the defensive. The Senate killed a fair housing bill. A Congressional attempt to curtail the justice department's ability to order bussing in school desegregation cases was only narrowly defeated. In the face of a new Republican administration with few political loyalties to blacks, there were signs that black leaders were beginning to reach out to Jews and Jewish organizations for badly needed support.

Murray Friedman
The United States, Israel, and the Middle East

During 1980 the Middle East became an area of growing concern and increasing frustration for the Carter administration as well as the American public. The inability of the United States to obtain the release of its diplomats held hostage in Teheran since November 1979, either through diplomatic and economic pressure or through force in the abortive rescue raid in April, compounded the national sense of impotence. (The hostages were finally released on January 20, 1981 shortly after President Ronald Reagan had been sworn in, thus depriving President Jimmy Carter of even this "triumph."

The Camp David peace process, regarded by the Carter administration as its most notable achievement, made little further progress after the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel in February. (See AJYB, Vol. 81, 1981, pp. 134–135.) The process of normalization proceeded haltingly and without much enthusiasm on the part of Egypt's professional bureaucrats and intellectuals. Israeli leaders, on the other hand, were anxious to go to Egypt; following Prime Minister Menachem Begin's meetings with Sadat in Aswan, opposition Labor party leader Shimon Peres traveled there. In October President Yitzhak Navon paid a three-day state visit to Egypt which included a speech before the Egyptian People's Assembly. (Begin had unsuccessfully asked to address the Assembly in reciprocity for Sadat's speech before the Israeli Knesset in November 1977.) Shortly after the visit, the Egyptians agreed to open the land border to trade and to encourage cooperation in a variety of fields. The most immediate practical ties were developed in agriculture and arid zone research.

Palestinian Autonomy Talks

While bilateral Egyptian-Israeli relations developed more or less according to schedule, the same could not be said of the other agreement reached at Camp David. Under this general framework for peace, negotiations between Egypt and Israel, with the help of the United States, were scheduled to produce agreement on a Self-Governing Authority (SGA) for the administered areas of Judea and Samaria (the "West Bank") and the Gaza District by May 26, 1980. Meetings of the autonomy negotiators took place in Cairo in January and in Herzliya at the beginning of February. The negotiators reached agreement on more than a dozen areas of responsibility for the Palestinian SGA. Egypt accepted the principle of an Israeli role in security, and Israel accepted some broadening of the SGA's authority. But the parties were still far apart on defining respective rights on security, land and water, the status of Arab residents of East Jerusalem, and whether the SGA might have quasi-legislative powers.
In early April President Carter met successively with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin in Washington. At the conclusion of the talks, Carter announced that "real progress" had been made and that the Egyptian and Israeli leaders had agreed to conduct accelerated negotiations on the autonomy issues, with the teams meeting alternatively in Israel and Egypt. Begin and Carter discussed setting up a "continuing committee" to deal with unresolved issues once broad agreement had been reached. American officials viewed the continuing committee as a device that would allow the negotiators to sign an agreement by the May 26 deadline covering those matters that had been settled and leaving to the committee the task of negotiating any unresolved issues. But Begin stressed that the committee would be empowered to deal only with relatively minor questions and would not be established until after the Palestinian self-governing authority was in place.

On April 20 American special envoy Sol Linowitz told interviewers on CBS's *Face the Nation* that since the previous October the negotiators had made sufficient progress to give the Palestinians reason to participate. "We are moving in the direction of full autonomy and therefore I hope we can interest them in joining the talks." Linowitz adamantly rejected suggestions that the United States apply pressure on Israel, notably on the issue of settlements in the administered territories. He stressed that the United States should devote its efforts to finding common ground between Egypt and Israel and should refrain from threatening to cut off aid because Israel might disagree with some principle of American policy. "It's not in their own best interest or ours to begin swinging a cudgel or acting as though they can be forced into doing something," Linowitz said, "because they won't unless they are convinced that it's right for them to do it."

Further talks in April and May were deadlocked and Sadat suspended the talks indefinitely, ostensibly because of objections to a proposal in the Knesset to declare united Jerusalem Israel's official capital. Consequently, no agreement was reached by the May target date.

The Americans were equally unsuccessful in inducing the Jordanians to assume the place provided for them in the Camp David agreements as partners in the management of the West Bank autonomy and the subsequent negotiations on its ultimate disposition. A meeting held by Linowitz with King Hussein in London on January 26 was later characterized by the American negotiator as having been "very frank," the diplomatic term for sharp disagreement.

Hussein's three-day visit to Washington in June produced no change in the Jordanian position, even though the king went home with presidential approval of the proposed sale of 100 M60-A3 tanks equipped with night vision sights. A few days before Hussein's arrival, Carter had told newsmen that "I'll use all the persuasive power I have to encourage Hussein to join the negotiations." But in speaking to reporters at the conclusion of their summit talks, Carter said, "We've not tried to change each other's mind."

Israel was also unable to bring prominent representatives of the West Bank and Gaza Palestinian community into the autonomy talks. Typical was the public
reaction of Gaza mayor Rishad al-Shawa, who commented after meeting with Linowitz that he objected to "the autonomy they are speaking about." A complicating factor, in the view of Egypt and the Carter administration, was the accelerated pace of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Following the murder of a Jewish student in Hebron on February 1, the Israeli government issued a communiqué saying it had "no objection to Jews living in Hebron as in any other part of Israel." This support of the longstanding demand of Gush Emunim militants to re-establish a Jewish presence within the heart of the old city of Hebron, from which the Jews had fled after the 1929 massacre, marked a departure from the government's policy under the Labor administration. Then, new Jewish settlements had been restricted to uninhabited areas. Even the Gush Emunim settlement of Kiryat Arba, which had won grudging retroactive approval from the Labor government at the time, had been established on the hills outside the city of Hebron. The proposed change in government policy drew fire from Egyptian prime minister Mustapha Khalil, who called it "illegal," and from a U.S. state department spokesman who, on February 12, said it would be "a step backward in the peace process."

President Carter's personal view that Israel's settlement policy imperiled the autonomy talks explains in part the U.S. delegation's initial support in the United Nations of a security council resolution on March 1 condemning Israel's policies in the occupied territories. Carter subsequently explained that the vote had been due to a failure in communications and that the U.S. delegation should have abstained because the resolution contained references to Jerusalem to which the U.S. objected. (The reaction within the Jewish community and the effect upon the presidential election campaign of the flip-flop on the March 1 vote are examined below.) The fact remains that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who told Congress he accepted "responsibility" for the vote, would not have authorized the U.S. delegation to support the resolution in the first place had it not been clear that the president was angry at the Israelis and wanted his displeasure to be reflected in American support for a UN resolution critical of Israel's settlement policy.

The autonomy talks were resumed in September in Washington after Prime Minister Begin had written President Sadat in mid-August calling for immediate resumption of the talks and Linowitz had won Sadat's agreement at the beginning of September. Israeli foreign minister Yitzhak Shamir met with Sadat in Alexandria on September 10 to discuss the autonomy talks. Shamir and Egyptian foreign minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali met with President Carter in Washington on September 17. This was followed up by additional meetings in Washington in mid-October among Dr. Yosef Burg, Israel's minister of the interior and head of the autonomy negotiating team, Hasan 'Ali, and Linowitz. The latter told the press that progress had been made and that Egypt and Israel had "moved closer to agreement."

While there had indeed been some progress on such questions as joint Israeli-Palestinian supervision of the development of water resources and public land use, the parties remained far apart on such basic issues as the legal source of the self-governing authority's powers; the meaning of "full autonomy"—purely
personal and administrative, as Begin insisted, or territorial in scope and including judicial and quasi-legislative functions, as Sadat claimed; and whether or not the Arab residents of the Eastern part of Jerusalem—which was regarded as an inalienable part of Israel by Begin and as an integral part of the West Bank by Sadat—would be able to participate in the elections for the SGA. These issues could not be left to determination by subordinates, and it was generally expected that they would have to be thrashed out at another summit conference among the principals after the American elections.

The defeat of Jimmy Carter set back the time-table for the expected confrontation, as the new Reagan administration decided to defer entering into the intricacies of the Arab-Israel dispute until after the administration had established itself and found its bearings. Another reason for delay was provided by the forthcoming elections in Israel scheduled for June 30, 1981. In view of the widespread early public opinion poll surveys which indicated a considerable advantage for the opposition Labor Alignment, which had been unenthusiastic about Begin’s autonomy formula and preferred some form of territorial compromise with Jordan on the West Bank, there was a tendency in Cairo and Washington to wait for the heated Israeli election campaign to be concluded. (In the event, the public mood in Israel shifted and Prime Minister Begin once again led the government, although with a reduced parliamentary majority.)

The Question of Linkage

At the time of the conclusion of the Camp David accords in September 1978, Israel had insisted that there was no legal linkage between the projected Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the general framework for peace which outlined the principles for Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and the Gaza District. Egypt’s responsibilities to establish diplomatic relations, to end the boycott of Israeli products, and to embark upon a process of normalization with Israel, Israeli officials maintained, were dependent solely on Israel’s performance of its obligations to staged withdrawal from Sinai, without regard to the progress or lack of progress in the autonomy talks. But as the April 1982 deadline for total Israeli withdrawal to the international frontier with Egypt began to draw near without any agreement having been reached on an autonomy formula, the Israelis began to be fearful that once Sadat had achieved his objectives in Sinai and all the oil and land had been returned to his control, Israel would lose its leverage on the Egyptian leader. What was to prevent him from adopting a militant position in support of Palestinian rights and of recalling the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv and ending the process of normalization, ostensibly because of Israel’s “intransigence” on the Palestinian question? By assuming such a stance Sadat would be able to retain hold of the Sinai while improving his chances of re-establishing Egypt’s traditional ties with the Arab world, which had been severely strained by the peace treaty with Israel. Consequently, Israeli officials began dropping hints that the timetable for
Israel's final withdrawal from Sinai might be made contingent upon the reaching of a satisfactory agreement with Egypt before then on a SGA for the West Bank and Gaza that was acceptable to Israel. Minister of Interior Burg expressed the point in a witty way when he told the American special envoy to the Middle East during the autonomy discussion in Washington in October that "henceforth your name shall no longer be Linowitz but Linkowitz."

Before returning to the Middle East in December, Linowitz announced that he had been authorized by President-elect Reagan to inform Egypt and Israel that Reagan pledged to maintain the Camp David framework for future Middle East negotiations. After discussions with Linowitz in Cairo and Jerusalem, Sadat and Begin issued a joint statement saying they had made "important progress" in negotiations and were confident that through "perseverance and resolve" they could "fulfill fully the promise of Camp David." These optimistic words notwithstanding, the autonomy talks were shelved for the first half of 1981.

**Plans for a Rapid Deployment Force**

Planning for an American rapid deployment force in the Middle East had been going on for two years, but with low priority until the "discovery" of the Soviet brigade in Cuba, the Iran hostage situation, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The last item was the most catalytic. However, the "Wolfowitz Report," prepared by the Pentagon in 1979, concluded that American forces could not stop a Soviet military takeover of Iran if Moscow decided "to seize a historical opportunity to change the worldwide balance." As an adjunct to that main conclusion, the report also concluded that "to prevail in an Iranian scenario, we [the U.S.] might have to threaten or make use of tactical nuclear weapons."

The Arab reaction to President Carter's assertion on January 23 that the U.S., in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, would provide a security umbrella for the Persian Gulf was cool. The "Steadfastness Front" (Syria, South Yemen, Libya, Algeria, and the PLO) contended that the U.S. would use the situation to "further American interests" and to deflect attention from the Palestinian issue.

Iraq, which for several years had been trying to lessen its heavy dependence on the Soviet Union, and was seeking Western European weapons and nuclear technology, protested strongly against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, calling it "outright interference." But Iraq also opposed any strengthening of the American military presence in the Persian/Arabian Gulf. Baghdad had long been the main challenger to Teheran for supremacy in the Gulf, and following the downfall of the shah, President Saddam Hussein al-Takriti, the Iraqi strongman, saw an opportunity to project Iraq's primacy.

President Saddam Hussein's response on February 8 to President Carter's call for a Middle East security system was an eight-point "National Charter" that called on Arab states to "maintain strict neutrality and non-alignment," to reject the presence of "foreign troops or military forces" and to deny "facilities for the use of
Arab territory" to foreign troops. The *Middle East Economic Survey* reported on February 25 that Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and the PLO had supported the idea of the "National Charter." More surprising was the endorsement of Saudi king Khalid, who was cited by *MEES* as saying that the principles of the Charter had made "the best possible impression on us." The rapprochement between erstwhile radical Iraq and conservative Saudi Arabia had been prompted not only by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but also by mutual concern over Ayatollah Khomeini's incitement of the local Shi'ite Muslims against their regimes.

**The Iraq-Iran War**

Iranian-Iraqi relations continued to deteriorate. In March Iraq asked Iran to recall its ambassador from Baghdad and announced that its forces had repulsed "aggression" by Iranians against an Iraqi border post. In April both sides expelled or recalled their remaining diplomats; Iraq cabled UN secretary-general Kurt Waldheim demanding that Iran withdraw from Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, three islands which the shah's forces had occupied in 1971 because they were strategically located near the Straits of Hormuz, through which the Gulf oil flowed; and Iran placed its army on full alert. On April 8 President Saddam Hussein warned that anyone who tried to "put his hand on Iraq" would "have his hand cut off without hesitation." Khomeini responded the following day by declaring that he hoped the Iraqi regime would be "dispatched to the refuse bin of history." Iranian foreign minister Sadeq Ghotbzadeh said that Iran had "decided to overthrow" the regime in Baghdad, and two days later President Abulhasan Bani-Sadr reiterated Iran's determination to have the Iraqi regime overthrown. Meanwhile, the Baghdad regime shored up its inter-Arab relations with visits from the rulers of Jordan and Kuwait.

The simmering conflict erupted into full-scale war in September. On the 17th of the month Saddam Hussein announced that Iraq was terminating a 1975 border agreement with Iran because the latter had failed to abide by it and declared that Iraq considered the Shatt al-Arab "totally Iraqi and totally Arab." Under the 1975 agreement the Iraqis had accepted the Iranian contention that the border should be along the midpoint of the Shatt al-Arab, the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers as they flow into the Gulf. For his part, the shah had pledged to stop supporting the Iraqi Kurds in their insurgency against the Baghdad regime. Now Iraq reasserted its claim to the old border, to other territory ceded to Iran, and also demanded the return of the three Persian-occupied Gulf islands to "Arab sovereignty."

In the fierce fighting of the following months Iraq and Iran temporarily crippled each other's oil installations and wreaked havoc on civilian population centers. Each side made extravagant claims to victory which proved premature, and after initial Iraqi territorial gains the fighting dragged on inconclusively.

The Iraq-Iran war further split the Arab world. Jordan served as an alternative means of sending supplies to Iraq, whose Gulf port of Basra was under siege, and
Jordanian king Hussein pledged to intervene "without hesitation" if requested to do so by Iraq. Most other Arab states also gave greater or lesser support to Iraq. Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, however, declared on October 10 that it was the "Islamic duty" of Arab countries to align themselves with Iran. Syrian president Hafez al-Assad, who a month earlier had gone to Tripoli to conclude an agreement with Qaddafi to merge their two countries, also supported Iran. In his case the reason was less Islamic sentiment than a desire to weaken Baghdad, Damascus' traditional rival. Baghdad responded by closing down the Libyan and Syrian embassies.

PLO leader Yasir Arafat scurried between Baghdad and Teheran offering his services as a mediator, since the conflict deflected Arab efforts and world attention from the Palestinian struggle. Arafat's efforts were rebuffed, with each side saying in effect, "If you are not with us, you are against us." A unanimous UN security council call for a cessation of hostilities and mediation efforts by a delegation of Islamic states proved equally fruitless.

The United States was caught in a dilemma. There was much popular resentment against the Khomeini regime for the continued holding of the American hostages. At the same time there was concern in Washington that Moscow would profit from a clearcut Iraqi victory and the prospect that secessionist movements among the Arab, Kurdish, Turkic, Baluchi, and other ethnic groups in Iran would hasten the dissolution of the country. On September 23 President Carter said the United States would adhere to "strict neutrality" in the conflict. A few days later Washington clarified its position to declare that the U.S. would be "strongly opposed to any dismemberment of Iran." The U.S. also suspended the planned export of six turbine engines intended to power Iraqi combat ships.

**American AWACS to Saudi Arabia**

At the end of September the United States sent four AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) radar command aircraft with several hundred support personnel to Saudi Arabia as a "temporary deployment" for "defensive purposes" at the request of the Saudi government. One might have expected that the Iran-Iraq war, coming upon the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the continuing turmoil within Iran, would have brought the Saudis around to favoring a closer defense relationship with the United States, including a greater receptivity to the American request for air and naval facilities within the region. Yet, the Saudis continued to give greater weight to Arab sentiment opposed to the presence of foreign bases on their own soil. Oman was the only Arab state in the Gulf region that agreed to American bases. The Saudis wanted American help, but on terms dictated by them. In June it had been disclosed that the Saudis had asked the Carter administration for extra fuel tanks, bomb racks, and sophisticated missiles to provide an increased range and offensive capability for the F-15 planes being purchased from the United States. While the Carter administration denied that it had agreed to the Saudi request, there were strong indications that the defense department was leaning toward approval, and a leading Saudi official was quoted by the Washington Star in mid-July.
as declaring that his government had received a "firm commitment" from Washington.

The proposed sale was opposed in a letter in early July to President Carter by 68 senators who reminded him that Defense Secretary Harold Brown had formally assured the Senate at the time of the original sale in 1978 that the U.S. did not intend to sell the Saudis any other "systems or armaments that would increase the range or enhance the ground attack capability of the F-15." Significantly, one of the opponents of the new equipment was Senate majority leader Robert Byrd (D., W.Va.), who had been a proponent of the original sale. Byrd said he could "see no rationale" for providing offensive equipment to the Saudis and urged the administration to drop the matter. Senate minority leader Howard Baker (R., Tenn.), who also urged Carter to deny the Saudi request, similarly cited the 1978 assurances and noted that he had approved the initial deal only because he had been convinced that it "would not pose any serious offensive threat to Israel." The Saudi request was shelved until after the American elections. Subsequently, the Saudis also demanded the right to purchase AWACS of their own to replace the American-manned planes temporarily assigned to the Gulf area.

**Egyptian-U.S. Defense Cooperation**

In contrast to the Saudi reluctance to be publicly identified with American regional defense efforts, President Sadat of Egypt frequently reiterated his readiness to make Egyptian facilities available to the United States whenever necessary. In April the abortive U.S. hostage mission made use of Egyptian bases en route; in November 1,400 soldiers of the proposed U.S. rapid deployment force flew to Egypt for joint training exercises. The joint maneuvers were only one sign of the increasingly close American-Egyptian defense relationship. In February the U.S. had announced that the Egyptians would be permitted to purchase F-15 and F-16 jet fighters. This came a day after Defense Minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali was quoted in *al-Ahram* as stressing that the United States would "open the doors" to Egypt's acquisition of advanced U.S. weapons systems so that Egypt would be "for the first time on an equal footing with Israel as far as arms are concerned."

The Israelis had mixed feelings about the growing closeness between Cairo and Washington. On the one hand, Begin and Sadat shared the American concern over Soviet expansionism and radical extremism in the region. On the other hand, the Israelis were not happy over the dilution of the special strategic relationship they believed they deserved to enjoy with Washington, and many Israelis were still skeptical over the permanence of the Egyptian commitment to peace with Israel and to a pro-American orientation. Israeli offers to make their facilities available to the United States for regional defense needs were shelved by Washington for fear of antagonizing the Arab world, and Israel's quiet suggestions that Eitam and Etzion (the two major air bases in Sinai that Israel was scheduled to evacuate in the spring of 1982) would be ideal for the rapid deployment force encountered opposition
from the Egyptians. Sadat made it clear that while he would provide temporary "facilities" to the U.S. as needed, he would not permit any permanent foreign bases, especially not in Sinai, whose total recovery had become a symbol of national prestige.

The Carter administration's alleged failure to recognize Israel's value as a strategic asset to the United States in the Middle East was a major theme in Ronald Reagan's election campaign. Writing in the Washington Post (Aug. 15, 1979), Reagan asserted that the U.S. position in the area "would be weaker without the political and military assets Israel provides, yet, American policymakers downgrade Israel's geopolitical importance as a stabilizing force, as a deterrent to radical hegemony, and as a military offset to the Soviet Union." In contrast to those who contended that the overthrow of the shah made it more necessary than ever for the United States to curry favor with the Saudis and other Arab states, Reagan stressed that "the fall of Iran has increased Israel's value as perhaps the only remaining strategic asset in the region on which the U.S. can truly rely." It was not only Israel's demonstrated military capacity that made her a reliable ally, Reagan pointed out, but in contrast to the regimes ruling in the other states in the region, "with a democratic political system like our own we need have no fear of Israel's political stability or of the rise of a radical, anti-American leadership at her helm."

**Israeli Isolation at the United Nations**

The erosion of Israel's international position within the United Nations continued during the period under review. Israel's isolation became virtually complete when Washington backed several anti-Israel resolutions.

On March 1, 1980 the United States voted in favor of security council resolution 465, thereby marking the first time that the Carter administration supported a security council resolution which not only condemned Israel's settlement policy, but also called for dismantling of the settlements and contained numerous references to Jerusalem as occupied Arab territory. President Carter's subsequent disavowal of the vote turned the issue into a major diplomatic and political embarrassment for the administration and only served to deepen the confusion surrounding America's Middle East policy. The American action revealed not only a lack of consistency but a failure to understand that the Arabs' anti-Israel campaign was in fact intended to undermine the American-backed Camp David process.

Resolution 465 had its origin in a superficially innocuous but basically pernicious Jordanian initiative of February 1979. This resulted in security council resolution 446 of March 22, 1979, calling for establishment of a three-member commission to "examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem." Other clauses of the resolution claimed that Israel's policy and practices of establishing settlements in "Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967" (emphasis added) had no legal validity, and deplored Israel's failure to abide by UN resolutions on the subject. Resolution 446 had
been adopted by a vote of 12 in favor to none against, with three abstentions (Norway, United Kingdom, United States).

U.S. representative James Leonard had expressed "grave doubts about the utility of the creation" of the commission at a time when the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks were at "such a critical stage." Indeed, the resolution was adopted just a week before the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Stressing that Egypt and Israel had made "a first important move toward a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East," he said it was "incumbent on the security council not to inject irritants into that process." The American delegate expressed his belief that the "confrontational debate" and intemperate criticism of Israel "only tended to distract, to disrupt, and to complicate the peace talks and the search for a just solution to the issue of settlements."

Jordanian representative Hazem Nuseibeh, in calling for the creation of the investigative commission, emphasized that if it confirmed the substance of Jordan's charges against Israel, then "it should become logically inescapable that the council should exercise the powers vested in it by the Charter, including Chapter VII, to ensure compliance." (Chapter VII speaks of UN enforcement measures, including economic sanctions and even military measures, such as the UN "police action" in Korea.) The March 1979 resolution thus not only created in the security council commission a locus for Arab grievances in direct competition with the Camp David process, but also opened a Pandora's box of possible anti-Israeli sanctions in the future.

In view of this background the United States might have been expected to veto the 1979 resolution. The American decision to abstain, rather than to exercise its right of veto and thereby block the creation of the commission, prompted speculation that the U.S. was motivated by a strong desire to induce Jordan and other so-called moderate Arab countries to support the goals of the Camp David agreements. The New York Times reported at the time that American officials conceded privately that the U.S. abstention "reflected the Carter administration's efforts during the Middle East negotiations to hold to a neutral course favoring neither Israel nor the Arabs." Israel announced that it was not prepared to have any contact with the commission which, it said, would serve only to underwrite "pre-determined and hostile conclusions," and refused the commission admittance when it arrived in late May.

Strong regret over Israel's lack of cooperation with the commission was expressed in the preamble of security council resolution 452 of July 20, 1979, which embodied the council's acceptance of the commission's recommendations. The resolution, which was adopted by a vote of 14 in favor to none against, with one abstention (United States), called upon "the government and the people of Israel to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction, and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem" and requested the commission "in view of the magnitude of the problem of settlements, to keep under close survey the implementation of the present resolution. . . ." Resolution 452 went
beyond the issue of settlements, as well, in its reconfirmation of the "need to protect and preserve" the holy places in Jerusalem. It was this last reference to the matter of Jerusalem that determined the United States' decision not to support the resolution, according to U.S. delegate Richard Petree.

Israel's ambassador Yehuda Blum (who was invited by the security council to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, along with the representatives of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the PLO) called the commission report—upon which resolution 452 was based—a regurgitation of the most extreme and unrestrained attacks on Israel's sovereign rights, and labeled its allegations ludicrous. Egypt's ambassador Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid expressed hope that Israel's settlement policy would be reversed, and claimed that the recommendations of the commission had the full support of his government.

Open disagreement between the Israeli and American governments continued to develop over the next few months, particularly in relation to the thorny settlement issue. For example, on December 12, 1979 the United States went along with 139 other general assembly members in supporting a resolution that "strongly deplored" Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and called on Israel to protect the indigenous population and halt changes in the legal status "of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem." However, U.S. representative James Costello voted against another resolution the same day that condemned Israeli actions in Jerusalem because, he said, it "contained accusations with little or no basis." Moreover, he emphasized that the United States felt that "the expression 'Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967' should not prejudice the results of negotiations." Thus, he put the assembly on notice that the U.S. did not accept the conclusion implicit in this language that the West Bank and Gaza were distinctly Palestinian territories, and therefore should become independent rather than have their disposition negotiated between Israel and Jordan, as the Sinai had been determined in the Egyptian-Israeli talks and the Golan Heights was intended to be negotiated between Israel and Syria.

The U.S. continued to issue statements criticizing Israel for creating new settlements, and was especially critical of the Israeli government's decision to permit Jews to move into the heart of Hebron. This decision, according to White House aides, "incensed both Mr. Carter and Mr. Vance," who regarded the Israeli stance as "provocative and felt it required an American response." The upcoming security council resolution (465)—whose genesis lay in an effort by several Arab and third world members of the security council to produce a resolution critical of Israel which could win American support—apparently seemed like the appropriate vehicle for such a response. Moreover, U.S. support for the Arab-sponsored resolution may also have been prompted by Washington's desire to recruit the support of the Arab world in the face of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and the then-ongoing hostage crisis in Iran.
During negotiations over the wording of the draft resolution, U.S. ambassador Donald McHenry was under state department instructions to work for the deletion of the operative paragraph (number seven) which implied criticism of Israel's administration of Jerusalem's holy places, and to try to eliminate other objectionable clauses dealing with the dismantling of existing settlements. Eventually, McHenry succeeded in getting paragraph seven removed, although the language on dismantling the settlements was to remain part of the resolution. McHenry suggested that the latter difficulty be dealt with by means of a "reservation" to be made after the vote. At this point, Secretary Vance ordered that the vote be delayed so as to allow him to check with President Carter, who had flown to Camp David for the weekend. Rather than submit a copy of the draft resolution to the White House to be reviewed by the national security council and passed along to the president, which was the normal consultative procedure in such circumstances, Vance spoke directly with the president on the telephone. Without actually viewing the text, Carter instructed Vance to authorize Ambassador McHenry to vote in favor of the resolution and to issue a "strong statement" of objection to the dismantling clauses.

On Saturday morning, March 1, Vance met with Ephraim Evron, Israel's ambassador to the U.S., who pointed out that a number of references to Jerusalem still remained in the resolution. Moreover, the resolution as a whole was contrary to stated U.S. policy, since it called for extending the existence of the investigative commission created the previous year and added to its mandate key items, such as control over water and other natural resources, which were at the heart of the U.S.-backed Egyptian-Israeli autonomy talks. Following additional consultation with Assistant Secretary Harold Saunders, Vance apparently concluded or was assured that the resolution was satisfactory as it stood. That afternoon McHenry cast the U.S. vote in favor of the resolution and followed up with a statement in which he labeled the call for dismantling the existing settlements "impractical." President Carter, upon his return from Camp David Monday morning, saw the final text for the first time. According to Vice President Mondale, Carter "really hit the ceiling" when he discovered that the resolution still contained a number of references to Jerusalem in the preambular sections. Carter later stated that his instructions had been that all references to Jerusalem should be deleted before the U.S. voted in favor. Carter then made the decision to issue a statement disavowing the vote on the grounds that it had been cast in error.

As expected, Israel assailed the initial U.S. support for the resolution. Egypt, however, praised the U.S. vote and declared that the American support for the resolution was in line with its role as full partner in the Middle East peace negotiations. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Boutros Ghali added that Egypt considered Israel's settlement policy an obstacle to the peace negotiations and that the security council's vote supported Egypt's position.
American Jewish Reaction

Even after President Carter disavowed the vote and Secretary Vance accepted blame for the "failure in communications" which paved the way for the initial U.S. support of resolution 465, American Jewish leaders expressed skepticism and even anger over the U.S. handling of the issue. Some felt that the White House statement disavowing the vote had repudiated only part of the resolution and thereby gave tacit approval to the resolution's identification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as Palestinian territory, as distinct from other occupied Arab territories. By not dissociating himself from this language in the council, as the U.S. delegation had done in the assembly the previous December, Ambassador McHenry's action was initially seen as a hint that the U.S. might be moving toward support of the PLO claim that the West Bank and Gaza should be part of an independent Palestinian state. Moreover, Carter's clarification of the issue of existing Israeli settlements, in which he described the call for dismantlement "neither proper nor practical," while an improvement over McHenry's formulation, was considered by many in the Jewish community to be inadequate and an indication of a worrisome American policy.

The March 1 resolution also included a call by the security council "upon all states not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connection with settlements in the occupied territories." There was here the beginning of the demand for sanctions that had been raised by Jordan the previous year. While the U.S. had succeeded in the drafting negotiations to have the limiting word "specifically" inserted, the affirmative American vote for this paragraph was at variance with President Carter's oft-repeated pledge never to use economic aid as an instrument for pressuring Israel to modify its policies.

The Carter administration's controversial vote and sudden reversal caused a political backlash centered around the ever-present issue of Mr. Carter's competence. American supporters of Israel were further concerned about the implications of the incident for American Middle East policy. Theodore Mann, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, sent a telegram to President Carter in which he placed the American action in the context of the broader geopolitical struggle. "I am worried about my country," Mann wrote the president. "I am beginning to doubt its good sense, its resolve, and its ability to discern right from wrong. When American citizens are being held hostage by terrorists in Bogota and Teheran, we have joined the Soviet Union in condemning the one country in the world most vulnerable to terrorism from taking active steps to prevent it. We should be attacking terrorists, not its victims."

Mann termed the U.S. vote "a heavy-handed interference in the autonomy negotiations going far beyond the Camp David accords we are pledged to support." After the New York Times had published an article based on state department sources who contended that the March 1 resolution was in fact consistent with American policy and did not represent any new departure, the director of Middle East affairs for the American Jewish Committee wrote a letter, published in the
Times on March 28, 1980, detailing the significant ways in which the resolution departed from stated American policy. George E. Gruen concluded: "Instead of encouraging Palestinian and Jordanian participation in the Camp David process of direct negotiation," the security council had, with the backing of the United States, created "a competitive locus for presenting Arab grievances, thereby undercutting the Camp David process and serving the interests of the rejectionist Arab states and the Soviet Union." This was patently "contrary to the American interest in strengthening the peace process in which the United States has been a 'full partner' trusted by both sides."

While unhappy with the Carter administration, American Jewish leaders were also becoming increasingly uncomfortable with some of the actions of the Israeli government and the pronouncements of Israeli officials. Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon evoked an angry reaction when he charged at a meeting of the Presidents’ Conference in New York on March 12 that American Jews had been dangerously silent about Israel's security needs because they had failed to produce a massive demonstration at the White House to protest the March 1 vote on the UN anti-settlement resolution. Conference chairman Mann, in a radio broadcast in Jerusalem, took Sharon to task for presuming to tell American Jews how to express their anger over the UN issue. Howard M. Squadron, president of the American Jewish Congress who was elected to succeed Mann as chairman of the Presidents’ Conference in June, said Sharon did "not understand the American political process and it was not appropriate for him to give such advice." Albert Vorspan of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations said he found Sharon's remarks "offensive, a total misstatement of reality." He added that he had no doubt that there was "anxiety and undiminished anger against the resolution and U.S. support for that resolution, and I don't think the feeling was mollified by the president's excuses."

But, he noted pointedly, staging a protest was only one possible way of expressing anger. "Voting is another."

Indeed, political analysts believe that the desire among Jewish voters to register a protest against the Carter administration's handling of the Israel issue at the UN was the major factor in Senator Edward Kennedy's defeat of President Carter in the New York Democratic primary on March 25. This event, together with a Harris poll in June showing that independent presidential candidate John Anderson would siphon off many traditionally-Democratic Jewish votes, prompted Robert Strauss, chairman of the Carter-Mondale campaign, to declare that the "lack of appreciation" in the Jewish community "for what the president has done for the State of Israel and to find peace in the Middle East" is "outrageous."

**American Position on Other UN Resolutions**

In his statement explaining the March 1 vote as due to a "failure in communications" between Washington and the U.S. mission to the UN, President Carter had said he wanted to reiterate "in the most unequivocal of terms" that in the autonomy
negotiations and "in other forums" the United States "will neither support nor accept any position that might jeopardize Israel's vital security interests. Our commitment to Israel's security and well-being," Carter concluded, "remains unqualified and unshakable." Yet, the American position at the United Nations in subsequent months revealed that United States support for Israel was by no means unqualified. This led Israeli officials and a considerable segment of American Jewry to conclude that the president was either lacking in sincerity or else that his definition of what was necessary for Israel's security and well-being was by no means synonymous with that of the Israeli government.

Thus, for example, the United States abstained on security council resolution 467 of April 24, which rebuked Israel for its April 9 incursion into Lebanon and for providing military assistance to "de facto forces"—the Christian militia of Major Haddad—in southern Lebanon. The resolution also strongly deplored all acts of violence against UN forces in Lebanon and in violation of the Israel-Lebanon armistice agreement. Yet, the resolution failed to condemn the PLO for the terrorist raid on a children's nursery at Kibbutz Misgav Am, which had prompted the Israeli operation against the terrorist bases in Lebanon, nor did it condemn the PLO for initiating most of the acts of violence against the UNIFIL forces. The American delegate reportedly had been instructed to abstain and not to veto the one-sided resolution because it merely "rebuked" Israel and did not formally "condemn" Israel's retaliation.

The United States did cast its veto on April 30 to block adoption by the security council of a resolution that would have affirmed the right of the Palestinians "to establish an independent state in Palestine" and called for Israel to withdraw from all territories occupied in the 1967 war. However, on May 8 the United States merely abstained on security council resolution 468, which called on Israel to rescind the "illegal" expulsion of three West Bank leaders (Mayor Fahd Kawasme of Hebron, Mayor Mohammed Milhem of Halhoul, and Sheikh Raja Bayud Tamimi of Hebron), and on a follow-up resolution on May 20 criticizing Israel for failing to implement the earlier resolution. The resolutions failed to mention that Israel had taken this action after terrorists had ambushed and killed seven Jewish students and wounded 15 others as the group was returning from Friday night services at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron. PLO leader Yasir Arafat took credit for the attack, saying it was part of a new phase of intensified armed resistance against Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. The state department had condemned the attack as "senseless" and "unjustifiable."

The Israeli government contended that the three West Bank leaders had been inciting the populace to violence against the Jewish settlers and openly endorsing the PLO. The two mayors vigorously denied the charge of incitement and the Israel supreme court agreed to review the case. There was no public criticism of the Israeli action by American Jewish organizations, although in private some American Jewish leaders as well as some Israelis questioned its wisdom, noting that the expulsion had made the local leaders international celebrities and enabled them
to make a poignant appeal for Palestinian rights at the United Nations and at many other forums, including Jewish centers in the United States and Western Europe.

**Condemnation of Anti-Arab Violence**

On June 2 a wave of anti-Arab bombings occurred in the West Bank. Mayor Bassam al-Shaka of Nablus lost both legs and Mayor Karim Khalaf of Ramallah lost part of one foot to explosives planted in their cars. (An Israeli sapper was blinded as he attempted to defuse a bomb in the home of the mayor of El Bireh.) Around the same time a grenade tossed into the Arab market of Hebron injured seven persons. Since the anti-Arab terrorism occurred at the end of the month of mourning for the Jewish victims of the Hebron ambush, suspicion focused on Jewish militants. A spokesman for the Kach movement of Meir Kahane expressed approval of the acts but disclaimed responsibility. Rabbi Kahane himself was in prison at the time. There was also some speculation that an extremist Arab group, seeking to cause further unrest, had set the bombs.

Prime Minister Begin described the attacks as "crimes of the gravest type" and pledged an "intensive investigation." The attacks were almost universally condemned in Israel, even by some groups of Israeli settlers. There was also prompt and vigorous condemnation by many American Jewish groups. Bertram Gold, executive vice president of the American Jewish Committee, coupled his condemnation of the bombings with an expression of gratitude that Prime Minister Begin and other Israeli officials had "reaffirmed their intention to take firm measures to combat extremist violence from whatever source." He added that the cycle of violence "will truly be broken only when the PLO and its supporters in the Arab world renounce terrorism" and the neighboring Arab states negotiated peace with Israel as Sadat had done. Presidents' Conference chairman Mann called the acts an "obscene use of violence" and said, "We condemn those criminals who are guilty of it, whether they be Jews or Arabs." Presuming that the terrorists were Jewish, he pointedly stressed, "the way of vigilantism and lawlessness is not the way of the People of the Book."

As was to be expected, the UN security council on June 5 condemned the attempted assassinations of the three West Bank mayors and then went on to express "deep concern" over Israel's failure "to provide adequate protection" for the civilian population in the occupied territories. The United States was the only country to abstain. American delegate Donald McHenry explained that the U.S. could not endorse the resolution since it had isolated a single outrage in a spiral of violence that had cost both Israeli and Arab lives. There were several other passages to which the U.S. took objection. But by not vetoing the resolution, the United States let stand a manifestly unfair criticism of Israel and helped to perpetuate the UN's double standard of always condemning Israel on the slightest pretext while failing to condemn PLO terrorism.
The only constructive security council actions in this period for which the U.S. voted were the unanimous renewals of the UN disengagement observer force on the Golan Heights and the renewal of the mandate of UNIFIL in Lebanon.

**Reaction to Jerusalem Law**

The long-standing Arab rejectionist campaign to delegitimize Israel and to force the United States to choose between joining in the condemnation of Israel or of being isolated from the mainstream of international opinion at the United Nations again focused on Jerusalem in the summer of 1980. Actions in the Israeli Knesset served to facilitate the confrontation on the issue. In response to earlier UN resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal from “all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem,” and in particular to a resolution by the Egyptian People’s Assembly on April 1 declaring Arab Jerusalem to be part of the West Bank and the capital of the Palestinian people, Israel began to reassert its own claim to sovereignty over the entire city. Many prominent Israelis, including Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kollek, believed that such action was unnecessary since the city had in effect been incorporated into Israel since 1967, and that it would needlessly provoke international controversy over an emotional issue that had best be left to the end of the peace process.

Nevertheless, neither the government of Prime Minister Begin nor the opposition Labor party were prepared actively to oppose the private member’s bill on Jerusalem introduced on May 14 by Geula Cohen, a former Begin supporter who had left the Herut party over the concessions made by Israel in the peace treaty with Egypt. Criticism by the Vatican and by the UN security council on June 30 galvanized popular sentiment in Israel in favor of the law, which was overwhelmingly approved in committee on June 30 and passed by the full Knesset on July 30 as a “basic law” and thus part of Israel’s constitution.

The law declared that “Jerusalem united in its entirety is the capital of Israel” and that the city was to be the seat of the president, the Knesset, the government, and the supreme court. In an effort to forestall one source of potential criticism, the basic law on Jerusalem reaffirmed that “the holy places shall be protected from desecration or from interference with free access to them by their respective adherents.” Legislation to this effect had already been enacted in June 1967. (At the same time it was announced that Prime Minister Begin planned to move his office and some other ministries to a new office complex being constructed in East Jerusalem—the section of the city occupied by Jordan from 1948 to 1967—to demonstrate the unification of the city.)

On June 30 the security council voted 14 to 0, with the United States abstaining, to deplore the legislative steps initiated by Israel to make all of Jerusalem, including the portion captured in the 1967 war, the capital of the Jewish state. Resolution 476, which had been put forward by 39 Islamic states, also accused Israel of attempting to alter the “physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure...
and status" of Jerusalem. It declared such Israeli action "null and void" and reiterated its call for an end of Israeli occupation of Arab territories "including Jerusalem."

In explaining the American abstention, Ambassador McHenry criticized the council for a series of eight debates over the previous four months which had "the effect, if not the intention, of undercutting the one active negotiation currently in progress" — the Camp David autonomy talks. The resolution was deficient, he said, because it omitted any reference to Israel's right to peaceful and secure borders. But McHenry, in explaining the American decision to abstain rather than to veto the resolution, also criticized Israel for its "unilateral act which has sought to change the character of the city outside a negotiated settlement." While reaffirming the American position that the city should remain physically undivided "with free access to people of all faiths," he stressed that the Israeli legislative action and the plan to move the prime minister's office "are inconsistent with international law and indeed with the very nature of negotiation."

Rabbi Joseph Sternstein, president of the American Zionist Federation, blasted the failure of the United States to veto "this blatantly false and unjust attack on Israel," and saw in it "a further demonstration of the ominous shift in our nation's Middle East policy." The Zionist leader assailed the United Nations as "a place where morality and justice are held hostage to the petrodollars and the influence they yield." Before the vote, reports had circulated that Western diplomats were fearful that an American veto might provoke Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil producers to cut production. Kuwaiti representative Abdallah Bishara had warned during the debate that he could not guarantee the flow of oil to any industrial country unless the problem of Jerusalem was dealt with. Iraqi representative Salah Ali warned that "the price for the American policy of injustice, bias, and one-sidedness will be very high for the American people." However, a high administration official in Washington, briefing reporters after the vote, denied that the American decision to abstain had been influenced by threats of an oil cutoff.

The American abstention apparently satisfied the Arabs, including the Palestine Liberation Organization. Zedhi Labib Terzi, the PLO observer at the UN, said he considered the resolution to have been approved unanimously "because the U.S. is in bondage now and cannot really take a position" until after the presidential election campaign was over.

The American electoral campaign did not deter the Arab states from pressing forward during the summer with their well-orchestrated campaign of anti-Israel measures at the UN. An "emergency special session" of the general assembly on July 29 passed a resolution (ES-7/2) reaffirming that a comprehensive and lasting peace could not be established in the Middle East without Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and without the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine. The resolution defined these as including the right "to return to their homes and property in Palestine," the right "to self-determination without external interference," and the right "to establish its
own independent sovereign state.” The resolution also reaffirmed “the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people” to participate “on an equal footing” in all UN deliberations and conferences dealing with the Middle East.

The resolution was adopted by a vote of 112 to 7, with 24 abstentions. While many states which had supported the resolution or abstained made a point of stating that their support of Palestinian rights was not intended to deny Israel’s right to exist, the Iraqi delegate made it clear that this was exactly what his government had in mind. He criticized the resolution for not being strong enough. At the least, he said, the assembly should have taken measures to impose sanctions “against the Zionist entity.” The call for withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, the Iraqi delegate insisted, “should not be construed to mean that the occupation of territories by force in 1948 and 1949 was legitimate.”

The United States voted with Israel against the resolution. The reasons stated for the negative American vote were that the resolution ignored one of the basic principles of resolution 242, namely that peace included the termination of all claims of belligerency and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area; and that by calling for Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from occupied territories the resolution “contradicted and undermined” resolution 242, the only agreed framework for peace. The U.S. also voted against a resolution endorsing the work of the Palestine Rights Committee, which had become an instrument for PLO propaganda through UN channels.

**European Initiative**

Most of the Western European countries, with the exception of Norway, abstained, despite American urging that they oppose the resolution. The delegate of Luxembourg, speaking on behalf of the nine-member European Economic Community (EEC), explained that they had abstained because certain elements of the resolution were inconsistent with resolution 242 and with the Community’s Venice declaration of June 13, 1980. The Community did not want to take a position on substantive issues in view of forthcoming talks with both sides.

In the Venice declaration, the members of the EEC said that growing tensions in the Middle East “rendered a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and pressing than ever.” They cited the “traditional ties and common interests” linking Europe with the Middle East as the grounds for their playing a “special role” in a more concrete way toward peace.

The EEC statement said that the time had come to work for the implementation of the “two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right of existence and to security of all states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.” The EEC offered to support international security guarantees for Israel and also endorsed the “right of the Palestinian people to exercise fully
its right to self-determination." The Venice declaration called for the renunciation of violence by all sides, an end to Israel's territorial occupation and to Israeli settlements, which "constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process," as well as for an agreed and not a unilaterally imposed status for Jerusalem. On the delicate question of the role of the PLO, the declaration noted that since attainment of the above objectives required the involvement and support of all parties concerned, this meant that the Palestinians and the PLO "will have to be associated with the negotiations."

The EEC stand angered both sides. The PLO refused to endorse the statement since it fell short of calling openly for an independent state and did not recognize the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians. The Israeli cabinet denounced the EEC statement, saying it smacked of the European appeasement of Hitler in 1938 and that the "guarantees" were no sounder than those given Czechoslovakia. The Venice declaration was widely criticized in Israel and by the American Jewish community as motivated by an effort to curry favor with the Arab oil producers and as an attempt to undercut the American-sponsored Camp David process.

Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, who had replaced Vance after the latter's resignation over the hostage rescue raid, conceded that the United States had not been involved in or consulted over the Venice declaration. Refusing to comment on the text of the declaration, Muskie tried to place a positive interpretation on the European initiative, noting that he was particularly pleased with the statement of Italian premier Francesco Cossiga at the press conference in Venice, "in which he emphasized that it is the intent of the European Community not to undermine the Camp David process, but to support it." There was some concern in Washington and Jerusalem that if the autonomy talks did not result in tangible progress on the Palestinian question, the Europeans would move from the stage of fact-finding to that of proposing their own substantive terms. The Europeans had privately assured the Americans that they did not plan to do so—not, at least, until after the American elections.

**UN Censures Israel on Jerusalem**

In his first major speech before the security council, on August 20, Secretary of State Muskie strongly criticized the series of "unbalanced and unrealistic resolutions" on Middle East issues that had been brought before the UN organs. Nevertheless, while calling the latest resolution "fundamentally flawed," Muskie abstained instead of vetoing resolution 478. In it the council censured Israel's enactment of the basic law on Jerusalem, decided not to recognize the validity of this law, and called upon all UN members "(a) to accept this decision; (b) and upon those states that have established diplomatic missions in Jerusalem to withdraw such missions from the holy city. . . ." Explaining the U.S. vote, Muskie emphasized that it was "vital that a political climate be preserved" in which the work for peace could succeed. This was understood to be an allusion to reports that Sadat had
threatened to pull Egypt out of the peace talks if the U.S. blocked the council resolution.

The secretary of state reiterated the American commitment to the vision of "an undivided Jerusalem, with free access to the holy places for people of all faiths." But, he stressed, that vision could not be achieved "by unilateral actions, nor by narrow resolutions" of the UN. The status of Jerusalem "must be agreed to by the parties" within the context of negotiations for a "comprehensive, just, and lasting Middle East peace." It was for this reason that "we have urged all the parties not to take unilateral steps that could prejudice the outcome of the negotiations."

The American abstention was roundly condemned by pro-Israel legislators and Jewish organizations. Senator Daniel Moynihan (D., N.Y.), who together with 11 other senators had cabled Muskie urging a veto, termed the abstention "a major error" that "reveals a great failure of understanding by our government. To abstain is to acquiesce," Moynihan declared. As a result, the U.S. had to assume responsibility for the council's action. Senator Jacob Javits (R., N.Y.) called the vote "a grave mistake" which "imperils the peace process." Anti-Defamation League chairman Maxwell Greenberg labeled the U.S. action "devoid of courage, leadership, loyalty to an ally, and unwise."

Dilemma of American Jewish Community on Israel

During 1980 the American Jewish community found itself increasingly caught in a painful dilemma. On the one hand, many American Jews who were deeply committed to Israel disagreed with the tactics of Prime Minister Begin and found some of his actions difficult to explain to the American public. On the other hand, they regarded some of the actions of the Carter administration as harmful to Israel. Consequently, American Jews were reluctant to add to the anti-Israel sentiment within the United States by publicly criticizing the Israeli government. Some recalled that Governor John Connally had specifically cited criticism of Israeli policies by American Jews as justification for his own critical stance contained in the Middle East proposals he announced in October 1979.

Nevertheless, some American Jewish criticism did receive public attention in 1980. For example, during a background discussion with the editorial board of the Jerusalem Post in February, visiting leaders of the American Jewish Committee warned that the Israeli government should not overestimate the extent of American Jewish influence or the degree of its support for controversial policies. AJC president Richard Maass said that Prime Minister Begin would be mistaken if he concluded from the fact that 100,000 Jews came out to cheer him in Central Park that such events "mean universal support for his policies among American Jews." AJC executive vice president Bertram Gold cited the reported plan of the Begin government to authorize the resettlement of Jews within the city limits of Hebron as the kind of decision the AJC "will not defend." Even though the AJC acknowledged the right of Jews to settle anywhere in historic Eretz Yisrael and had publicly challenged the
Carter position that such settlements were "illegal," the Committee felt that implementation of this right at the present time in the heart of Hebron "causes dangers to Israel's interests in the U.S. and around the world."

While the AJC felt it could not successfully explain and justify such a policy, Gold added that he did not think the organization would attack the Begin policy in public. However, the Jerusalem Post, a paper supporting the Labor party, chose to publish a summary of the discussion in a news article and cited the AJC's views to buttress its own editorial opposition to the Hebron resettlement plan. The Post article was picked up by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency and reprinted throughout the United States.

In March Edgar Bronfman, chairman of the North American branch of the World Jewish Congress, was sharply critical of the Begin government's settlement policies. In a guest column in WJC News & Views, Bronfman warned that "Israel must learn to stop asking the unreasonable of American Jewry" and said that Israel was becoming "a country whose moral base is slowly eroding because of its inability to explain its 'expansionist' policies on the West Bank" and its domestic problems. He added that young Jews were becoming less and less willing unquestioningly to say "my Israel right or wrong."

In May the Workmen's Circle, the largest Jewish fraternal labor organization, adopted resolutions that cited three developments which were sources of anxiety for its members: "the instability of U.S. support of Israel, growing acceptance of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the democratic world, . . . and the policies of the Begin government which make it appear to be more committed to retaining control of the West Bank than in arriving at a permanent peace." The resolution called for "meaningful autonomy for the Palestinians" together with adequate safeguards for Israel's security. While critical of the Begin settlement policy, the Workmen's Circle accepted the Israeli position on Jerusalem, saying that "Jerusalem must be the capital of Israel and this should not be a negotiable item."

These and similar critical comments prompted Leon Dulzin, chairman of the World Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency executives, to appeal to American Jewish leaders "not to take sides" in Israeli politics and to impose on themselves "a self-discipline" when they make public comments on issues that divide Israeli society. Speaking to the Presidents Conference in New York on June 2, Dulzin contended that American Jews should focus on those issues on which there was a basic consensus in Israel and avoid speaking out on divisive issues, since this only helped the enemies of the Jewish state.

In an interview with the JTA on June 22, Howard Squadron, the newly-elected chairman of the Presidents Conference, agreed that where there were differences of opinion between American Jewish leaders and the government of Israel, these should be conveyed in "private," since exchanges in the media "do not help Israel and do not increase the effectiveness of the Presidents Conference." Nevertheless, more than 50 prominent American Jews issued a statement at the beginning of July in support of the Israeli Peace Now movement. What was noteworthy was that in
addition to the scholars, writers, and rabbis who had signed similar statements in the past, the signatories this time included leaders of major mainstream Jewish organizations, notably three former chairmen of the Presidents Conference, three former chairmen of the United Jewish Appeal's Young Leadership Cabinet, five members of the World Zionist Executive, and three former presidents of the UJA's women's division. Using the Peace Now theme that "our way is not theirs," the statement declared that "Extremists in the public and within the government, guided by secular and religious chauvinism, distort Zionism and threaten its realization." Their way, the statement added, advances "the vicious cycle of extremism and violence," "endangers and isolates Israel," undermines consensus within Israel, leads to divisions within the Jewish people, "alienates friends of Israel and strengthens the extremists among our enemies." Our way, the signatories said, "is the way of peace and security through territorial compromise on the West Bank."

Ivan Novick, president of the Zionist Organization, told the ZOA national convention in October that those American Jews who "embraced" the Peace Now movement in Israel and "chastised" the Israel government engaged in "action which borders on irresponsibility." He characterized as "nonsense" the argument that "there is a need to go before the Christian world to criticize Israel in order to be helpful to the Jewish people."

The Presidential Candidates on Israel

Of all the presidential hopefuls only two adopted policies that were openly critical of Israel—former governor John Connally of Texas and Ed Clark of the Libertarian party. In October 1979 Connally issued a detailed Middle East peace plan that called for scrapping the Camp David agreements and urged the United States to pressure Israel to agree to a virtually total withdrawal from the occupied territories in exchange for "a clear understanding from Saudi Arabia and other moderate oil-producing nations in the region that they will forsake the oil weapon and return to stable prices."

The three major candidates in the November election—Carter, Reagan, and Anderson—all professed to be true friends of Israel, and much of their campaigning to Jewish audiences was devoted to convincing the voters that they had done or would do more for Israel than their rivals. At the annual policy conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee in May, Vice President Walter Mondale, speaking on behalf of President Carter, noted that half of the $22 billion in U.S. aid to Israel since 1948 had been sent during the three-and-a-half years of the Carter administration. He contrasted the promises made by the other candidates with the delivery by the Carter administration in terms of aid, arms, and progress in moving toward peace.

At the B'nai B'rith International conference in Washington on September 3, Reagan emphasized that the American bond with Israel was not only "a moral imperative," but was based on U.S. self-interest, since "Israel is a major strategic
Reagan proceeded to attack the Carter administration’s record on arms sales to Saudi Arabia, its voting record at the United Nations, its position on Jerusalem, and its vacillation regarding the PLO. Reagan charged that “President Carter refuses to brand the PLO as a terrorist organization. I have no hesitation in doing so. We live in a world in which any band of thugs clever enough to get the word ‘liberation’ into its name can therefore murder school children and have its deeds considered glamorous and glorious.” Terrorists, he insisted, should be identified as such. Those who wish to recognize or negotiate with them should be willing “to pay for the price of appeasement.”

Speaking to the B’nai B’rith conference the following day, Carter contrasted his record with the “reassessment” under the previous Republican administration and cited Israeli ambassador Ephraim Evron to confirm the fact that “we have never threatened to slow down or cut off aid to Israel,” adding that “I can assure you that we never will.” Carter said he considered American aid to Israel not as a “handout” but as “an investment in the security of America.” Carter reaffirmed American commitment to UN resolution 242 and said “we will oppose any attempt to change it.” He declared that “the United States government and I personally oppose an independent Palestinian state—and unless and until they recognize Israel’s right to exist and accept resolution 242 as a basis for peace, we will neither recognize nor negotiate with the PLO.”

Congressman Anderson stressed his own fourteen-year record of constant support of economic and military aid for Israel, as well as his call for direct Arab-Israel negotiations at a time when the state department was still fearful of negative Arab reaction. He charged that the Carter administration had demonstrated a lack of will and had not been sufficiently vigorous in opposing the OPEC cartel. He acknowledged that Israel played an essential role in stabilizing the Middle East. “But let us not make the error that Governor Reagan does seeing Israel primarily in strategic terms,” Anderson said, emphasizing that “our commitment to Israel grows out of shared ideals and principles.”

As already noted, the issue of Israel’s security and welfare played an important role in the voting of the Jewish electorate. Although Jews were still generally more liberal in their voting pattern than other groups of similar economic and social background, 1980 marked the first time in more than half a century that a majority of Jews did not vote for the Democratic candidate. According to an ABC exit poll, more than half of the Jews who voted for Reagan had voted for Carter in 1976, if they had voted at all in that year. The corresponding fraction of defectors among the general voters was only a quarter. The shift to Reagan would have been even greater had Anderson not been running. The Illinois representative received one out of every six Jewish votes. His appeal was chiefly to the college-educated and the middle- and upper-income Jewish voters.

The significance of the Israel factor in the anti-Carter vote is revealed in the fact that many Jewish voters in New York and California who voted for Reagan also voted to elect liberal Democrats to the House and Senate, according to an election
analysis by Milton Himmelfarb of the American Jewish Committee. Carter's rumored flirting with the PLO and his brother Billy's relationship with Libya apparently hurt the president more with Jewish voters than did Anderson's record, which he subsequently disavowed, of sponsoring an amendment to the Constitution recognizing Christianity as the spiritual basis of the United States. The best estimate is that Jewish voters split as follows: Carter, 45 per cent; Reagan, 37 per cent; and Anderson, 17 per cent.

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