FUTILE ATTEMPTS TO ESCAPE from an escalating cycle of violence marked the year 2001, which many believed to be the most difficult year for the Jewish state since 1948, when it fought its War of Independence. What the Palestinians called the Al-Aqsa intifada began in late September 2000, continued on into early 2001 even while peace negotiations were in progress, and for all intents and purposes amounted to the seventh war in Israel’s 53-year history—after the War of Independence, the 1956 campaign in Sinai, the 1967 Six-Day War, the 1969–71 war of attrition, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 war in Lebanon. But this latest war was the first since 1948 to be fought, by and large, on Israeli-controlled territory, and the first in which military casualties were matched by civilian dead and wounded. During a year of bloodshed and violence, 208 Israelis lost their lives and over 1,500 were wounded.

In diplomatic terms, the year began with Israelis and Palestinians engaged in talks at Taba, Egypt, in a last-ditch effort to close a deal that had seemed close to realization half a year earlier, at Camp David. It ended with diplomatic dialogue severed and contacts limited to futile attempts, not to achieve lasting peace, but just to get a cease-fire.

In the interim, Israel got a new prime minister. But the tough policies of the Likud’s Ariel Sharon, who won the February 6 election on the slogan “Only Sharon Can Bring Peace,” seemed to produce even more violence: greater terror, almost daily attacks, and a growing feeling of insecurity on the streets and highways of Israel.

DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS

Negotiations on the Road to Elections

Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein, who two weeks previously had affirmed that the government had full power to negotiate with the Palestinians even though elections were due in slightly more than a month, raises eyebrows on January 2 by writing to Prime Minister Ehud Barak questioning the morality of taking fateful decisions so close to election
day, even though Barak was pledged to bring any proposed deal to the Knesset for approval. Conceding that "carrying out negotiations indeed seems to fall under the prime minister's area of responsibility," Rubin-stein said that, in continuing talks with the Palestinians, Barak should avoid making major moves "unless there is no other choice, such as directing the army or defending the country in time of war." Political figures on the left accused Rubinstein of yielding to pressure from the right, which, throughout the run-up to the elections, had argued that Barak had no right to negotiate with the Palestinians since any deal reached could well be a desperate attempt to swing votes in his favor and away from the Likud candidate, Ariel Sharon.

Though the actual campaign had not yet officially opened, there was already some jockeying for position. Sharon, acting on the advice of his advisers to run a low-key campaign, nevertheless appeared at a January 1 press conference with former prime minister Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu. Afterwards, Sharon aides accused Netanyahu of "sabotage" for saying only that voters should support Sharon "because Barak's policies endanger the State of Israel," which they considered a mere half-hearted endorsement of the Likud candidate.

With Barak trailing in all the polls by double-digit margins, former president Ezer Weizman said that he would support the Likud candidate "because the country needs some order," adding: "I am thinking about what is good for the state." Weizman's endorsement came despite the former president's strong backing for the peace process in the past. Another damaging-to-Barak endorsement came from the Center Party's Dan Meridor, a partner in Barak's coalition, who explained: "There is no way that I can support the policy of the government, and so I will support the opposite line."

On January 2, with only 18 more days left in his term, President Bill Clinton entertained Palestinian Authority president Yasir Arafat at the White House. Despite the visit and Clinton's continuing efforts to attain an Israeli-Palestinian deal while he was still in office, U.S. officials expressed pessimism, saying that they did not think there was "sufficient understanding" between the sides to reach any kind of deal. Meanwhile, the Palestinians circulated a document containing a point-by-point cri-tique of the Clinton proposals, saying they would continue negotiations only if they were satisfied by the clarifications they had asked from Clinton on four key issues—Jerusalem, borders, settlements, and the Palestinians' "right of return" into Israel proper. The White House, for its part, was under the impression that it had extracted a pledge from Arafat to
cooperate in antiterror measures, intensify efforts to stop the violence, and arrest at least some terrorists.

Also that day, Barak formally opened his campaign at Labor headquarters in Tel Aviv’s Hatikva Quarter. The atmosphere of the meeting was glum, with several key Labor figures, including Jerusalem Affairs Minister Haim Ramon, conspicuously absent. A Ha’aretz reporter on the scene said that “Barak was the only one who tried to smile. . . . A heavy scent of defeat hung in the air.”

On January 7, as U.S. peace envoy Ambassador Dennis Ross was about to visit the region for a last-ditch effort to arrive at a deal before the end of the Clinton administration, the president himself appeared before the Israel Policy Forum in Washington and outlined the parameters of his proposals (see above, pp. 198–99). The next night, however, hundreds of thousands of Israelis attend a mass rally in Jerusalem to express opposition to Clinton’s plan to transfer part of the capital city to the Palestinian Authority. Police estimated the crowd at 250,000, while organizers claimed 400,000—either way, one of the largest assemblies ever held in the city. Thousands formed a human chain around most of the Old City, a giant picture of the capture of the Temple Mount during the Six-Day War was projected on the walls of the Old City, and loudspeakers blared out, “the Temple Mount is in our hands,” the famous statement of the late general Mordechai (Motta) Gur, at the time commander of the paratroop brigade. Speakers include former Supreme Court president Moshe Landau, who recalled the thick retaining walls that divided pre-1967 Jerusalem, Chairman Ronald Lauder of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, who claimed to represent “tens of millions of Jews throughout the world” opposed to ceding any part of Jerusalem, and Avital Sharansky, wife of former interior minister Natan Sharansky, who said that the liberation of Jerusalem in 1967 had triggered the renaissance of Jewish awareness in the former Soviet Union.

Sharon raised the low profile he has been maintaining during the campaign in an interview with Kfar Chabad, an ultra-Orthodox weekly. Asked why he publicly rejected the understandings reached in 2000 at Camp David but did not explicitly repudiate the 1993 Oslo agreement with the Palestinian Authority, Sharon responded: “The Oslo accord is an agreement which no longer exists. Period.” Sharon went on to explain earlier statements about his possible flexibility toward Palestinian demands. “When I talk about painful concessions, I mean we are not going to reconquer Nablus and Jericho. That’s a painful concession, because these
are the cradle of the Jewish people. I don’t know of any people in the world that has surrendered national historic assets, unless defeated in a war—and we were not vanquished in a war.” Launching his campaign on January 10 in a festive rally at Jerusalem’s main convention center, Sharon spoke of “unity” and “peace.” He said that “no real peace can be achieved without concessions, and we will reach a peace based on a compromise.” Nevertheless, he pledged, “under any agreement we will protect Israel’s security interests.”

Barak continued to trail badly in the polls, and pressure mounted on him to withdraw from the prime ministerial race in favor of elder statesman Shimon Peres, who was running almost even with, or only slightly behind, Sharon in many of the surveys. Peres, for his part, did nothing to discourage such sentiments.

Barak’s prospects, very poor among Jewish Israelis, were made even worse by the certainty that he would not get anywhere near the 90-percent level of support from Israeli Arabs that he received in the 1999 victory over Netanyahu. Indeed, Israeli Arab groups openly advocated a boycott of the February 6 vote, blaming Barak and his administration for the killing of 13 Israeli Arabs in clashes with police during demonstrations in early October 2000, soon after the intifada started. Under the slogan “We will never forget or forgive,” one group said in a statement: “Boycotting elections is a national obligation for the purpose of changing the current political formula, expressed in the view that Labor takes the Arab vote as a predetermined, guaranteed preserve.” A Labor loss caused, at least in part, by the failure of Arab support, the statement suggested, might “lay the foundations for a new relationship” between Israel’s center-left party and the million-plus-strong Arab sector, the nation’s largest minority.

On January 11, President Moshe Katzav, whose office was supposed to be nonpartisan, stated his personal opinion in a public forum. Katzav told residents of the Jordan Valley area of the West Bank that he was disappointed with the decline of public opposition to certain concessions to the Palestinians. “Seven years ago,” he said, “no one would have dared to speak aloud of recognizing the PLO. Three years ago, most Israelis did not support the establishment of a Palestinian state. Half a year ago, most Israelis spoke of a united Jerusalem firmly, resolutely. And I feel that this too has diminished.” Katzav argued that any future agreement would have to take into account the possibility that Palestinians were insincere when speaking of a desire for peace, and he supported Attorney General Ru-
binstein's "moral" argument against the present government's striking a peace deal with the Palestinians, even though it had the full legal right to do so.

Efforts to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian deal before the end of the Clinton administration effectively ended on January 12, when the outgoing U.S. president announced that it would be up to the incoming George W. Bush administration to continue peace efforts. Clinton added the obvious—that Bush would not be obligated by the Clinton administration's positions. (On January 19, the day before Clinton left office, Israel and the United States signed an agreement reducing U.S. economic aid by $120 million a year while adding $60 million to military aid. The economic aid had been given to Israel over the years to service loans for the purchase of arms in the 1970s, when the United States gave loans rather than grants of military aid. The gradual phase-out of the economic aid was due to be completed in 2008.)

After the murder of an Israeli, Roni Tzalah, in Gaza on January 14, Barak slowed the pace of peace contacts with the Palestinians. He also rejected a proposal from Peres for a paper stating the points of agreement and disagreement that had been reached in talks so far.

In the official opening of TV advertising for the campaign (in Israel, there are no media spots other than blocs of time designated by the Central Elections Committee during a specified period of time before the election), Barak and Sharon traded charges on a variety of subjects. In a special segment for Arab voters, Barak expressed regret for the killing of 13 Israeli Arabs the previous October. In his broadcast to the wider public, Barak said he was sorry for so often going it alone, and promised that, if reelected, he would consult more closely with senior members of his own cabinet. The Barak broadcasts also attacked Sharon for getting Israel embroiled in a war in Lebanon in 1982, and featured a series of simulated "news bulletins" purporting to show a just-elected Sharon gradually leading Israel into another war.

Likud politicians said they would not respond to such negative tactics, which, they said, were aimed at frightening the public. Sharon's television campaign, however, did highlight episodes of terror during the Barak years, and claimed that only the Likud candidate could bring peace and unity. In one spot, Jerusalem mayor Ehud Olmert—who himself had been a candidate for the Likud leadership after the June 1999 resignation of Netanyahu—charged Barak with making excessive concessions over Jerusalem. (Barak, striking back, claimed that the Jerusalem mayor had met with him just before the Camp David meetings in the summer of 2000
to discuss practical solutions for the capital, and that "Olmert opened up maps and aerial photographs, proposing positions I might take at Camp David, ones whose consequence would be the division of Jerusalem.")

Barak's shaky position was not enhanced when tens of thousands of government and municipal workers went out on strike. The strike was settled after nine days, at the end of January, when the Histadrut labor union backed down from its demand for a 16-percent across-the-board wage increase, accepting instead a raise of 3.6 percent and a one-time payment of 1,250 shekels (about $300 at the time). Total cost to the economy of the pay package: 3.5 billion shekels, over $650 million.

On January 21, marathon talks began at Taba, in Egyptian Sinai just south of Eilat. Leading the Israeli delegation was Shlomo Ben-Ami, the acting foreign minister. Binyamin (Fuad) Ben-Eliezer, the transport minister in Barak's government, opposed the talks, saying they represented "a loaded gun" against Israel, and that the PA "will use the timing to squeeze more concessions out of Israel." Ben-Eliezer was joined in his opposition by two other Labor ministers, Dalia Itzik and Haim Ramon. Sharon, for his part, accused Barak of trying to score a last-minute diplomatic coup to change the outcome of the election.

The following day, Tourism Minister Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, the leader of the Center Party and a member of the Israeli team at Taba, commented: "There are serious discussions as well as signs that indicate a change, and a serious approach." Still, Shahak cautioned, "There are no new positions on either side. It is a discussion on how to bridge the gaps between positions." The talks were interrupted briefly after the killing of two Israeli restauranteurs in Tul Karm on January 23, when Barak temporarily recalled the Israeli negotiators (see below, p. 548).

Contacts with the committee headed by former U.S. senator George Mitchell, which was investigating the causes of the violence and ways to lower it, were suspended on January 21, in protest over the visit of Larry Pope, the committee's technical chief, to the Temple Mount without an Israeli escort. A few days later Israel said it would not resume cooperation with the committee unless Pope were removed, saying that his unescorted visit to the mount clearly indicated his lack to sensitivity to the religious and political complexities of the site. Indeed, that same day Israel also ordered the police to stop the Wakf, the Muslim religious trust, from work it was doing on the mount (see below, pp. 585–86).

The Taba talks ended on January 27. The heads of the two delegations, Shlomo Ben-Ami and Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala), speaker of the Palestinian National Assembly, jointly declared that the sides "have never been
They expressed the belief that it "will be possible to bridge remaining gaps when the talks are resumed after elections in Israel." The daily *Ha'aretz*, citing Israeli sources, reported that the discussions at Taba addressed the size of the blocs of settlements to be incorporated into Israel and the borders of a Palestinian state (both sides exchanging maps), security (the establishment of a joint panel to discuss Israeli overflights of Palestinian airspace, even while the PA maintained its opposition to the presence of any Israeli troops in the Jordan Valley), and the Palestinian refugees. On this last issue, Yossi Beilin, Israel's justice minister and a member of the Israeli team, said that a "menu of solutions" was formulated to address the explosively controversial issue of a Palestinian "right of return" and Israel's historic "responsibility" for the plight of the refugees, and that one idea was the formation of an international body to handle compensation and resettlement. According to the *Ha'aretz* report, Beilin was optimistic.

On the Palestinian side, Abu Ala spoke positively of "six days of serious activity," but the PA's information minister, Yasir Abd Rabbo, a member of the delegation, was more cautious in his assessment. "It's not that simple," he told a radio interviewer. "There are many questions that require answers from the Israeli side. Yes, one could say there was development on some questions and there was a readiness for drawing closer on some questions. But I would not want to say that the questions are approaching solution. And from another point of view, one must assert that there was no firm [Israeli] policy of progress during six months or during the last year. When playing and zigzagging with positions ends, then we will realize progress."

The Likud, predictably, called the joint statement by Ben-Ami and Abu Ala a campaign gimmick to help Barak. A party statement proclaimed: "Making a secret agreement, Barak has conceded everything and gained nothing. Barak has promised peace before, but brought war. Once again he is selling lies." Michael Kleiner, a Knesset member of the far-right National Union, said the joint statement was "an effort to defraud the public."

Israeli and Palestinian officials involved in the Taba negotiations tried to arrange a Barak-Arafat meeting in Sweden to finalize a deal. But the Palestinian leader, in a speech to the annual World Economic Forum on January 28 in Davos, Switzerland, accused Israel of making "barbaric war" by using shells and bullets with depleted uranium—a forbidden substance—against Palestinian women and children. A furious Barak called
off the Swedish summit. Over the next few days attempts were made to revive the idea, but on February 4, two days before the election, Barak informed UN secretary general Kofi Annan and Swedish prime minister Goran Persson to abandon efforts to arrange a meeting.

In a January 29 interview on Israel TV's Channel 2, Arafat rejected the claim made by Yasir Abd Rabbo, his own information minister, that the agreement reached at Taba was harta-barta—slang for meaningless talk. "Taba was not harta-barta, he said. We accept that what we achieved there was not all that we are looking for, not all that you are looking for, but it was a step forward, and the most important thing is that we agreed to continue." Channel 2 also interviewed President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, who said he had not heard from candidate Sharon, but would meet him for the sake of regional peace. The Egyptian leader played down talk of a possible war. "Who is talking about war?" he asked. "We aren't, it's not in our interest. We are interested in stability, not war."

**Landslide**

At the end of January, some polls showed Barak trailing by as much as 18 percent. Barak's campaign team desperately began distributing to voters simulated army emergency call-up orders, saying that Israelis would have to choose between such notices, which would surely be distributed for real after Sharon was elected, or a letter informing them of a reduction in their mandatory reserve duty because regional peace had been achieved, which they would get if Barak were reelected. Voters were informed that they had only a few more days to decide which letter would end up in their mailbox. After Likud MK Tzipi Livni protested to the Central Elections Committee that this was an improper use of the IDF for political purposes, Justice Mishael Cheshin, who headed the committee, issued an order barring Labor—or anyone else—from issuing such fake orders.

A memorial march was held a few days before the election to mark the 19th anniversary of a 1982 Peace Now demonstration outside the prime minister's office protesting the invasion of Lebanon, an invasion engineered by Sharon, then the minister of defense. It was at that demonstration that peace activist Emil Grunzweig was killed by a grenade thrown into the crowd. "Emil, We Won't Forget. Arik [Sharon], We Won't Forget," read one of the placards. Raya Harnik, whose son Goni was killed taking the strategic Beaufort heights in South Lebanon during that
war, spoke emotionally to the gathering: “We did not forgive and forget that we agreed to sacrifice our children. Now we hear sounds of war from the same political camp.”

On the advice of his team of political advisors, which included the American expert Arthur Finkelstein, Sharon ran a low-key campaign, avoided discussing his previous record, and did not reply to Labor charges that he planned to reoccupy the West Bank and possibly start a new war. Though Likud campaigners at major crossroads around the country bore signs warning that Barak “is bringing the [Palestinian] refugees back to Israel,” the effort seemed superfluous. Barak, trailing very badly in the polls, was fending off last-minute efforts to have Shimon Peres replace him on the ballot.

In a preelection interview with the mass-circulation daily Yediot Aharonot, Sharon said he would create a broad-based government designed to heal the rifts “between right and left, religious and secular, immigrants and veteran Israelis, Jews and Arabs.” On February 5, the day before the election, Sharon got the formal support of the ultra-Orthodox parties—United Torah Judaism (UTJ), made up predominantly of Ashkenazi Jews of Eastern European origin, and Shas, whose electorate was mainly Sephardi Jews with roots in Middle Eastern countries. Since most Orthodox voters tended to have right-wing views, this was not surprising. But it nevertheless came as a final blow to Barak: since this election was only for prime minister and not the Knesset, the Labor camp had hoped that the ultra-Orthodox, whose main political interests were economic, might stay home on February 6.

Final polls showed Sharon with an unsurmountable lead—according to Channel 2 TV, it was 58-42, while Labor’s own internal figures gave the challenger a 14-percent margin. A last-minute Labor effort to get out the Arab vote was aimed at preserving the party and lessening the humiliation of the impending defeat: Barak issued a public apology for the killing of 13 Israeli Arabs the previous October.

Sharon scored a smashing victory, capturing 62.4 percent of the vote to Barak’s 37.6 percent. The nearly 25-point margin was the largest in Israeli history. Only 18 percent of Israel’s 500,000 Arab voters turned out on election day. Partly because of this unofficial Arab boycott but also because the result was a foregone conclusion, the overall turnout was just 62 percent of eligible voters, as compared to average turnouts of 80 percent in previous elections. After the returns were counted, Abdulmalik Dehamshe, an MK from the United Arab List, said: “Today we proved that we are not in anyone’s pocket.” Dehamshe called the boycott “an
electoral declaration of independence." About 70 percent of immigrants from the former Soviet Union who were eligible to vote cast ballots, and, according to one exit poll, 62.8 percent supported Sharon. At the previous election, in 1999, about 90 percent of the "Russians" voted, about 58 percent of them supporting Barak.

Although the victorious Sharon had made it clear during the campaign that he wanted to include the vanquished Labor leader in a national unity government, Barak surprised almost everyone by announcing his resignation from the Labor leadership and the Knesset, saying he would step out of politics "for a while." This left the Labor Party in shambles, with a bitter succession fight likely. Barak took the opportunity to defend his peace policies, but he conceded that he might have been ahead of his time: "Perhaps," he noted, "our public is not mature enough to face up to the painful truths that we laid out before it. Perhaps the Palestinians are not mature enough either, and resorted to the barren solution of violence." Barak ended on a hopeful note, saying that eventually "the truth will triumph" among Israelis and Palestinians.

In his victory speech to delighted followers at Jerusalem's main convention center the day after the election, Sharon disclosed that he had just spoken with President George W. Bush, who reminded him, during the phone call, of a helicopter trip the two men had taken several years earlier through the Jordan Valley and parts of the West Bank (Sharon used the term "Samaria"). "And he [Bush] said to me: ‘No one believed then that I would be president and you would be prime minister. But as things turned out I have been elected president and you have been elected prime minister.’" Sharon told the crowd that Israel "has embarked on a new path, a path of domestic unity and harmony, of striving for security and genuine peace." He was pledged to achieve "genuine peace and stability," and added: "I know that peace requires painful compromise on the part of both sides. Any diplomatic accord will be founded on security for all people of the region." His goal was "realistic political accords ... based on mutual respect and the reciprocal fulfillment of obligations."

Reacting to Sharon's election, Arafat tried to sound optimistic, saying that the result did not necessarily mean the end of the peace process. "We respect the choice of the Israeli people," he commented. But Nabil Shaath, a member of various negotiating teams and the PA's planning minister, took a more pessimistic view, telling Israel's Channel 2: "Judging from Sharon's past, there is no way we can make any progress."

Keeping his preelection pledge to create a broad-based government, Sharon immediately entered into negotiations with all political parties.
On February 26, after Barak announced his withdrawal from politics, the central committee of Labor—which, with 26 seats, was the largest single bloc in the 120-member Knesset—agreed to join Sharon’s national unity government. There was, however, strong opposition to the move from Laborites fearful that their party would lose its identity by entering the coalition.

The Knesset approved the new government on March 7, by 72 to 21. Eight political parties were included in the cabinet. Labor got the key defense (Binyamin Ben-Eliezer) and foreign-affairs (Shimon Peres) portfolios. Finance went to Silvan Shalom, a Likud politician married to Judy Nir Moses, a member of the family that owned the mass-circulation Yediot Aharonot Hebrew daily. Shas increased its hold on power with five ministries, and Salah Tarif, a Druse member of the Labor Party, became the first non-Jew ever in an Israeli cabinet, being given the post of minister-without-portfolio.

**Government Ministers**

Prime Minister and Acting Absorption Minister: Ariel Sharon, Likud
Defense Minister: Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, Labor
Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister: Shimon Peres, Labor
Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister: Silvan Shalom, Likud
Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister: Eli Yishai, Shas
Internal Security Minister: Uzi Landau, Likud
Justice Minister: Meir Sheetreet, Likud
Housing Minister and Deputy Prime Minister: Natan Sharansky, Yisrael ba’Aliya
Minister of Industry and Trade: Dalia Itzik, Labor
Culture, Science, and Sports Minister: Matan Vilna’i, Labor
Transport Minister: Ephraim Sneh, Labor
Agriculture Minister: Shalom Simhon, Labor
Communications Minister: Reuven (Ruby) Rivlin, Likud
Education Minister: Limor Livnat, Likud
Environment Minister: Tzachi Hanegbi, Likud
Regional Cooperation Minister: Tzipi Livni, Likud
Religious Affairs Minister: Asher Ohana, Shas
Labor and Social Welfare Minister: Shlomo Benizri, Shas
Health Minister: Nissim Dahan, Shas
Tourism Minister: Rehavam Ze’evi, National Union-Yisrael Beitenu
Infrastructure Minister: Avigdor Lieberman, National Union-Yisrael Beitenu
Minister for Jerusalem Affairs: Eliyahu Suissa, Shas
Minister without portfolio in charge of liaison with Knesset: Danny Naveh, Likud
Minister without portfolio and social-affairs coordinator: Shmuel Avital, One Nation
Minister without portfolio: Ra’anana Cohen, Labor
Minister without portfolio: Salah Tarif, Labor

New Government, Old Problems

On February 8, Barak wrote President George W. Bush noting that the ideas brought up at Camp David and Taba were not binding on the new government of Israel. Barak recalled that President Clinton, when presenting his ideas, had insisted that they would become null and void at the end of his term. President Bush, for his part, issued a statement distancing his administration from the ideas and parameters of the Clinton administration in regard to the Israel-Palestinian peace process.

In early February, Bush appeared to take a first step toward opening his own dialogue with the parties by dispatching Secretary of State Colin Powell—who was visiting the region anyway to gain support for the policy of containment of Iraq—to separate meetings with Sharon and Arafat. In addition to seeking a halt to the violence, Powell called on Sharon to end enforced closures of the West Bank and Gaza, saying that it was “necessary to lift the siege as soon as possible so that economic activity can begin again in the region.” Sharon responded that the blockade would end only after a complete cessation of Palestinian hostilities. In his meeting with the U.S. secretary of state, Arafat pushed his often-advanced idea of an international force—a plan that was anathema to Israel—and asked for U.S. pressure to get Israel to halt the building of Jewish settlements on occupied land in the West Bank and Gaza.

On February 26, the European Union announced a 60-million-euro (about $60 million) package of economic measures to prevent the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. However the EU conditioned the emergency aid on the PA’s adoption of an austerity budget. Without the aid and the new budget, it explained, “there is a very real risk of loss of legitimacy and public disillusionment with the Authority which could lead to anarchy, the atomization of power, and increased lawlessness.”
Sharon's campaign had emphasized that only the ex-general knew how to deal with terror, but Sharon revealed little about his plans for doing so, even after forming his new government. In a March 11 interview with CNN's Wolf Blitzer, who, in the 1970s and 1980s, had been the Washington correspondent of the Jerusalem Post, the new prime minister said that "the mistake of the former government was that it agreed to negotiate under fire and under terror." The effect, he contended, was to increase Palestinian demands and extract concessions that made Israel weaker. "This government has another policy. We will not negotiate under pressure," he insisted. Arafat, for his part, made a speech to the Palestinian National Council, the PA's parliament, attacking Israel's policy "of military escalation, siege, and starvation." Meanwhile, Israel, in response to continued terror attacks and firing on the Jerusalem suburb of Gilo, tightened its control around Bethlehem, south of the capital, and Ramallah to the north.

On March 13, the Foreign Ministry publishes a list of guidelines on the positions of the new government, which, it said, were issued by Foreign Minister Peres in coordination with Sharon. The document stressed Israel's determination to reach peace, said that "restoring security and calm" was at the top of the government's priorities, emphasized that "the conduct of peace negotiations calls for tranquility," made it clear that Israel was willing to lift restrictions in Palestinian areas where there was calm, and in fact announced that it was lifting the close on Tul Karm, Qalqilya, Bethlehem, and Hebron.

Sharon paid his first visit to Washington as prime minister on March 19–20, meeting President Bush, Secretary Powell, and other top officials. According to a Reuters report, Bush expressed surprise at the PA's use of a film clip hailing Muhammad al-Dura, the 12-year-old Gaza boy killed in a crossfire during the early days of the intifada, and other child "martyrs." The president said he "had trouble understanding why Palestinians would place their children in harm's way, rather than trying to protect them."

Meeting with the Council of Europe's Middle East subcommittee on March 20, Foreign Minister Peres said that progress must be based on an end to the violence, use of the language of peace rather than of confrontation ("The two peoples are extremely angry at each other and have lost their capacity for dialogue"), a return to the negotiating table, and easing living conditions in the territories. Unlike Sharon, who demanded a full cessation of hostile acts before any other steps could be taken, Peres argued that all four conditions could be implemented simultaneously.
Peres then met with PA's planning minister, Nabil Sha'ath, and its chief negotiator, Sa'eb Erakat, in Athens on April 4. This was the first high-level Israeli-PA encounter since the February elections. Though Peres announced after the meeting that security officials from the two sides, together with U.S. representatives, would meet at the Erez checkpoint to discuss ways of ending the violence, there were more terror attacks and more Israeli responses.

The U.S. stepped up its efforts to quell the violence in mid-May. Secretary Powell designated William Burns, a veteran diplomat who had served as U.S. ambassador to Jordan, as his point man in the region. On May 21, the committee headed by former U.S. senator George Mitchell formally issued its long-awaited report on the causes of the violence, together with recommendations to bring it to a halt. (Other members of the Mitchell Committee, following the mandate issued at the Sharm al-Sheikh summit in November 2000, were former Turkish president Süleyman Demirel, Norwegian foreign minister Thorbjörn Jagland, former U.S. senator Warren Rudman, and Javier Solana, the European Union's security chief.)

The committee, in a letter dated April 30 and released three weeks later, recommended that the parties reaffirm their commitments to previous agreements and resume security cooperation, while working together to establish a meaningful cooling-off period and to implement additional confidence-building measures. The committee called on the PA to “make a 100-percent effort to prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators . . . [including] immediate steps to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists” operating within the PA's jurisdiction. At the same time, it said the PA should prevent gunmen from firing from its territory on Israeli populated areas or IDF forces, which, it said, “places civilians on both sides at unnecessary risk.” The report called on Israel to freeze all settlement, including the “thickening” or “natural growth” of existing settlements. It also said Israel should lift closures, transfer tax monies that it collected for the PA, allow Palestinians to return to jobs in Israel, and prevent settler violence against Palestinians and their property.

The report rejected the allegations of both sides as to what triggered the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada. It stated flatly that Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount on September 28 “did not cause the Al-Aqsa intifada. But it was poorly timed and the provocative effect should have been foreseen; indeed it was foreseen by those who urged that the visit be prohibited.” The committee further criticized the decision of the police to “use lethal means” when Palestinians rioted on the Temple Mount the
next day, September 29. On the other hand, the panel had “no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the PA to initiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity.” Nevertheless, there was also no evidence that the PA tried to contain the violence once it began. “Amid rising anger, fear and mistrust,” it said, “each side assumed the worst about the other and acted accordingly.”

Tensions in the region remained high. An Israeli army spokesman termed “a terribly tragic event” the killing of a four-month-old girl, Iman Hijo, by Israeli fire directed against targets in the Khan Yunis refugee camp in the southern Gaza Strip. An Israeli strike against a crew firing mortar shells from PA territory in the northern Gaza Strip on May 9 killed Abd al-Karim Maname, a Hezbollah activist who once served as a bodyguard of the Islamic Resistance Movement’s spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. And on May 15, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad cut off a state visit to Egypt and rushed back to Damascus after Israeli defense minister Ben-Eliezer, visiting the Golan Heights, suggested that the Syrians were responsible for a rocket attack on Israeli forces at Har Dov (known in Arabic as Jebel Rus) on the foothills of Mt. Hermon. In his “message” to Assad, Ben-Eliezer said, “I suggest that you tell Hezbollah, clearly, not to escalate the situation on your back. I am telling you that violence will not help.”

In early May, the Israeli navy announced the capture of the San Tornini, a Lebanese fishing vessel loaded with arms that was headed for Gaza to deliver them to the PA. According to the army, the deadly cargo—in-tercepted off Haifa—included 50 Katyusha rockets, four SA-7 shoulder-held antiaircraft missiles, 20 RPG rocket-propelled grenade launchers, two 60-mm. mortars with 98 rounds of 60-mm. ammunition for them, 62 land mines, 30 Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifles, and 13,000 rounds of Kalashnikov ammunition. The army described the weapons as infinitely more sophisticated than what the PA had been using previously, adding that the 107-mm. Katyushas, if fired from Gaza, could hit the southern Israeli city of Ashkelon.

On May 23, Sharon announced a unilateral cease-fire, telling the army to fire at Palestinians only in self-defense. In a televised speech, he called on the Palestinians to stop the violence. “Peace will be achieved only through talks. Stop the violence and accept us as a serious and responsible partner for reaching peace,” he said. Though Sharon remarked that he considered the Mitchell recommendations “a positive basis that can enable both sides to end the cycle of violence and return to the negotiat-ing table,” he insisted that a substantial cooling-off period would be neccessary between the end of violence and the resumption of talks.
Even after a Hamas suicide bomb at a busy discotheque at the Tel Aviv Dolphinarium on June 1 killed 21 Israelis, Sharon vowed to maintain the cease-fire. Under increasing domestic pressure to act in response to the worst terror act since the start of the new intifada, Sharon told members of the Likud that “the government stance requires that we act responsibly. We need to see the whole of the problem, the security problems and the very complicated political problems.” German foreign minister Joschka Fischer, who was at his hotel across the street from the Dolphinarium at the time of the suicide attack, sought to defuse the potentially explosive situation by meeting with Israeli leaders and with Arafat. Acting out of what Israelis believed was fear of heavy retaliation, Arafat himself announced a cease-fire on June 2, saying: “We will exert now our utmost efforts to stop the bloodshed of our people, and of the Israeli people, and to do all that is needed to achieve an immediate and unconditional, real, and effective cease-fire.”

Both CIA director George Tenet and EU security chief Javier Solana arrived in the area, hoping to prevent the violence from escalating. On June 13, Tenet finalized a cease-fire plan under which the PA agreed to halt acts of violence and incitement against Israel, and Israel promised to loosen the blockade around Palestinian areas and pull its security forces back to the positions they occupied before the start of the intifada the previous September.

Sharon headed for the United States in late June, stopping on the way in London to confer with British prime minister Tony Blair. At a joint press conference before their private meeting on June 26, it was clear that Bush and Sharon differed. While Bush said there had been enough progress to send Secretary of State Powell to the region to start paving the way for the next steps as envisioned by the Mitchell Report, Sharon stuck to his demand that there could be no progress so long as hostilities and incitement continued. Sharon emphasized the need for an “absolute end” to the violence, while Bush insisted that “progress is being made,” adding: “Is it as fast as we’d like? No, it’s not. But the fundamental question my administration asks is, are we making progress? Is peace closer today than it was yesterday? We believe that the answer is yes—the cycle of violence must be broken.” Sharon, on the other hand, said that Israel “will not negotiate under fire and terror . . . . last week, we had five people killed by terror, that’s like 250 people, maybe 300 people, in the United States. There can be no compromise with terror, and if we stick to our positions that demand an absolute end to terror before the next stage, our neighbors will understand that we have to do it.” Bush praises Sharon for showing patience in the face of casualties. “But,” he added, “we also be-
lieve that progress has been made, and it is important it doesn't fall apart.” He expressed the hope that the cease-fire would hold so that the Mitchell process could move forward.

Sharon met with Powell two days later, on June 28, and afterward the two men announced details for the consolidation of the cease-fire. There would be a seven-day period of complete quiet, then a six-week cooling-off period, in turn followed by the implementation of the confidence-building measures envisioned in the Mitchell Report. Palestinians, however, objected to allowing Sharon to determine when and whether there had been seven days of complete quiet. Arguing that Israel was stalling, they demanded a limited three-week cooling-off period, followed by implementation of Mitchell, leading to renewed negotiations.

In the interim, settlement activity continued. On June 27, the Israeli army reported that 60 of the 66 outposts set up by settlers outside their larger communities on the West Bank were, to one extent or another, illegal; 24 of them had been established, the report said, since the start of the intifada at the end of September 2000. According to the army, of the 60 illegal outposts 21 were absolutely illegal, 29 had irregularities in the planning process, and the status of the others was questionable. It added that 19 of these outpost were protected by the army, 12 by armed civilians, and 35 had no formal protection at all.

In mid-August, Sharon strengthened his base of support—and fulfilled a long-held goal—by bringing the Center Party, which had stayed out of the coalition when it was formed in March, into the government. The key figure was Dan Meridor, the former Likud leader who had left that party during the Netanyahu administration. Meridor, formerly chairman of the Knesset’s key Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, now became minister-without-portfolio, responsible for strategic planning and national security—including the Mossad and the Shin Bet security services, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Council. Roni Milo, the former Tel Aviv mayor and another ex-Likudnik, replaced Tzipi Livni as minister for regional cooperation, while David Magen, a third former Likud MK, took over as chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

9/11 and After

The September 11 terror attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington had a palpable effect on Israelis and Palestinians. The very next day, September 12, about 100 Israelis—
and many more Arabs—lying in the U.S. were among the foreign nationals picked up by the FBI, which combed the country for anyone who might not be in the country legally, and whose actions might indicate terrorist connections. In many cases, they were kept in solitary confinement and not released for several months.

After suffering severe embarrassment when TV showed rejoicing on the streets of East Jerusalem and Ramallah, the PA acted quickly to stifle demonstrations in support of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda terror network. Some Palestinian officials went so far as to suggest that the scenes may have been staged by TV crews, and there were reports of threats against TV journalists. Arafat and other PA officials denounced the attacks on the U.S. on September 12, expressing fear that Israel might take advantage of the tough new U.S. stance against terror to ratchet up its military operations against the PA.

But it was domestic terror, not what happened in the U.S., that motivated Israel to move into Jenin, in the northern West Bank, the "nest of terrorism" from which a series of deadly operations, including a suicide bombing at the Nahariya train station in which three Israelis died, had been launched. About 14 Palestinians were killed in Jenin. Israeli troops also moved briefly into the edge of the Gaza Strip in another attempt to clean out positions used to fire upon Israeli territory.

Sharon, calling Arafat Israel's bin Laden, resisted U.S. efforts to obtain a pullout from PA areas, and vetoed a meeting between Peres and Arafat that had been scheduled for September 16. The prime minister said that any future meeting between the two could only follow 48 hours of complete quiet. That quiet did not come; after a shooting attack in Jerusalem, Israel sent its troops into the outskirts of Ramallah. After another ostensible Arafat call for a cease-fire, as well as increased U.S. and European pressure, Sharon announced on September 18 that the military action against the Palestinians would be halted: Israeli forces would only fire in self-defense, or in immediate response to a Palestinian attack. Hamas and Islamic Jihad, however, declared a continuation of offensive operations against Israel.

The Peres-Arafat meeting, rescheduled for September 23, was delayed once again by renewed violence, but the two men finally met on September 26. They agreed to reactivate the Tenet-brokered cease-fire deal, but violence broke out again almost immediately, with new terror attacks and Israeli retaliation. Israeli sources said that Arafat had not issued the directives necessary to slow down violence, although Peres did concede that the Israeli army overreacted. In the five days following the Peres-
Arafat meeting, news agencies reported that some 17 Palestinians had been killed and 150 wounded, and 11 Israelis wounded.

British foreign secretary Jack Straw's late-September visit to Israel was marred by comments Straw made in Tehran, on an earlier stop in his Middle East tour. Speaking in the Iranian capital, Straw issued a statement saying: "I understand that one of the factors that helps breed terrorism is the anger many people in this region feel at events over the years in Palestine." Prime Minister Sharon's office called Straw's remarks "one-sided" and "sympathetic to Palestinian terrorism," and canceled a planned meeting between Straw and the Israeli prime minister. Sharon, however, reinstated the meeting after a phone conversation with British prime minister Tony Blair. Blair's office said that no apologies were made for Straw; Sharon's office quoted Blair as telling the prime minister that Straw's statement did not reflect his own position, and urging Sharon to go ahead with the meeting.

During this period the Americans were building their antiterror coalition. Sharon and other Israeli leaders were disturbed that Israel had been tacitly excluded from the alliance, while Syria and Iran were apparently not being held accountable for their role in sponsoring terror in general, and terror attacks against Israel in particular. At a press conference in Tel Aviv on October 4, Sharon openly expressed his fear that Israel was being abandoned, raising eyebrows abroad and arousing some criticism at home. He called on the Western democracies "not to repeat the horrible error of 1938. The enlightened democracies of Europe decided to sacrifice Czechoslovakia in favor of a convenient temporary solution. Do not try to appease the Arabs on our backs. We are unable to accept that. Israel will not be Czechoslovakia. Israel will fight terrorism."

The comment brought a rare rebuke from the White House. Presidential spokesman Ari Fleischer called Sharon's remarks "unacceptable" and emphasized that President Bush "is an especially close friend of Israel." Furthermore, asserted Fleischer, "the United States would not do anything that would appease the Arabs at Israel's expense." Sharon backed down two days later. In a statement issued by his office, the prime minister expressed his "appreciation of the deep friendship and special relations between the United States and Israel, and especially George W. Bush." Sharon, the statement continued, "requested to forward his appreciation of the bold and courageous decision of the president to fight terrorism. Israel fully supports this position and cooperates with it." Secretary Powell proclaimed an end to the mini-crisis. "It's over," he said. "From time to time we'll have these little cloudbursts, but that does not
affect the strength of our relationship ... Israel has no better friend than the United States, and they know that we know that.”

On October 16, the prime minister said he would accept Palestinian statehood, but only under certain circumstances—which he said he would not disclose, lest that plan become the starting-point for future negotiations. Sharon’s office denied a report that his plan envisioned a staged process leading to a Palestinian state in several years and complete Israeli evacuation of the Gaza Strip. The office emphasized, again, that there would be no negotiations until the Mitchell recommendations were fully implemented.

The diplomatic process, at this point, appeared to be tilting in Arafat’s favor. The PA leader toured European capitals, garnering support for the establishment of a Palestinian state, according to the daily Ha'aretz, from prime ministers Tony Blair of Britain, Bertie Aherne of Ireland, and Wim Kok of the Netherlands. At the same time, 28 former top U.S. diplomats and foreign-policy officials who had expertise and experience in the Middle East—including former U.S. envoys to Israel Samuel Lewis, Thomas Pickering, and Edward Walker—wrote to Bush, urging him to act to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict “for a range of reasons, one of which is to prevent our enemies from using the conflict to continue their acts of horror against us.”

Israel came in for wide criticism after it moved soldiers into the outskirts of West Bank cities, in reaction to the October 18 assassination in Jerusalem of Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze’evi. After the troops moved in, Arafat met with the U.S. consul general in Jerusalem, Ronald Schlicher (whose post, because of its wide responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza, was called by some Israelis “ambassador to the Palestinians”), UN special envoy Terje Larsen, and European Union Mideast envoy Miguel Moratinos. Arafat wanted U.S. help in getting Israel to stop its military operation in the territories, and Schlicher and Larsen told him to take “immediate steps” against terror.

On October 22, State Department spokesman Philip Reeker said that the “Israel Defense Force should be withdrawn immediately from all Palestinian-controlled areas, and no further such incursions should be made.” Reeker also called on the PA to “do all in its power to halt violence, and to bring to justice the terrorists whose actions are betraying Palestinian interests.” The Americans also conveyed a message to Israel, via U.S. ambassador Dan Kurtzer, acknowledging that Israel has informed them that it did not intend to stay indefinitely in the West Bank positions it had recently taken. Sharon, for his part, indicated that the
troops would stay until the operation's objectives were achieved. A senior Israeli defense source told *Ha'aretz* that there is "no intention to withdraw from the Area A territories, because there are serious alerts about planned terrorist attacks from those Palestinian areas."

EU leaders visited Israel and the PA in mid-November in an attempt to get the Tenet-Mitchell process started. They were disappointed by Sharon, who stuck to his guns and resisted efforts to lift his demand for seven days of quiet before the start of a formal cease-fire. "In my meeting with the Americans," Sharon told a press conference following his talks, "it was agreed that seven days were needed to see whether Arafat implements the cease-fire... We are firm on what we agreed on with the Americans, that is our position and it is going to be our position in the future." Sharon added that diplomatic negotiations, as envisaged by Mitchell, should only take place after an absolute cessation of terror and incitement; a seven-day trial period for the cease-fire; a six-week cooling-off period; and, finally, confidence-building measures. (Peres, it was well known, was willing to dispense with the seven days of quiet provided that Arafat took credible action against terrorism.) The Europeans were not persuaded by Sharon; according to the usually reliable *Ha'aretz*, EU security chief Javier Solana, speaking to reporters after meeting with Sharon, called the insistence on seven days of quiet "stupidity."

Meanwhile, there were reports of internal difficulties on the Palestinian side. Continuing economic uncertainty brought on by the intifada, some feared, could cause the collapse of the PA, and the Israeli army was worried that this would trigger a wide-scale uprising along the lines of the first intifada of 1987—but with the use of arms. This was hardly the first time that stories about the PA's imminent demise had circulated. As early as February, PA officials had taken pains to divert blame for its problems, pointing out that many of its administrative and financial difficulties, were the direct result of Israeli policy, including the lack of freedom of movement and delays in Israel's transfer of tax revenues collected from Palestinians working in Israel. "Every day of siege costs the PA $10 million," the PA declared. "Israel must remove the siege immediately if it does not want to choke off the Palestinian Authority's economy."

Sharon, in November, spoke more and more openly against Arafat, contending that the PA head was no longer a partner for anything, not even a cease-fire, and charging that Arafat continually and consistently violated agreements. Though never suggesting that Israel would go so far as to eliminate Arafat, Sharon was reported to believe that Israel would be better off if the PA came under the control of security officials such
as Jibril Rajoub, the head of West Bank Preventive Security. Such men, in Sharon's opinion, were less tied to ideology, and their pragmatism would possibly enable them to strike a deal based on limited territorial compromise, while postponing, for now, the potentially deal-breaking issues of Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees' "right of return."

On November 26, the daily *Ha'aretz* reported that senior intelligence sources had told Sharon that Arafat did not appear to be part of a possible solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for a number of reasons. First, many people in the Palestinian political system were talking about a post-Arafat era. These intelligence sources, said the newspaper, recommended that Israel devote its attention to building contacts with the "next generation" of PA leaders. According to the report, senior Palestinian leadership, feeling that Arafat was leading them down a dead end after registering no political gains after more than a year of violence, complained openly to foreign diplomats and, indeed, to Arafat himself. A second threat to Arafat, Israeli intelligence believed, was the Palestinian "street," which was giving more support to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Third, Israeli military pressure had seriously damaged Arafat's ability to rule. And fourth, Europe was becoming disenchanted with Arafat, EU officials having discovered that the PA leader had lied to them.

Secretary Powell outlined U.S. Middle East policy in a long-awaited speech at the University of Louisville on November 19. He outlined a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while emphasizing the United States' "enduring and ironclad commitment to Israel's security." He called on the Palestinians to "end violence and prepare people for hard compromises ahead," and to make a "100-percent effort to end the violence and terror," including the arrest, prosecution, and punishment of those responsible. The secretary of state—who noted that he was speaking on the 24th anniversary of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat's historic November 1977 visit to Jerusalem, the precursor to the 1978 Camp David agreements and the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty—made the U.S. view on settlements in the territories equally clear, saying that they preempted peace efforts. Powell, therefore, called on Israel to end the occupation and allow the Palestinians to establish a "viable" state in which they might control their own lives.

**Zinni Mission**

Powell also announced that William Burns and retired U.S. Marine general Anthony Zinni would travel to the Middle East on a mediation
mission. The U.S. administration's hopes for Zinni were based largely on his reputation for toughness. But in Israel, there were misgivings about the general's lack of strategic vision about the Middle East and about his extensive past contacts with Arab countries. But, after a meeting with Edward Walker, former U.S. ambassador to Israel and assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs in the Clinton administration, the Israeli embassy in Washington sent back an optimistic report, according to Ha'aretz. The paper quoted the report as saying: "The fact that Zinni is close to Arab countries could help with a solution. His lack of information could be an opportunity for Israel to present its case." It also suggested that Zinni's inexperience in the conflict could be an advantage. Walker had reportedly said: "We had 15 years of people who knew every detail but they didn't lead anywhere. Maybe someone who comes from somewhere else can refresh the thinking and help reach a solution."

The difficulty of Zinni's task was accentuated a few hours before his arrival in Israel, when Sharon reiterated his insistence on seven days of quiet as a condition for the start of the six-week cooling-off period stipulated in the Mitchell Report. "Israel places great importance on reaching a cease-fire and will do everything it can in order to achieve this aim," said Sharon. "Israel is committed to the Tenet and Mitchell agreements. I hope that the [arrival] of General Zinni will further the process and hasten the start of the seven days of quiet that has been decided upon."

Sharon greeted Zinni personally, taking the envoy on a helicopter tour of the country, including—in addition to the West Bank and Gaza, Jerusalem, and the "seam" areas in the Sharon plain north of Tel Aviv—a visit to his wife Lily's grave at the family farm in the Negev. However Zinni's arrival was also greeted by a new wave of violence. In Gaza, a mortar attack killed an Israeli soldier, five Palestinian boys were killed by an Israeli booby-trap meant for Palestinians firing mortars, and a suicide bomber blew himself up; in the West Bank, meanwhile, the Israelis assassinated Muhammad Abu Hanud, the top Hamas military man there, also killing two of his deputies. Palestinians insisted that the targeting of Abu Hanud was a deliberate Israeli attempt to sabotage the Zinni mission even before it started. "I cannot forecast whether these [U.S.] efforts will succeed because Sharon is trying to drown these efforts in a sea of blood," Palestinian information minister Yasir Abd Rabbo told the Voice of Palestine radio. Other Palestinians suggested that Sharon ordered the hit on Abu Hanud to provoke Hamas into a revenge attack, placing Hamas in a quandary: a violent response would damage Arafat in the Zinni-Burns talks, but failure to respond would damage the organization's
prestige. On the Israeli side, Defense Minister Ben-Eliezer justified killing Abu Hanud. Since the Hamas leader had been planning further attacks, explained Ben-Eliezer, refraining from the assassination was "inconceivable," even on the eve of the U.S. peace mission.

Just before his own meetings with Zinni, Arafat told a press conference that he would expend "100-percent effort" to effect a cease-fire. Still, he told Zinni that he rejected Israel's demand for seven days of quiet before implementing the Tenet and Mitchell recommendations. According to senior PA officials, the Israelis were setting a trap for the Americans, since the demand for seven days of quiet—hardly realistic, in the eyes of the Palestinians—would surely sabotage the Zinni initiative. After meeting with Arafat in Ramallah, Zinni said that "both sides have suffered far too much in the last months."

Zinni was as horrified as the rest of the world by the double suicide bombing that took place December 1 on the Ben Yehuda pedestrian mall in central Jerusalem, in which 11 Israelis lost their lives. He stayed on in the region nonetheless, continuing to press for implementation of some kind of cease-fire. In mid-December, after Israel pledged not to take offensive action against Palestinians and only to open fire in self-defense, Zinni attended a joint security meeting in Jerusalem, where he asked Israel to hold off on punitive actions and demanded that the PA take a series of steps to thwart terrorism and round up suspects. Back in the U.S., meanwhile, President Bush expressed his disappointment with Arafat's record in fighting terror. During a meeting with officials of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Bush said, "The U.S. has incontrovertible information showing that Arafat has not arrested Hamas military leaders."

Zinni announced he would stay in the region for another 48 hours and meet with top security officials on both sides. Israel pledged to "act responsibly, and prevent escalation. We have absolutely no intention of acting in an unbridled way. We want Zinni to succeed, and it would be wrong for him to come across as being partisan. We won't provide the Palestinians with excuses not to act." But Israel reserved the right to act in immediate response to gunfire or other attacks on Israel targets, and to neutralize "human time bombs" who were on the way to carry out attacks against Israel. Jibril Rajoub, head of PA Preventive Security on the West Bank, accused Israel of breaking its promise already by attempting to assassinate Mohammed Sidr of the Islamic Jihad in Hebron, even though Sidr did not appear on the list of top terror suspects Israel had submitted to the PA.
In response, Israeli security officials complained that the PA had yet to demonstrate resolve in clamping down on terror. Most leading terror suspects, the Israelis noted, continued to roam freely in the territories, and even those suspects who were ostensibly arrested or detained were not being interrogated by the PA's security officers. While conceding a drop in the number of attacks in the territories and inside Israel proper, Israel insisted that this was due to PA political pressure on Hamas and Islamic Jihad to hold off while Zinni was in the region, and not to a crackdown on terror groups.

On December 3, Sharon delivered a speech to the nation blaming the wave of terror on Arafat. “He is directly responsible for everything that is happening—and he is the greatest obstacle to peace in the Middle East,” Sharon said. The terror acts, he added, were designed to “expel us from here. Their aim is to bring us to total despair, a loss of hope and a loss of the national vision which directs us. That won’t happen.”

On December 9, Israelis get a moral boost from the city that was victim to the world’s largest terror attack. Rudy Giuliani, still the mayor of New York, visited Israel together with his successor, Michael Bloomberg, and Governor George Pataki of New York State. The highlight of the trip was a stop at the impromptu memorial to the 11 victims of the December 1 Ben Yehuda mall double suicide bombing.

Whatever progress Zinni might have made came crashing down on December 12, when Palestinian gunmen attacked a bus at the entrance to the largely ultra-Orthodox town of Immanuel on the West Bank, killing ten Israelis. The killers first set a roadside bomb, and then fired with automatic weapons on rescue efforts. Israel responded by breaking off all ties with the PA, sending troops and tanks to lay siege to Palestinian towns, declaring Arafat “irrelevant” to peace efforts, destroying his personal helicopters at their hangar in Gaza, and denying him freedom of movement by moving troops close to Arafat’s headquarters in Ramallah.

Washington refrained from issuing its usual call for Israeli restraint, and Israel interpreted this as support for its position. According to U.S. press reports, Powell asked his European counterparts not to invite Arafat for state visits. Washington vetoed a pro-Palestinian resolution at the UN Security Council. The Americans also recalled Zinni to Washington for consultations, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher saying that Zinni would remain in contact with both sides, and eventually return. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer added that Zinni was never meant to stay in the region “forever.”

As Zinni left, Arafat, under intense international pressure, addressed
his people on Palestinian TV in Arabic, to mark the Muslim holiday of Id al-Fitr, the end of the holy month of Ramadan. He called on them to observe a cease-fire. "Today, I am reiterating my call for a comprehensive cessation to all the armed activities," Arafat declared from his office in Ramallah. "I call for a complete halt to all activities, especially the suicide attacks that we always condemn." Arafat also accused Sharon of declaring war on the Palestinian Authority. Appealing directly to the Israeli public, he said that the only way out of the crisis was to resume peace talks immediately and move toward a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza, with Jerusalem as its capital.

Israel greeted the statement with skepticism. Sources in Sharon's office said that Israel "is sick and tired of talk and false promises and will do what it must to protect its citizens and its existence." Foreign Minister Peres commented: "If the PA wants to exist, it must get out of the cycle of terror." Defense Minister Ben-Eliezer added: "It's nice to talk but the test is action. We've never seen Arafat really fight terror. The test will be real activity against terror."

Violence dropped off significantly thereafter, and Islamic groups pledged to refrain from suicide attacks inside Israel. But Israel continued to insist that such restraint was merely cosmetic, and that the PA had no intention of eschewing violence in the long run. The cease-fire call, according to Israeli sources, was merely a tactical move to reduce pressure on Arafat, as indicated by the sham nature of the PA's arrests—the detainees were allowed freedom of movement—and by the absence of any serious investigation or interrogation of master terrorists.

A YEAR OF BLOODSHED

Killings Continue

The first day of 2001 set the tone for what would be a bloody year. On January 1, Dr. Thabet Thabet, a pediatrician and leader of Yasir Arafat's Fatah movement, was killed by unidentified—but presumably Israeli—assassins near his home in Tul Karm. Local residents said that an Israeli helicopter hovered overhead as the killers pumped 14 bullets into the body of Thabet, who had been known in the past as an active supporter of the Oslo peace process. Members of Israel's Peace Now movement, who had met with Thabet on numerous occasions, expressed shock that Israel had targeted the physician for a selective killing.
A few days later, Prime Minister Barak justified the policy of assassinations—without reference to the Thabet killing—before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, saying that Israel had to fight terror by any means at its disposal. But committee chairman Dan Meridor, the former Likud finance and justice minister who helped form the Center Party before the 1999 elections, declared his opposition to such killings, arguing that the law did not allow harming anyone without due process and trial unless the person was in the process of carrying out a terror attack.

Also on January 1, a car bomb went off at about 7 p.m. at a busy intersection in downtown Netanya. Thirty-four Israelis were injured in the blast, which did serious damage to stores along the busy shopping street. Earlier in the day, two Palestinian gunmen were killed in a battle with Israeli forces near Tul Karm.

Meanwhile, the daily *Ha'aretz* reported that the families of 13 Israeli Arabs killed in clashes with police in early-October 2000 had each received $10,000 from Iraq, on orders of President Saddam Hussein. Earlier, the same families had gotten 20,000 shekels (about $5,000 at the time) from the Israeli Islamic movement.

On January 5, the army, responding to the Netanya car-bombing a few days earlier, tightened security in the Gaza Strip, effectively dividing the area into three sectors. Palestinians from the Gaza City area were not allowed to pass into the central area, and residents of the central area were blocked from passage either to Gaza City in the north, or to the Rafiah/Khan Yunis area at the southern end of PA territory. Security was also tightened in the West Bank.

Movement was somewhat eased a week later, in tandem with efforts to revive the peace talks. The army lifted its encirclement of Jenin, Qalqilya, and the western exit to Nablus, and ended its division of the Gaza Strip into three sectors. It also allowed the international crossings at the Allenby Bridge, near Jericho, and at Rafiah, at the southern end of the Gaza Strip, facing Sinai, to be reopened, and once again permitted the passage of Palestinian cargo through the Karni checkpoint at the northern end of the Gaza Strip. It also reinstated passes to Palestinian VIPs, allowing their holders to travel freely in the territories without the restrictions to which ordinary Palestinians were routinely subjected. Security contacts between the two sides resumed, but, according to Palestinian reports, not all Israeli troops were pulled back from positions they had taken since the outbreak of violence.

Though the atmosphere seemed somewhat improved, Israelis—and
the world—were horrified by the TV pictures of the public execution of two Palestinians convicted of collaboration with Israel. The men executed, over the weekend of January 12–13, were Alam Bani Odeh, in Nablus, and Majdi Mahawi, in Gaza. A firing squad wearing ski masks shot Bani Odeh to death at a square in central Nablus, as an estimated 5,000 spectators call out "Allahu akhbar" (God is great). Odeh was convicted of complicity in the fatal explosion of the car of his cousin, Hamas activist Ibrahim Bani Odeh, on November 23, 2000. According to the Palestinians, Alam Bani Odeh took his cousin's car for a few hours just prior to the blast, and turned it over to Israeli agents who planted the explosive in it. Mahawi was executed for allegedly setting a trap near Rafiah on December 22, 2000, for his cousin, Jamal Abd al-Razak of Hamas. In an Israeli attack on the taxi in which Abd al-Razak was riding, the Hamas man and three others were killed. The executions, and especially the public manner in which they were carried out, raised protests in Israel and other places; human-rights groups pointed out that the executions happened within days of the men's convictions, effectively denying them any right of appeal.

On January 14, Roni Tzalah, an Israeli, was kidnapped and murdered in the southern Gaza Strip. Shortly afterward, other Israelis living in Gaza rampaged through several nearby villages, burning cars and shops, uprooting trees, and destroying Palestinian greenhouses and irrigation equipment. Fatah Tanzim took responsibility for the Tzalah killing, as it did for the January 17 murder of Hisham Miki, 54, the head of Palestinian TV. Miki, a close associate of Yasir Arafat, was shot to death by masked gunmen as he sat over lunch in a Gaza seaside restaurant; his killers said the assassination was a blow against PA corruption.

Israel, suffering from conventional forms of terror, was horrified on the morning of January 18, when Palestinian security forces turned over the body of 16-year-old Ophir Rahum to Israel. Rahum had been lured to Jerusalem by a woman he met on the Internet who identified herself as "Sally" and promised to have sex with him. They arranged a meeting at the Jerusalem central bus station; from there she drove him to Ramallah and took him to two senior Fatah operatives, Hassan al-Kadi and Abdu Fatah Doleh, from the village of Beituniya, near Ramallah. The boy was shot to death in the car, with an AK-47 assault rifle. His body was temporarily buried, then turned over to Palestinian officials by local residents. Within a few days the Shin Bet, using records from the boy's computer and an Internet chat room, located Amana Muna, 25, who admitted her role, but first said that she and the others had planned only to kidnap the
boy. Brought before a court later, she declared herself proud of what she had done.

_Ha'aretz_ quoted two of Ophir's friends as saying that their pal had already met the woman once in Jerusalem, at the home of one of her friends. "Ophir was certain that she was a tourist. He had no idea she was an Arab. He described her as having black hair and being good looking, and was very excited that a woman in her 20s was interested in him. I am sure he was not aware of any danger. He trusted her because he had been with her in the past," one told the newspaper after Ophir's funeral.

On January 23, Israel was shocked again by the brutal, execution-style murder of two Israeli restarateurs, Motti Dayan, 27, and Etgar Zeituni, 34, who had gone to Tul Karm to buy flower pots for their Yuppies sushi bar on Tel Aviv's trendy Sheinkin Street. Accompanied by an Israeli Arab (who was later cleared of any involvement in the killings), they stopped to eat at the Abu Nidal restaurant in the PA-controlled town, and were grabbed by a group of masked men who drove them to a road near the Nur Shams refugee camp where they pushed the men out of the car and shot them in the head. The killers reportedly filmed the murder.

Tensions remained high throughout the period of the Israeli elections, with rioting and more violence after Sharon's victory. Israel continued its policy of targeted killings. On February 13, Mosoud Ayad, who, Israel said, was linked to Hezbollah and was responsible for a number of mortar attacks on Gaza Strip settlements, was killed by Israeli helicopters. And on February 19, Hamas operative Mahmoud Madani, who, Israel claimed, was responsible for two February 8 car bombs in Jerusalem's Me'ah She'arim ultra-Orthodox neighborhood, was shot by Israeli security units inside Nablus.

Terror took a new form on February 14, when Khalil Abu Qibeh, a Palestinian who worked legally ferrying laborers from Gaza to Israel, drove his bus into a crowd of soldiers and civilians at a bus stop near Holon. Eight people were killed.

Another potential kidnap-murder episode was avoided on March 25, when Arafat intervened to obtain the freedom of four Israelis, three of them Arabs and one of them a Jew, who were taken into custody by members of Arafat's Fatah movement in Tul Karm. The men were spotted as Israelis in the Tarboosh restaurant, and arrested. Arafat, informed of the incident, sent out Palestinian security forces to find the Israelis and make sure they were unharmed. They were returned to Israel several hours later. Israeli police said that "dozens" of criminal files had been opened in the preceding months against Israelis, Jewish and Arab, who violated the ban against entering PA-controlled Area A.
But, on March 26, another horrifying killing took place. Shalhevet Pas, ten months old, was shot to death by a Palestinian sniper. At the time of the shooting, the baby was being held by her mother near their home in Hebron’s Jewish Quarter, and the shots were fired from PA-controlled Abu Sneina, a hilltop neighborhood overlooking the Jewish Quarter. Settlers demanded that Israel move into Abu Sneina and “win the war against terrorism.” The Pas family delayed their daughter’s funeral beyond the traditional one day between death and burial, vowing that she would be put to rest only after the army conquered Abu Sneina. The hilltop was not taken, and Shalhevet was finally buried a week later, in Hebron’s ancient Jewish cemetery. Hebron settlers took out their anger by going on a rampage against Palestinian shops in the city, triggering gas-balloon explosions in several of them.

In response to mortar attacks on Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip, Israel sent tanks and bulldozers into the Khan Yunis refugee camp, at the southern end of the strip, on April 11. And on April 16, after mortar shells hit the outskirts of the Israeli development town of Sderot, east of the northern end of the strip, Israel temporarily took over PA land in the village of Beit Hanun. Israel withdrew its troops the next day, insisting that the operation was over—although Palestinians suggested that the pullback came only after pressure from the United States, whose secretary of state, Colin Powell, called the action “excessive and disproportionate.” A few days later, another similar raid took place in southern Gaza, where Israeli tanks moved in to destroy a Palestinian police post and then withdrew after a few hours.

On April 16, Israeli planes—responding to the April 14 killing of soldier Ehud Litvak by a Hezbollah rocket on the Lebanese border—bombed a Syrian radar station near Beirut. Three Syrian soldiers were killed in the attack, Israel’s first strike against Syrian forces in five years. Despite rising tensions, Jordanian foreign minister Abdul Illa al-Khatib came to Jerusalem for talks with Shimon Peres, his counterpart; Khatib was the first top Arab diplomat to visit Israel since Sharon took office.

The attack on the Syrian radar station reflected the Sharon government’s view that, despite the relatively lengthy pauses between Hezbollah actions against Israeli troops along the northern border, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah and others in the leadership of the Shi’ite Muslim organization had been operating on the assumption that Israel would not respond. The strike against Syrian targets was intended as a signal to Damascus, which was in de-facto control of Lebanon.

In response to Palestinian mortar fire on the Jerusalem neighborhood of Gilo, Israeli forces moved briefly into neighboring Beit Jalla on May
6. Israeli sources said that radical Palestinians, including the Tanzim militia of Arafat's Fatah movement, had been attacking from the mainly Christian town partly because of the impact an Israeli attack there would have on world opinion. Israel said it had planned the operation to take only a few hours, but Palestinians claimed that the area was a major battlefield, and they had lost one dead and 20 wounded in the fighting. There were no Israeli casualties. But exchanges of fire continued, and on May 14 seven Palestinians died and four Israelis were injured in shooting between Beit Jala and Gilo.

A day later, in response to a mortar attack, Israel shelled southern Gaza, killing a four-month-old baby; Sharon said that Israel “will make every effort to try and avoid tragic cases” in the future.

Violence continued through much of May. Two Israeli teenagers were brutally stoned to death just outside the settlement of Tekoa, near the historic Herodion fortress east of Bethlehem, on May 9. An Israeli raid near Ramallah on May 14 killed five Palestinian police officers; Palestinians said that four of the men were asleep when the Israeli attack took place, and Arafat accused Israel of “a dirty immoral operation.” Yasir Abd Rabbo, the PA's information minister, said the killing was “well-calculated and consistent with the policy of the Israeli army, to carry out assassinations and mass executions of Palestinian security forces and officials.” Israel explained that until just before the attack, the post had been used by Force 17, Arafat’s presidential guard, which had been involved in numerous terror attacks in the area, although Lt. Gen. Shaul Mofaz, Israel's chief of staff, admitted that the results of the operation were “not as intended.”

On May 15, Palestinians marked the 53rd anniversary of Israeli independence—or in their terms “al-Nakba” (the Disaster). In a day of rioting throughout the territories, Palestinians counted their casualties at four dead and over 2,000 injured.

After a Palestinian suicide bomb at a Netanya shopping center killed five Israelis on May 18, Israel struck back hard. The same day, it sent F-16 warplanes to drop heavy bombs on PA targets—most of them police posts already abandoned by the Palestinians, in anticipation of the imminent attacks. Twelve Palestinians, however, were killed.

The U.S. was far from pleased by Israel's use of American-made warplanes in this operation. On May 21, Powell called for an immediate, unconditional end to violence, and launched a more active role for the U.S. in efforts to bring about a cease-fire. Sharon announced that he had ordered Israeli troops to stop initiating actions against the Palestinians, but the terror organizations did not cooperate. The following week saw a rash
of bombings: a car bomb in Hadera injured 65, another car bomb just missed an army convoy in the Gaza Strip, four people were hurt when two car bombs went off in central Jerusalem, and yet another car bomb exploded in Netanya, injuring four. Not even Palestinian VIPs were spared the effects of tightened security—a car bomb hit the home of Jibril Rajoub, head of PA Preventive Security in the West Bank. Rajoub, who was in the house at the time, was not injured, but five of his aides suffered slight wounds. Defense Minister Ben-Eliezer said categorically, “I cannot imagine that any IDF commander would think of firing at Jibril Rajoub and his home.” The army explained that it was returing fire from the building; it knew that the house belonged to Rajoub, but he was not a target.

**Tel Aviv Dolphinarium**

On June 1, 21 people—most of them teenage immigrants from the former Soviet Union—were killed in a suicide bombing outside a disco at the Dolphinarium on the Tel Aviv seafront. Israel immediately sealed off the West Bank and Gaza, and Sharon convened an emergency cabinet meeting, but Israel did nothing. Responding to criticism of the army’s inaction, Sharon declared that restraint was also a display of strength. In the weeks after the Dolphinarium attack, security forces said they suspected that the nuts, bolts, and nails that were part of the bomber’s “package” might have been treated with bacteria in order to magnify the lethal effect, noting that infections from the Tel Aviv atrocity were 25 percent greater than what was normal in such cases. A 22nd person later died of his wounds.

On June 22, two Israeli soldiers were killed by a car bomb in the Gaza Strip. The men, Avi Izhak and Ofer Kit, had gone to help a Palestinian woman calling for help, and approached a jeep parked by the side of the road. The Hamas suicide bomber inside the vehicle then blew himself up.

Palestinian terror was not Israel’s only worry. On June 24, the daily *Ha'aretz*, quoting Mossad intelligence reports, suggested that the Al Qaeda organization of Osama bin Laden “may try to carry out a major attack on an Israeli embassy.” Security was tightened around Israeli legations in East Africa, where bin Laden forces bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Zambia in 1998; at the same time, Washington put its troops in the Persian Gulf on Delta-stage alert.

Israel continued its policy of targeted elimination of terror leaders. Osama Jawabreh, 29, of Fatah, nicknamed “Nanny,” was killed by an explosion at a public phone in Nablus. This killing was almost identical to
the elimination, in April, of Islamic Jihad military chief Iyad Hardan. The Shin Bet described Jawabreh as an explosives expert, and said he was building car bombs to be sent into Israeli cities. Because of the rash of attacks on the road, the army ordered settlers to travel in convoys on certain highways in the West Bank, or in cars protected against gunfire. Such a level of armor-plating for an ordinary automobile, according to Ha’aretz, cost 350,000 shekels (over $80,000).

In mid-June, Israeli Arab journalist Yusuf Samir, in his 60s, returned to Israeli territory after spending more than two months in PA custody. The Egyptian-born Samir—the father of popular Israeli singer Haya Samir—had vanished in Bethlehem on April 4, after a run-in with members of Yasir Arafat’s presidential guard. For the two months that Samir was missing, the PA had denied any knowledge of his whereabouts. But Samir now charged he had been held by PA security forces, who interrogated him and accused him of spying for Israel. He said that he had escaped from the place where he was held, in Bethlehem’s Duha neighborhood, when a guard fell asleep at his post, and managed to reach the Israeli army’s checkpoint at Rachel’s Tomb, on the outskirts of the city. Israeli sources, however, suggested that Samir’s escape had been staged by the PA, which had become embarrassed by the affair.

Attempted bombings continued intermittently. In late July, a car bomb went off prematurely, injuring no one, in a car park under an apartment building in Jerusalem’s Pisgat Ze’ev neighborhood, and another 7-kg. explosive device, hidden in a watermelon, was found in a bus near the city’s Malha shopping mall, and defused. Egged bus driver Menashe Nuriel pushed a potential suicide bomber out of his bus in the Jordan Valley on August 2. The next day, an alert security guard spotted a bomb planted in a detergent box at the Tel Aviv central bus station.

Eight soldiers and two civilians were lightly wounded on August 5, when Ali Ibrahim Joulani of East Jerusalem fired an automatic rifle at pedestrians outside the offices of the Defense Ministry, near the Azrieli Tower office complex in central Tel Aviv. After spraying the area with bullets, Joulani—who had a history of working with Israelis, no known terror links, and no criminal record—got into his car and apparently tried to escape. He was shot to death by a police officer on the scene.

Sbarro

On August 9, a Hamas suicide bomber blew himself up in the Sbarro pizza restaurant at the corner of King George Street and Jaffa Road in
downtown Jerusalem. Fifteen Israelis—including five members of one family—were killed in the blast. (In September, the Palestinian Authority closed down an exhibition by students at a-Najah University in Nablus, commemorating the month that had past since the Sbarro bombing. The “Sbarro Café Exhibition” included “body parts” from mannequins, and red paint, to indicate blood, was splashed on the walls. Another part of the exhibit paid tribute to the shaheed, or martyrs, who carried out suicide-bomb operations, including a depiction of one, as shown in videotapes taken by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, with a Koran in one hand and a AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifle in the other. According to one account, the display also showed a Palestinian crouched behind a rock, getting ready to pounce on a mannequin in the garb of an ultra-Orthodox Jew, as a taped recording, playing on the loudspeakers, called out: “Oh Believer. There is a Jewish man behind me. Come and kill him.”)

Despite heightened security precautions that had the police and the army on a constant state of high alert, suicide bombings continued. An Islamic Jihad attacker exploded his bomb on August 12 just outside the Wall Street coffee shop in the Haifa suburb of Kiryat Bialik, wounding 20 people. Had he triggered the explosive device inside the store, the toll would have undoubtedly been much higher. Israel responded by closing down a number of Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem—including Orient House, the PA headquarters in the city—and deployed F-16s to bomb the police headquarters in Ramallah. The Orient House closing drew wide criticism from the United States and Europe, and Palestinians described it as an escalation that would bring the intifada to the capital.

On August 16, a Palestinian cabdriver was killed north of Ramallah. As his cab was hit by stones, the cabbie lost control, and died in the crash. Police suspected that the taxi was hit by a rock thrown from an Israeli vehicle headed in the opposite direction, which was seen by passengers inside the taxi.

Israel security forces remained on a high state of alert, and numerous terror acts were stopped before the perpetrators could reach their intended targets. On August 16–17, for example, a police dragnet was set into motion after warnings of planned suicide bombings in the north of the country, perhaps in Haifa, Hadera, or Afula. Police stopped a suspicious car with two Palestinians in it outside the Israeli Arab village of Baka al-Garbiyeh and arrested two suspects. The car contained a 10-kg. explosive device, and the suspects said that one of them, who had worked in the Haifa area and knew Hebrew well, had planned to carry out a suicide terror attack at the City Hall nightclub on Shabtai Levy Street in
Haifa, which was hosting a large party for teenagers that night. Police and Shin Bet officials noted that Hamas and other radical Palestinian organizations had increasingly been targeting places of entertainment, particularly those frequented by young people.

Israel continued to respond to Palestinian attacks by moving into PA-controlled areas briefly in order to make arrests and destroy key firing positions. It began such an occupation of the Abu Sneina hill, overlooking the Jewish Quarter of Hebron, on August 22, and destroyed two positions used by snipers. Two days later, the Israeli forces withdrew.

The policy of "selective eliminations" netted its most important target yet on August 27, when two rockets fired from a helicopter hit the second-floor office of Abu Ali Mustafa, 63, the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The office was very close to the Ramallah headquarters of Yasir Arafat. Mustafa, the highest-ranking Palestinian killed in the current intifada, was sitting at his desk, and died instantly. While the Palestinians claimed that he was only a political leader, Israel believed he was personally responsible for the planning and execution of several terrorist attacks against Israel, including the dispatch of two car bombs (a PFLP specialty) to Jerusalem. Abu Ali Mustafa was actually the nom de guerre of Mustafa Zibri, who succeeded the Marxist-leaning PFLP's founder, George Habash, as secretary general of the group. He had returned to the West Bank in 1999, after 32 years in exile.

About a month after the Mustafa killing, the PFLP, the second-largest PLO faction after Arafat's Fatah, selected Ahmed Saadat as its new leader. Saadat, 48, a teacher of mathematics, had spent ten years in Israeli jails. He was considered a representative of the PFLP's "radical" wing, and in some quarters his selection was seen as pushing the PFLP toward more aggressive anti-Israeli actions.

In early September, the PFLP "responded" to the Mustafa assassination by setting off four car bombs in downtown Jerusalem; there were no serious injuries. Another attack in the same area of the capital by a Hamas suicide bomber dressed as an ultra-Orthodox Jew, on September 4, resulted in the wounding of 13 Israelis and a grisly scene, as the bomber's body parts were scattered over a wide area on Nevi'im Street near the Bikur Holim Hospital. The man appeared to be headed towards the main Jaffa Road-King George Street intersection (scene of the Sbarro pizzeria bombing less than a month earlier) when he was spotted by two border policemen, and when they approached him he blew himself up. One of the four people seriously wounded in the attack was one of the policemen, an Ethiopian immigrant.
Violence continued intermittently over the next month, with more terror attacks—including a suicide bombing at the Nahariya train station on September 9 carried out by an Israeli Arab from the Abu Snaan village near Acre, and a drive-by shooting on the West Bank. In response, Israel dispatched tanks and troops into Jenin, on the northern West Bank, and sent forces briefly into Ramallah and areas of the Gaza Strip.

On October 4, Palestinian gunmen firing from the hilltop Abu Sneina quarter (the same area from which the shots that killed baby Shalhevet Pas were fired) hit Sukkot holiday worshipers at Hebron’s Machpela Cave (Cave of the Patriarchs). The following day, Israeli troops moved into Abu Sneina and held the area for ten days before withdrawing. Seven Palestinians were reportedly killed in the fighting.

Ze’evi Assassination

On October 18, Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze’evi, a controversial figure from the far-right party National Union-Yisrael Beitenu, was shot to death by gunmen from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The shooting took place just outside the room on the eighth floor of the Jerusalem Hyatt Hotel where Ze’evi had spent his weekdays in Jerusalem for years. The minister had gone back to his room after an early breakfast to be interviewed on the phone; the gunmen were waiting for him in the corridor. Ze’evi’s body was discovered by his wife and constant companion, Ya’el. His funeral the following day was a show of strength by the right wing, with calls for stronger action against the PA. Two of the four men suspected of involvement in the killing were soon picked up by the Israelis. (About a month later, a Shin Bet report indicated that some of the responsibility for Ze’evi’s death rested on the minister himself, because he refused to accept security guards, maintained a regular schedule, and insisted on living in the Hyatt, although it was adjacent to Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. The report recommended adoption of a law requiring VIPs who have been assigned Shin Bet bodyguards to obey those security people, as was the case in other countries.)

Israel responded to the killing by moving its troops into six Palestinian towns. On the same day, Atef Abayat, a Fatah Tanzim leader whom Israel held responsible for several drive-by murders in the Bethlehem area, was killed by an explosion in his car. A week later, Abayat’s cousin and two other Palestinians accused of involvement in terror were killed in a similar blast. Israel continued its policy of targeted killings—the most prominent victim was Jamil Jadallah of Hamas in Hebron.
Israel pulled its forces out of Bethlehem on October 29. According to Palestinian claims, about 50 Palestinians were killed in intermittent fighting during the two-week incursion into PA-controlled Area A. Troops remained in place around other cities. Terror continued, however, virtually unabated in late November and early December— a shooting attack at the Afula market on November 27, a suicide bombing and a drive-by shooting on November 29, and two large-scale attacks: the December 1 double suicide bombing in Jerusalem's Ben Yehuda downtown pedestrian mall in which 11 Israelis died, and a December 2 suicide bus bomb in Haifa with 15 fatalities. Israel's response was surprisingly restrained, despite mounting pressure on Sharon.

On November 22, five Palestinian boys in Khan Yunis were killed when an Israeli boobytrap went off as they were on their way to school. The army at first denied there were any munitions in the area, and only on December 19 did it admit responsibility, adding that a series of operational errors were involved.

On November 23, Israel's policy of targeted killing netted Hamas master-terrorist Muhammad Abu Hanud, 34, of Asira al-Shamalieh, near Nablus. Two other top Hamas terror operatives were killed in the operation. Abu Hanud had been personally involved in a lengthy series of bombings directed against Israeli civilians, had taken part in the overall planning of Hamas operations in the West Bank, and, in the summer of 1997, had personally dispatched five suicide bombers. According to Israel, Abu Hanud had been a senior player in the planning of the August 9 Sbarro bombing in Jerusalem and the June 1 Dolphinarium attack in Tel Aviv, and the controller of a number of suicide bombers based in Tul Karm who were intercepted by Israeli security forces before reaching their targets. In August 2000, before the start of the intifada, three soldiers of Israel's elite Duvdevan antiterror unit were killed by friendly fire in a botched attempt to capture Abu Hanud at his home village (see AJYB 2001, p. 485).

In early December, the sheikh of the Al-Azhar mosque in Cairo—who, by virtue of his post, was one of the most influential religious authorities in the Muslim world—ruled that Islamic law did not authorize suicide attacks against innocent victims. That quickly drew a response from the mufti of Jerusalem, Sheikh Arameh Sabri, who charged that the sheik's religious ruling was brought about by outside pressure. "Those who do not have the courage to speak the truth should remain quiet," said Sabri, an appointee of PA head Arafat. "Resistance is legitimate and those who give their lives do not require permission from anyone." Sabri declared
that Muslims "must stand at the side and encourage" those who engage in jihad, holy war. And, in an interview with the international Arabic-language *Al-Hayat* newspaper, he responded to a question about attacking innocent Israeli civilians: "Who is civilian and who is military? There have been many more Palestinian civilians than fighters killed in the intifada. School children whose bodies were torn to pieces. Pregnant women who were prevented from reaching hospitals, where many times the mother and the child both died."

Israel reacted strongly to a December 12 Hamas attack at the entrance to the West Bank ultra-Orthodox town of Immanuel, where attackers planted a roadside bomb that crippled a bus and then fired on rescue efforts, killing ten people in all. Israel then launched heavy attacks on West Bank and Gaza targets and tightened its siege on West Bank cities—including moving tanks very close to Arafat's headquarters in Ramallah and restricting the PA boss's movements. Amid reports that Israel was seeking to push Arafat out, the cabinet declared the PA leader "irrelevant." Arafat, seeking to relieve growing military pressure from Israel and political pressure from the EU and the U.S., delivered a speech on December 16 on PA TV in Arabic, in which he called for an end to "armed activities" against Israel (see above, p. 545).

The call got a tepid response from Palestinians. Hamas indicated that it would hold off, for the time being, on attacks inside Israel; Islamic Jihad made no such commitment. Violence did seem to taper off—though Israel pointed out that it was still continuing at a lower level. There were more attacks in the territories. On December 24, for example, Vitaly Binus, 47, was driving along a road between Nablus and Tul Karm when he was attacked by three Fatah gunmen. Binus fought them off, but was seriously wounded. Before losing consciousness, though, he managed to shoot one of the attackers to death. Meanwhile, efforts to root out terrorists responsible for earlier murderous attacks continued. On December 24, the Shin Bet security service announced it had cracked the Hamas cell that carried out the December 2 Haifa bus bombing; the key suspects were two bomb-making brothers from Jenin.

Israel prevented Yasir Arafat from making his traditional Christmas Eve visit to Bethlehem, saying that it would allow the PA leader to make the trip of a few miles from Ramallah, north of Jerusalem, to Bethlehem, south of the city, only if the PA turned over the two PFLP killers of Tourism Minister Ze'evi who were still at large.

In a survey of its activity against Palestinian targets during 2001, the Israeli air force reported that its assault helicopters had fired 500 missiles
of various types, and that F-16 warplanes had dropped 80 bombs, the largest of which weighed one ton. The air force indicated that civilian casualties of its attacks had been relatively few (it did not give a number), but noted that despite the use of precision weapons, even the most minor mishap could lead to injuries and death for innocent civilians.

Police registered 1,794 terror acts on Israelis in 2001, compared to 410 in 2000. For the year, 208 people were killed and 1,523 injured. Police sappers defused 27 bombs in 2001, and nine terrorists were killed by police during terror strikes. Jerusalem suffered 90 attacks, the most of any city; these included 35 bombings and 28 incidents of gunfire.

**Israeli Victims of Terror Attacks, 2001**

January 14—The bullet-ridden body of Roni Tzalah, 32, of Kfar Yam in Gush Katif, is found near the Kfar Yam hothouses. Tzalah was apparently killed by Palestinians who worked on his farm.

January 17—The bullet-riddled body of Ophir Rahum, 16, of Ashkelon, is handed over to Israeli authorities. On the previous day, Rahum traveled to Jerusalem to meet a young woman with whom he had conducted a relationship over the Internet. She then drove him toward Ramallah. At a prearranged location, another vehicle drove up and three Palestinian gunmen inside shot Rahum more than 15 times. One terrorist drove off with Rahum’s body and dumped it, while the others fled in the second vehicle.

January 23—Motti Dayan, 27, and Etgar Zeituny, 34, cousins from Tel Aviv, are abducted from a restaurant in Tul Karm by masked Palestinian gunmen and executed.

January 25—Akiva Pashkos, 45, of Jerusalem, is shot dead in a terror attack near the Atarot industrial zone north of Jerusalem.

January 29—Arye Hershkowitz, 55, of Ofra, north of Ramallah in the West Bank, is killed by shots fired from a passing car near the Rama junction.

February 1—Dr. Shmuel Gillis, 42, a father of five from the settlement of Karmei Tzur, is killed by Palestinian gunmen who fire at his car near the Aroub refugee camp on the Jerusalem-Hebron highway. Lior Attiah, 23, of Afula is shot to death by terrorists while traveling near Jenin.

February 5—Sgt. Rujayah Salameh, 23, is killed by sniper fire near Rafiah at the southern end of the Gaza Strip.

February 11—Tzachi Sasson, 35, of Kibbutz Rosh Tzurim in Gush Etzion, is shot and killed by Palestinian gunmen while driving home from Jerusalem.
February 14—Simcha Shitrit, 30, of Rishon Lezion; Staff-Sgt. Ofir Magidish, 20, of Kiryat Malachi; Sgt. David Iluz, 21, of Kiryat Malachi; Sgt. Julie Weiner, 21, of Jerusalem; Sgt. Rachel Levi, 19, of Ashkelon; Sgt. Kochava Polanski, 19, of Ashkelon; Cpl. Alexander Manevich, 18, of Ashkelon; and Cpl. Yasmin Karisi, 18, of Ashkelon are killed when a bus driven by a Palestinian plows into a group of soldiers and civilians waiting at a bus stop near Holon, south of Tel Aviv. Another 25 people are injured in the attack.

February 26—The body of Mordechai Shefer, 55, of Kfar Sava, is found in an olive grove near Moshav Hagor. Investigators suspect terrorism.

March 1—Claude Knap, 29, of Tiberias is killed and nine people injured when a terrorist detonates a bomb in a Tel Aviv-to-Tiberias shared sherut (service) taxi at the Mei Ami junction in Wadi Ara, north of Tel Aviv.

March 4—Naftali Dean, 85, of Tel Mond; his niece, Shlomit Ziv, 58, of Netanya; and Yevgenya Malchin, 70, of Netanya are killed in a suicide bombing in downtown Netanya; 60 people are injured. Hamas claims responsibility.

March 19—Baruch Cohen, 59, of Efrat, dies when shots are fired at his car while he is driving to work in Jerusalem from his home in the Gush Etzion area. After being hit by bullets, he loses control of the car and collides with an oncoming truck.

March 26—Shalhevet Pas, ten months old, is killed by sniper fire, while being held by her mother, at the entrance to the Jewish Quarter in Hebron.

March 28—Eliran Rosenberg-Zayat, 15, of Givat Shmuel and Naftali Lanzkorn, 13, of Petah Tikva die in a suicide bombing at the Mifgash Hashalom ("Peace Stop") gas station several hundred meters from an IDF roadblock near the entrance to Qalqilya, east of Kfar Sava. The boys are on their way to a religious school in the West Bank. Four others are wounded in the attack, for which Hamas claims responsibility.

April 1—Reserve Staff Sgt. Ya'akov Krenschel, 23, of Nahariya, dies of wounds suffered in a firefight between army and Palestinian forces southeast of Nablus. Dina Guetta, 42, of Haifa, is stabbed to death on Ha'atzmaut Street; her murder turns out to be an initiation ceremony into a terrorist cell, which is apprehended in July.

April 2—Sgt. Danny Darai, 20, of Arad, is killed by a Palestinian sniper after completing guard duty at Rachel's Tomb at the entrance to Bethlehem.

April 21—The mutilated body of Stanislav Sandomirsky, 38, of Beit Shemesh, is found in the trunk of his car near a village north of Ra-
mallah. Sandomirsky vanished on his way home from Jerusalem to Beit Shemesh the previous night.

April 22 — Dr. Mario Goldin, 53, of Kfar Sava, dies when a Hamas terrorist detonates a powerful bomb at a bus stop on the corner of Weizman and Tchernichovsky streets in the city, north of Tel Aviv. About 60 people are injured.

April 28 — Shlomo Elmakias, 20, of Netanya, an off-duty soldier, dies, and four women passengers are wounded in a drive-by terrorist shooting attack on the Wadi Ara highway in the Galilee.

April 28 — Simcha Ron, 60, of Nahariya, is found stabbed to death in Kfar Ba'aneh, near Carmiel in the Galilee. The terrorists responsible are apprehended in July.

May 1 — Assaf Hershkowitz, 30, of Ofra, is killed when his vehicle overturns after being fired upon at a junction between Ofra and Beit El. The victim's father, Arye, was killed not far from the same place in January.

May 8 — Terrorists kill Arnaldo Agranionic, 48, at the Binyamin Farm, a lonely outpost where he lived, on an isolated hilltop east of Itamar in Samaria.

May 9 — Yossi Ish-Ran, 14, and Kobi Mandell, 14, both of Tekoa, are found stoned to death in a cave about 200 meters from the small settlement near Herodion, south of Jerusalem, where they lived.

May 10 — Constantin Straturula, 52, and Virgil Martinesc, 29, two Romanian citizens employed by an Israeli contractor, are killed in a bomb attack while repairing a vandalized fence at the Kissufim Crossing into the Gaza District.

May 15 — Idit Mizrahi, 20, of Rimonim, is fatally shot in an ambush as she, her father, and brother drive along the Alon Road in the West Bank on their way to a wedding. Terrorists fire 30 bullets, 19 of which hit the family's car.

May 18 — Tirza Polonsky, 66, of Moshav Kfar Haim; Miriam Waxman, 51, of Hadera; David Yarkoni, 53, of Netanya; Yulia Tratikova, 21, of Netanya; and Vladislav Sorokin, 34, of Netanya die in a suicide bombing at Hasharon Mall in the seaside city of Netanya. Over 100 others are wounded. Hamas claims responsibility.

May 18 — Lt. Yair Nebenzahl, 22, of Neve Tzuf is killed and his mother seriously wounded in a Palestinian roadside ambush north of Jerusalem.

May 23 — Asher Iluz, 33, of Modi'in dies in an ambush outside Ariel, where he was heading to supervise road paving.
May 25 — The burnt body of Yosef Alfasi, 50, of Rishon Lezion, is discovered near the West Bank city of Tul Karm.

May 29 — Gilad Zar, 41, of Itamar, dies in a terrorist ambush while driving in the West Bank between Kedumim and Yizhar. The Fatah Tanzim claim responsibility. Sarah Blaustein, 53, and Esther Alvan, 20, of Efrat, are killed in a drive-by shooting near Neve Daniel in the Etzion bloc south of Jerusalem.

May 31 — Zvi Shelef, 63, of Mevo Dotan, is the victim of a drive-by shooting attack north of Tul Karm. Shot in the head, he dies en route to the hospital.

June 1 — Marina Berkovizki, 17, of Tel Aviv; Roman Dezanshvili, 21, of Bat Yam; Ilya Gutmans, 19, of Bat Yam; Anya Kazachkov, 16, of Holon; Katherine Kastaniyada-Talkir, 15, of Ramat Gan; Aleksei Lupalu, 16, of Ukraine; Marianna Medvedenko, 16, of Tel Aviv; Irina Nepomneschi, 16, of Bat Yam; Yelena Nelimov, 18, of Tel Aviv; Yulia Nelimov, 16, of Tel Aviv; Raisa Nimrovsky, 15, of Netanya; Pvt. Diez (Dani) Normanov, 21, of Tel Aviv; Simona Rodin, 18, of Holon; Ori Shahar, 32, of Ramat Gan; Liana Sakiyan, 16, of Tel Aviv; Maria Tagilchev, 14, of Netanya; and Irena Usdachi, 18, of Holon die in a suicide bombing outside a disco near Tel Aviv's Dolphinarium along the seafront promenade just before midnight on Friday night. Sergei Pancheskov, 20, of Ukraine; Yael-Yulia Sklianik, 15, of Holon; Jan Bloom, 25, of Ramat Gan; and Yevgenia Dorfman, 15, of Bat Yam later die from their injuries. The explosion also wounds 120 people.

June 11 — Yehuda Shoham, aged 5 months, of Shilo in the West Bank, dies of injuries incurred on June 5, when he was critically injured by a rock thrown at the family's car near the settlement, north of Jerusalem.

June 12 — Father Georgios Tsibouktzakis, 34, a Greek Orthodox monk from the St. George Monastery in Wadi Kelt in the Judean desert, is shot and killed while driving on the Jerusalem-Ma'ale Adumim road, east of the capital. A week later, the Shin Bet security service arrests two members of Force 17, Arafat's presidential guard, who, it says, confess to the murder. According to the report, the killers—who mistook the monk for an Israeli because he was driving a car with yellow Israeli license plates—said they had obtained the weapons they used, two AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifles, from an aide to Tanzim militia head Marwan Barghouti.

June 14 — Lt. Col. Yehuda Edri, 45, of Ma'ale Adumim near Jerusalem is killed by a Palestinian informant for Israeli intelligence in a shooting attack on the Bethlehem bypass tunnel road connecting the Gush Etzion bloc with Jerusalem. One of his security guards is seriously injured.
June 18—Dan Yehuda, 35, of Homesh dies in a drive-by shooting between Homesh and Shavei Shomron, near Nablus. Doron Zisserman, 38, of Einav, is shot and killed in his car by sniper fire near the entrance to Einav, east of Tul Karm.

June 20—Ilya Krivitz, 62, of Homesh in Samaria, is shot to death at close range in an ambush in the Palestinian town of Silat a-Dahar, near his home.

June 22—Sgt. Aviv Iszak, 19, of Kfar Saba, and Sgt. Ofir Kit, 19, of Jerusalem, are killed in a suicide bombing near Dugit in the Gaza Strip, when a jeep with yellow Israeli license plates, supposedly stuck in the sand, blew up as they approached.

June 28—Ykaterina (Katya) Weintraub, 27, of Ganim in northern Samaria is killed and another woman injured by shots fired at the two-car convoy on the Jenin bypass road.

July 2—Aharon Obadyan, 41, of Zichron Ya’akov is shot to death near Baka al-Sharkia, north of the West Bank city of Tul Karm and close to the 1967 Green Line border, after shopping at the local market, which borders on the Israeli Arab town of Baka al-Gharbiiya.

July 2—The body of Yair Har-Sinai, 51, of Susiya in the Hebron hills, is found. He had been killed by shots to the head and chest.

July 4—Eliahu Na’aman, 32, of Petah Tikva, is shot at point-blank range just inside the Green Line frontier between Israel proper and the West Bank, at Sueika, near Tul Karm.

July 9—Capt. Shai Shalom Cohen, 22, of Pardes Hanna, is killed and another soldier is wounded when an explosive charge detonates beneath their jeep after they leave the Aduraim IDF base south of Hebron.

July 13—Yehezkel (Hezi) Mualem, 49, father of four from Kiryat Arba, is shot and killed between Kiryat Arba and Hebron. Mualem was at the spot to protest a shooting attack the previous day.

July 14—David Cohen, 28, of Betar Illit, dies of injuries sustained in a drive-by shooting in Kiryat Arba on July 12.

July 16—Cpl. Hanit Arami, 19, and Sgt. Avi Ben Harush, 20, both of Zichron Yaakov, are killed and 11 wounded, three seriously, when an Islamic Jihad suicide bomber explodes at a bus stop near the train station in Binyamina, halfway between Netanya and Haifa.

July 24—The body of Yuri Guschkin, 18, of Jerusalem, brutally murdered, bearing stab and gunfire wounds, is found in Ramallah. Guschkin, son of a family of new immigrants who lived in the northern Pisgat Ze’ev neighborhood, was lured to the area by Palestinians he met at a nightspot in downtown Jerusalem. In mid-August,
Nassar Abu Zeidah, the main suspect in the killing, is tracked down by a police unit and shot to death attempting to escape. He and three other Palestinians, according to the police account, got Guschkin drunk before kidnapping him.

July 26—Ronen Landau, 17, of Givat Ze'ev, northeast of Jerusalem, is shot and killed by Palestinian terrorists. The young man and a friend with whom he had gone to see a movie were being driven home by his father when the car was ambushed on the main road near Givon, just outside the capital.

August 5—Tehiya Bloomberg, 40, of Karnei Shomron, mother of five and five-months pregnant, dies when Palestinian gunmen open fire on the family vehicle between Alfei Menashe and Karnei Shomron in the West Bank, not far from Kfar Sava. Three people are seriously wounded, including her husband, Shimon, and daughter, Tzipi, 14.

August 6—Yitzhak Snir, 51, of Ra'anana, an Israeli diamond merchant, is shot dead in Amman, in the yard of the building where he kept a flat. His body is found the following morning. Jordanian authorities insist that Snir, who visited Jordan often, was killed for criminal motives.

August 7—Wael Ghanem, 32, an Israeli Arab from Taibeh, is shot and killed by Palestinian assailants on the road near the West Bank town of Qalqilya. Police believe the motive is suspected collaboration with Israeli authorities. Zohar Shurgi, 40, of Moshav Yafit in the Jordan Valley, is shot and killed by terrorists while driving home that evening on the Trans-Samaria Highway.

August 9—Giora Balash, 60, of Brazil; Zvika Golombek, 26, of Carmiel; Shoshana Yehudit Greenbaum, 31, of the U.S.; Tehila Maoz, 18, of Jerusalem; Frieda Mendelsohn, 62, of Jerusalem; Michal Raziel, 16, of Jerusalem; Malka Roth, 15, of Jerusalem; Mordechai Schijveschuurder, 43, of Neria; Tzira Schijveschuurder, 41, of Neria; Ra'aya Schijveschuurder, 14, of Neria; Avraham Yitzhak Schijveschuurder, 4, of Neria; Hemda Schijveschuurder, 2, of Neria; Lily Shimashvili, 33, of Jerusalem; Tamara Shimashvili, 8, of Jerusalem; and Yocheved Shoshan, 10, of Jerusalem are killed and about 130 injured in a suicide bombing at the Sbarro pizzeria on the corner of King George Street and Jaffa Road in the center of Jerusalem. Hamas and Islamic Jihad claim responsibility. On the same day, Aliza Malka, 17, a boarding student at Kibbutz Merav, is killed by terrorists in a drive-by shooting at the entrance to the kibbutz in the Gilboa region, west of Beit She'an. Three teenage girls who are with her in the car are injured, one seriously.

August 25—Maj. Gil Oz, 30, of Kfar Sava; St.-Sgt. Kobi Nir, 21, of Kfar Sava; and Sgt. Tzachi Grabli, 19, of Holon are killed and seven
soldiers wounded when two Palestinian terrorists infiltrate a stronghold base in Gush Katif in the Gaza Strip at about 3:00 a.m. The attackers, members of the PLO Fatah faction and of the Palestinian security forces, are killed by IDF soldiers. That evening a married couple, Sharon Ben-Shalom, 26, and Yaniv Ben-Shalom, 27, of Ofarim, are killed when Palestinian gunmen open fire on their car as they return home on the Jerusalem-Modi'in highway. Their children, aged one and two, are lightly wounded. Sharon's brother, Doron Sviri, 20, of Jerusalem, also wounded in the attack, dies the following day.

August 26—Dov Rosman, 58, of Netanya, is killed in a shooting attack shortly before 5 p.m. near the village of Zaita, on the Green Line between Israel and the West Bank not far from Kibbutz Magal. Rosman, a merchant, had gone to the spot to rendezvous with a Palestinian customer.

August 27—Meir Lixenberg, 38, of Itamar, father of five, is shot and killed by Palestinian terrorists from a roadside ambush while traveling between Har Bracha and Itamar, south of Nablus.

August 29—Oleg Sotnikov, 35, of Ashdod, a truck driver employed by Dor Energy, is killed in a shooting attack outside the Palestinian village of Kutchin, west of Nablus. Sotnikov drove his tanker truck into the area alone, after an escort failed to show up.

August 30—Amos Tajouri, 60, of Modi'in, is shot in the head at point-blank range by a masked gunman in the Arab village of Na'alin, while dining at a restaurant owned by close friends. According to Mursi Amira, owner of the restaurant, Tajouri had lent him money to open the establishment.

September 6—Lt. Erez Merhavi, 23, of Moshav Tarum, dies in an ambush shooting near Kibbutz Bahan, east of Hadera, while driving to a wedding. A female officer with him is seriously injured.

September 9—Yaakov Hatzav, 42, of Hamra in the Jordan Valley, Sima Franko, 24, of Beit She'an, a kindergarten teacher, and their driver are killed in a shooting attack 300 meters south of the Adam Junction in the Jordan Valley. They were in a minibus transporting teachers to the regional school when it was attacked by Palestinian terrorists. Later that day Dr. Yigal Goldstein, 47, of Jerusalem; Morel Derfler, 45, of Mevasseret Zion; and Sgt. Daniel Yifrah, 19, of Jerusalem are killed and some 90 injured, most of them lightly, in a suicide bombing near the Nahariya train station in northern Israel. The bomber is identified as coming from the nearby Israeli Arab village of Abu Snan.

September 11—Border Policemen Sgt. Tzachi David, 19, of Tel Aviv, and St.-Sgt. Andrei Zledkin, 26, of Carmiel, are killed when
Palestinian gunmen opened fire on the Ivtan Border Police base near Kibbutz Bachan in central Israel.

September 12—Ruth Shu’i, 46, of Alfei Menashe, is shot from a passing vehicle while on her way home at about 7:30 p.m., near the village of Habla near Qalqilya. Injured in the head and abdomen, she dies en route to Meir Hospital in Kfar Saba.

September 15—Meir Weisshaus, 23, of Jerusalem, is fatally shot late Saturday night in a drive-by shooting near the Ramat Shlomo ultra-Orthodox neighborhood on the Ramot-French Hill road in northern Jerusalem.

September 16—Sgt. David Gordukal, 23, of Upper Nazareth, dies in an exchange of fire south of Ramallah, during which five senior Palestinian terrorists are arrested and a number of Palestinian positions and a camp of Force 17, Yasir Arafat's presidential guard, are attacked.

September 20—Sarit Amrani, 26, of Nokdim, is killed and her husband Shai seriously wounded in a shooting attack near Tekoa, south of Bethlehem. The couple's three children, also traveling in the vehicle, are not injured.

September 24—Salit Sheetrit, 28, of Kibbutz Sde Eliyahu in the Jordan Valley, is killed in a drive-by shooting at Shadmot Mehola on the road through the Biq'a, the part of the Jordan Valley that is in the West Bank.

October 2—Cpl. Liron Harpaz, 19, of Alei Sinai, and Assaf Yitzhaki, 20, of Lod, are killed when Palestinian terrorists infiltrated the northern Gaza community of Alei Sinai, opening fire on residents and hurling grenades into homes. Fifteen others are wounded in the attack. Yitzhaki had come to the settlement to visit Harpaz, his girl friend.

October 4—Sgt. Tali Ben-Armon, 19, an off-duty woman soldier from Pardesia, Haim Ben-Ezra, 76, of Givat Hamoreh, and Sergei Freidin, 20, of Afula, die when a Palestinian terrorist in the uniform of an Israeli paratrooper opens fire on civilians at the central bus station in Afula. Thirteen other Israelis are wounded.

October 5—Hananya Ben-Avraham, 46, of Elad, is killed in a machine-gun ambush near Avnei Hefetz in central Israel.

October 7—Yair Mordechai, 43, of Kibbutz Sheluhot, is killed when a suicide terrorist detonates a large bomb strapped to his body near the entrance to the kibbutz in the Beit She’an Valley.

October 17—Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze’evi, 75, is assassinated by two shots to the head outside his room at the Jerusalem Hyatt
Hotel. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claims responsibility.

October 18—Lior Kaufman, 30, of Ramat Hasharon, is killed and two others are injured, one seriously, by shots fired at their jeep in the Judean desert, near the Mar Saba monastery.

October 28—St.-Sgt. Yaniv Levy, 22, of Zichron Yaakov, is killed by Palestinian terrorists in a drive-by machine-gun ambush near Kibbutz Metzer in northern Israel. The Tanzim wing of Arafat's Fatah faction claims responsibility.

October 28—Ayala Levy, 39, of Elyachin; Smadar Levy, 23, of Hadera; Lydia Marko, 63, of Givat Ada; and Sima Menachem, 30, of Zichron Yaakov, are killed when two terrorists armed with assault rifles and expanding bullets open fire, from a vehicle, on Israeli pedestrians at a crowded bus stop in downtown Hadera. About 40 are wounded, three critically.

November 2—St.-Sgt. Raz Mintz, 19, of Kiryat Motzkin, is shot to death at an IDF roadblock near Ofra, north of Ramallah.

November 4—Shoshana Ben-Yishai, 16, of Betar Illit, and Menashe (Meni) Regev, 14, of Jerusalem, are killed when a Palestinian terrorist opens fire with a submachine gun at the Egged 25 bus at the French Hill junction in northern Jerusalem. An additional 45 people are injured. The terrorist is killed by border police and uniformed officers stationed at the busy intersection.

November 6—Capt. (Res.) Eyal Sela, 39, of Moshav Nir Banim, is shot dead by three Palestinian terrorists on the southern Nablus bypass road.

November 9—Hadas Abutbul, 39, of Mevo Dotan in northern Samaria, is shot and killed by Palestinian terrorists as she drives home from work in nearby Shaked.

November 11—Aharon Ussishkin, 50, head of security at Moshav Kfar Hess, east of Netanya, is summoned to the entrance of the moshav to investigate a suspicious person. The man, a Palestinian, pulls a pistol and shoots Ussishkin to death.

November 24—Sgt. Barak Madmon, 26, of Holon, an IDF reservist, is killed by a mortar shell that lands in the soccer field of Kfar Darom in Gush Katif, while on his way to take up guard duty.

November 27—Noam Gozovsky, 23, of Moshav Ramat Zvi, and Michal Mor, 25, of Afula, are killed when two terrorists from the Jenin area open fire with AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifles on a crowd of people near the central bus station in Afula. Police officers and a reserve soldier kill the terrorists in the ensuing firefight. Another 50 people are injured, ten of them moderately to seriously.
November 27 — Etti Fahima, 45, of Netzer Hazani in the Gaza Strip, is killed and three others are injured when a Palestinian terrorist throws grenades and opens fire at a convoy on the road between the Kissufim crossing and Gush Katif in the Gaza Strip.

November 29 — Sgt. Yaron Pikholtz, 20, of Ramat Gan, is killed and a second soldier injured in a drive-by shooting on the Green Line, near the West Bank village of Baka el-Sharkiya. On the same day, Inbal Weiss, 22, of Zichron Ya’akov; Yehiav Elshad, 28, of Tel-Aviv; and Samuel Milshevsky, 45, of Kfar Sava, are killed and nine others wounded in a suicide bombing on an Egged 823 bus near the city of Hadera, en route from Nazereth to Tel Aviv.

December 1 — Assaf Avitan, 15, Michael Moshe Dahan, 21, Israel Ya’akov Danino, 17, Yosef El-Ezra, 18, Sgt. Nir Haftzadi, 19, Golan Turgeman, 15, Guy Vaknin, 19, and Moshe Yedid-Levy, all of Jerusalem, Yuri (Yoni) Korganov, 20, of Ma’alei Adumim, and Adam Weinstein, 14, of Givon Halhadasa, are killed and about 180 others injured — 17 seriously — in a double suicide bombing on the Ben-Yehuda mall in central Jerusalem. A car bomb designed to hamper rescue efforts explodes on nearby Rabbi Kook Street 20 minutes later. Ido Cohen, 17, of Jerusalem, fatally injured in the attack, dies of his wounds on December 8.

December 2 — Prof. Baruch Singer, 51, of Gedera, is killed when Palestinian gunmen open fire on his car near the northern Gaza settlement of Alei Sinai.

December 2 — Tatiana Borovik, 23, Mara Fishman, 51, Ina Frenkel, 60, Ronen Kahalon, 30, Samion Kalik, 64, Mark Khotimliansky, 75, Cecilia Kozamin, 76, Yelena Lomakin, 62, Yitzhak Ringel, 41, Rassim Safulin, 78, Leah Strick, 73, Faina Zabiogailu, 64, Mikhail Zaraisky, 71, Riki Hadad, 30, of Yokne’am, and Rosaria Reyes, 42, of the Philippines, are killed and 40 others injured in a suicide bombing on an Egged 16 bus in Haifa.

December 12 — Border Police chief warrant officer Yoel Bienenfeld, 35, of Moshav Tel Shahar, Avraham Nahman Nitzani, 17, of Betar Illit, Yair Amar, 13, Esther Avraham, 42, Moshe Gutman, 40, Yirmiyahu Salem, 48, Israel Sternberg, 46, all of Emmanuel, David Tzarfati, 38, of Ginot Shomron, and Hananya Tzarfati, 32, and Ya’akov Tzarfati, 64, of Kfar Saba, are killed when three terrorists attack a Dan 189 bus and several passenger cars with a roadside bomb, antitank grenades, and light arms fire near the entrance to Emmanuel in Samaria at 6 p.m. About 30 others are injured. Both Fatah and Hamas claim responsibility.

December 25 — Sgt. Michael Sitbon, 23, of Beit Shemesh, an IDF reserve soldier, is killed, and four other soldiers are injured in a shooting attack near the Jordanian border north of Beit She’an.
On the Trail of the Lynchers

The army and the Shin Bet security services announced on June 25 that they had recently arrested two Ramallah-area residents suspected of being among the ringleaders of the October 12, 2000, lynching of Israeli army reservists Vadim Nozich and Yossi Avrahami at the Ramallah police station (see AJYB 2001, p. 497). One of the detainees was Aziz Salha, 20, from the village of Dir Jarir, who was photographed waving his bloody hands from the second floor of the police station during the lynching. According to Israeli security sources, Salha said that, after rumors spread about two Israeli soldiers being held in the police station, a mob broke into the building. Salha and others had gone into the room where the soldiers were being held, and beat and choked one of them. When he saw that his hands were covered with blood, he went to the window to show the crowd below. The second key suspect, according to the army, was Muhammad Nuara, 18, a Fatah Tanzim activist from a village near Ramallah. Nuara said he had stabbed one of the soldiers. These arrests brought to 15 the number of suspects taken into custody in the lynching case. Israel said it would continue to hunt down all those who participated in the crime.

On April 15, Irina Nozich gave birth to a son in Netanya. The boy was named Vadim, after his father.

Har Dov Kidnap Victims

On October 7, 2000, three soldiers—Adi Avitan, Benny Avraham, and Omar Sueid—were kidnapped by Hezbollah at Har Dov on the northern border (see AJYB 2001, p. 484). On January 10, 2001, the special committee set up by the army to investigate the kidnapping exposed serious failures in the Northern Command leading up to the Hezbollah operation. The committee, headed by retired major general Yossi Peled, said that senior officers had correctly identified the Har Dov area as a potential trouble spot, but that operational changes, including movement in convoys of two vehicles, had never been identified. The report added that Hezbollah observers on the other side of the border fence had probably been able to determine that the kidnap spot was on the “seam” between the sectors controlled by two different IDF units, the Galilee
Brigade of paratroops and the Hermon Brigade of the Engineering Corps, in which the kidnapped soldiers served. In fact, the report added, the Hermon Brigade had actually simulated a kidnap attempt in an exercise during September 2000, but had never implemented the operational conclusions of that simulation. It also criticized the reaction time of IDF units, and said that the first rescue group arrived at the site fully 17 minutes after the detonation of the explosive device that Hezbollah used to injure the three soldiers at the start of the kidnap operation.

Over the course of the year, rumors circulated about a possible exchange of the boys for a group of Hezbollah prisoners in Israel, including long-time captives Sheikh Abdul Karam Obeid and Mustafa Dirani, who were being held by Israel as “bargaining cards” for a potential deal for the remains of three soldiers missing since the Lebanese war and for captured airman Ron Arad. In late January, in fact, reports in the Lebanese and Israeli press indicated that talks on a prisoner swap via a German intermediary were in a “decisive stage.” The newspaper owned by Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri said that the key was a “more receptive” attitude on the part of Israel, but Hezbollah denied a deal was in the making.

During the summer, Israel sought to view videotapes, taken by UN soldiers in the sector, that were said to shed light on some aspects of the kidnap. However the UN refused to hand over the tapes, arguing that to do so would, in effect, constitute taking sides in the conflict. In the end, Israel was allowed to send experts to view the tapes, one of which was said to include pictures of UN troops laughing in the aftermath of the kidnapping.

On November 11, Israeli army chief chaplain Rabbi Yisrael Weiss ruled that the kidnapped men were to be considered soldiers killed in action, whose place of burial was unknown. The chaplain announced his finding based on information provided by the defense establishment, and only after consulting with a number of prominent rabbis, including Chief Rabbis Yisrael Meir Lau and Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron, and Shas spiritual leader Rabbi Ovadia Yosef. The families of the three soldiers initially accepted the ruling. Shortly after the announcement, however, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader, continued to cast doubt on the fate of the soldiers. He said that Israel was to blame for the suffering of the Avitan, Avraham, and Sueid families for not acceding to his organization’s demands, and termed the Israeli announcement that the three men were dead “a game we refuse to play. Let them say what they want, it’s their business.”
A few days after the chief chaplain's statement, Defense Minister Ben-Eliezer, in an interview with Army Radio, cast some light on the kind of evidence the army had received, though he was not specific: "We received information, and the information was very tough. It left no doubt that the three boys were killed." Later in the interview, Ben-Eliezer said that "someone saw," but refused to add additional details when pressed by the interviewer.

**OR Commission Hearings**

Former prime minister Ehud Barak stayed clear of the controversy that erupted between top police officers and the cabinet minister responsible for them at hearings of the commission of inquiry formed to look into the death of 13 Israeli Arab citizens during rioting in early October 2000 (see AJYB 2001, pp. 504–05). The hearings of the commission, headed by Supreme Court Justice Theodor Or, continued intermittently throughout the year, and they were marred by violent attacks by relatives of some of those killed on some police officers involved in the killings. Because of the threat of violence, special security measures were taken to keep spectators and witnesses apart.

Barak, who testified in November, praised the police and refrained from placing blame on the top command. In his one day of testimony, Barak was not prepared to go into details about the riots. Instead, he focused on his government's policy and on an analysis of the events and the way they were handled. When asked to comment on the behavior of senior police officers, Barak avoided giving a direct answer, saying he preferred not to make definitive judgments regarding past events about which he had insufficient information.

The former prime minister denied suggestions that his government had not done enough to help Israel's one million Arab citizens. He also categorically rejected the idea that he should not have allowed Ariel Sharon, then leader of the opposition, to visit the Temple Mount on the eve of Rosh Hashanah 2000—the event generally considered to have triggered the new Palestinian intifada. Barak said intelligence reports had indicated that the visit would pass peacefully. Barak also did not feel that police had used excessive force in dispersing Muslim rioters on the Temple Mount on September 29, the day after the Sharon visit. "The rioters," he said, "are responsible for the riots as are those who incited them."

In his testimony, Shlomo Ben-Ami, who was internal security minister
in October 2000, struck back at senior police commanders who had accused him of inaction and of failure to support them. He also criticized the police for not reporting to their superiors. Ben-Ami attempted to explain away his own failure to launch a comprehensive investigation into the causes of the 13 deaths by saying that he had devoted all of his energies to bringing a halt to the deadly fire against Israeli citizens.

Ben-Ami blamed former national police chief Yehuda Wilk for failing to provide him, as the minister in charge, with vital reports during the course of the early-October 2000 disturbances, and said that Alik Ron, at the time the commander of the police in the Northern District, had disobeyed explicit orders from the political echelon. He said that Ron, Wilk, and others did not report to him on the deployment of marksmen from the special antiterror squad, and charged that Wilk had even denied that the sharpshooters had been called out. He added that, at Umm al-Fahm on October 2, Ron’s actions against demonstrators armed with slingshots was in direct contravention of a directive from the political echelon, which Wilk was supposed to have delivered to Ron.

Ben-Ami said that, when he had taken over as internal security minister, he had ordered the police to show restraint and sensitivity toward the Arab sector, and not to use either real or rubber bullets unless lives were actually in danger. Responding to criticism that he could not properly have handled the internal security job at the time because he was also serving as acting foreign minister and was thus deeply involved in negotiations with the Palestinians, Ben-Ami said that the jobs were interrelated, since foreign affairs actually helped him carry out his duties in the internal-security area.

Earlier, Ron had claimed that the police were unprepared for the rioting in the Israeli Arab sector, which broke out a few days after the first violence, involving Palestinians, on the Temple Mount. Ron admitted that “it was possible to foresee that the riots would take place,” but that “it fell upon us [the police] like a bolt out of the blue” because of lack of clarity in intelligence reports. The former Northern District police commander responded to accusations that his men had used excessive force by saying that over the past few years there had been a “horrible rise in the violence against policemen” due to a lack of police manpower. He charged that Israeli Arab MKs had inflamed citizens against the police, and that, in many mosques in the north, Muslim clerics had referred to slain Jews as “monkeys and pigs.”

Mayor Ramez Jerayssi of Nazareth, who testified in June, gave a dif-
ferent version of the police's relations with Israeli Arabs. He said Arab citizens saw the police presence in Nazareth and elsewhere as a provocation, an embodiment of Israeli authority, and that this raised tensions. “Every contact between police and [Arab] young people is like lighting a fire beside a barrel of explosives,” Jerayssi said. After Justice Or's comment that “perhaps an educational effort is needed to explain that police are there to maintain order,” Jerayssi said: “Maybe the police should change their method of operating in the field first.”

Much of the testimony at the hearing was extremely damaging to the police. Snipers from the special antiterror squad told the commission that senior commanders who were not on the scene authorized them to shoot live ammunition at youths armed with slingshots who were 40–70 meters away, during riots in Nazareth. At that range, police regulations only permitted the firing of rubber-coated projectiles. Members of the antiterror unit testified to the commission from behind a curtain, and were introduced to the panel by their initials rather than their first names, for their own protection. Other witnesses testified with a glass shield separating them from the audience. These procedures were instituted after the father of one of the Israeli Arab victims physically attacked Chief Superintendent Guy Reif, after the latter claimed that he had not fired directly at rioters, but had only shot into the ground, resulting in the wounding of one demonstrator. (Two youths had been killed in clashes at the Israeli Arab town of Sakhnin, where Reif was commanding the force at the time.) Reif got a bloody nose in the altercation, while other members of the audience hurled objects toward Reif, calling him a murderer. One woman fainted, and others began weeping hysterically.

Camp David Retrospective

While serving as acting foreign minister in 2000, Shlomo Ben-Ami had been a key Israeli participant in the American-brokered Camp David peace talks (see AJYB 2001, pp. 490–94), which ended in failure and were followed by the new Palestinian intifada. In the summer of 2001, around the first anniversary of Camp David, Ben-Ami was one of a number of Israelis who spoke out publicly about the reasons for the failure. In a lengthy interview with Ha'aretz, Ben-Ami insisted that the talks collapsed “because Arafat failed to put forward proposals of his own, and succeed in conveying to us that at some point his demands would have an end.” Ben-Ami contended that, at Camp David, Israel, unlike the
Palestinians, defined its vital interests concisely. “We didn’t expect to meet the Palestinians half way, and not even two-thirds of the way,” but, he said, Israel did expect there would be, at some point, a meeting of minds and a compromise. “The feeling was that they were constantly trying to drag us into some sort of black hole with more and more concessions, without it being at all clear where all the concessions were leading, what the finish line was.”

Ben-Ami noted that the method of negotiation, involving both top leaders—Barak and Arafat—all the time, was probably a mistake; it might have been better, he felt, to have the leaders just set the guidelines, and allow lower-level negotiators to do the work. But he denied that Prime Minister Barak was to blame for insisting on a “comprehensive” settlement—what some critics called an “all-or-nothing” or “take-it-or-leave-it” approach—in his dealings with Arafat. Ben-Ami recalled that on the final night at Camp David, before the meeting broke up, Israel offered a partial deal, and it was Arafat who refused: Ben-Ami said he suggested to Arafat that the discussions on Jerusalem be delayed for two years. “Not even two hours,’ Arafat said, waving two of his fingers.” “On the one hand,” Ben-Ami told Ha'aretz, “they weren’t ready to compromise on the core issues, certainly not on Jerusalem, but, on the other, they didn’t agree on a partial settlement either.”

Responding to allegations that Barak had humiliated the Palestinians and failed to show them respect, Ben-Ami conceded that Barak had a closed and introverted personality, was hard to like, and did not make emotional contact with others. To reinforce the point, Ben-Ami recalled one “warming-up” dinner hosted by Madeleine Albright, the U.S. secretary of state at the time, at which Barak sat “like a pillar of salt.” “But,” asked Ben-Ami, “does anyone really think that if Ehud Barak had been nicer to Arafat, that Arafat would have given up on the right of return? Or on the Temple Mount?”

There was no chemistry whatsoever between the two leaders, said Ben-Ami, and the personal coincided with the political—the summit was “an encounter between a person who was looking for a rational settlement and another person who talks and embodies myths. That encounter didn’t work, in retrospect I understand that it never could have worked.” In Ben-Ami’s view, no “rational Israeli leader” could have reached a settlement with Arafat at Camp David. “The man,” he said, speaking of the PA leader, “is simply not built that way.”
Palestinian Textbooks

The Civilian Administration in the West Bank and Gaza released a study, in November, on the new Palestinian textbooks that had been introduced in the territories over the past year. It found that the books, although somewhat more moderate than the Jordanian and Egyptian texts previously used, still taught hatred of Israel.

The textbooks used in PA schools, from elementary through high school, not only denied Israel’s right to exist and praised the struggle against it, but also contained anti-Semitic stereotypes. The books described Israel as “a country of gangs, born in crime,” called Zionism a racist movement and a “germ,” and explained that the 1993 Oslo Accords were not a move towards peace, but intended “to get the Palestine Liberation Army into the territories.” One text charged that Israel set fire to the Al-Aksa mosque in 1969 (this was actually done by a deranged Australian non-Jew, Dennis Michael Rohan) as part of the Zionist plan to take control of Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount), destroy the Muslim buildings there, and rebuild the Jewish Temple. Another text said that Zionism aspired to Judaize Palestine by expelling its Arab residents.

Indeed, the PA textbooks did not even discuss Israel as a state, but only in the context of issues such as the settlements, the use of natural resources, wars, and investigations. The books’ maps had no place called “Israel,” only a “Palestine” whose borders included present-day Israel. Some of the maps contained the Arab names of towns as they were called before the establishment of Israel. According to the textbooks, the Palestinian refugee camps were temporary quarters, until the residents could return to the places they were forced to abandon in 1948 and 1967.

Human Rights Abuses

The annual U.S. State Department report on human rights for 2000, issued in late-February 2001, accused both Israel and the Palestinian Authority of abuses. The report said that Israeli security bodies often used excessive force, in violation of their own rules, and condemned Israel’s “targeted killings” of those Palestinians that Israel said were planning attacks. The same report noted that PA forces frequently failed to prevent other armed Palestinians from firing on Israelis, in their presence, and had themselves been involved in attacks on, and clashes with, Israelis. In all, the report said, the record of the entire Middle East on human rights was poor, and it singled out Iraq for some of its harshest criticism.
Al Qaeda in Israel?

On February 22, Israeli authorites announced that they were holding Jihad Latif Shuman, 31, a British-Lebanese citizen also known as Gerard Shuman, in administrative detention. Shuman, according to an official government statement, had entered Israel, using his British passport, on December 31, 2000, and had stayed in two Jerusalem hotels. When he was arrested on January 5, his possessions included a yarmulke, a timer, a large amount of cash, and several cellphones. Shuman—a computer-science graduate of the American University in Beirut—told interrogators that his Hezbollah controllers had sent him from Lebanon to Britain, and had ordered him to leave his Lebanese passport at a “drop” there. He was told to rent an apartment and a voice-mailbox in London, obtain a cellphone, and use a travel agency that would take cash for a ticket to Israel. In Israel, he was told to speak only English and to dig up a dead drop in the Wadi Joz area of East Jerusalem, where he would also pick up other items. Shuman admitted that he had called his controllers in Lebanon with information about his stay in Israel. At his remand hearing before a judge, Shuman complained about mistreatment during his interrogation.

Shuman’s mission was strikingly similar to that of Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber” apprehended aboard a Paris-to-Miami flight early in 2002. Reid, it would turn out, was in Israel during the summer of 2001, reportedly conducting reconnaissance on possible Al Qaeda targets, and also visited Egypt.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Slowdown Continues

The downward trend of the Israeli economy, brought on primarily by the outbreak of large-scale violence beginning in late-September 2000, accelerated during all of 2001. The economy was also a victim of the global slowdown that had been felt for more than a year, but was exacerbated by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon on September 11.

The result was the worst year for the country’s economy since 1953, when the then-young State of Israel was preoccupied with the absorption of hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants from around the
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2001 was negative, at -0.5 percent, in striking contrast to the increase of 6.4 percent registered in 2000. Economists, though, were quick to point out that 2000’s GDP figure was deceptive, representing a brief period of rapid growth for the first nine months of the year; in fact, they noted, the general trend of the five years from 1996 to 2001 was recessionary.

But in fact the -0.5-percent figure for 2001 was deceptively positive. Since population during the year increased by 2.4 percent, per-capita GDP—the real test of an economy’s performance—actually declined by a cumulative 2.9 percent for the year, after rising by 3.6 percent in 2000. The business sector figure was even worse, declining by 2.1 percent after rising by a robust 8.5 percent the previous year.

If the year as a whole was bad, the fourth quarter was even worse. GDP fell by an annualized 7.2 percent in the fourth quarter of 2001, following drops of 4 percent in the third quarter and 3.5 percent in the second. Business product plummeted 11.8 percent in the fourth quarter, after falling 4.5 percent in the third quarter and 6.8 percent in the second. Business product fell steadily in all of the five quarters since the start of the violence in September 2000. Per-capita figures showed the same trend: GDP per capita fell an annualized 9.5 percent in the fourth quarter.

Another clear indicator of the state of the economy was the government’s deficit for 2001, which reached a record 21.3 billion shekels, 12.9 billion shekels more than the planned deficit of 8.4 billion and a stunning 4.6 percent of GDP. Accountant General Nir Gilad noted that 2.3 billion shekels of the deficit was illusory, the result of delay in the transfer of U.S. aid, which would later be incorporated into the 2001 figure. But even with the aid, the 19-billion shekel deficit was three times higher than planned, and 19 times the 1-billion shekel deficit recorded in 2000.

The 4.6-percent-of-GDP deficit should be compared with the government’s official target of 1.75 percent of GDP. Even with the U.S. aid added to the government’s 2001 revenues, the budget deficit still amounted to 4.1 percent of GDP, 2.3 times the target. The worsening of the deficit occurred mainly in the final quarter of 2001. It was due to a considerable fall in tax revenues and to excess government spending, partly because of the security situation.

Negative figures continued across the board. Investments were down 8.9 percent, after rising by 1.1 percent in 2000; exports, which had risen 23.9 percent in 2000 on the back of the high-tech industry, fell by 13.1 percent, as world markets for Israeli goods, particularly technology goods, were weak before the shocks of September 11, and got much
weaker still in the period of insecurity that followed. As domestic demand contracted, imports, which had risen by 1.2 percent in 2000, also declined, by 6.4 percent. Housing construction, another engine for economic growth in better times, declined by 15.8 percent.

Private consumption, which accounted for 64 percent of Israel's GDP, also slowed. In 2001 it grew by only 3.1 percent, compared to 6.6 percent in the preceding year. Public consumption, which constituted 30 percent of the GDP, grew at a similar rate, 3.2 percent. Both these factors, plus the relatively sharp decrease in imports, helped to moderate somewhat the recessionary pressures.

As an export-based economy with a small domestic market of just over 6 million souls, Israel inevitably suffered from the recession that affected the rest of the world. The global GDP growth figure of 0.8 percent, down from 2000's 4.7 percent, was one key indicator of the way the wind was blowing. Similar declines were felt in Israel's two key foreign markets: GDP growth in the United States, which had increased by 4.1 percent in 2000—the last of ten very fat years for the world's largest and most important economy—rose by only 1 percent, while European growth declined more moderately, from 3.5 percent in 2000 to 1.5 percent in 2001. Even Japan, which had been stuck in the depths of economic crisis for a decade, was affected, with GDP growth declining from a modest 1.5 percent in 2000 to only 0.6 percent in 2001.

As a consequence, exports of Israeli goods, which had grown in 2000 at a rate of 24 percent and were the key engine in that year's rapid growth, operated in the opposite direction in 2001, declining by 13 percent in real terms. The main factor, of course, was the slowdown around the world, and particularly in the United States. Technology exports, which accounted for 53 percent of all exports in 2000, declined by 10 percent. And yet, even despite the decline, exports were still 19 percent higher than they had been in 1999. Exports of services also fell by 23 percent in real terms, a result of the slowdown in sales of start-up companies, revenues from which fell by about half.

Revenues of the national Mifal Hapayis lottery rose by 6.38 percent to 2.97 billion shekels in 2001, but lottery officials had predicted an increase of 8 percent. Lottery sales slowed significantly in the second half of 2001, probably because of the worsening security situation, the slowing economy, and fear of terror attacks in crowded shopping malls and city centers, where many Mifal Hapayis stands were located.
Growing Deficit, Low Inflation

Israel's trade deficit grew 2.6 percent in 2001, from $6.9 billion in 2000 to $7.1 billion in 2001. Exports in 2001 were $25.7 billion as compared to $28.3 billion in 2000, a decline of $2.6 billion. Imports in 2001 totaled $32.7 billion, a decline of $2.5 billion from the figure of $35.2 billion in 2000. High-tech exports—77 percent of industrial exports—declined by $1.1 billion, while imports of raw materials (excluding diamonds and fuel) fell by $1.5 billion. Two-thirds of the decline in raw-material imports were in high-tech industries. The downward trend, evident during the entire year, was particularly evident in December, when the gap between imports and exports totaled $597 million, up 57 percent from November and 63 percent more than December 2000.

The high-tech slowdown was reflected in sharp staff cuts by dozens of companies—including some that had been industry leaders—and the closing of other firms. The most striking victim was Chromatis, a maker of digital data-transmission equipment, which closed down in August, a little more than a year after it had been purchased for a record price of $4.8 billion by Lucent, the U.S. telecommunications infrastructure firm. The main reason for the closing, according to Lucent, was the lack of customer demand for Chromatis-Lucent products.

The continuing contraction of the economy brought with it an unusually low rate of inflation. For the year, the Consumer Price Index (CPI), compiled by the Central Bureau of Statistics in Jerusalem, increased by only 1.4 percent, far below the "target" of 2.5–3.5 percent envisaged in the 2001 budget. In fact, 2001 was the third consecutive year in which the CPI fell below government expectations: in 1999 it rose by 1.3 percent (compared to a target of 4 percent), and in 2000, when the government built its budget on the expectation of a 3–4 percent inflation rate, it was unchanged.

The continuing gap between inflationary planning and actual inflation increased the pressure on the Bank of Israel and its governor, David Klein, to lower the interest rate. Through most of the year, Klein sought to cut the rate the central bank charged commercial banks in small increments, reducing it from 8.2 percent at the end of December 2000 to 5.8 percent in December 2001, while resisting pressure from manufacturers and some public figures for a major cut. (The gradual lowering of interest had actually been in progress since late 1998, when it stood at 13.5 percent. It was started by Prof. Jacob Frenkel, a World Bank economist who was Klein's predecessor as governor of the central bank.)

But on December 21, as part of a package deal in which the govern-
ment promised to trim its unpassed budget for 2002 by 6.15 billion shekels (about $1.5 billion), set a deficit target of 3 percent of GDP, and make certain adjustments in exchange-rate calculations, Klein agreed to trim a whopping 2 percent off interest, bringing the basic rate down to 3.8 percent from its previous 5.8 percent. The immediate reaction to the rate cut was predictable: a quick depreciation of the shekel, which reached about 6 percent before year's end and continued into January 2002, upward moves in the prices of local shares (these became more attractive investments as compared to the lower rates of interest on shekel deposits), and a decline in yields on the bond market, especially in short-term bonds linked to the CPI. At year's end, some economists were predicting a continuing rise in the shekel-dollar rate to levels of as much as 4.7 shekels to the U.S. dollar, representing a 10–12 percent depreciation in the Israeli currency. Such depreciation would, inevitably, raise the shekel prices of imported goods such as automobiles and consumer appliances, and increase the price of homes and housing rentals, which were traditionally calculated in dollars. On the other hand, the lowering of the value of the Israeli currency was a great boon to export-oriented industries, whose locally incurred costs, including infrastructure and labor, were sharply lower dollarwise, while their sales brought in a larger number of shekels.

**Uneasy Investors**

The lack of confidence of investors was reflected in figures released by the Ministry of Industry and Trade's Investment Center, which said that the grants it issued fell by 12 percent in 2001 to $1 billion, excluding a $239-million investment in a new factory built by Tower Semiconductor in Migdal Ha'emek. The number of requests for support, 658, was similar to the 2000 number, but 29.6 percent lower than the 1999 figure. The number of approved requests fell 10.6 percent, to 440, for investments totaling $1.2 billion, including the entrepreneur's matching portion.

Some 86 percent of the projects approved and 80 percent of the money handed out by the ministry's investment center went to companies in the electronics, electricity, software, machinery, chemicals, and plastics sectors, while the remainder went to traditional industries. Investments in "priority" enterprises, such as development towns in outlying areas and on Israel's borders, totaled $781 million, up from $638 million in 2000. The drop in investments, and even more in requested investments, signaled a wide-scale cutback in investors' plans to open new factories, and reflected pessimism about the future of the economy.

One of the few areas where there was substantial investment was in
companies dealing with mobile Internet technology, a field in which Israel was a world leader. During the year, $160 million was invested in 80 such companies, many of them start-ups.

At the same time, Israelis invested $5 billion overseas in 2001, compared with $9.9 billion in 2000. Since 1998, total direct foreign investment totaled $6.2 billion. Foreign investments by Israelis in shares traded on foreign stock exchanges totaled $3.5 billion over the same period.

But if investment provided some glimmer of optimism, most of the news was less hopeful. Industrial production, for example, which had grown by 10 percent in 2000, fell by 5.7 percent in 2001—the worst performance by Israeli industry since the first intifada in 1988–93. About 17,000 industrial workers were laid off in 2001. Trend figures showed that industrial production had been falling for 18 months, since the start of the global high-tech crisis, and that the political and security unrest locally merely exacerbated an existing trend.

Tourism in the Doldrums

The number of tourists to Israel fell dramatically, by 54 percent in 2001, as compared with 2000. The total number of tourists—1.218 million—was only 100,000 higher than the number that visited Israel in 1991, the year of the Gulf War, and was similar to the situation during the 1970s.

As in previous years, the United States provided the largest number of tourists, 266,000 entries, more than one-fifth of the total. However, the number of tourists from the United States was down 45 percent. Britain contributed 140,000 tourists, 12 percent of the total number and a drop of 30 percent from 2000. Other countries: France—129,000, down 36 percent; Germany—65,000, down 63 percent; and Russia—56,000, down 25 percent. Declines from some other countries were particular sharp, mainly from states where large numbers of people had accompanied Pope John Paul II on his visit to Israel in March 2000. Those included Italy, down 85 percent to 25,000, and Poland, down 69 percent to 13,000.

Tourist overnights in Israeli hotels dropped by 60 percent in 2001, the Hotel Association said. There were only 3.8 million tourist overnights during the year—the smallest number since 1970. And that figure meant that there were many more vacancies in 2001 than 30 years before, since Israel now had 46,000 hotel rooms as compared to 15,000 in the 1970s.

The hard-hit tourism industry took some solace in the fact that Israeli overnights for the year rose by 14 percent, to 11.3 million. But total overnights fell by 23 percent, compared to 2000. According to the Hotel
Association, occupancy rates were at a low ebb—only 43 percent of capacity nationwide. Even in 1991, the year of the Gulf War, occupancy for the year amounted to 53 percent of capacity. The situation was, of course, exacerbated by the creation of new hotel rooms over the past decade, in advance of the tourism boom that had been expected in the Millennium Year of 2000. Jerusalem hotels were particularly hard hit, with only a 23-percent occupancy rate in 2001.

Outbound tourism by Israelis, which had grown exponentially throughout the 1990s and into 2000, took a turn in the opposite direction in 2001, as per capita overseas travel fell by 1.3 percent. Though the number of excursions abroad, 3.56 million, represented a slight increase, 0.9 percent, over 2000, with the population growth of over 2 percent factored in, the average rate of foreign travel per Israeli declined. This was another effect of accelerating economic weakness, since the figure included not only Israelis traveling abroad for pleasure, but also Israelis on foreign business trips. Other figures confirmed the trend. The average overseas stay, 11 days, was shorter than in previous years: In 1997, traveling Israelis spent 12.5 days abroad, and in 1993 the figure was 17 days. Tourist exits to Egypt, including Taba, just across the border from Eilat, fell by 76 percent; total tourist exits to neighboring countries plummeted by 32 percent, from 576,000 in 2000 to 393,000 in 2001.

**Bright Spots**

Although 2001 was a very bad year for high-tech investment, two Israeli companies did manage to buck the negative trend. Indeed, those two firms, Versity and Given Imaging, were the only Israeli companies to conduct Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) on Wall Street in 2001. Versity, a developer of integrated circuits, raised $23 million in March 2001, but Given's task was much more difficult. The company, which had developed a miniaturized pill-sized camera and transmitter that is swallowed, and sends out pictures of the entire gastrointestinal tract, was due to offer its shares on the NASDAQ exchange in New York in mid-September; the offering, naturally, was delayed after the terror attacks. Given—whose adapted technology was developed at Rafael, Israel's government-owned arms-development authority, was the first company from anywhere to hold its IPO on Wall Street after 9/11. It raised $60 million.

Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), the government-owned aerospace firm, was another of the few companies that did well in 2001. In fact, IAI met its 2001 sales target, despite Israel's security situation and the slowdown
in global aviation that worsened following September 11. During the year, IAI signed $2.9 billion worth of new contracts—26 percent higher than company forecasts of $2.3 billion. IAI sales in 2000 totaled $2.2 billion. The cancellation of the sale to China of Phalcon early-warning airborne command-and-control posts in 2000, under heavy U.S. pressure, did not affect sales, IAI officials said—although the damages to be paid for calling off the $240-million sale had still to be determined at year's end. IAI reported increased sales of information-gathering systems and night-vision equipment, offsetting a decline in some other areas of operation such as maintenance of foreign aircraft. This diversification was a key part of IAI's long-term strategy to switch the balance of its sales more heavily towards the civilian sector and away from defense, IAI officials said.

During the year, Galaxy Aerospace, the maker of executive jets jointly owned by IAI and the Pritzker family of Chicago—owners of the Hyatt hotel chain—was sold to General Dynamics for $600 million.

Israel's defense exports totaled almost $2.6 billion in 2001, rising from $2.49 billion in 2000. The 2001 figure represented a record, since the only year with a higher defense export figure, 1997, included in its calculations the proceeds of the later-canceled sale of the Phalcon early-warning aircraft to China. In all, these exports represented more than two-thirds of the production of Israel's defense industries, which amounted to about $3.6 million, according to the Defense Ministry's sales division, known by its Hebrew acronym Sibat. According to Sibat's figures, Israel accounted for about 10 percent of the world's total defense exports of $25–$30 million.

Sales of electrical appliances in Israel rose sharply in 2001—refrigerators by 25 percent, video (or DVD) recorders by 32 percent, dishwashers by 16.5 percent, washing machines and air conditioners by 9 percent, and television sets by 4.5 percent. This happened despite the economic slowdown and security fears—or perhaps because of them. Some observers suggested that people were spending more time at home because they were afraid of going outside, and therefore needed more appliances. Another statistic supporting this hypothesis was that the sale of new cars dropped by 8.5 percent.
Israel by the Numbers

Israel’s population reached 6.4 million, 5.2 million of them—81 percent—Jews. This brought the Israeli share of the world Jewish population (of 13.25 million) to 38 percent (see below, pp. 000–00). The total population of Israel grew by 152,000 over the year, a growth rate of 2.4 percent—the Arab sector growing at a much higher rate of 4.6 percent.

Only 43,000 new immigrants arrived in Israel in 2001, the lowest figure since the start of the immigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU) in 1990, the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) reported. The 2000 figure had been 63,000, and the annual average in the late 1990s had been around 70,000. The drop was attributed not so much to the intifada violence, but more to the shrinking size of the Jewish community in the FSU, which was still the main source of newcomers—34,000 in 2001, 77 percent of the total. Since 1990, according to the CBS figures, 1.06 million people had immigrated to Israel, mostly from the FSU. That amounted to 37 percent of the total of 2.9 million people who immigrated to Israel since the founding of the state.

Of the states of the FSU, Ukraine supplied the most immigrants to Israel during the year, 14,000, as compared to 20,000 in 2000. Russia accounted for 11,000, down from 2000’s 19,000. There were 3,300 from Ethiopia, 1,400 from Argentina (up from 1,100 in 2000), 1,200 from the United States (unchanged from 2000), and 1,000 from France (also unchanged). Twenty percent of immigrants were 14 years old and younger, 9 percent were 65 and older. Though the overall immigration figure was the lowest in a decade, the CBS offered a note of consolation: 2001’s immigration was larger than the 15,000-a-year average for the 1980s, before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the massive inflow of immigrants from Russia, Ukraine, and the other ex-Soviet republics. In the 1980s, about 15 percent of the smaller overall total of immigrants came from Africa, principally Ethiopia, 29 percent from the Americas and Oceania, and only 19 percent originated in the Soviet Union.

Immigration had, in fact, declined steadily after a major spurt in 1990, when almost 200,000 newcomers came to Israel, and 1991, when the figure was 176,000. From 1992 onward, between 70,000 and 80,000 immigrants a year came to Israel in most years, the only exceptions being 1997, when there were 66,000, 1998, when the figure dropped to 56,000, and 2000.
A total of 9,419 Israeli couples divorced in 2001 as compared to 9,210 in 2000, an increase of 2.3 percent, according to Rabbi Eli Ben-Dahan, director of the rabbinic courts. This marked a reversal of the steady decline in divorce that had set in after the rate reached a high of 5 percent in the mid-1990s. Over that period there had been a drastic drop in the divorce rate on the West Bank—45 percent—but a rise in divorce in the country’s development towns.

Israelis appeared to be traveling on the roads less in 2001 because of the security situation, and the number of all traffic accidents declined by 12 percent for the year. However, the number of traffic fatalities rose by 8.3 percent, from 518 in 467 serious accidents in 2000, to 561 in 494 serious accidents in 2001. The number of people killed in traffic accidents now exceeded the number killed in Israel’s wars, according to police figures: Since 1948, there had been 21,586 traffic deaths and 20,729 military fatalities.

Crime increased in 2001, reversing the downward trend of 2000 and 1999. Murder was up 28 percent—from 135 cases in 2000 to 173 in 2001—and armed robbery rose 10.66 percent. Drug-related crimes rose by 4.7 percent. Increases were also recorded in car theft and home break-ins. But sexual offenses declined slightly. A total of 3,554 sex-offense files were opened, as compared to 4,057 in 2000, and the number of rape files opened dropped from 682 in 2000 to 658 in 2001—a decrease of 3.5 percent. Israel’s rate of stolen cars, 15 per 1,000, was the highest in the world, according to the National Insurance Union.

Absence without leave from the army increased by 30 percent in 2001, according to a report presented to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee by Brig. Gen. Uzi Lev-Tzur, the army’s ombudsman. Lev-Tzur said that most of the violators attributed their unauthorized absences to the financial situation of their families. At the same time, the ombudsman said that the number of complaints filed by soldiers about alleged humiliating treatment in the army had fallen by 15 percent, and complaints about improper medical treatment by 25 percent. There were, however, a high number of complaints about sleep deprivation, Lev-Tzur said, without providing figures.

Fuad Wins Labor Race

Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, 65, the minister of defense known universally as “Fuad,” was elected to the leadership of the Labor Party after a bitter four-month battle against Avraham Burg, 46, speaker of the Knesset, who was thought to be way ahead before the party primaries on Sep-
tember 4. However Burg showed only a tiny lead after the primary votes were counted, and, after extensive bickering and an exchange of charges, a revote was called in 51 polling stations where the result was disputed. Ben-Eliezer won most of the ballots cast in the December 26 revote, and that gave him a 2,000-vote victory (50.8 percent). Burg had termed the revote a "farce," and Labor members from the Druze and Arab communities announced that they would not participate. The Knesset speaker did not bother to campaign during the last week before the second vote, saying that he preferred devoting his time to his parliamentary duties. After the revote sealed his defeat, Burg commented, "For weeks we knew that the results were determined in advance."

With his election, Ben-Eliezer assumed the role of senior Labor minister in the government of national unity. "I intend to maintain Shimon Peres's place in the party and will not do anything to detract from his stature," he said. "But let me make it clear, from now on I am the senior minister in the party," he added. Baghdad-born Ben-Eliezer, who immigrated to Israel with his family at the age of 13, thus became the first Sephardi leader in the history of Labor, the party which, in its previous incarnation as Mapai, stretched back to the beginning of the State of Israel. "Until they told me yesterday, I thought I was an Israeli in every way," the new party leader said. "You can't take from me the fact that I was born in Iraq, or that my given name is Fuad."

The victory of Ben-Eliezer—an ex-general who once was military governor of the West Bank—meant that Labor was more likely to stay in the government than would have been the case under the dovish Burg. Still, there were those in the party who pressed for an early exit from the governing coalition, including Haim Ramon and Yossi Beilin, both of whom were widely viewed as strong candidates to succeed to the leadership of Labor. Ramon congratulated Ben-Eliezer in an Army Radio interview. "You have to admire him," Ramon said, "for starting a race in which he had almost no chance of winning and ending up as the Labor party chairman." Beilin, however, criticizing Ben-Eliezer for "overtaking Sharon from the right," called him only the "legal" but not the "legitimate" leader of Labor, and expressed the hope that someone else would be the party's candidate for prime minister in the next election.

**Temple Mount Excavations**

On January 21, Prime Minister Barak ordered police to stop excavation work on the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) by the Wakf, the Muslim religious trust in charge of administration of the Al-Aqsa Mosque
and the Dome of the Rock. Complaints about unauthorized digging there had been circulating for months, with Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein, the Antiquities Authority, and the Archeology Council all lodging protests. Right-wing groups and prominent archeologists charged that the digging had destroyed artifacts dating back to antiquity, and said that some significant pieces had been found amid the debris from the digging that was dumped by the Wakf in the Kidron Valley. The Wakf had not allowed any Jewish archeologists on the site since September 28, 2000, the day before the start of the new intifada.

Barak, who at first was reluctant to involve himself in this religiously and politically volatile matter, finally acted after the Council for the Prevention of the Destruction of Antiquities on the Temple Mount charged that the state was not doing enough to supervise activities on the site. Dr. Gabi Barkai, an archeologist, said, "Large-scale work—some of which was authorized, and most of which was not—has been carried out over the past months on the eastern section of the Temple Mount, along the eastern wall, between King Solomon's Stables and the Rahamim Gate, together with underground work in various other areas of the mount."

Press reports indicated that about 1,500 tons of earth, which may have contained unexamined archeological remnants, had been removed from the mount between the start of the new intifada in late September and Barak's order in January. In addition, the Shin Bet security service reportedly told Barak about the Wakf’s long-term plans to start using several parts of the mount, including the refurbished underground area known as King Solomon's Stables, as mosques. The Shin Bet also noted that paving and construction work had been performed at the area around the Mercy Gate. A few days after Barak’s order, Israel Radio reported that the Wakf had dug a tunnel between King Solomon's Stables and the underground remains of the ancient Al-Aqsa, equipped with electric lighting and an observation point at the Al-Aqsa end.

Yatom Disqualified

The Supreme Court, on December 27, disqualified Ehud Yatom, a former high official in the Shin Bet security service, from serving as the prime minister's chief adviser on terror. The ruling came after two Meretz MKs, opposition leader Yossi Sarid and Mossi Raz, former head of the Peace Now movement, challenged Yatom's appointment because of his involvement in the 1984 Bus 300 scandal, in which two Palestinian terrorists who had been captured alive were killed by the security agency. The Shin Bet later tried to cover up the killings and cast the blame on
Yitzhak Mordechai, then a high-ranking army officer. Yatom—who was pardoned by then-president Chaim Herzog before he could be indicted—admitted killing the two Palestinians, describing, in a 1996 interview, how he had crushed their heads with a rock.

After the Supreme Court ruling, Likud politician and Deputy Internal Security Minister Gideon Ezra, a former second-in-command of the Shin Bet, said the failure to appoint Yatom would have grave implications in the fight against terror. Yatom himself called it "a sad day for all the security services." Yatom—whose ex-general brother Danny Yatom had been a key aide to former prime minister Ehud Barak—had been disqualified from other high-level jobs because of his role in the Bus 300 scandal. In 1998, for example, when Dan Tichon, then speaker of the Knesset, wanted to make Yatom the chief of Knesset security, a legal opinion by Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein predicted that such an appointment would probably "meet with substantial legal obstacles if it is brought to judicial scrutiny."

Legacies of Violence

A law passed by the Knesset on December 19 barred the president from ever granting a pardon to anyone convicted of assassinat ing a prime minister. The vote was 63-5, with eight abstentions. The new statute meant that Yigal Amir, serving a life sentence for the 1995 assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, could never be pardoned for his crime. "I hope we have managed to put political assassinations behind us, and that the murder of a prime minister was a one-time happening," said Avshalom Vilan, MK from the left-wing Meretz Party, who sponsored the bill. Deputy Defense Minister Dalia Rabin-Pelosof, Rabin's daughter, said she hoped the law would help prevent other such murders. During the debate on the bill, several Labor MKs noted that President Moshe Katzav had made it clear that he did not favor the bill, on the grounds that it would limit presidential power. Katzav, though, said that his skeptical view of the bill had nothing to do with the Rabin case, and that he would never pardon Amir.

However, President Katzav triggered considerable controversy by deciding to free Margalit Har-Shefi, who, in 1999, was sentenced to nine months in prison for failing to tell the police that Yigal Amir had told her of his plan to assassinate Yitzhak Rabin. Katzav said that Har-Shefi, who, after going through a series of appeals, had entered prison on March 21, "has paid her debt to society and has been punished." Critics of the president's move included Rabin's daughter, Deputy Defense Minister
Rabin-Pelosof, and Justice Minister Meir Sheetrit—who nevertheless signed the pardon papers out of what he said was respect for the presidency. Har-Shefi, released from the Neve Tirza women’s prison on August 10, had served less than half of her sentence. Three weeks earlier, the parole board had denied her request for an early release, saying she had expressed no remorse. Har-Shefi had constantly maintained that she never believed Yigal Amir when he told her that he planned to kill Rabin, and that was why she had not gone to the police.

Before Har-Shefi went to jail, she had worked as a substitute teacher in the settlement of Psagot, not far from Ramallah. But on February 1, then-prime minister Barak, in his capacity as acting education minister, ordered her fired. Barak said he would not allow the education of Israeli children “to be placed in the hands of one implicated in the murder of Yitzhak Rabin.”

In 1993, Yoram Shkolnik fired shots from his Uzi into a Palestinian who had been captured and tied up after an incident in which the prisoner was said to have stabbed another settler at Ma’aleh Hever, a settlement in the South Hebron Hills. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. On February 18, 2001, Shkolnik, now 32 years old, was released after serving seven-and-a-half years, the Supreme Court upholding a decision of the parole board. A month earlier, the high court had stopped Shkolnik’s release hours before he was to be freed in order to hear an appeal from the state. Shkolnik’s sentence had previously been commuted to 11 years by former president Ezer Weizman.

Human-rights organizations protested Shkolnik’s release, as they had the light sentence meted out to another settler, Nahum Korman, a month earlier. Korman got six months of community service and a fine of 70,000 shekels ($17,000 at the time) for killing an 11-year-old Palestinian boy, Hilmi Shusha, in 1996, after a car was stoned.

Nazareth Mosque

In 1999, the Muslim majority in Nazareth—the city venerated by Christians as the birthplace of Jesus—began work on a new mosque adjacent to the Basilica of the Annunciation, where, Christian tradition had it, the Angel Gabriel visited Mary. Christian leaders, including the pope and the Vatican hierarchy, were upset, and Israel found itself in the unenviable position of having to offend either Muslims or Christians (see AJYB 2000, p. 474).

Excavation for the new mosque began on November 12, 2001, and the
Christian world exerted considerable pressure on Israel to bring it to a halt. On November 28, the leaders of all the Christian communities in Israel issued a statement warning “our Jewish friends” that construction of the mosque would have “destructive effects” on the Christian-Jewish dialogue. Undoubtedly acting under the direction of the Israeli government, the Regional Commission for Planning Regulation asked a Nazareth court to halt the excavation, and it did so on December 19, though few believed that this would put the controversy to rest.

**Charges, Investigations, Convictions**

**Campaign Laws**

In October, State Comptroller Eliezer Goldberg issued a report of his investigation into the financing of Ariel Sharon’s successful contest for the leadership of Likud in September 1999, when Benjamin Netanyahu resigned as leader after losing the election for prime minister, that summer, to Ehud Barak. Goldberg reported that Sharon, together with his son, Omri, had violated campaign laws by funneling some 5.9-million shekels through a dummy corporation, Anaex Research, established by Dov Weisglass, Ariel Sharon’s lawyer, and run by Omri Sharon. The funds were used for polling and to provide other services for the Sharon campaign.

In a letter to the comptroller on August 27, Ariel Sharon said that he had heard of Anaex “for the first time” in a preliminary draft of Goldberg’s report. However, according to a report on Israel’s Channel 2 TV in late September, during Goldberg’s questioning of the prime minister, Sharon was shown a 100,000-shekel check he had written and signed. Sharon admitted that he had signed the check, but told Goldberg that his son Omri handled all financial matters. Goldberg’s report said that Omri Sharon and Gavriel Manor, the figurehead CEO of Anaex, had declined to answer questions, “because they were concerned about self-incrimination,” with Omri Sharon adding that his refusal to answer was also “to avoid hurting others.” According to Goldberg, Omri Sharon’s lawyer, Dan Sheinman, insisted that the money had been spent to improve Ariel Sharon’s personal image and was therefore not covered by the law on campaign finance.

Ariel Sharon announced: “Since the comptroller’s report determined that these were illegal contributions, I intend to return the money to Anaex so it can be returned to its donors.” By mid-November he had returned 4.7 million shekels—$1.1 million at the time.
Speaking at a June 11 memorial marking a year since the death of Syrian president Hafez al-Assad, in Assad's birthplace of Kardaha, northeastern Syria, Israeli MK Azmi Bishara of the (Arab) Balad Party called on Arab countries to promote "resistance" against Israel. "After the Hezbollah victory," he said, referring to Israel's withdrawal the previous year from South Lebanon, "and after the failure of the Camp David Summit, Israel started to reduce this sphere of influence. Today, Israel puts forward a choice—either accept Israel's dictates, or full-scale war. There is no possibility of carrying on with a third alternative." Bishara attacked the Sharon government for bringing the Middle East to the point where "either Israel's program is accepted or the whole region goes to the brink of war."

Bishara was one of ten speakers at the memorial. Others included Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Lebanese president Émile Lahoud, Iranian vice president Hassan Habibi, and leaders of other militant and pro-Iranian groups. In his speech, Nasrallah vowed to return to the disputed Shebba farms area on the foothills of Mt. Hermon—which he still claimed as Lebanese, though the UN had determined it to have been part of Syria before its conquest in 1967 by Israel, and therefore not returnable to Lebanon—with "blood, jihad, and resistance." Ten days earlier, before going to Syria, Bishara was questioned by police about his role in facilitating the visits of Israeli citizens to Syria, an enemy country. Bishara called this investigation into his reported practice of helping Israeli Arabs visit Palestinians who had been living in Syria since 1948 "political persecution."

Reaction to Bishara's words was predictably intense. Likud MK Ze'ev Boim called on Internal Security Minister Uzi Landau to arrest Bishara on his return to Israel. Effi Oshaya, chairman of the Labor faction in the Knesset, urged Bishara to ask Syria to pay half his salary, explaining that even though the MK was an Israeli citizen and parliamentarian, he actually served Damascus. "Bishara's appearance with Nasrallah," Oshaya said, "shames the State of Israel and deepens the divide between Jews and Arabs in Israel," adding that Bishara "is spitting in the faces" of the families of three Israeli soldiers who were kidnapped by Hezbollah, "with Syrian support," in October 2000.

After the Knesset lifted Bishara's parliamentary immunity, the State Attorney's Office filed an indictment against him on November 11. The charge sheet, in Jerusalem District Court, alleged that he supported a ter-
Orist organization, and the office noted that it would, at some later time, also charge Bishara and his two parliamentary aides, Mussa Diab and Ashraf Kursham, with abetting illegal trips to Syria.

Yitzhak Mordechai

On March 21, a magistrate’s court in Jerusalem convicted Yitzhak Mordechai, a former defense and transport minister, of indecent assault on two women, and acquitted him of a similar charge against a third. Mordechai was found guilty of harassing a female army officer who worked for him when he headed the IDF’s Northern Command in 1992, and of harassing a Likud party activist at his home in Mevasseret Yerushalayim, outside Jerusalem, while he was defense minister in 1996. The evidence in the third case, in which the complainant was a clerk in the Tel Aviv office of the Transport Ministry, was not sufficient to warrant a conviction, the judges said. The court rejected Mordechai’s contention that the police investigation was flawed, adding that the defendant’s evasive behavior during the course of the investigation had damaged his credibility. In late November, the Jerusalem district court upheld Mordechai’s conviction. The former minister said, however, that he would carry his appeal to the Supreme Court. “I will do everything in my power to prove my innocence at the highest levels,” he said.

Ofer Nimrodi

Ofer Nimrodi, publisher of the daily Ma’ariv Hebrew newspaper, was convicted of fraud, obstruction of justice, falsifying corporate documents, and witness harassment by a Tel Aviv district court on October 24, and sentenced to 25 months in jail. Nimrodi was also fined 349,000 shekels (about $75,000) in a plea-bargain agreement. The jail term included ten months of a suspended sentence on his 1998 conviction for wiretapping, and 15 months on the later charges, which stemmed from Nimrodi’s behavior during the investigation of the earlier offense, when he ordered wiretaps of his newspaper competitors. The 15 months that Nimrodi had already been in police custody under a court remand order in the obstruction-of-justice case were to be counted against his sentence, so that—with the usual time off for good behavior—Nimrodi would serve only a few additional weeks in jail.
AVIGDOR KAHALANI

Avigdor Kahalani, the former internal-security minister, was cleared of three charges of obstructing justice, breach of trust, and breach of confidence by a Tel Aviv magistrate's court on March 20. Kahalani was accused of trying to find out if police were investigating Ofer Nimrodi, the Ma’ariv publisher, on charges of obstructing justice in a wiretap case (see above). Kahalani’s former chief of operations at the ministry, Yossi Levy, had already been convicted of negligence in the case, and, in a plea bargain, had been fined 30,000 shekels (about $7,500). Levy and Kahalani were said to have attempted, on Nimrodi’s request, to find out about the then-secret investigation. The judge in the case, Oded Elyagon, called the entire case “a trial balloon” that ended up with nothing more than “hot air.” The prosecution appealed Elyagon’s decision, but the Supreme Court turned it down later in the year.

AVIGDOR LIEBERMAN

Infrastructure Minister Avigdor Lieberman was ordered to pay fines totaling 17,500 shekels ($4,000 at the time), in a plea-bargain agreement accepted in Jerusalem magistrate’s court on September 25. Lieberman admitted striking one 12-year-old boy and threatening another after the two fought with Lieberman’s son in 1999, on the West Bank settlement where the Russian-born leader of the Yisrael Beitenu party lived.

SALAH TARIF

Police recommended in mid-July that Minister for Arab Affairs Salah Tarif, the first non-Jew ever to serve in an Israeli cabinet, be indicted for involvement in the bribery of an Interior Ministry official by a Palestinian man seeking Israeli citizenship. Police passed the file on to the State Attorney’s Office, saying there was sufficient evidence to charge Tarif, a Druze, with acting as an intermediary for Hosni Badran in contacts with Rafi Cohen, the former head of the Interior Ministry’s Population Registry Department. After meeting with Cohen in 1999, police said, Badran engaged in a fictitious marriage with a 22-year-old new immigrant.

“DERI LAW”

A bill permitting the parole of convicts who had served half their sentences, instead of the previous requirement that the criminal serve two-
thirds of the sentence, was approved in a 48-47 Knesset vote on February 13. An amendment sponsored by Shas made the law applicable to prisoners already serving their time in jail, so that it would apply to former party leader Arye Deri, serving a four-year sentence for bribery and other offenses (see AJYB 2000, pp. 476–77).

YEMENITE CHILDREN

In the early years of the state, an unknown number of children were taken from Yemenite families living in ma’abarot (immigrant transit camps). The parents were told that the children were in hospitals, and, later, that they had died. For decades, however, rumors circulated that the children had actually been adopted by by Ashkenazi families, and activists from the Yemenite community demanded to know the truth. Two official investigative commissions, one in the late 1960s and the other in the early 1990s, had found no evidence to support the allegation.

In 1995, yet a third commission was established after violent protests by the Mishkan Ohalim movement, led by Rabbi Uzi Meshulam. The Cohen-Kedmi Commission, over the course of almost seven years, heard testimony from 900 relatives of Yemenite children who disappeared from 1948 to 1954, in addition to 150 other witnesses, and unequivocally rejected claims of a plot by the “establishment” to turn the children over to Ashkenazi families. The commission report, published on November 4, said that there was adequate documentation for the deaths of 972 of 1,033 missing babies, five had been found to be alive, and the fate of the other 56 was unknown.

Yemenite activists, including families of some of the children who, the commission said, had died, denounced the decision and said that the real facts were still being covered up.

1997 MACCABIAH

A Tel Aviv district court rejected the appeal of five men convicted of involvement in the 1997 Maccabiah Games bridge collapse, in which four members of the Australian delegation to the “Jewish Olympics” lost their lives and 70 more were injured (see AJYB 1998, pp. 462–64). In its October 10 decision, the court said: “It was one of the worst civil disasters in Israel’s history. The negligence of the appellants is so great, so unmistakable, and so obvious. How did they have the gall to appeal their convictions and raise such infuriating contentions?”
The court added that the appellants—engineer Micha Bar-Ilan, sentenced to 21 months in prison; Yehoshua Ben-Ezra and Baruch Karagula, partners and managers of the Ben-Ezra–Karagula steel plant, sentenced to 15 months; Adam Mishori, general manager of Irgunit, which built the bridge, sentenced to nine months; and Maccabiah Games chairman Yoram Eyal, who got six months of community service—“behaved with gross negligence, abused the public’s trust, and were careless with the lives of thousands of Maccabiah participants, who marched on an unsafe bridge, several of them to their deaths. The appellants abandoned the Maccabiah participants and their families to disaster, and they should ask their grieving and injured brothers’ pardon and forgiveness for their criminal negligence, arrogance, and lack of attention.”

Earlier in the year, on February 11, Israel agreed to pay Australian Jewish athlete Sasha Elterman $4 million for injuries sustained in the bridge collapse. Elterman underwent nearly 40 operations after being hurt when the bridge, just outside the Ramat Gan National Stadium, collapsed into the polluted Yarkon River.

**Judaica Ring**

On April 3, police announced they had broken an international ring that had been stealing Judaica in Israel and selling it around the world. The investigation began in March, when some of the ten suspects in the case tried to sell Torah rimonim (ornaments) at an auction. Organizers of the auction suspected that the objects were stolen, and, later, police found hundreds of similar objects, worth millions of dollars, in the Jerusalem home of one of the suspects.

**Disasters**

**Air Sibir**

Air Sibir Flight 1812, on a routine weekly flight from Ben-Gurion International Airport to Novisibirsk on October 4, blew up about 185 kilometers from the Black Sea resort city of Sochi, roughly an hour after it took off. All those aboard—78 people, including 66 Israelis—were killed. Most of the passengers were new immigrants to Israel from Russia, who were going to visit relatives in the Siberian city; many of the others were Russians returning from paying similar visits to Israeli kin.
At first, a terror attack was suspected—Russian president Vladimir Putin publicly suggested as much—but there was also talk that the ten-year-old Tupolev plane had not been maintained properly. Taking no chances, authorities at Ben-Gurion put the airport on high alert, halting all outgoing flights for several hours as security teams rechecked all baggage. But within hours, U.S. Department of Defense sources, apparently basing their conclusions on U.S. satellites monitoring missile launches around the world, indicated that the midair explosion had been caused by a missile fired during joint Russian-Ukrainian military exercises near the Crimean peninsula, west of the crash site. However, the Ukrainians insisted that they had tracked every missile fired during their exercise and all were accounted for, adding that no missiles had been aimed in the direction of the airline.

The joint Russian-Ukrainian maneuvers were being conducted about 250 kilometers from the crash scene. After the initial denials, Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma fired Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk and his aides. Kuchma ordered a check of all Ukrainian missiles, banned new missile launches until the investigation was over, and promised that his country would pay compensation if it indeed were responsible. He said that Ukraine "will do everything necessary to soften the pain and suffering of the families." On October 13, Ukrainian officials confirmed that one of their country’s S-200 missiles had struck the place. Kuchma denied suggestions that his country had attempted to avoid responsibility for the tragedy. "We have tried to be as transparent as possible from the very beginning," he said, "and have taken all steps to ensure an efficient investigation."

Relatives of many of the Israeli citizens killed in the crash were flown to Sochi to witness the search. But few bodies were recovered. Housing Minister Natan Sharansky, himself an immigrant from the former Soviet Union, noted that the crash was the second harsh blow suffered by Israel’s million former Soviet citizens, after the June 1 Dolphinarium disco bombing, in which most of the 21 victims were of Russian origin. "It’s really difficult to describe. It’s a harsh blow to people who have been Israeli for just a few years and finally started to get absorbed in society, finally started to get accustomed to their new life," he said.

**Wedding Hall**

At least 23 people were killed on May 24, when the Versailles banquet hall, on the top floor of a three-story building in Jerusalem, collapsed.
Over 100 others were injured, many of them trapped in the rubble for hours until they could be rescued. Amid public outrage at the evident laxity in enforcing construction codes, the government established a formal commission of inquiry into building practices, and police interrogated ten people—including the architect who developed Pal-Kal, the system of ceiling support that was thought to be responsible for the collapse. Since the building had only minimal insurance, survivors and injured victims demanded that the government declare the collapse an official disaster, making them eligible for compensation.

**Religious and Secular**

The Tel Aviv city administration caused an uproar in late July when it decided that the law designed to force the closing of places of entertainment on Tisha B’Av (the fast day commemorating the destruction of the First and Second Temples in Jerusalem) applied only to “entertainment halls,” not cafés, restaurants, or bars. As a consequence, Tel Aviv mayor Ron Hulda’i instructed municipal inspectors not to issue fines to the proprietors of establishments which remained open on the day. Still, the mayor said he was not trying to make an ideological statement or to undermine the solemnity of the day, but was merely conforming to the legal realities as laid out by city’s legal counselor.

The decision had little actual impact on Tel Aviv, where eating places and bars had generally been open on this day of fasting and mourning. But it did trigger consternation and angry protests from Orthodox political circles. Rabbi Natan Elnatan of Shas, deputy mayor of Tel Aviv, threatened to cause a national coalition crisis if Prime Minister Sharon did not force Hulda’i to rescind his decision, and Interior Minister Eli Yishai of Shas ordered his ministry’s lawyers to check if the Tel Aviv action was really legal. Moderate Orthodox politicians chimed in as well. Deputy Foreign Minister Michael Melchior of the left-leaning Meimad Party (Modern Orthodox), said: “Apparently the Tel Aviv municipality does not think that the residents of the city need to know about the destruction of the Temple, about the Diaspora, and about the uprising. In its attitude, it is separating the city from the rest of the country.” On the other hand, MK Yossi Paritzky of the anticlerical Shinui Party praised the Tel Aviv mayor, who, he said, had proved “that Tel Aviv-Jaffa is a city that never sleeps, and is devoid of religious coercion.” He expressed hope that other mayors would follow Hulda’i’s example.
Sports

The Maccabi Tel Aviv basketball team won the championship of the European Suproleague on May 13, defeating Panatanaikos of Athens by 81-67 in the final. Almost 8,000 Israelis went to Paris to see the game, and tens of thousands of Israelis celebrated the victory in Tel Aviv’s Rabin Square.

Ariel Ze’evi won the 100-kg. gold medal at the European Judo Championships, on May 20. Ze’evi won the title by scoring an “ippon” (knockout) over Ghislain Lemeire of France in the final, which he reached by beating opponents from Ukraine, the Netherlands, and Georgia. Ze’evi had been Israel’s best hope for a medal at the 2000 Olympics in Sydney, but finished fifth.

Alexandr Averbukh won a silver medal in the men’s pole vault at the World Track and Field Championships held in Edmonton, Canada, in early August. Averbukh also won gold at the Russian winter track championships in February.

Other Israeli victories: Emil Sutovski, the Azerbaijan-born Israeli chess champ, the European individual chess championship in Macedonia in June; 470-class sailors Yogeg Yosef and Shafa Amir, the silver medal in the world junior yachting championships, held in Turkey in September; Gal Friedman, a bronze medal in the European windsurfing championships in Marseilles in September; Galit Chait and Sergei Sakhnovsky, silver medals in the Skate Canada competition in Saskatchewan; Matti Mazor, 12 years old, and Hod Dahari, 11, gold medals in swimming, yachting, and track, at the world championships for disabled children in Miami; Shahar Pe’er, 14 years old, the prestigious Orange Bowl junior girls title in the Key Biscayne, Florida, youth tennis tournament.

The 16th Maccabiah Games—known popularly as the Jewish Olympics, where Jewish athletes from all over the world compete—ended nine days of competition on July 23 with a ceremony at Sultan’s Pool in Jerusalem. The games themselves had appeared in danger, because of the security situation, until shortly before their opening on July 14 in Jerusalem’s Teddy Stadium. In the end, however, organizers said that 5,281 sportsmen and sportswomen from 43 countries took part in the competitions, including 1,300 from Israel. The largest foreign delegations came from the United States (387), Canada (300), Argentina (160), Brazil (115), and Russia (110). Although the level of competition may have been lower than anticipated because some outstanding athletes can-
celed their participation, organizers emphasized that holding the games under such circumstances was an emphatic affirmation of Jewish unity.

Addressing the closing ceremony, Prime Minister Sharon thanked the participants, saying, “You have shown great solidarity and great courage during hard days for Israel. There are hard days ahead, but no doubt we will win. I am sure you will be our best ambassadors around the world, and I hope that when you come back next time to participate, you will decide to settle here.”

Personalia

Honors and Awards

The 2001 Israel Prizes went to Prof. Aviezer Ravitzky of the Hebrew University (Jewish Thought); Prof. Gavriel Solomon of Haifa University and Prof. Ya’akov Rand of Bar-Ilan University (Education); Prof. Ruth Ben-Israel of Tel Aviv University and Prof. Yehoshua Weisman of the Hebrew University (Jurisprudence); Prof. Marcel Elyakim of the Hadassah-Hebrew University School of Medicine, Prof. Ruth Arnon of the Weizmann Institute, and Prof. Bracha Ramot of Tel Aviv University (Medicine); Profs. Yosef Imri and Shmuel Strieman of the Weizmann Institute (Physics); noted composer Zvi Avni, and Profs. Yehezkel Braun and Herzl Shmueli of Tel Aviv University (Music); wheelchair basketball star Baruch Hagai (Sport); and Abba Eban, Mordechai Ben-Porat, and Yitzhak Shamir (life’s work and special contribution to the society and the state). The Truman Peace Prize, awarded by the Hebrew University’s Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, went to Richard Holbrooke, former U.S. ambassador to the UN.

Appointments

Shlomo Aharonishky became Israel’s police commissioner, replacing Yehuda Wilk; Brig.-Gen. Suzy Yogev, previously the commander of Chen, the Women’s Army Corps, which had been disbanded as part of the army’s new recognition of women’s role in the military, was named adviser to the chief of staff on women’s issues; Majali Wahabe became the first member of the Druse sect to be director general of a government ministry when he assumed that role for the Ministry of Regional Cooperation in May; two judges, Edmond Levy, who presided at the murder
DEATHS

Diodoros I, 77, for two decades the Greek Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem, in January; Michael Elkins, 84, long-time Israel correspondent for the BBC and Newsweek and for the last decade ombudsman of the Jerusalem Report, who was the first to report Israel's stunning victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, in March; Doron Ashkenazi, 45, widower of the late pop singer Ofra Haza, of a cocaine overdose, in April; Yoram Bronowski, 52, translator, critic, and journalist at the Ha'aretz Hebrew-language daily, in April; Yossi Yadin, 81, veteran actor and founder of Tel Aviv's Cameri Theater, and brother of the late archeologist and deputy prime minister Yigael Yadin, in May; Walter Eytan, 90, veteran diplomat and the first director general of Israel's Foreign Ministry, in May; Faisal al-Husseini, 60, scion of a prominent Jerusalem Arab family and the PLO official responsible for Jerusalem affairs, in Kuwait, where he was representing the PA at a conference of Gulf States in May, buried on June 1 at Jerusalem's Al-Aqsa Mosque where thousands of Palestinians from the territories, waving PLO and PA flags, attended the funeral, without interference from Israeli security forces; Justice Dov Levin of the Supreme Court, 76, head of the Israeli council on traffic accidents, in June; Levi Ben-Avishai Ben-Pinhas, 82, high priest of the 700-strong Samaritan community, in June; Yehiel Dinur, 84, novelist who wrote in Hebrew about the Holocaust under the name K. Zetnik (pronounced Katzetnik), in August—when called as a witness at the 1961 trial of Adolf
Eichmann in Jerusalem, Dinur collapsed on the stand; Dudu Dotan, 53, popular Israeli comedian, actor, and author of children's books, while on a September vacation in Turkey; Gideon Lev-Ari, 65, noted radio newscaster and former head of the government-owned station, in October; Binyamin Ziegel, 79, founder of the Israel Police National Fraud Unit in 1974 and dogged investigator of several prominent white-collar criminals, in October; Alec Israel, 59, literary editor of the Jerusalem Post, in October; Rabbi Eliezer Menachem Schach, 103, head of the Ponevezh Yeshivah in Bnai Brak and acknowledged leader of the "Lithuanian," non-Hassidic ultra-Orthodox community, spiritual father of both the Sephardi Shas and Ashkenazi Degel Hatorah political parties, in November; Yigal Lev, 68, Ma'ariv journalist and former head of the National Journalists' Union, in November; Prof. Ya'akov Matzner, 54, dean of the Hebrew University Medical School, Prof. Amiram Eldor, 59, hematologist at Tel Aviv's Ichilov Hospital, and Avishai Berkman, 50, senior Tel Aviv municipal official, all in a November plane crash near Zurich; Reuven (Robbie) Shapira, 52, former African fishing magnate and owner of the Hapoel Haifa soccer club, by his own hand in Nigeria, over his failing business and heavy debts for the soccer club, in December.

HANAN SHER